Multiple Modernities and Good Governance

Thomas Meyer, José Luís de Sales Marques

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138574526
• eBook ISBN: 9781351273862
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book represents the first discussion from a political science perspective of the concept of Multiple Modernities in three dimensions. First taking stock of the discussions of the concept itself, the book then connects the concept to more recently developed analytical and normative concepts that concretize it, before finally opening up a discussion about its implications and consequences for the political dimension.

Written by outstanding scholars in the field, the book addresses four principal concepts – Good Society, Good Governance, Human Security and Varieties of Capitalism. It determines whether and to what degree these concepts enable us to discover the commonalities and differences that distinguish the emerging multiple modernities in our time with respect to their political implications and consequences.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of political theory, political economy, international relations, comparative politics and sociology.

PART I

Good governance

1

Multiple Modernities and Good Governance

Thomas Meyer

Modernization theory refuted

Since the end of the “clash of ideologies” era in the 1990s, the overall situation in the world – culturally as well as politically – has become increasingly fragmented, confused, and conflict-laden. This disarray includes a variety of phenomena: more armed struggles and all sorts of old and new wars between groups, the exact nature of which is often difficult to make out. Misunderstanding, disorientation, and suspicion nourish prejudice, fear, and sometimes aggression, all of which make the world more unsafe. In many cases, these circumstances militate against understanding and cooperation, the most urgent necessities in a time of globalization.

Before this “new obscurity” phase (Habermas 1985) of the world situation began, the global pattern seemed rather well structured. Identity and difference, belonging and opposition (both culturally and politically) seemed unambiguous: the “free West” here and the authoritarian communist camp over there, with the neutral countries more or less affiliated with one or the other of the ideological camps. Finally, an all-embracing process of modernization seemed to be underway that would guarantee a final convergence of the different systems due to either the immanent logic of technological and economic progress (Rostow 1960) or the obvious cultural superiority of the West (Lerner 1958). Its own institutional setting appeared to the West as the obvious normative model for the rest of world.

The democratic revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989 has been interpreted in two different ways. First, we have Samuel Huntington’s theory, predicting that the world should prepare for a new age of insoluble conflicts since the great ideologies of the 20th century finally have lost their credibility (Huntington 1996). From his perspective, understanding, mutual recognition, and trust-building among the great world civilizations seemed unattainable because of the deep fault lines that cleave apart their irreconcilable basic values. An era of hostility and conflict was to be expected. Meanwhile, Francis Fukuyama’s declaration of the end of history drew heavily from the classic modernization theories of the 1950s (Fukuyama 1992). He crowned the one and only true victor after thousands of years of struggle and trial and error in human history: the West, with its political system of free elections and economic system of free markets. In that view, liberal democracy and capitalism are presented as the solution to the puzzle of history for all of humanity. Henceforth, so the hypothesis goes, the process of Western modernization could complete its ineluctable historic task: disseminating its unique blessings over the rest of the world by instituting free elections and free markets in every country, East and West, North and South.

As a consequence of such thinking, Western-style modernization was carried out unhesitatingly in the wake of the democratic revolutions that took place across Eastern Europe. In most countries, the process occurred through acts of abrupt institutional change, with the expectation that comprehensive cultural transformations eventually would align these changes with the values and attitudes of the local populace. But these policies brought with them some unanticipated consequences, including the misery of large parts of the population, the temporary return to power of communist parties in some of the affected countries after a few years, and today a strong wave of new authoritarianism in tandem with novel brands of semi-fundamentalist identity politics (Meyer 2001).

In spite of all this, the theory of uniform Western modernization of the 1950s – one that had lost all traction in the interim because it did not fit with the new reality – was refurbished and reformulated as “neo-modernization theory” in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the theocracies of the World (Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc.), as well as China and Russia (the latter after its painful neo-liberal intermezzo), continued to pursue differing strategies that tried to combine (sometimes very) selective modernization with an insistence on the right to their own traditional values and practices.

Two new approaches: Multiple modernities and good governance

Thus, we are now in a situation that invites us to reconsider the combined concepts of modernization and Western-style government along with their implicit claims to be universal models for the rest of the world. During the previous two decades, two alternative conceptions have been put forward in response to this dilemma: the notions of multiple modernities and good governance. Both were developed in an effort to transcend the hegemonic Western discourse about what modernization means and what it implies politically that persisted until the end of the Cold War. Moreover, both concepts originated in an effort to understand and respect cultural differences while building a bridge of common values and objectives between civilizations (Meyer 2007). Thus, although they were developed and presented independently of each other, the intention behind them is similar and they largely overlap.

