Nationalism appears to be rising in a renascent Asia, stoking tensions, aspirations, pride, and identity politics while amplifying grievances and raising questions about prospects for continued peace and prosperity in what is touted as the Asian century. Battles over the past in the present stir concerns about the future as competing narratives are invoked to shape national identities and arouse patriotic passions. Nationalism is raising the stakes in territorial disputes externally while internally marginalizing discordant voices and shaping identity politics with significant implications for ethnic and religious minorities.
This edited collection presents concise case studies of selected regional themes and issues while also presenting analytical overviews of contemporary nationalism in nine nations spanning the region: China, Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Russia. While covering post-1945 Asia, the emphasis is on more recent developments. Given the importance of Asia in the twenty-first century, this book thus aims to be relevant and timely while also providing some deeper background.
This is a transnational, interdisciplinary collaboration that involves leading experts in their fields. The thematic chapters are a mix of cross-national and issue-specific studies that elucidate regional implications of nationalism and other factors contributing to tensions. The country chapters overview what is driving contemporary nationalism and survey the domestic and international ramifications. All of the authors reconsider and interrogate common perceptions about nationalism in Asia with an eye toward deepening our understanding of the context and dynamics lurking behind the media headlines.
Asia is shaping the global future but in many respects remains shackled to the divisive past. Here we explore how contemporary interactions are deeply influenced by shared histories and traumas. There is much to be learned by studying the roots and consequences of nationalism in these societies and the varying challenges they face. Approaching Asia from the perspective of nationalism facilitates a comparative analysis that helps readers better understand each society and the region. Readers will also learn about the ramifications of nationalism for contemporary Asians and the worlds they participate in. The triumphalism implicit in the âAsia centuryâ narrative confronts troubling realities that influence this trajectory and how it is being contested.
In the first section, we begin with an overview of theories of nationalism and end with a survey of public attitudes toward nationalism around the region. Polling data suggest that nationalism is not as rampant as one would expect from media representations, but the willingness to fight for the nation in Asia exceeds levels in the United Kingdom and the United States. Chapters in the thematic section also explore power politics in the region, concluding that energy nationalism is costly and risky. Two chapters examine the nexus of religion and nationalism, focusing on South Asia and China. There are also chapters on nuclear legacies, the rule of law, and the role of leadership as they pertain to nationalism. The Sino-Japanese rivalry that attracts considerable media attention is analyzed from the perspective of great power rivalry and U.S. efforts to counter Chinaâs bid for regional hegemony. Another geopolitical flashpoint, the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands, is traced to U.S. decisions and choices in the 1950s that sowed the seeds of ambiguity and rivalry between Japan and South Korea. The United States wishes these âfrenemiesâ would cooperate more in security matters since both countries are allies, and Washington believes that the disputes on history and territory are sapping the potential of trilateral security cooperation in countering China.
East Asia is home to the second (China), third (Japan) and eleventh (South Korea) largest economies while India and Indonesia are rapidly rising. Worsening geopolitical tensions in recent years raise concerns about the potential for war and the impact this might have on the people and societies in the region and on the global economy, but the absence of major international conflicts in the region since 1979, the so-called East Asian Peace, provides some reassurance. There is, however, a relatively limited regional network of organizations to promote confidence-building measures and dispute resolution mechanisms. The architecture of regionalism is limited to the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its expanded interactions with regional dialogue partners. ASEAN inspires limited confidence because the nature of the organization is oriented towards consensus building. The limits of this approach have been most evident in ASEANâs efforts to cope with a more assertive China as it pursues maritime and territorial claims that overlap with member statesâ claims.
Chinaâs twenty-firstâcentury diplomacy represents the norm of great powers as Beijing is trying to alter the regional status quo to suit its national interests. Problematically, however, there are few examples in history that demonstrate status quo powers conceding enough to accommodate or satisfy rising powers aspirations and ambitions. The lessons of history are thus troubling in terms of prospects for regional peace. These concerns are only partially offset by the extensive economic ties that make conflict unthinkable and compel compromise based on rational assessment of risks and the potential costs of heading into the abyss.
