The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia

Katherine Brickell, Simon Springer, Katherine Brickell, Simon Springer

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780367581473
• eBook ISBN: 9781317567820
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Offering a comprehensive overview of the current situation in the country, The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia provides a broad coverage of social, cultural, political and economic development within both rural and urban contexts during the last decade. A detailed introduction places Cambodia within its global and regional frame, and the handbook is then divided into five thematic sections:

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• Political and Economic Tensions

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• Rural Developments

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• Urban Conflicts

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• Social Processes

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• Cultural Currents

The first section looks at the major political implications and tensions that have occurred in Cambodia, as well as the changing parameters of its economic profile. The handbook then highlights the major developments that are unfolding within the rural sphere, before moving on to consider how cities in Cambodia, and particularly Phnom Penh, have become primary sites of change. The fourth section covers the major processes that have shaped social understandings of the country, and how Cambodians have come to understand themselves in relation to each other and the outside world. Section five analyses the cultural dimensions of Cambodia's current experience, and how identity comes into contact with and responds to other cultural themes.

Bringing together a team of leading scholars on Cambodia, the handbook presents an understanding of how sociocultural and political economic processes in the country have evolved. It is a cutting edge and interdisciplinary resource for scholars and students of Southeast Asian Studies, as well as policymakers, sociologists and political scientists with an interest in contemporary Cambodia.

PART I

Political and economic tensions

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THE CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS OF CAMBODIA

Alignments in Regional and Global Contexts

Sok Udom Deth, Kairat Moldashev and Serkan Bulut

Introduction

Cambodia is a country known for two contradicting geographies and histories: on one hand, as home to the splendid temple Angkor Wat, the largest religious edifice in the world built during the twelfth century, and on the other hand as the “Killing Fields” – popularized by the Oscar award-winning film of the same name that portrayed the genocide of Cambodians between 1975 and 1979 under the Khmer Rouge (known formally as Democratic Kampuchea). Visitors who are not well read on Cambodia’s history are often perplexed by the stark contrast between the country’s past glory and the contemporary signs and symptoms of poverty. Although there has been remarkable urban development during the last decade, this paradox remains largely unchanged.

There are certainly multiple lenses through which one can look at Cambodia and its current place in the world. This chapter does so by focusing on the country’s geopolitics, seeking to situate and discuss Cambodia in the post-Cold War context. Specifically, we examine Cambodia’s transformed relations and ongoing tensions with neighboring countries, Cambodia’s place in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional bloc, as well as Cambodia’s position in the context of a “rising” China and the pivot to Southeast Asia by the US. Finally, we propose a way forward for Cambodia’s advancement of interests in domestic and global affairs.

Since the end of the Cold War, Cambodia has been reintegrated into different regional and global economic and political communities, notable among which were the accession into ASEAN in April 1999 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2004. These processes of regionalization and globalization have certainly contributed to the changes of geopolitical landscapes of Cambodia during the last two decades. Cambodia is no longer an isolated nation of the 1980s that only had diplomatic and trade relations with the socialist Eastern bloc, but a vibrant economy with one of the highest growth rates (expected to be over seven percent in 2015 and the following years) (Asian Development Bank 2015, 213). The Global Financial Crisis in 2008–9 had an indirect impact on the country, hitting its major service sectors that comprised tourism, construction and garment/footwear exports (mainly to the US and Europe). This is a testimony to the connectedness of the country’s position in the global economy. At the same time, on different levels, traditional security issues with neighboring countries, as well as an apparent emergence of the rivalry between a rising China and the purported “pivot to Asia” by the US remain the core geopolitical concerns for Cambodia (and the region at large). The following sections deal with these issues in further detail.

