Transforming Environments and Rehabilitation

A Guide for Practitioners in Forensic Settings and Criminal Justice

Geraldine Akerman, Adrian Needs, Claire Bainbridge, Geraldine Akerman, Adrian Needs, Claire Bainbridge

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781317338239
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

How can environments play a role in assisting and sustaining personal change in individuals incarcerated within the criminal justice system? Can a failure to address contextual issues reduce or undermine the effectiveness of clinical intervention? Bringing together a range of leading forensic psychologists, this book explores and illustrates inter-relationships between interventions and the environment in which they take place.

This book examines how the environment can be better utilised to contribute to processes of change and how therapeutic principles and practices can be more strongly embedded through being applied in supportive, facilitative environments. In addition, it expands on emerging conceptualisations of how psychological functioning and environmental context are inextricably linked and offers an alternative to prevailing intrapsychic or 'essentialist' views of areas such as personality and cognition.

Providing new and challenging insights and perspectives on issues of central relevance to forensic psychology and related disciplines, this book contributes to the development of innovative and unifying directions for research, practice and theory. This book will be an essential resource for those who work with or intend to work with offenders, particularly practitioners, researchers and students in the fields of psychology, criminology, psychiatry, psychotherapy and social work.

1


STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF HUMAN FUNCTIONING FOR FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY

Alethea Adair-Stantiall and Adrian Needs

Introduction

[A] very large part of the fundamental structure of nineteenth-century science was inappropriate or irrelevant to the problems and phenomena which confronted the biological and behavioural scientist.

– Bateson, 1972, p. 27

Since its inception in the late 19th century, the discipline of psychology has been aligned with the physical sciences. Conceptualisations of people and human behaviour have historically been reduced to constituent ‘parts’ in much the same way a scientist might analyse chemical compounds to get to an underlying structure. Through embracing the notion that psychological knowledge is akin to the subject matter of chemistry, physics or biology, we have come to ‘essentialise’ what we study, searching for the ‘true’ nature of the person and the significant enduring features of their functioning. Against this backdrop and the prevailing Western view of the individualised self, explanations centred upon factors and mechanisms ‘within’ the person have flourished and continue to dominate our thinking today at the expense of considering the role of context. Mesquita, Barrett, and Smith (2010) refer to this as the ‘essentialism error’ in psychology. They highlight the way in which experimental methodology, imported from the natural sciences, has contributed to a fragmented representation of the mind which views psychological phenomena such as personality traits, emotions and attitudes as separate from each other. Moreover, they argue that such methods have encouraged contextual influences to be thought of as potential sources of interference or ‘measurement error’ as opposed to the central aspect within which psychological processes are embedded and constituted (Barrett, Mesquita & Smith, 2010). Mesquita et al. (2010) present an impressive array of evidence for what they term “the context principle”, the idea that human behaviours and their associated thoughts, feelings and psychological states occur as a result of “multiple transactive processes”, which emerge from “moment-by-moment interaction with the environment” (Barrett et al., 2010, p. 5).

Context is inescapable (in the words of the Goon Show “everyone has to be somewhere”) but this very ubiquity may contribute to it being overlooked. This tendency has supported the continued construction and use of frameworks for understanding and changing behavior that are incomplete at best, even in settings (such as prisons) where the context is rather distinctive. Another reason for this neglect is that it leads to ways of thinking that are likely to be unfamiliar to many practitioners and researchers. After considering the complexities inherent in defining and conceptualising context, this chapter considers a range of reasons for our tendency to ‘decontextualise’ human behaviour and notes something of the history of alternatives to this. It then argues that dominant approaches to working with what used to be termed ‘offenders’ are themselves largely the result of research and evaluations that gave relatively little attention to contextual aspects or related issues such as process. The field of evaluation, meanwhile, has been developing an increasingly sophisticated awareness of the importance of context, process and the wider ‘systems’ in which these occur. It draws towards a close with a brief outline of concepts that have become established in the study of complex systems. These have in many cases eclipsed or replaced traditional approaches in the sciences that psychology has sought to emulate.

Some readers will recognise the respectful nod in the title of this chapter to Gregory Bateson’s (1972) collection of essays ‘Steps to an Ecology of Mind’. At this point we will invite the reader to consider Bateson’s question of where we may most usefully locate the boundary of a blind person’s mind. Does mind end with the skull or with the fingers that hold the white stick, or does it extend into the world through the stick? Similar questions from earlier authors might be asked (see Palmer, 2004): at what point does ingested food become part of an organism rather than part of its environment (Bentley, 1927), or in the case of a person with an artificial arm trying to repair an engine, is the arm part of the person or part of the machinery (Ashby, 1960)? Although these might sound like questions introduced into a conversation in a pub, their implications are far from trivial. The study of context, of relationships between person and environment, demands that we reflect carefully upon some of our most long held assumptions.

Defining context – stating the obvious?