The United States seeks a balancing role as it pursues a policy of containment. Beijingâs apparent hegemonic ambitions have stoked an Arc of Anxiety stretching across Asia from New Delhi to Tokyo, creating a strategic opening for the United States as it bolsters security ties in support of the Obama Pivot. The planned shift of U.S. military forces to the region and upgraded security ties with regional partners are meant to deter China and encourage it to engage in dialogue and compromise. But Beijing does not appear inclined to be a passive stakeholder in a system where others have written the rules; it wants a greater say. It is in this context that Beijing launched its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. Despite Washingtonâs opposition and lobbying, most key U.S. allies around the world, with the exception of Japan, joined the AIIB as charter members, arguing that concerns about governance and sustainability can better be addressed by working from within rather than sniping from outside. Clearly, economic self-interest also played a role in the decision to join, and there is no shortage of regional infrastructure needs that are not met by the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. By not allowing China to assume a role in these international financial institutions commensurate with its growing economic and political heft, Washington played a powerful role in Beijingâs decision to establish its own development bank, one that is certain to project and amplify its influence throughout the region.
The most salient and disturbing question is whether regional rivalries will lead eventually to war or cooler heads will prevail. On balance, there are many good reasons to believe that war can be averted and, if conflict erupts, it can be contained. There is too much at stake to imagine a nightmare scenario devastating the region, but that does not mean there is no risk and suggests the urgent need to deepen dialogue and nurture mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes. It is troubling that expanding militarization of disputes and significant upgrading of security capabilities overshadows the urgency of prioritizing diplomacy.
In this volume, none of the authors argues that nationalism is likely to precipitate major conflict. At most, nationalism generates grassroots support for sabre rattling and skirmishing, but leaders are not hostage to nationalist forces and usually orchestrate nationalism to serve their purposes, both domestically and internationally. So headlines about rising nationalist sentiments sparking war in Asia appear alarmist and misleading. The public is not calling the shots, and leaders are not beholden to extremist nationalism.
The greatest danger of nationalism is domestic, where âenemiesâ are handy and vulnerable. Across the region, nationalism is used to create a sense of âweâ and âtheyâ that often discriminates against domestic minorities. The embers of a self-righteous nationalism based on identity politics represent a serious risk to peace, safety, and the rule of law. Nationalism is the basis for, and justification of, bigotry, intolerance, and stifling of dissent. The mainstream nationalism in each country based on a common identity rooted in shared customs, ethnicity, religion, and language marginalize minorities and âsubversivesâ in ways that imperil their interests and trample on their dignity and human rights. In many Asian nations, this nationalist oppression sparks a backlash that explains support for greater autonomy and, in some cases, separatism. These little nationalisms at the fringes simmer, feeding off shared grievances that spark protests that can erupt into violence and insurrection. As discussed in the chapters that follow, Kashmiris, Muslims, and tribal groups in India, Tibetans and Uighurs in China, Rohingya in Myanmar (Burma), Papuans and Acehnese in Indonesia, and Moros in the Philippines are some examples of minorities that have suffered from more assertive mainstream nationalism. Okinawans also feel their democratic voice is ignored by Tokyo and Washington in deciding issues related to the U.S. bases that are concentrated in their homeland. They know all too well from WWII what it is like to be caught between the strategic calculations of distant powers; one-third of the population was killed in the 1945 Battle of Okinawa in the waning months of a war that was already lost, sacrificial pawns to the machinations of nationalists who believed that their honor required more deaths and sacrifice.
My hope is that deeper understanding of nationalism and its troubling imperatives in Asia will highlight an important feature of the regional geo-political landscape that raises risk and requires bolder leadership. Drawing attention to the insidious nature of nationalism directed inward and the baleful implications for minorities and dissenters exposes the cynical orchestration of nationalism and the harmful consequences it causes. What may be conjured up as a distraction from intractable problems or to bolster legitimacy can spark communalism and intolerance that tarnishes and imperils significant achievements. There is an urgent need for concerted effors to douse the embers of self-righteous nationalism that bedevil the Asian century.
The most populous and economically dynamic region of the globe, Asia is poised to dominate the twenty-first century. But as Asian nations grapple with modernization, can they avoid the economic and political rivalries that plunged Europe into nationalist conflicts in the last century? Newspaper headlines suggest that in recent years, nationalism is spreading across Asia, with a renewed vigour not seen since the end of the Cold War. Unlike in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, modernization in Asia today is taking place against a backdrop of globalization. Yet, rapid cultural exchange and deepening economic interdependence have not undermined the power and resonance of national solidarities (Calhoun, 2007: 1). Rather than encouraging cosmopolitan attitudes, Samuel Huntington, among others, argues that twenty-first century globalization is fuelling inter-civilization and nationalist hostilities both in Asia and across the globe (Huntington, 1996; see also Kaldor, 2004; Smith, 1995).
