The Case Against Military Intervention

Why We Do It and Why It Fails

Donald Snow

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN:
  9780765647566
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317501763
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since World War II, military intervention in developing world internal conflicts (DWIC) has become the primary form of U.S. military activity, and these interventions have proven unsuccessful in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This book argues such failure was entirely predictable, even inevitable, due both to the nature and dynamics of foreign military intrusion in the affairs of other countries and especially the DWICs that provide the major contemporary form of potential U.S. military in the foreseeable future. Basing its analysis in both human nature (the adverse reaction to prolonged outsider intrusion) and historical analogy, the book argues strongly why military intervention should be avoided as a national security option and the implications of such a policy decision for national security strategy and policy.

1

SETTING THE TABLE

The Phenomenon of Intervention

The central thesis of this work is that military intervention is almost always a bad idea, an observation that is especially true in contemporary times. It consistently asks the question, “Why should the United States almost always reject the temptation to commit military forces to conflicts in the developing world?” That question underlies and motivates this book. Its short answer is that such involvements are almost certain to fail, in the long run if not the short run. Failure is not always physical, in the sense of loss on the battlefield. That definition of failure is more historical in nature whereas contemporary failure is more normally measured in terms of whether such violent intrusions achieve the goals they set out to achieve. They rarely do.

Foreign forces on one’s soil will almost always be resented, and likely rejected, and eventually resisted successfully. This argument gains importance because the “opportunities” for American military interventions are in internal instabilities and wars in developing countries. These developing world internal conflicts (or DWICs) resemble our most recent military misadventures and are a recurring emphasis of the text.

This assertion is hardly a revelation, especially for Americans still immersed in the wake of unsuccessful American military incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan and surrounded by crises in diverse parts of the globe from Crimea to Syria and to large parts of Africa, for which intervention is one possible U.S. policy response. An added lure to the intervention option is that it is proactive and virile, a sign that the United States remains a muscular, vital superpower, not a declining, toothless shadow of its former self that neither invites nor can demand respect. Using force is masculine and virile, while reluctance to doing so can be seen as pusillanimous. These assertions are virtually always specious.

Americans have questions and doubts about the attractiveness of using force in foreign situations. In the immediate wake of recent adventures in the countries flanking Iran, Americans are “intervention shy,” a reaction similar to the period immediately after the conclusion of American involvement in Vietnam almost a half-century ago. The Vietnam hangover, as it was known at the time, gradually faded, and by the 1980s the United States was at it again with smaller incursions in places like Beirut and Grenada. By the 1990s, the pace quickened as the United States intruded militarily in the Middle East (Kuwait) and Africa (Somalia), the Western Hemisphere (Haiti), and the fringes of Europe (Bosnia and Kosovo). Stimulated by the reaction to the events of September 11, 2001, the United States engaged in full-scale, Vietnam-sized commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike most modern U.S. politics, these actions were bipartisan, with administrations from both parties leading military adventures.

We have now returned to the post-Vietnam “square one” of how we got drawn into these adventures. The answers are complex, and their examination begins in this chapter by looking at the phenomenon of intervention, as the chapter subtitle suggests. It begins with a look at the underlying idea of political interference in its various forms, of which military intervention is the most extreme form. Interference occurs for a variety of reasons, and these motives are more or less important to states, and the importance of the interests involved are related to the severity of the interests and the consequences of their realization or denial. The discussion centers particularly on the interests associated with military intervention, since these are generally the cases where the consequences of actions are greatest. The section concludes with how the pattern of rationalization is changing both at the rhetorical and operational levels.

The chapter then turns to the historical dimension of interference. Particularly in terms of interference with armed forces, history is replete with examples of intrusion by peoples on other peoples. Historically, the most prevalent (certainly the most recorded and heralded) instances have been in order to conquer and subjugate people (the imperialist motivation). Popular histories have emphasized the successes of these efforts but not the resistance to imperialism or the eventual successes of such resistance.