Relations with neighboring countries

Following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge and a United Nations-sponsored transition of the early 1990s, Cambodia was faced with the prospect of being “wedged between two more prosperous and newsworthy neighbors: the economic dynamo of Thailand, the soaring dragon of Vietnam,” where Cambodia’s affairs attracted little interest outside the country (Strangio 2014, xiv). In July 2008, however, a brewing conflict between Cambodia and Thailand attracted global media attention when the Preah Vihear temple and a 4.6 square kilometer tract of land adjacent to the temple became the focus of a militarized standoff. After the Cold War, the relationship between Cambodia and Thailand had been heading towards a more cooperative situation of shared interests. The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thai politics in the late 1990s, and Hun Sen’s emergence as the dominant political figure in Cambodia after 1998, helped forge closer ties between the two countries. Thaksin’s pro-business foreign policy in the region was warmly received by Hun Sen’s “neoliberal” government in Cambodia (Springer 2010). Save for the brief diplomatic rupture following the early 2003 riots in Phnom Penh (which had to do more with domestic politics in Cambodia), relations between the two countries from 1993 to 2008 were by and large amicable, especially during Thaksin’s term (2001–6). Cambodia’s proposal to have the Preah Vihear temple recognized as a World Heritage Site was supported by Thaksin’s proxy government under Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej (Deth 2014).

The conflict over Preah Vihear became a linchpin in Thai domestic power struggles, which eventually saw a military-backed opposition Democrat Party come to power in late 2008. Between December 2008 and July 2011, relations between Cambodia and Thailand deteriorated significantly, with strong mutual distrust, frequent accusations and threats of violence in press releases and through the media, and, worse, occasional deadly military clashes along the border. It was only after Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, won the national election in July 2011 that hostilities subsided and diplomatic relations reverted back to friendship and cooperation. Trade relations between the two countries reached US$4.5 billion in 2013, a 12 percent increase from the previous year (Shen Qing 2014). In November 2014, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Preah Vihear temple and the promontory over which it is located is within the Cambodian territory, but fell short of ruling entirely in Cambodia’s favor over the disputed 4.6 square kilometer area (Raymond 2014).

Due to ongoing domestic conflict in Thailand the dispute over the temple has dissipated, where a renewed focus on pursuing aspects of economic cooperation has prevailed. This holds true both for Cambodia’s relation with Yingluck’s government and with the Thai military government after the recent coup in May 2014. Thailand’s troubles have been felt in Cambodia in other ways, where, as an immediate impact of the Thai coup, more than 200,000 Cambodian migrant workers fled Thailand due to the Thai military government’s crackdown on illegal migrant workers in the country. The crackdown was likely due to concerns that Cambodian workers might join forces with the pro-Thaksin demonstrators. The implication of this policy for Cambodia was huge, resulting in an estimated loss of more than US$1 million per day in revenue (Leng 2014). Relations between the two countries have once again improved, with high-level diplomatic visits and pledges of cooperation on various fronts (Chheang 2014b).

Apart from the Preah Vihear conflict, an issue of particular contemporary concern is the problem of the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, which measures 26,000 square kilometers, and is estimated to contain up to 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and an undetermined quantity of oil (Open Development Cambodia 2012). Cambodia and Thailand had signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2001, setting a joint-development regime over certain areas of the OCA, as well as defining a maritime border. The Thai government unfortunately shelved this agreement in 2009. Talks over the joint effort to explore the OCA re-emerged under Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration, but were halted once more as Thailand was undergoing political turmoil before the May 2014 coup. In early December 2014, Cambodia’s Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP 2014) reported that a Joint Technical Committee for Border Demarcation and Common Development of Oil Resources in Cambodia–Thailand Maritime Overlapping Claims Area chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Sok An had been established. According to the report, in addition to overseeing maritime border demarcation, the Committee is commissioned to “negotiate, prepare for treaties and other legal documents related to the common development of oil resources in the maritime overlapping claims area between the two neighboring countries”. It remains to be seen, however, whether the recent drop in the global price of oil will slow down the negotiation process between the two countries.

With mutual economic and political legitimacy interests at stake, it looks plausible that the Cambodian government and its military counterpart will continue to cooperate on most aspects and avoid highly sensitive issues that may jeopardize the two countries’ relationship in the foreseeable future. While the OCA may eventually serve as a win–win outcome and increase amity between the two nations, the Thai military’s past rhetoric about “protection of Thailand’s national sovereignty” over the Preah Vihear conflict means that the issue will probably be left untouched for some time to come.