Whilst everyday language (e.g. “let me put it in context”) and dictionary definitions of the word suggest that knowing ‘the context’ is important to understanding communication, there is a general consensus amongst researchers that precise definitions of the term remain elusive (Cohen & Siegel, 1991), if not impossible (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992). As Cohen and Siegel (1991) point out, accurately defining context is “like having a note taped to your back, you know it’s there, but it remains out of sight when you turn to view it” (p. 3). In their 2005 paper, ‘Understanding context before using it’, Bazire and Brezillon (2005) systematically examined 66 definitions of context across a number of academic disciplines. They highlight the confusion arising from the multiplicity of terms used synonymously to refer to context, such as ‘field’, ‘situation’, ‘environment’, ‘setting’ and ‘background’. Secondly, they note how difficulties arise due to the fact that defining context (somewhat ironically) depends on the context in which it is being used, both in terms of the discipline applying it and the goal of its use. The reported definitions are diverse and the range encompasses, for example, reference to surrounding environment, a shared goal, interaction between people, interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs, parts [preceding and following] of discourse that fix meaning, knowledge and beliefs, culture, ecology and community.

All these facets are relevant to a consideration of context. However, this multi-faceted reality of what Siegel and Cohen (1991) refer to as “fuzzy boundaries” leaves us struggling to articulate an unambiguous description of contexts even though intuitively, we know what they are (p. 313). They argue that this latter point (contexts as intuitive knowledge) is central to understanding the dilemma of context definition. They draw on the work of White (1983) to discuss two broad classifications of knowledge that humans have about the world: ‘grandmother knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’. The former comprises implicit information, or laypersons’ understanding about how the world works, akin to the kind of knowledge required to raise a child. It is gained through processes such as imitation and is passed down generations through informal education. In contrast, ‘scientific knowledge’ deals with tangible facts about the world. It can be rationally explained and is communicated through formal education (Siegel & Cohen, 1991). Our understanding of context, they argue, is an example of ‘grandmother knowledge’; intuitively we ‘get it’, but attempts to identify clear cut descriptions leave us struggling to articulate what we mean.

Nevertheless, this lack of a formal and complete definition, although unsettling, is perhaps as Goodwin and Duranti (1992) suggest, “not a situation that necessarily requires a remedy” (p. 2). That said, it is important to provide some clarity in our descriptions of concepts to avoid the risk of them becoming meaningless. With these points in mind, we will proceed by discussing some general principles relevant to a consideration of context.

Towards an understanding of context

The word ‘context’ originates from the Latin ‘contextus’, meaning to weave together (Oxford English Dictionary, OED; 2015). To weave also means to intertwine, suggesting that context refers to an intricate, mutually bound relationship between two or more entities (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992). Similarly, Houts (1991) states that “context is concerned with … part-whole relations, and with how structures composed of elements affect isolated parts of the structure” (p. 27). A contextual approach to understanding human behaviour is therefore inherently ecological, the underlying assumption being that we must attend to interactions between people and their environments. However, rather than proceeding with a “science as usual” approach that treats the individual and environment as separate ‘parts’ that influence each other, there is a need to appreciate the constant dynamic reciprocal interplay between person–context transactions which constitute situations and which themselves usefully comprise the unit of focus (Cohen & Siegel, 1991; Moen, Elder Jr, & Luscher, 1995). This approach is consistent with Kurt Lewin’s (1935) notion that behaviour results from an interaction between the person and their context at that moment in time (known famously through the equation B = f(PE)).

In addition to the above is the recognition highlighted previously that attending to context improves our understanding of the topic at hand. Indeed, the OED refers to context as the circumstances surrounding an event which contribute to it being fully understood and the parts of language or text which clarify its meaning. What is striking about this is the implication that in the absence of considering context, the phenomena under scrutiny (for our purposes, human behaviour), not only cannot be fully understood, but is stripped of meaning. As Schegloff (1993) suggests, by placing something in context, it is “accordingly … treated as transforming and correcting our understanding” (p. 193). In this sense, context is akin to Goffman’s (1974) notion of a discursive frame; it constitutes the components surrounding an idea or event that equips us to interpret ‘what is going on’.

These two principles of context, that it comprises mutually constitutive relationships between elements of ‘the whole’ and increases our ability to interpret information meaningfully, are relatively easy to grasp. However, the picture becomes more complicated when we consider, in relation to an analysis of human behaviour, the elements of context to be included and how to characterise the relationships between them.

The individual in context

The position adopted by Cohen and Siegel (1991) argues for the transactional, inseparable relationship between the person and context in accounting for human behaviour. In their discussion of the individual in context, Cohen and Siegel highlight the work of Rogoff (1982) who refers to this as the ‘contextual event perspective’, where person–context transactions are placed centre stage in our analyses, implicit within which is “a flavour of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts” (p. 10). Perhaps the notion of ‘an individual in context’ is conceptually misleading, invoking images of the person operating as a discrete entity ‘within’ but yet independent of a set of external influences collectively entitled ‘context’. It is possibly for this reason that Cohen and Siegel call attention to an integrated approach in contextually rich explanations of human behaviour. Individuals are not simply ‘influenced’ by context. Their development and behaviour is mutually constituted by the context in a continuously evolving dynamic ‘co-production’. Individuals and their associated ‘intra’ processes are pivotal, but they do not and cannot exist independently of the contexts in which that person has lived, continues to operate, selects or helps create (Kihlstrom, 2012). Even supposedly stable indices of variation such as neuroticism are susceptible to alteration as a result of exposure to life events (Jeronimus, Riese, Sanderman & Ormel, 2014).