The multiple modernities approach initially was conceived by the renowned Israeli sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt (2000), who wanted to challenge the hitherto-undisputed monopoly of Western-style modernity as the universal form of modern culture. Eisenstadt argued that the core content of modernity as understood in the tradition of Max Weber is open to a broad variety of differing or even competing interpretations and embodiments, all of which should have equal value and legitimacy. Once accepted as such, these diverse visions could have consequences across all realms of social and political life.

The concept of good governance was first developed on the basis of the experience of the World Bank (1992). It was a first step in overcoming the longstanding propensity of almost all the principal political actors and scholars in the West to consider the Westminster model of parliamentary government as the purest form of democracy, one that could and should be implemented in all corners of the world regardless of context, culture, and history. Good governance was based on the idea that the objectives of human welfare and well-being can be achieved or approximated in countries that reject the classical institutions of Western style democracy. The World Bank definition of good governance makes no reference to institutions or regimes; instead, it highlights several procedural and outcome dimensions of politics, including good government and public-sector management, transparency, and a legal framework for development. Other definitions along the same lines have opted for a more dynamic approach. For example, they might describe good governance as the process by which the interests of the entire society are served in fair ways with increasing opportunities for participation of all and the growing implementation of the rule of law (Meyer 2013).

Both concepts are designed to overcome a long tradition of West-centrism and open up some of the core values of modern culture to a broader variety of possible and legitimate, yet competing, interpretations. They transcend the alternatives offered by Huntington and Fukuyama, respectively. And, of course, they reject the total negation of all modern cultural values by fundamentalists from all civilizations, who incidentally feel very well understood and encouraged by Huntington.

A little later another “third way” paradigm gained prominence in comparative social science and the study of social systems: the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice 2001a). Research based on this approach demonstrated that there is no such thing as capitalism or a free market economy per se, but rather a broad range of combinations among elements: markets, regulations, state intervention, social actors, and restrictions of the rights of private property. Which of the varieties prevails in a country depends mainly on its cultural context and historic experiences. For example, coordinated market economies and liberal market economies differ in degree but not in kind, and to some extent embody cultural differences. According to research produced by this school of thought, there is no prospect of convergence among the different varieties of capitalism in the foreseeable future.

Eisenstadt’s generative idea

Of course, the concept of multiple modernities cannot and does not stipulate anything approaching the uncompromising cultural relativism that characterizes Huntington’s view. Instead, it presupposes a common core of all the different types of modernity. Eisenstadt’s proposal for the definition of such a core has been widely accepted in the debates concerning his theory. The key difference between modernism and traditionalism (here he follows Max Weber) is “the conception of human agency and of its place in the flow of time” (Eisenstadt 2000: 3). Modernism embraces an idea of the future as characterized by a number of alternatives realizable through autonomous human agency – the principle of “subjectivism,” as some have put it. The premises on which the social, ontological, and political order is based, and the legitimation of those premises, are no longer taken for granted as “objective” or given. A new “reflexivity developed around the basic ontological premises of the structures of social and political authority.” Therefore, “modernity and Westernization are not identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only authentic modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others” (Eisenstadt 2000: 3). But the core of modernity includes “the autonomous participation of members of society in the constitution of the social and political order, or the autonomous access of all members of the society to these orders and to their center” (Eisenstadt 2000: 5).

Regarding the governance process, the multiple modernities approach would still entail, among other things, the acceptance and institutionalization (in some form) of social and political pluralism and participation both at the level of debate about the common good and at the level of political decision-making. However, the core demands of modern politics might assume a variety of institutional forms. They could vary along several axes: the prevailing historical situation, the requirement that basic order be maintained, and respect for divergences in cultures and traditions.

This pluralistic notion of the requirements of modern culture overlaps in its meaning, basic thrust, and tolerance for multiple institutional settings with the essential concerns of the concept of good governance.

