The Routledge International Handbook of Critical Positive Psychology

Nicholas J. L. Brown, Tim Lomas, Francisco Jose Eiroa-Orosa, Nicholas J. L. Brown, Tim Lomas, Francisco Jose Eiroa-Orosa

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138961432
• eBook ISBN: 9781317335115
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Applied Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the field of positive psychology has sought to implement a science of human flourishing so that we may lead happier, more fulfilling lives. It has found expression not only in academic papers but also popular books and, increasingly, in government policy. The Routledge International Handbook of Critical Positive Psychology is the first volume dedicated to a critical appraisal of this influential but controversial field of study.

The book critically examines not only the scientific foundations of positive psychology, but also the sociocultural and political tenets on which the field rests. It evaluates the current field of knowledge and practice, and includes chapters analysing the methodological constructs of the field, as well as others that question what positive psychology actually means by ideas such as happiness or well-being. Taking the debate further, the book then discusses how positive psychology can be applied in a wider variety of settings than is presently the case, helping communities and individuals by acknowledging the reality of people's lives rather than adhering strictly to debateable theoretical constructs.

Including contributions from disciplines ranging from psychoanalysis to existential therapy, theology to philosophy, and contributors from throughout the world, The Routledge International Handbook of Critical Positive Psychology will be enlightening reading for anyone interested in how psychology has sought to understand human well-being.

1

Critical positive psychology

A creative convergence of two disciplines

Piers Worth and Matthew Smith

Introduction

The need for and development of positive psychology comes from a wish to explore and articulate the positive aspects of human life and existence, in contrast to the apparent research priority of mainstream psychology to focus on problem-based questions (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). However, acts of refocusing or re-orientation have been occurring in psychology for decades in different forms. For example, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) and Gilligan (1982, 2011) have contributed to a substantial shift in the understanding of the place of women and the psychological knowledge of women in psychology. Arguably, this occurred within a larger and broader-based development of feminist psychology and qualitative research methods that grew from the early 1980s. The emergence of critical psychology as a discipline in the 1980s, and positive psychology in the late 1990s, are each a form of redressing a balance in perspective from what may be described as mainstream psychology.

This present book is a milestone in positive psychology development, bringing us the opportunity to draw on critical psychology perspectives in our work to look at the two disciplines together. The intention of this chapter is to offer a summary of some of the principle aspects of critical psychology and to then contrast them with positive psychology. We might find positive psychology deserves the challenges offered by critical psychology to overall professional practice in our profession, or some way in which positive psychology is actually responding to critical psychology in its practices. As a final step, this chapter will ask how the discipline of critical psychology might influence or inform the development of positive psychology given its relative “youth.”

An overview of critical psychology

Austin and Prilleltensky (2001, para. 1) define critical psychology as “a movement that challenges psychology to work towards emancipation and social justice, and that opposes the uses of psychology to perpetuate oppression and injustice.” In their review of the origin of this standpoint, Austin and Prilleltensky look back on historical developments in the social sciences that pressed for perspectives and that contrasted with those of the positivist traditions. They highlight examples, such as the reconstruction that followed post-war Germany, where they asserted that a neutrality of values was not acceptable or potentially realistic. In doing so, they link critical psychology origins to South American Liberation Theology and in turn Liberation Psychology: grassroots movements which challenged widespread poverty and social injustice, refusing to accept them. These movements did not seek a value neutrality or the abstraction of its work from social and political contexts; to the contrary, these traditions assert the need to resist injustice and the oppression of marginalised groups, to seek significant social change, and to seek dialectical activity and relationship between groups, communities, and society more broadly (Austin & Prilleltensky, 2001). These authors argue that psychology as a discipline can and should seek community and social change, rather than prioritising scientific precision and value neutrality.

For professional psychologists, the implications of these views may be challenging or unsettling. Chamberlain and Murray (2009) suggest the contrast between what might be called a conventional discipline of psychology and a critical discipline may emerge in “differing values, epistemologies and research methodologies favoured by each” (p. 145). The “critical” discipline and perspectives seek to challenge many seemingly conventional assumptions, often taking a social constructionist approach and seeing the social context as fluctuating under historical and social influences. Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) assert that social constructionism is at the heart of critical psychology. The implication is that what we perceive and believe as reality is a function of social consensus in our context. The reality of knowledge is also a construction of social context. “Normality,” they argue, is a judgment based on social standards, coloured by culture and ethics. This perspective points the way to our understanding of critical psychology’s commitment to review our actions and our views within the social and cultural perspective and context. The psychology we produce generally is a function of our society, its history and culture, and those who have the power and influence within it. For these reasons, what we believe as “true” must also be seen as “partial.”