The historical pattern has changed over the past century or so. Aggression and aggrandizement are no longer extolled as worthy goals, and though they are still arguably practiced in fact (e.g., 2014 Russian actions in Crimea). Interventions are now more typically justified in more benign, noble terms. The American odyssey of interference is a microcosm of the broader historical experience, and a broad overview of the evolution forms the concluding section of the chapter.

The study adds two other dimensions to illustrate why military interventions in the internal affairs of other peoples regularly fail. One dimension is indeed historical, arguing that military intrusions into others’ affairs have been recurring—if underemphasized—themes throughout history, and resistance efforts against such intrusions have almost always been successful in the long run. From this perspective, what happened to the United States in its most recent misadventures are basically contemporary examples of enduring historical dynamics, not anomalies that somehow run counter to historical experience.

The historical case may not seem obvious at first. Classic imperialist motives included and often brought adventure, glory, great wealth, and access to exotic goods and experiences to the conquerors. They also brought resistance and the constant need to enforce rule over reluctant, disgruntled subjects, and that resistance usually succeeded in expelling the intruders. Conquest was always easier and more satisfying than rule. Modern interventions generally strip the intruders of the benefits and accentuate the burdens of their actions. The satisfaction has largely disappeared.

Many contemporary apologists try to argue that special characteristics of place, failures of the American will, or accidents of history have doomed what would have otherwise been successful enterprises. Although the contemporary environment does influence the dynamics of successful resistance to outside military influence, it is primarily to condense and accelerate the pace of successful expulsion of outside intruders—a quickening of historical processes of failure.

The other dimension that sets this study apart is the elaborated argument that resistance represents a basic and inexorable aspect of human nature. The ability and hence pace of interventions to produce temporary positive results may create the temporary illusion that imposition succeeds in some cases, but the underlying human response of revulsion, resistance, and repulsion of unwanted others is a basic human instinct. This may seem—and be—an unremarkable observation, and yet people have and continue to advocate and carry out interventions as if human nature is not violated by and does not reject such actions. Outside intrusion is offensive and will inevitably trigger rejection and resistance regardless of who interferes or why they intrude, a truth that is often overlooked or rationalized away. One might, for instance, recall that one reason very serious intervention advocates argued that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would be a rousing success was because the Iraqis would welcome the invading Americans as “liberators” rather than as unwanted imperialists who would not go back where they came from on their own and thus had to be resisted and eventually expelled. The gist of this second dimension is thus that outside interventions fail because that is essentially all they can do.

This second dimension changes the perspective of the “blame game” about why the military interventions in which the United States has become immersed have failed. Most contemporary critiques begin with the question of why an intervention was unsuccessful after the decision to intervene and its implementation occurred: what did we do wrong once we got there that contributed to defeat? These critiques sometimes (but not always) have an examination of whether we should have committed ourselves in the first place, but they tend to focus on unique aspects of particular application sites, not on the underlying dynamics of reaction to intervention. People argue, for instance, that Afghanistan was a bad place to intrude ourselves, because Afghanistan is a historically lousy place to try to subdue. While true enough some of the time, such a perspective misses the point that these military interventions trigger universal instincts to resist and should be avoided because they are destined to fail almost all of the time. The key question should be, “Why do we think we can overcome natural human reactions and factors?” in any particular place, the answer to which is almost always that we cannot. Looking for excuses after the fact simply misses the point.

The Idea of Intervention: Forms of Interference

One dictionary definition (World Book Dictionary, 1985) of intervention is “interference in the affairs of one nation by another.” Given this broad meaning of the term, acts of interference are ubiquitous in international relations and always have been. As noted in the Introduction, interference across state borders violates the principle of sovereignty on which the state system is premised and is technically illegal in international legal terms, but it persists nonetheless.

