If youâve read the module on the nature of language, you know that linguists define language as some kind of underlying mental representation that is implicit and abstract in nature. As underlying mental representation, language consists of constraints on the properties of a linguistic system such that a speaker knows not just what is possible in a given language but also what is impossible. For example, the English speaker knows that Does Bill drink vodka? is possible in English and that Drinks Bill vodka? is not possible in English, while the Spanish speaker knows that the equivalent of Drinks Bill vodka? is possible in Spanish but not the equivalent of Does Bill drink vodka? Neither the English speaker nor the Spanish speaker knows why the versions of the sentences just presented are impossible in each of their languages; they only know that they arenât. This is what makes mental representation of language implicit. What makes this representation abstract is the subject of formal linguistic inquiry, and if the reader is interested, there is some discussion in the module on the nature of language. The point to underscore here is that this mental representation does not resemble the types of rules found in textbooks (e.g., âThe English passive is formed byâŚâ) or the kinds of prescriptive rules given by teachers and language purists (e.g., âdonât use double negativesâ). Mental representation is difficult to describe in simple terms.
Different from language is communication, although many people tend to confuse the two. Communication is one of the things that people do with language, although people can communicate with each other without language (e.g., all adult North Americans know what the man in Figure 1 above is indicating) and species that donât have language are very good at communicating a wide variety of messages (e.g., every dog can read every other dogâs tail position). Before we contrast language with communication, letâs create a working definition of communication.
The Nature of Communication
Definitions of communication abound, and experts might argue about the specifics of a definition. But what is clear about communication is that it involves some kind of meaning exchange between two or more people (or, to be precise, two animate beings). For this exchange to occur, there has to be expression and interpretation of meaning. That is, one entity must express a meaning and another entity must understand what the other entity is attempting to convey. Communication is never a one-way venture in which the entire burden is on the person who is attempting to express something. As you read these words, you are the interpreter of meaning; I, as the author, am attempting to express meaning. Thus, expression can be either oral or writtenâor signed, if weâre talking about language used among the deaf. We shouldnât fall into the trap of thinking that communication is only oral. Likewise, interpretation can involve listening to or reading somethingâor watching signing, if weâre talking about language used among the deaf.
But what is meaning? Minimally, there are two levels to meaning. The first is the face value of words or phrases. I can say, for example, Itâs raining. And indeed, if you look out the window, you will see precipitation. I am merely stating a fact. Now imagine that my partner gets ready to leave the house, kisses me goodbye, and then heads for the door. I shout out, âItâs raining!â He then stops by the front closet and grabs an umbrella. In this case, although indeed there is precipitation outside, my utterance had the additional intent of making a suggestion: youâd better take an umbrella. What this scenario demonstrates is that a string of sounds (or gestures) can have either âfactualâ information or some other hidden âintent,â or both. These âhidden intentsâ are called speech acts and include such things as suggestions, recommendations, compliments, insults, and requests. (For detailed discussion of speaker intent and what are called speech acts, see the module on the nature of language, specifically the discussion of pragmatics.)
But the expression and interpretation of meaning is not always successful on the first go-round. In face-to-face communication (or even in chat rooms), negotiation of meaning occurs if what was expressed was not what was interpreted. We communicate non-comprehension by a variety of means, such as asking for clarification, using some gesture or expression, or by saying something that clearly shows we did not understand or misinterpreted what the person just said. This in turn triggers the other person to do something: repeat, state another way, ask a question about our comprehension, and so on. Following is an example:
TIM: Sheâs getting married.
NICOLE: LIC.
TIM: I know. It licks.
NICOLE: Licks? No, LâIâC. LIC. Like I Care.
TIM: Oh.
In this interchange, Nicoleâs use of the acronym LIC (pronounced like âlickâ) is misinterpreted by Tim, who thinks itâs a verb. Nicole realizes this by Timâs response and enters into a repair sequence in which she clarifies her intended meaning. A good deal of native-speaker negotiation of meaning happens when there is a lack of lexical knowledge, a difference in cultural knowledge, or the intent of a sentence is misinterpretedâand there probably isnât a reader of this module that hasnât experienced this kind of negotiation of meaning recently, if not sometime today.
To be sure, there are situations of communication in which negotiation of meaning may not be present. This happens, for example, when one reads, when one listens to the radio, when one watches a movie or TV. In short, whenever there is no interaction involved. And yet, the idea that communication is fundamentally both the expression and interpretation of meaning is present even in non-interactive situations. Letâs illustrate with an example from writing. As I write this module, I am imagining an audience of largely non-experts. This does not mean that an expert in language teaching and communication may not read this module; it simply suggests that I am tailoring my writing for a particular group of people. I am casting the net as wide as possible to make what I write comprehensible. This affects the way I write, the examples I use, the length of my sentences, terminology and jargon, and so on. Why? Because, as a writer, I am anticipating the readerâs interpretation. I am asking myself constantly, âWill the reader understand what I have just written? What can I do to make it fully accessible?â Thus, although it may seem that only the expression of meaning is involved, I cannot write without contemplation of the interpretive side of things. To be sure, whether I am successful is another matter. Indeed, the reader may re-read, ask him or herself, âDid I just understand that correctly?â and engage in other behaviors indicative of the readerâs role of interpreter in this particular act of communication. No matter...