Fox, Prilleltensky, and Austin (2009) and Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) argue that as psychologists we are part of a profession, and by inference part of a professional class and elite. The majority of psychologists are working in organisations and are, in turn, they argue, “institutionalised” and may as a result hold a restricted or narrow view of the needs of those needing psychology. They imply we seek the status quo rather than change. Chamberlain and Murray (2009) suggest that some of the disciplines of psychology, such as health, are consciously seeking to respond to and match the scientific stances of others as a means of contributing to and collaborating with them. The choices of traditional methods of scientific work are a form of legitimising a discipline of psychology in a wider social setting. The inference and the view from critical psychology is that harm is done within the status quo and more fundamental reform is needed to achieve changes to social structures that are likely to promote change to well-being and social justice (Fox et al., 2009).

Critical psychology proposes two views that challenge and conflict with mainstream psychology. First, any “society,” critical psychologists assert, whether that is a broad view, or a more localised one such as an educational system, will communicate what it believes and values, particularly about human nature and the social context. An example is our focus, within positive psychology, of the importance and contribution of eudaimonia. Second, in the act of doing so, it is argued that psychologists will forget the influence of the localised or broader culture in which they exist, its history and culture. Put in other words: The “fish” are not aware of the “water” they are swimming in, yet they are completely contextualised within it. As a result, all psychology is a reflection of the culture, social system, and locality in which it has emerged. This is a crucial challenge to us, within positive psychology, to remember that the bulk of the work to date is situated within Western cultures, and the need to question and explore what cross-cultural experiences might be. A core assumption of critical psychology is that our individuality, our subjective experience, is profoundly embedded in our social culture and will reflect the norms and expectations of our community. Chamberlain and Murray (2009) mirror these views and express concern that an individualistic focus within psychology might overlook potential social influences. For example, those of us involved in teaching positive psychology theories of human strengths and how they may be promoted may be overly focused on personal traits and how these may be developed by personal choice from within an individual. The bias inherent within this approach was highlighted for the authors when discussing these theories with our students undertaking the MSc in Applied Positive Psychology (MAPP) programme at Bucks New University. One Muslim student was very assertive with us, questioning the individualistic focus of positive psychology and contrasting this with the collectivist influences of her own culture. Strengths are only strengths in the social setting and context, not in some abstract and independent sense (Fox et al., 2009).

Fox et al. (2009) pull together these issues and summarise three interrelated concerns about mainstream psychology: (1) They see a focus on and a weighting towards the individual, to the extent that it promotes individualism, in place of group or the wider society. They believe mainstream psychology adversely affects the achievement of community and mutuality as a result of this bias towards individualism and, through this, strengthens unjust social practices; (2) The implicit allegiance of mainstream psychology within institutions affects the discipline of psychology’s capacity to contribute to the weaker or marginalised members of society; (3) These problems may occur despite the motivation of psychologists in this context to seek the contrary. This creates an invitation to those of us engaged within positive psychology to ask whether these points apply to our discipline. We (the authors of the present chapter) infer that they do.

Further, Fox et al. (2009) argue that the individualistic and competitive focus has additional potential for damage due to its lack of focus on groups that may be powerless or marginalised. The individualistic focus, they argue, becomes embodied in the beliefs of core social institutions such as politics, courts, schools, and religion. At this level of embodiment in the societal institutions that surround us, individualism becomes an ideology rather than a psychological reality, and implicitly one that mainstream psychology may absorb and mirror in its activities.

Austin and Prilleltensky (2001) describe those involved in mainstream psychology, such as the academics that seek the scientific roots and grounding, as positively and caringly motivated. At the same time, they argue, there is the need for an alertness to the circumstances and needs of those being “prescribed” to. This implies questions, such as how accurate our understandings of the needs of others can be when we might be vested in an organisational status quo, or whether we are failing to acknowledge the social or systemic context. For those of us involved in positive psychology, this may involve a question: How appropriate is the “positive” approach in a particular circumstance or situation?

Fox et al. (2009) return to challenge mainstream psychologists with the view that criticism of the social, moral, and political implications of the theory, research, and practice in psychology is limited by, and even absent in, the educational courses offered on psychology generally. They argue that psychology needs more than a scientific and academic method and grounding. Outputs must in turn include an understanding of possible use, processes that can be drawn upon, and how populations of unequal voice may be treated and cared for.

In summary, the aim of the critical psychology discipline is to retain the best of other psychological traditions while challenging what might constitute oppressive behaviour and limitations to our vision and perspective of our professional practice, such as the over-focus on individualism, without reference to or consideration of social and cultural influences. Critical psychology is further provocative in its assertion that mainstream psychology has not yet fully embraced reflexivity, an alertness to how our assumptions and values appear in and influence our theories, methods, goals, and values. The assumption of scientific neutrality may cut us off from a willingness to accept that we live in a culturally complex and varied world, and instead lock us into an assumption of being value-free or neutral (Fox et al., 2009). This prompts the question for the discipline of positive psychology whether, in our priority to be “scientific,” we have omitted or paid incomplete attention to our assumptions and values, methods, and goals.