This interference is conducted in a number of ways and for various reasons. The forms vary along a continuum of means, from the relatively limited, non-intrusive, and restrained to extremely disruptive, and even violent, methods. The means chosen in any particular situation reflect a variety of concerns and calculations, including how important it is to influence the state in which interference is contemplated and the ease or difficulty of succeeding at achieving the goals of the act: ultimately interfering is a matter of the interests of the intruding states. The most extreme form of intervention, which is the central concern of this book, is military intervention.

Although the major concern is with the use of military force to influence the actions of other states and their peoples, it is worthwhile to consider more limited forms as well. Doing so accentuates the prevalence of interference as a universal practice in the affairs of states, and the forms are sometimes linked in practice. It is not entirely unusual, for instance, for a potential intervening state to employ relatively limited, comparatively mild forms of interference to achieve its goals, and if these fail, to resort to progressively more strenuous forms, up to and even including the recourse to military intervention. At the same time, success at limited forms of interference may create an implicit belief in the efficacy of intervention and make more extensive recourse to its various forms, including force, more likely. This latter possibility seems to have been part of the American pattern of interference, especially as practiced during the Cold War, which is the subject of the last section of the chapter.

States interfere in the affairs of other states both because they feel it is necessary and because they feel they can get away with such actions. States are, after all, largely motivated and driven by what they consider to be their national interests (conditions they feel are important for national purposes). These interests often come into conflict with the interests of others, and when they do, it becomes necessary to reconcile the conflicts of interest that are represented. Since all parties want their conflicts to be settled on terms most favorable to them, one way to sway the outcome in their favor is to influence the other side to make it more receptive to their position. A prominent way to do that is to try to exercise influence within the other state—to interfere, in other words.

Whether and what kind of interference will be contemplated is partly the result of the interactive calculation of the importance of interests and how easily they can be attained. One key element is the notion of vital interests. These are generally defined in one of two ways, either as interests that are so important to the states that their failure to realize them would be intolerable, or as interests important enough to go to war over. The boundary between vital interests and lesser interests (less than vital or LTV) is important, because it is the point where military intervention may be contemplated.

The other key element is how easy or difficult it is to achieve a particular goal. Generally speaking, the easier it is to succeed, the more likely the attempt will be. The two elements are related. The easier attainment is, the more likely influence will be applied regardless of the importance of the issue; but the more important the interest is, the more it likely will be pursued regardless of the difficulty of attainment. When interests are considered vital, the consideration of ease of achievement may either be suspended as a consideration or false assessments may be made about that ease. All of this is most important when physical intervention with armed force is considered.

The 2014 Russian incursion into Crimea illustrates this kind of calculation. The Crimean peninsula has been considered very important to Russia since the days of the Russian Empire, to the point that it was the central feature of the Crimean War of 1853–56, when Russia tried to assert control over the territory and the other European powers resisted that annexation. Crimean port facilities are an important part of Russia’s desire for warm-water ports and thus year-round access to the world’s oceans, and thus the possession of secure naval bases there has long been what the Russians consider in their vital interest.

During the days of the Soviet Empire, this interest was realized, because Crimea was part of the Soviet Union. For reasons that remain opaque, Nikita Khrushchev, however, assigned Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and when the Soviet Union dissolved, it became part of independent Ukraine. The Russians, however, maintained their base rights in Crimea. This arrangement was satisfactory until Ukraine began to drift toward association with the European Union, raising the possibility of a hostile Ukrainian regime in control of the peninsula. At this point, a vital Russian interest seemed endangered.

It was in these circumstances that Russian president Vladimir Putin acted to gain control of Crimea. He attempted to exercise enfluence over the Ukraine by promoting pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine to ensure a friendly government. When this ploy failed, however, he was faced with a potentially hostile regime in Kiev that might also jeopardize Russian access to Crimea. In this circumstance, he moved first to detach Crimea from Ukraine and to incorporate it into Russia.