Despite the different global context, contemporary Asian nations face many of the same difficulties of modernization that confronted Europe a century ago. In responding to the challenges of industrialization, nation building, and democratization, Asian nationalisms share much in common with their earlier Western counterparts. In seeking autonomy and self-rule, the goals of Asian nationalisms are also similar to those seen in Europe. The catalysts for nationalism in East and West are, however, in many cases dichotomous. Nationalism in nineteenth-centuryâEurope spurred imperialist expansion, with resistance to colonial domination subsequently mobilizing nationalist movements for independence in many parts of Asia (Chatterjee, 1986). But even the history of colonialism does not draw a clear distinction between Asian and European nationalisms. Irish and Indian nationalist movements both arose in part in reaction to British domination. Nor can a line be drawn between European and Asian nationalisms in terms of age. The oldest Asian nationalismsâin Japan, the Philippines and Indiaâpredate those in some parts of Europeâfor example, in Estonia, Corsica, and Euskadi (Anderson, 2001).
It is clear that attempts to define a distinct theory of Asian nationalismâdifferent from in the West and all the restâare doomed to failure. Furthermore, no single theory can explain the rise of nationalism in every Asian nation (or its failure to emerge) at every point in time. Within Asia there exists a rich typology of nationalisms, with varying aims and origins. The official nationalism of Meiji-era Japan has obvious differences with the popular nationalism mobilized by the Congress Party in 1930s India. Even within Asian states, a variety of nationalisms compete to influence state policy and action. In contemporary China and Russia, for example, rising popular nationalisms increasingly challenge state-led nationalism projects, circumscribing the autonomy of national leaders in key areas of policy (Deans, 2005; March, 2012).
This does not mean that existing theories of nationalism have nothing to add to our understanding of nationalism in Asia. Although there can be no grand theory of Asian nationalism, when combined with knowledge of specific historical, social and political contexts, theory can help to illuminate why nationalism comes to dominate in certain settings and times (Calhoun, 1997: 8). The existing body of nationalism theories should be treated as a typology of nationalisms that can be used to analyze specific historical cases (Breuilly, 2001). With this in mind, the sections below discuss the three main classical theoretical positions on nationalism. Each section provides a summary of the main variants of the theoretical position under discussion and of the contribution made by key theorists. Before examining theory, I provide definitions of key concepts in nationalism studies. Following other scholars in the field, I begin my discussion of theory with primordialist and perennialist approaches. I next focus on modernism, taking into account the differences between theorists in this tradition emphasizing social/cultural, economic or political factors underlying nationalism. I end by exploring ethnosymbolism.
Primordialist and perennialist theories
Primordialism describes the belief that nations are a natural part of human life. The term comes from the word âprimordialâ, meaning âexisting from the very beginning of timeâ (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010). Primordialist theories postulate that the nation is founded on primordial attachments. These attachments may be cultural (Clifford Geertz, 1973; Edward Shils, 1957); or socio-biological (Pierre Van Den Berghe, 1981). For culturalists such as Shils and Geertz, primordial attachments stem from the cultural âgivensâ (or assumed givens) of language, kinship, religion, race and territory (Geertz, 1973: 260). The attachment that family members feel for one another is not a function of social interaction but âbecause a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of bloodâ (Shils, 1957: 142). Primordial sentiments are overpowering and coercive. If an individual is a member of a group, he/she inevitably feels attached to that group and its customs (Geertz, 1973: 259â260). Primordialism is therefore emotional rather than rational, spiritual rather than sociological. But neither Shils nor Geertz argues that the world is constituted by a primordial reality (Smith, 1998: 157). Rather there is a crucial distinction between perceived givens and actual givens (Brubaker, 2004: 83). Real or otherwise, many nationalists believe in primordial objects and feel their power (Smith, 1998: 158). For nationalists âa man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two earsâ (Gellner, 2006: 6).
For socio-biologists like Van Den Bergh, nationalism derives from the view that ethnic and national groups share a common descentâreal or imaginedâthat is maintained by horizontal ties of marriage (Van Den Bergh, 2001: 274). Ethnicity, then, is âkinship writ largeâ (ibid). Whether extended kinship across the nation or ethnic community is real or not is unimportant. As long as kinship is perceived as real, it can become the basis of âpowerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrismâ (Van Den Berghe, 1994: 98). As neighbouring populations often resemble each other in appearanceâeye and hair colour in East Asia for exampleâcultural crite...