What is inclusive education?
Picture a situation of social introduction, which typically proceeds as follows:
| Other Person: | So I hear you are a lecturer. What is your subject? |
| Me: | I lecture in the field of inclusive education. |
| Other Person: | Inclusive education? What is that? |
| Me: | Well ⌠itâs an education reform initiative thatâs concerned with reducing exclusion, so itâs about every childâs right to education and valuing diversity. Itâs policy in South Africa and my field of research. I work with teachers and student teachers to enable them to teach diverse learners effectively. |
| Other Person (politely attempting not to look bored): | Huh? What do you mean by âdiverse learnersâ? |
| Me: | Unlike when we were at school, South African classrooms now include learners who come from a variety of language, racial and socio-economic backgrounds, and there may be learners with disabilities too. We aim to ⌠|
| Other Person (interrupts): | Oh, you mean special education â why didnât you say so? You know, my husband/wife/sister once worked with someone whose kid was special needs. Shame,1 hey? Itâs nice to know that there are people like you who can help them, I know I would never have the patience. Nice to meet you. |
And Other Person goes off to mingle and I am left contemplating the impossibility of distilling âinclusive educationâ for cocktail party use. Situations like these are a reminder that inclusive education is not easily pigeon-holed. Not only is its meaning contested, what it actually is is not often interrogated. I suggest that while debates about definitions have value, they should come second in the quest to clarify the nature of inclusive education. This is because its meaning could well be different, depending on what we are assuming inclusive education is. Inclusive education can be identified in different ways. In this and the next chapter, three possibilities will be explored: inclusive education as a discourse, as an ideology and as a field. Each of these positions inclusive education differently, and offers different analytical possibilities. To begin, I will explore inclusive education as a discourse, and then discuss inclusive education discourses operating in the professional, policy and public domains.
Inclusive education as discourse
I am not alone in suggesting that inclusive education is a discourse. Rose (2010a: 5) writes of âdiscourses of inclusionâ and Kalijanpur (2011: 98) reviews a book, saying that it would contribute to the âcritical discourse on international inclusive educationâ. But before examining inclusive education as a discourse, discourse itself needs to be understood. There are various useful definitions of discourse. Fairclough offers discourse as âlanguage use conceived of as socially determinedâ (2001: 18), and Blommaert (2005) says variously that it is âlanguage-in-actionâ (2) and âall forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and developmentsâ (3). Gee (2008: 154) suggests that discourse is âlanguage in useâ. So âdiscourseâ is more than a pretentious word for language, it encompasses the multiple contexts in which language and other semiotic activity takes place. Gee maintains that discourse is a part of Discourse (big âDâ deliberate) which is âsaying (writing)-doing-believing-valuing combinationsâ (2008: 154). Big D Discourse is associated in Geeâs schema with the capacity to couple ways of speaking and writing with ways of behaving and believing to realise various socially recognisable identities.
The Discourse of inclusive education enables a variety of identities to be enacted in different domains. Participation in the Discourse takes different forms and is legitimated in different ways.2 But what is particularly useful in calling inclusive education a discourse is the idea, emphasised by Geeâs hyphens, of the interconnectedness of speaking, writing, doing, believing and valuing. Inclusive education can readily be seen as a combination of speaking and writing (evidenced in policies and legislation, conference presentations, workshops, journal articles and books), particular beliefs and values about equity and participation in schools and various systemic, school and classroom practices. These elements cannot be separated â what is said/written and done cannot be considered apart from the belief systems that inform and sustain the saying, writing and doing.
A seminal piece on inclusive education discourses was Dysonâs 1999 contribution to the World Yearbook of Education. In this article, Dyson maintained that inclusion was âlocated within a limited number of discoursesâ (39). From those offering a rationale for inclusion he identified a rights and ethics discourse and an efficacy discourse and, from those promoting the realisation of inclusive education, a political discourse and a practical discourse. Importantly, Dyson recognised that these different discourses constructed different notions of inclusion, and made different questions possible. He concluded that we should talk of âinclusionsâ (46) to acknowledge its many versions. Fifteen or more years have passed since Dyson categorised inclusion discourse, and while much of what he said is still valid, things have changed. I agree that we still have discourses (emphasising the plural) of inclusive education, but it is my sense that Dysonâs rationalisation discourse has diminished over the years. Its place has been taken by a multi-disciplinary, critical and theoretical discourse of inclusion that interrogates the concept and the ways it has been encoded and enacted. The practical discourse that seeks to realise inclusion is flourishing.
I argue that it is fruitful to consider inclusive education as operating as a discourse in three overlapping domains, which I have categorised as the professional domain, the policy domain and the public domain. The saying-doing-believing of inclusive education in each of these domains is different, but their boundaries are blurred, and the discourses seep into one another. I am reminded by Gee (2011: 36) that âDiscourses are not âunitsâ with clear boundariesâ and that I am engaged in ârecognition workâ (37). Recognising discourses and labelling them is thus a tentative exercise, because discourses change over time and not everyone will agree on the distinctions I make. Despite this, it is productive to look at the different domains to examine how inclusive education is languaged in each and to what effect.