Putin’s calculations for intervention combined the importance of the issue and the ease with which it might be attained. Clearly, the Russian leader perceived a vital interest to be in jeopardy, and Russian public opinion apparently agreed. Strong actions were thus justified. At the same time, Putin calculated that his goal was attainable, since outside powers were unlikely to take decisive action to prevent the Russian takeover. Importance and attainability combined to justify the action.

One generic and concrete consequence of this general reasoning is that larger, more powerful states tend to interfere with others more than smaller, weaker states, who tend to be the recipients, rather than the instigators, of attempts to interfere with others. Larger states are likely to have more extensive interests than smaller states, and they are likely to have the means available to exercise influence, including the recourse to military force. It thus follows that larger states are also more likely to engage in interference across the board of possible actions, including the use of armed force. In contemporary international affairs, armed intervention into other states is the most frequent use of armed forces, and thus the findings of Russett and others depicted in the Introduction are not surprising: the three countries that have resorted to armed force since 1945 are the United States, Russia, and China.

Interference covers a wide range of actions that states can take to influence one another. It goes beyond present purposes to try to catalogue all the methods that states employ, but one can note that such actions form a continuum of sorts, from the least to the most intrusive and from the non-military to the military.

As one moves from left to right along the continuum, the actions become more drastic, active, and controversial. They also presumably reflect determinations of increasing interests at stake in different outcomes to particular concerns.

The least intrusive forms of interference tend to be political rather than military. These forms cover a wide range of possible actions that are generally limited in purposes and methods. The purposes of such actions are to influence states (normally their governments) to act in ways compatible with the interests of the interfering states. Occasionally, these attempts at influence are open and public—the U.S. Secretary of State publicly supporting a course of action in a target state, for instance. Historically, many of these actions are not open and include things like bribing officials, seeking to influence elections by providing propaganda or funds to one side or another, planting stories in the local press, spreading lies against parties who oppose the interests of the interfering state, or even encouraging internal parties to overthrow governments. The United States, for instance, has employed a wide range of these kinds of actions throughout Central America and in select South American countries like Chile in the 1970s (the American role in the overthrow of Salvador Allende as Chilean president).

What distinguishes these forms of interference is that they involve the commission of acts that are uniformly illegal in the countries being subjected to them. This illegality goes beyond international legal entreaties about interference and encompasses acts that are in violation of the criminal or civil codes of the government in which they occur. Generally, if the intrusion is revealed, it will discredit the government that initiates it and thus weaken the prospects of achieving its goals (as well as subjecting all parties to the transaction to criminal prosecution). As a result, a primary criterion for such actions is that they can be denied (known as plausible deniability), particularly if the actions are revealed. The extent to which a state will engage in illegal, secret means is both a measure of the importance of the issue to the initiating country and the perceived prospects of success.

In the post-World War II environment, and particularly in the heated atmosphere of the Cold War, intrusion expanded in terms of the frequency of actions undertaken, in the purposes for taking action, and in terms of the means employed. In actions directly between Cold War antagonists, this meant things like the extensive use of espionage as a tool to learn about the intentions and activities of the other side, and it also meant ratcheting the intensity of intrusive options. The most prominent of the methods employed was what is known as covert action. While virtually all intrusive actions were covert in the sense of being done secretly to avoid the appearance of interference and to maintain the veil of plausible deniability, Cold War covert actions raised the violent content of actions undertaken to the level of at least quasi- or semi-military methods. Two of the most prominent methods were sponsoring or materially assisting the physical overthrow of governments and even the assassination of unfriendly leaders of other countries.

Getting rid of regimes that opposed different countries’ interests is not, of course, unique to the contemporary world. Assassinations with outside backing have a long if not especially rich background, but this course of action is nonetheless notable in the Cold War environment for ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 Setting the Table: The Phenomenon of Intervention
• 2 The Transition: What Happened to Our World of Violence?
• 3 The Interventionist Age
• 4 Modern Mayhem: The American Experience in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
• 5 Sticking Your Guns in Other People’s Business
• 6 Defying Einstein: Repetition and Results
• 7 The Way Ahead
• Index