The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology

Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781317511472
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Edited by an international team of leading scholars, The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology is the first major reference work devoted to this growing field. The Handbook 's 46 chapters, all appearing in print here for the first time, and written by philosophers and social theorists from around the world, are organized into eight main parts:

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• Historical Backgrounds

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• The Epistemology of Testimony

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• Disagreement, Diversity, and Relativism

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• Science and Social Epistemology

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• The Epistemology of Groups

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• Feminist Epistemology

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• The Epistemology of Democracy

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• Further Horizons for Social Epistemology

With lists of references after each chapter and a comprehensive index, this volume will prove to be the definitive guide to the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of social epistemology.

PART I

Historical Backgrounds to Social Epistemology

1

ON THE BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

David Henderson

The contributions to this section commonly survey wide literatures, reflecting big, interrelated issues. They seek to provide overviews of lines of development within philosophy and in related fields that afford background and perspective for contemporary social epistemology.

Work in both the sociology and history of science has prompted, encouraged, and reinforced the realization among many philosophers that there is a need for a social turn within epistemology—that epistemologists need to take account of processes at various social scales in which beliefs came to be formed and transmitted, and in which epistemic sensibilities or norms took form and were transmitted and enforced. Taking account of such processes would afford at least an important complement to traditional, narrowly individualistic epistemology. For example, work in the history of science by Thomas Kuhn (1957, 1962, 1977) and others focused on the practices within disciplines that had produced many of our most cherished exemplars of knowledge. Such work made evident that developments in those disciplines commonly turned on social processes within a community with shifting sensibilities. Communities of investigators seem to coalesce around notable work—which then serves as models for ongoing practice. It was in communities that scientists commonly came to share understandings of what made for the successes represented by such notable or exemplary work—which then served as the normative take away to which community members aspired, and insisted on. It was in view of the shared results of conforming practice that community members developed and refined a sense for promising or favored lines of further inquiry. In this, social processes involving ongoing public evaluation and exchange were significant. Such processes shaped the evaluation of extant results and conditioned the parameters of evaluation (reinforcing or revising those parameters). These social processes also made for an ongoing regulation of the practices of individual investigators and groups of investigators—as community standards informed the practices of making and evaluating observations, and of weighing the implications of their results for their general understandings. Thus, work by Kuhn and others historians presented epistemologists with a compelling case: if one were serious about understanding how best to form beliefs, it seems one would need to attend to community-level processes—to what were the features of such processes that furthered or hindered scientific practice and epistemic practice generally. At the very least, one needed to add a social leg or two to epistemology. In this handbook, K. Brad Wray discusses the work of Thomas Kuhn and the related historical study of science—and he traces some of the associated work in the philosophy of science that responded to the history of science.

In his contribution to this handbook, Stephen Turner discusses the philosophical roots of the sociology of science. He focuses on the lines of thought that ultimately issued in the sociology of science of Karl Mannheim ([1929] 1954): German Idealism and the body of social theory that begins with Henri de Saint-Simon and extends through Marx and his followers. This is, admittedly, not standard fare for contemporary epistemologists. However, Turner’s discussion makes recognizable various antecedents of concerns that are both sociological and philosophical. This serves as background for understanding more contemporary sociological and historical treatments of science. Turner’s entry can be combined with Michael E. Lynch’s contribution, “The Sociology of Science of Social Constructivism,” (in the Science and Social Epistemology section of this handbook). Together, these make for a sustained treatment of the sociology of science and its philosophical roots. Lynch traces the sociological thread forward from where Turner leaves off, beginning with Robert Merton’s (1973) sociology of science, and follows it into subsequent sociological approaches, notably the strong programme in the sociology of science (Barnes and Bloor, 1982; Bloor, 1976). Wray’s chapter also discusses the Strong Programme and the uptake of Kuhn’s work in the sociology of science. Obviously, these discussions must cover a lot of ground and literature; in so doing they provide a glimpse of fields that are important when thinking about our life situated within a community of interdependent epistemic agents. They raise questions about the advantages and limitations endemic to even in the most sophisticated of our epistemic practices and communities—advantages and limitations that result from our cultural and intellectual interdependencies. One might fruitfully compare the concerns highlighted with the issues pursued by the philosopher of science Philip Kitcher in his article, “The Naturalists Return.” (1992).