Context as social system(s)

Cohen and Siegel (1991) provide a helpful framework for considering context in terms of social systems by drawing upon Urie Bronfenbrenner’s (1986, 1988) developmental theory. This highlights the importance of considering the impact of both proximal and distal social features in understanding behaviour. Although Bronfenbrenner’s work was originally developed to account for children’s development, his ideas have applicability across psychological disciplines and are relevant for considering context across the lifespan (Cassidy, 2013; Clausen, 1995). At the heart of his theory is the idea of a set of nested systems, which serve as an explanatory basis for how various proximal and distal social relationships might operate interdependently in both a direct and indirect way to influence a person’s experience and behaviour (Cassidy, 2013; Cohen & Siegel, 1991). His Ecological Systems Theory was later updated and entitled the Bioecological Model to account for the influence of biology on behaviour (Bronfenbrenner, 1995). A snapshot of the key concepts within the model is illustrated in Box 1.1.

Bronfenbrenner’s model represents an example of a systemic perspective in that it is concerned with the interconnection between the person and the various systems in which they are embedded and the communication between them. It is inherently relational and interactive, encouraging us to consider the person and their experience not just in their own right, but in terms of what they are a part of. Clarke and Crossland (1985) made a similar point, arguing that neglect of context in favour of the more familiar ‘taking apart’ of functioning can render action largely unintelligible. Whilst it is possible ‘objectively’ to measure the physical actions involved in a handshake with great precision and detail, this does little to clarify why the handshake was performed (for example as a greeting or parting, or to seal a bargain). Attempting to study part of a system without consideration of the system constrains understanding and can alter the character of both, as in removing a heart (Clarke & Crossland, 1985; also see Palmer, 2004). In his ecological approach to visual perception, Gibson (1979) coined the term ‘affordance’, referring to the notion that the external environment provides the opportunity (or ‘affords’) particular types of action. Crucially, this potential for action was not regarded as a property of either the person or the environment alone. In this regard, Van Geert (2003) pointed out that to someone who has learned to read, a book is more than just a physical object.

It is entirely consistent with such a view to consider the physical environment, or as it is often named, the ‘behaviour setting’, when accounting for context. Consideration of how one might behave in settings as diverse as a tube station, a football stadium, a prison, the post office queue and our own homes highlights how our immediate environment provides us with contextual information about the role(s) to adopt and the variations in behaviour that are possible or acceptable (Argyle, Furnham, & Graham, 1981; Cassidy, 2013). This latter point highlights the way that physical environments and their impact on behaviour cannot be separated from the social features of any situation, including the presence of implicit social norms. Ecological psychologist Roger Barker was a key figure in promoting a focus on an understanding of human behaviour in the environment (Barker, 1968, 1978). Although his work has been criticised for neglecting the person (Graesser & Magliano, 1991), Barker and colleagues have accumulated an impressive array of evidence demonstrating the power of behaviour settings in shapi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Foreword by Rex Haigh
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Steps to an ecology of human functioning for forensic psychology
• 2 The social context of transition and rehabilitation
• 3 Only connect: implications of social processes and contexts for understanding trauma
• 4 Trauma-informed care and ‘good lives’ in confinement: acknowledging and offsetting adverse impacts of chronic trauma and loss of liberty
• 5 A campaign for climate change: the role of therapeutic relationships within a climate of control
• 6 The importance of personal safety to therapeutic outcome in the prison setting
• 7 Rehabilitating offenders: the enabling environment of forensic therapeutic communities
• 8 Creating a therapeutic community from scratch: where do we start?
• 9 Psychologically informed planned environments: a new optimism for criminal justice provision?
• 10 Democratisation, disability and defence mechanisms: reality confrontation in Rampton
• 11 Relationships, social context and personal change: the role of therapeutic communities
• 12 Wearing two hats: working therapeutically as a discipline prison officer
• 13 The Enabling Environments Award as a transformative process
• 14 Creating an Enabling Environment in high security prison conditions: an impossible task or the start of a revolution?
• 15 Establishing Enabling Environment principles with young adult males in a custodial setting
• 16 The heart and soul of the transforming environment: how a values-driven ethos sustains a therapeutic community for sexual offenders
• 17 The role of environmental factors in effective gender-responsive programming for women in the United States: current status and future directions
• 18 Contextual influences in prison-based psychological risk assessment: problems and solutions
• 19 The importance of organisational factors in transferring the principles of effective intervention to offender rehabilitation in the real world
• 20 Nidotherapy: a systematic environmental therapy
• Index