Islam and Zyphur (2009) caution that the critical psychology view of mainstream psychology is a form of caricature or summary, and therefore we must note the possibility of rejecting it because this too might be a sweeping summary or generalisation. They ask we not lose the possibility and prompts of the challenges critical psychology offers to our professional practice. If we concur with Prilleltensky and Fox (1997) that critical psychology is based on a commitment to caring and compassion, with psychology as a discipline actively contributing to the search for inclusive social change, then critical psychology’s intentions have value to us regardless.

How might critical psychology inform positive psychology?

As we move forward to consider how critical psychology might influence positive psychology, we must remain alert to the benefits and risks of the unfolding of the disciplines involved (Austin & Prilleltensky, 2001). Thus, the questions we raise and the issues we point to within this chapter are not an advocacy of perspectives and actions to be accepted and taken necessarily as a whole, but ones to use within our own different working contexts. What we are attempting here is to bring two challenging disciplines together and explore tentatively how critical psychology might inform or influence positive psychology. The two disciplines have both, in their own way, sought to question the development and practice of mainstream psychology, so that seeking to bring critical psychology to positive psychology perhaps gives the latter a “taste” of its own challenge to mainstream psychology. There may be a discomfort in our positive psychology practices being questioned; if so, we need to have the openness to notice this, and hold that tension as we explore the possible implications.

Both critical and positive psychology argue that mainstream psychology “misses” aspects of the delivery and values that would alter the contribution of psychology to the community and broader society. Critical psychology, in its argument that psychologists may be “institutionalised” within existing systems, would argue for the availability of psychological knowledge and support for diverse populations, and that this should be tailored to them.

In the earlier years of positive psychology as a discipline, there was a trend towards producing books and other publications that, while grounded in scientific knowledge, were written in plain language and aimed at the general public to make positive possibilities available in plain language (e.g., Haidt, 2007; Linley, 2008; Lyubomirsky, 2008; Seligman, 2002; Worth, 2010). However, more recently, there has been a substantial unfolding in the peer-reviewed positive psychology literature, which is vital to maintaining the momentum of our relatively young subfield and to legitimising the claims we make (Donaldson, Rao, Lucas, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Donaldson et al.’s summary of peer-reviewed publications (1,336 articles between 1999 and 2013, with 2006–2007 showing the start of a marked increase in activity) suggests that there is significant work left to accomplish to further argue the case for and contribution of positive psychology.

Part of this effort in the literature has, arguably, been about legitimising the very existence of the discipline. The study of human well-being and strengths has, paradoxically, been one of the main areas in which positive psychology has chosen to mirror the mainstream profession focused on illness. For example, Keyes (2009) offers an articulation of well-being that, by choice, is written to reflect the “symptomatic” structure and presentation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. The depth of the argument assembled by Peterson and Seligman (2004) on strengths in the description of the “Values in Action” structure of human strength would appear to have done something similar. We could argue that this style of writing is a means of communication, balancing with those psychologists that are engaged primarily in work on ill-health and providing language that they might find it more practical to understand and adopt. This reflects, we believe, what Chamberlain and Murray (2009) describe as a form of seeking legitimisation via communicating and defining “positive” states in forms similar to those used for understanding illness and disease.

Critical psychology would question an unbalanced pressure towards positivistic and scientific thinking, with the implication that this may, in turn, restrict the nature of knowledge available to diverse populations (Austin & Prilleltensky, 2001). Yet with the “youth” or newness of positive psychology, Seligman and others, not surprisingly, assert the need for the scientific grounding of our new area of work (e.g., Donaldson et al., 2014). However, “science” is not only found in quantitatively based research. We echo Hefferon (2014) in her advocacy of qualitative research in positive psychology, and her underscoring of its importance. Miles and Huberman (1994) and Worth (2000) both illustrate how qualitative research may create and highlight questions which can in turn be explored by other methods.

Chamberlain and Murray (2009) offer an interesting insight in suggesting that critical psychology perspectives create a shift in methods of work towards the qualitative and the participatory, which in turn offer insight into the experiences of specific groups and a scope for transformative change. The social construction of our understandings and insights will be revisited and revised in these alternative methods, offering changed and deeper perspectives. These become, potentially, a source for social change. Yet at the same time, Chamberlain and Murray acknowledge a need for methodological balance, in knowing via numerical methods how much of something occurs, and in qualitative insight into the nature and experience of the area of study. Giving voice to those involved in an experience, they assert, will bring forward issues of inequality and need that other methods may not.

The possibilities implied in this use of a wider range of research methods reflect the advocacy of Prilleltensky and Nelson (2002) for a broader focus of analysis and intervention, one that examines the self or individual, relationships, and the wider community. They propose a use of methods that explores the influences and dynamics of systems on human experience, rather than a positivistic focus on, for example, the individual. Prilleltensky and Nelson offer a framework for a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Foreword: interiorizing and interrogating well-being
• Introduction
• 1 Critical positive psychology: a creative convergence of two disciplines
• Section 1 Criticism of positive psychology
• Section 2 Doing positive psychology critically
• Section 3 Applied perspectives
• Index