Let us turn to the contributions in this part of the handbook that focus on background work within philosophy. In “The Twin Roots and Branches of Social Epistemology,” Finn Collin provides a particularly broad perspective. One root is traditional analytic epistemology—and here the development of naturalistic and reliabilist approaches loom large. The second root is work in the philosophy of science—particularly that prompted by work in the history of science such as that by Kuhn. Collin characterizes several branches coming off of each major branch. Branches arising out of the philosophy of science includes work labeled “critical social epistemology.” This set of work is associated with the writings of Steve Fuller and with the journal Social Epistemology that Fuller founded. Critical social epistemology seeks comparatively less continuity with traditional epistemology than is sought in most work within social epistemology.

Collin traces the way in which contemporary analytic epistemology came to be concerned with the social production and (particularly recently) the social distribution of knowledge. Here, the writings of Alvin Goldman (for example, 1967, 1972, 1986, 1992, 1999) represent several notable junctures in the development of a distinctively social focus within epistemology. Traditional analytic epistemology focused pretty exclusively on matters that were internal to the mental life of individual epistemic agents—several central evaluative statuses of interest were taken to turn on internal states of the individual agent—the agent’s perceptions, beliefs, and inferences. Such epistemology is termed internalist. Goldman and others (Alston, 1985, 1989; Harman, 1986, for example) advanced influential arguments for a reorientation of epistemology beyond merely matters to which the individual agent has internal access. Externalist epistemology—epistemology that is not simply internalist—is now prominent in mainstream epistemology. Goldman’s suggestion was that, even when an agent could not access justificatory reasons supporting a given belief, that belief might yet be justified as a result of being generated by a reliable cognitive process. Beliefs could be so justified even though the agent did not have independent internal resources for certifying the reliability of the generating process. Thus, attention comes to focus on the reliability of the processes by which agents form their beliefs.

The development of externalist, commonly reliabilist, epistemology opened the space for a social turn. After all, some of the relevant processes by which agents gain reliable belief extend beyond the individual agent and include wider social processes and exchanges—thus social epistemology. Processes at the level of the group may be more (or less) reliable than the processes employed by the members individually. As the resulting social epistemology is part of a piece with wider (commonly externalist and reliabilist) developments within analytic epistemology, Collin labels this branch Analytic Social Epistemology (ASE). He traced its development using Goldman’s influential writings as representative.

In his discussion of ASE, Collin notes the important work of Miranda Fricker, who argues that undervaluing the epistemic capacities and contributions of members of various groups—such as women—yields a form of epistemic injustice that is harmful both to the agents and to the epistemic results in the community (Fricker, 2007).

As Collin indicates, the socially focused literature in analytic epistemology has developed so as to remain very much of a piece with the literature in analytic epistemology generally. Somewhat surprisingly, this has proceeded with only occasional attention to a separate social epistemological literature: that arising out of the philosophy of science. At least it is safe to say that the two branches of social epistemology have not been ideally integrated. As Collin notes, the sciences constitute “an especially eminent example of social cognition”—so it is fitting that epistemological reflections on the sciences have generated a social epistemological literature. Perhaps analytic epistemologists have been hesitant to draw on the philosophy of science in part because that tradition confronts concerns that seem to make problematic the idea of the accretion or accumulation of a socially shared body of knowledge. Those concerns are represented by (at least some readings of) the work initiated by Thomas Kuhn, and responding to these concerns has been important within the philosophy of science. Some epistemologists have been content to leave such issue largely to philosophers of science.