Varieties of modernity

Each of the three conceptual innovations mentioned above (modernities, good governance, and varieties of capitalism) made its appearance in the academic discourse of the late 20th century and has stimulated inspiring, fruitful research and debate ever since. This is certainly due to the obvious fact that the pattern of ideologies, civilizations, and political systems observable in today’s world does not display any tendency towards uniform standardization anytime soon. To oversimplify a bit, we can assign countries to distinct groups representing different spheres of cultural tradition:

• “The West” (internally split into the different cultures of libertarian and social democracies).

• Religious-political fundamentalism in tandem with theocracies (e.g., in Iran and Saudi Arabia), that deny modern core values altogether.

• Authoritarian systems with representative political institutions and elections and a sphere of economic liberty (e.g., China and Russia) that claim to pursue alternative paths of modernization.

And, in addition, there is the increasing number of failing states and/or those experiencing civil war conditions featuring regional warlord regimes (mainly in Africa) that do not offer any credible legitimizing ideas at all.

The dispute about the essence and the limits of the concept of modernization focuses on the opposing claims of representatives of the “West” and of the authoritarian regimes. Two questions are of particular interest in this context. First, where exactly should we draw the demarcation line between different modes of modernization and outright anti-modernism? And second, do we have clear criteria for distinguishing countries with more or less good governance from those that definitely display bad governance? These are questions that are interesting for theoretical reasons and political assessment as well as for the choice of adequate approaches to international/intercultural dialogue and cooperation.

The logic and dynamics of modernization

Where can we look for answers? From the multiple modernities approach, we can learn that there is a common core of modern culture, even though there may be a broad variety of institutional expressions of this core. As mentioned above, the common core can be formulated succinctly as the principle of subjectivity or self-determination. The renowned sociologist Richard Münch (2001) has proposed that this core can be understood as the universal dimension, or the culturally neutral logic of modernization, consisting in the very general principles of rationalism, secularism, individualism, and universalism (in the sense that arguments address a global community of interlocutors).

It seems obvious that the process of implementing the same logic of modernization in culturally variable settings (the dynamics of modernization) will be conducive to different results depending on its tempo, the culture in question, the historical and social conditions of each country in which the process of modernization takes place, and the point in time at which we observe it. Thus, Japanese, Chinese, American, Russian, Iranian, South African, French, or British modernization all will be and will remain different. Yet, it is also obvious that none of the differences among them can be justified simply on the grounds that each is different. It must be shown persuasively that these aspects of difference still maintain some connection to the common core. In that sense, diversification is in itself the unavoidable logic of modernization, at least as long as “modern” institutions are not imposed on a country from outside. In order to ascertain whether such a connection really exists, it makes sense, at any given point in time, to ask: Is the level of modernization that has been attained so far in a given country permanent, at least according to the judgment of the relevant local authorities, and mainly due to the cultural conditions in that country? Or is it temporary (again according to relevant authorities) and mainly due to a lack of time and/or resources? The answer to this question matters tremendously, and opens up issues for further research.

To forestall serious confusion, we need to make it clear at this point that the model of the modernization process adumbrated in these pages by no means entails an essentialist notion of culture, of the kind that inevitably informs theoretical schemes such as Huntington’s. The idea of a clash of civilizations and its justification by reference to static fault lines running between the basic values of the contending civilizations presupposes that cultural contexts can be treated as though they were natural phenomena incapable of any real change. By contrast, the Münch model – taken as definitive in this context – is both dynamic and open. Yet we must go farther still, treating culture under conditions of globalization (really even before that) as constitutive: i.e., as a dynamic space of social discourse shaped by contradictions, in which competing actors contend to interpret and pass on tradition in light of their accumulated experiences and existing social conditions. What decides the version of tradition that will be handed down is not the content of that tradition itself, but instead the balance of forces among the competing elites charged with interpreting it. The resulting body of tradition that such an elite succeeds in getting accepted is thus always provisional. It is constantly being questioned by major or minor actors who present more or less drastic alternatives and, in various ways, try to win acceptance for their own versions. Even when it seems as though an entire society is clinging rigidly and dogmatically to certain cultural patrimonies, closer examination shows that its elites are involved in a constant defensive struggle against ever-present alternatives offered by those with an interest in challenging prevailing schemes.

Unquestionably, when the defenders of tradition in a given cultural sphere come out on top – as is often the case –...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Foreword
• Introduction
• PART I: Good governance
• PART II: Development
• PART V: Globalization
• 12. Plural modernity and negotiated universals
• Conclusion
• References
• Index