Inclusive education as a discourse in the professional domain
By the professional domain,3 I refer to places and spaces where inclusive education knowledge is produced, recontextualised and reproduced4 (Maton 2014). I am deliberately collapsing finer distinctions that could be made between the field of practice and the field of knowledge production, or between academics and practitioners, and am considering a broad domain that encompasses universities, schools and publishing houses. There could be various ways to classify the discourse of inclusive education in this domain. Slee (2011: 62â3), for example, has identified clusters of influence on inclusive education5 and an argument could be made that each of these clusters could be identified and analysed as a discourse of inclusive education. My categorisation of the discourse of inclusive education in this domain is broader, as I draw on Aristotelian terms and read two main discourses which are contrasted and connected â epistÄmÄ and technÄ.6 These two terms have a complex history and have been used differently by different ancient philosophers, some of whom used the terms interchangeably (Parry 2008). However, using Kemmis and Smithâs (2008: 23) definitions, epistÄmÄ can be said to represent the disposition of seeking truth, with the associated actions of contemplation and theoretical reasoning, and technÄ can refer to the disposition to act in a reasoned way, according to the rules of a craft, with a means-ends orientation. My use of these Greek terms deliberately resists calling one discourse âtheoryâ and the other âpracticeâ, given the many meanings and contestations embedded in those terms. EpistÄmÄ and technÄ serve my purpose well, not only for their relative unfamiliarity which dislodges the conventional ascriptions of meaning, but also because they are both contrasted and connected. So thinking of these two inclusive education discourses as dichotomies is less helpful than thinking of them as bifurcations. Bifurcation is both branching and linked, and is generative, suggestive of new possibilities. It is also a reminder of partiality (Davis 2004), both my own as I recognise my bias in drawing distinctions, but also the incompleteness of the distinctions drawn.
The epistÄmÄ discourse in inclusive education represents multiple disciplinary and theoretical gazes. These include Allan (2005, 2007), who puts philosophersâ ideas to work on inclusive education; Sleeâs (2010) sociological lens on inclusive education; various (critical) disability theories (Barton 2010; Gable 2014; Oliver 2013; Oliver and Barnes 2012; Terzi 2008); comparative education, particularly with reference to globalisation (Rizvi and Lingard 2010); and policy studies (Liasidou 2012). The discourse is conceptual and analytical, not empirical, and is often critical as it reflects on the epistemology/epistemologies of inclusive education and interrogates policy and practice. Alan Dyson recognises this epistÄmÄ discourse as he is quoted in Allan and Slee (2008: 35):
⌠[Y]ou get a kind of wing of the inclusion movement which is very much about conceptualization, critical thinking. If it has a home in academic disciplines itâs probably within philosophy of education, sociology of education, where people do not feel it is necessary to do empirical work out there in the field because it doesnât actually tell you very much.
This epistÄmÄ discourse offers theoretical understandings of the problem(s) of exclusion and marginalisation in schools. In some iterations (for example, Brantlinger (2006) and Slee (2011)), it is critical of the ways in which prevailing special education norms and practices have been thinly overlaid with a veneer of inclusive-sounding language.
Various grammatical and semiotic devices indicate the abstract nature of the written epistÄmÄ discourse of inclusive education. Consider the first sentence of Allanâs (2007: 281) chapter titled âInclusion as an ethical projectâ as an example:
The inclusion of disabled students within mainstream schools continues to be debated amid criticisms of conceptual confusion among those holding opposing views (Gallagher 2001), and accusations that inclusion has become an ideological battlefield.
This sentence has a complex grammatical structure, and employs a number of features that signal this as abstract, specialised language. These include nominalised verbs, such as âinclusionâ, âconfusionâ and âaccusationsâ. Nominalisation removes actors, tense and modality from verbs, and changes them from being processes into abstract things. Allanâs sentence also uses noun phrases, like âconceptual confusionâ and âopposing viewsâ. Noun phrases work to condense âa whole sentenceâs worth of informationâ (Gee 2011: 8) into a couple of words, thereby complexifying the content of the sentence. The verb processes in these sentences are not material, i.e. about âactions and eventsâ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). The processes are verbal (âcontinues to be debatedâ), mental (âholding opposing viewsâ) and relational (âinclusion has become an ideological battlefieldâ) which dislodges them from specific contexts.7 Neither the writer nor the audience are explicitly present in this sentence, reinforcing its abstraction. Other features, like in-text citations and predominant verbal text (i.e. minimal diagrams, pictures, tables, etc.) would characterise this kind of discourse.
The epistÄmÄ discourse of inclusive education is, in my experience, not always highly valued by those working directly in schools. When invited to conduct workshops on inclusive education, I am usually reminded that teachers want âpracticalâ ideas, not theory, and that I should provide information that teachers can go away with and put into practice the next day. The teachers in Du Toit and Forlinâs (2009) study confirm this, saying, âwe want it [training] in laymanâs terms: ten easy steps to pinpoint a problemâ (656). In other words, they are clamouring for the technÄ discourse of inclusive education.
The technÄ discourse could be said to focus on presenting the solution to the problem(s) of exclusion and marginalisation in schools by providing the âhow toâ of inclusive education. The attributes of the Aristotelian term technÄ are very evident in this discourse, as it has a strong focus on practical knowledge and it suggests a ârational ability to intervene and change the surrounding worldâ (Saugstad 2002: 380). The idea of the rules of a craft is inherent in technÄ, and learning the rules requires apprenticeship with an accomplished craftsperson. So the technÄ discourse in inclusive education presents, The Teachersâ Guide to Inclusive Education: 750 Strategies for Success! (Hammeken 2007) and What Successful Teachers Do in Inclusive Classrooms: 60 Research-Based Teaching Strategies T...