Philip Kitcher had developed a position in the philosophy of science that has real social epistemological meat. As Collin discusses (Chapter 3 of this volume), Kitcher has sought a “sociologically realistic analysis of science”—one that can provide “a robust sense for the notion of scientific progress” and the growth of knowledge, while acknowledging the complexities to which the history and sociology of science have directed attention. As Collin also notes, Kitcher’s work has significant continuity with Goldman’s—for example, in its occasional use of micro-economic models (Kitcher, 1993). Perhaps we should add that Kitcher’s general epistemological bearings are reliabilist, and that Kitcher (1992) as well as Goldman adhere to a program of naturalizing epistemology along lines suggested in Quine’s classic (1969) “Epistemology Naturalized.” To naturalize epistemology is to pursue it in a way that draws freely on scientific results. One might think of this as a scientifically informed engineering of our pursuit of truth. It is safe to say that quite generally naturalizing epistemology has loomed large in externalist epistemology and in social epistemology in particular. (More on naturalizing epistemology later; it is the subject of Chase Wrenn’s contribution to this volume.)

Of course, science as a social phenomenon will inherit various biases and limits from the social groups in which it is practiced. Consequently, in reflecting on science as an epistemically important, paradigmatic, form of social organization in the production of knowledge, one will want to come to terms with such biases and foibles. In engineering our scientific pursuit of truth, it will be important to limit the distortions or biases occasioned. Again, one finds such concerns in Kitcher’s work. They are also doggedly pursued in the work of a set of feminist philosophers of science and epistemologists. Representatives of this work include the writings of Sandra Harding (1991), and Lorraine Code (1991). Collin’s chapter focuses on the work of Helen Longino (1990, 2002).

Longino wanted to salvage scientific objectivity while making science more sensitive to social concerns, among which feminism had her special interest. She buttressed her critique of traditional science with detailed studies of biological theorizing in particular, demonstrating gender bias of various sorts. Still, Longino wanted to show that science as such is not inherently biased against women or other particular groups. The task was to devise a conception of science that would have room for a plurality of social concerns.

(Collin, this volume)

Indeed, one might say that the responsiveness to “a plurality of social concerns” is central in Longino’s social epistemology—as such it is thought to vitiate bias and provide gains in ultimate objectivity. It does this by allowing all qualified parties to bring to bear relevant information so as to subject candidate positions to scrutiny (see also Wylie and Hankinson, 2007). (Much relevant discussion is also to be found in Sharon Crasnow’s “Feminist Philosophy of Science as Social Epistemology”, later in this handbook.)

Finally, Collin discusses Critical Social Epistemology (CSE)—a tradition in science studies associated with the journal Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy founded by Steve Fuller. He notes that, unlike those approaches previously discussed that also focus on science, “Fuller [and CSE] does not try to work out a compromise between analytic philosophy of science and its various critics of the 1970s and 1980s.” While CSE is commonly viewed as pursuing a science-debunking agenda (also associated with the Science and Technology Studies program), Collin argues that this reading may be overdrawn. He suggests that Fuller’s position comprises a set of views held by philosophers of science—each being a minority position in that field. However, this set of minority views is not espoused in combination by those working outside the CSE approach. Collin provides a balanced overview of the main outlines of Fuller’s thought. In so doing, he allows one to understand how this form of social epistemology (CSE) relates to the more widespread variants such as: (a) ASE as represented by Goldman and many others; (b) the kind of social philosophy of science represented by Philip Kitcher; and (c) important work by feminist philosophers of science and epistemologists.

As noted already, externalist epistemology afforded the opening for social epistemology. Epistemology had to do with the class of processes by which folk ought to form and maintain their beliefs or understandings, and these were taken to be those with some fitting balance of reliability and power or fecundity. Now, insofar as matters such as: (a) the reliability, tractability or implementability, and productive power of belief forming processes are concerns central to epistemology; and (b) processes at the social level can significantly enhance or diminish such features, epistemologists would need to attend to social processes. They must consider how social organization and more or less tractable forms of cooperative belief formation and transmission can contribute to reliability and veritistic productivity. But, from the philosophical armchair, one cannot get far gauging the reliability and veritistic productivity of belief-producing and belief-transmitting processes at either the social level or at the level of individual cognitive processes. For example, some armchair attractive processes may not be tractable or implementable within human cognitive archi...