To the east, Cambodia’s relationship with Vietnam has also experienced ebbs and flows during the past several decades, particularly as a result of the spillover effects of the Vietnam War. While the pro-US governments of the Khmer Republic (1970–5) fought against Vietnamese communist troops (attempting to get rid of the Vietnamese sanctuaries along the Ho Chi Minh Trail on Cambodian soil), the Khmer Rouge (1975–9) engaged in border conflicts with the now unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, both on land and at sea (Kiernan 2008). During the 1980s, under Vietnam’s patronage, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (whose core leaders still comprise the current ruling Cambodian People’s Party leadership) was established but had to continue to fight against the then in-exile Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which was comprised of three main Cambodian factions: the communist Khmer Rouge, the royalist FUNCINPEC, and the republican KPNLF.

Prior to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, some 150,000 Vietnamese troops had withdrawn from Cambodia. Since then, official diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Vietnam have been largely cooperative. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$184 million in 2001 to US$1.8 billion by 2010 (Thayer 2012). In 2008 and 2009, the two countries signed several cooperation agreements including: visa exemption, goods transit, railway linkages, information exchanges between ministries, and shared radio transmissions (Thayer 2012). In August 2012, the presidents of both countries’ national assemblies committed to building bilateral relations based on the motto, “good neighbors, traditional friendship, comprehensive and long-term sustainable cooperation” (Chheang and Wong 2014, 243). By 2013, the bilateral trade had jumped to US$3.43 billion; Vietnam’s foreign direct investment in Cambodia totaled over $3 billion, while close to one million Vietnamese tourists visited Cambodia during the same year (Chheang 2014a).

Yet, as Thayer (2012) has pointed out, two main issues have continued to dominate Cambodia’s relations with Vietnam since the 1990s: ethnic Vietnamese residents in Cambodia and the land border. Chheang (2014a) has similarly observed that “although bilateral ties strengthened over the decades, they remain vulnerable to domestic politics, nationalism, and external powers’ intervention.” Many Cambodians who support the opposition party (Cambodia’s National Rescue Party—CNRP) also resent perceived hegemonic dominance by Vietnam over the Cambodia. The opposition party has attempted to use this to score political points, often engaging anti-Vietnamese rhetoric. This public discourse underscores the problems of illegal Vietnamese migrants in Cambodia, the granting of long-term Economic Land Concessions to Vietnamese companies along the Cambodia–Vietnam border, which also allegedly bring in Vietnamese workers/residents, as well as Cambodia’s perceived disadvantages in the boundary demarcation process with Vietnam. It is in such a context that Chheang (2014a) argues that “although anti-Vietnam protests do not have much impact on the wider, positive trend of the bilateral relations, both countries need to work transparently to resolve outstanding issues: border demarcation, cross-border migration and economic land concessions granted to Vietnamese companies.” This is particularly salient given the evident decline of popularity of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in the latest 2013 national election.

In December 2014, the incumbent governments of Cambodia and Vietnam pledged to advance further cooperation between the two countries. In particular, they sought to reach a bilateral trade target of US$5 billion by 2015, strengthen collaboration in such areas as tourism and petroleum, demarcate and plant markers along the 1,200 kilometer-long border, and improve mutual understanding and connectivity (Parameswaran 2014). If the CPP remains in power following the 2018 election, Cambodia–Vietnam relations will remain cordial at the state level, though at the expense of further alienating a major part of the electorate. If the CNRP comes to power, its government will have to tread a fine line between maintaining good diplomatic and economic ties with Vietnam on the one hand, and appearing firm in the eyes of its supporters in its dealing with this neighboring country on the other.

To the north, unlike Thailand and Vietnam, Cambodia’s relationship with the Lao PDR makes very few news headlines. In general, although the two countries have a cordial relationship, one particular issue stands out as being a potential flashpoint for conflict: Laos’s construction of hydropower dams on the Mekong River, most notably the massive 1,285 megawatt Xayaburi Dam and the 260 megawatt Don Sahong Dam. If built, according to International Rivers (2014), the dams would block critical fish migration routes, destroy the river’s complex ecosystems that serve as important fish habitats, and affect agriculture as far downstream as the M...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia
• Part I Political and economic tensions
• Part II Rural developments
• Part III Urban conflicts
• Part IV Social processes
• Part V Cultural currents
• Index