North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security

Tae-Hwan Kwak, Seung-Ho Joo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9780754671763
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317086581
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• Subtopic: Politics

North Korea's testing of a nuclear bomb sent out a shock wave throughout the world and totally changed the strategic equation in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. This testing has far-reaching implications for Korean peace and unification, Northeast Asian security and America's global war on terrorism. This key volume provides an in-depth analysis of the inter-Korean and international dynamics of North Korea's nuclear crisis. It offers new insights into the six-party talks designed to resolve the crisis, suggests creative formulas to resolve the ongoing crisis through peaceful, diplomatic means and delves into the interests and policies of the major powers - the US, China, Japan and Russia - at the six-party negotiating table. The contributing authors are distinguished specialists and experts in the field and as such offer valuable expertise into the dynamics of this nuclear crisis for students and academics

Chapter 1 Introduction

Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo

DOI: 10.4324/9781315598581-1

North Korea’s test explosion of a nuclear bomb on October 9, 2006 sent a shockwave throughout the world and totally changed the strategic equation in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. With that, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) declared itself a nuclear power, and the international community led by the US scrambled to impose sanctions against North Korea.

The second North Korean nuclear crisis began in October 2002 when North Korea allegedly admitted a secret nuclear program based on highly enriched uranium (HEU). Shortly thereafter, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework quickly dissolved and North Korea accelerated its nuclear weapons program without external constraints. The six-party talks, involving the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, convened in Summer 2003 to peacefully resolve the crisis but failed to make a breakthrough agreement. Pyongyang officially announced in February 2005 that it had nuclear weapons, test-fired seven ballistic missiles (including a Taepodong-II long-range missile) in July 2006, and tested its first nuclear device underground in October 2006. With the North Korean nuclear test, the unresolved nuclear crisis entered into a precarious, perilous phase. The North Korean test explosion of a nuclear device was to have serious and far-reaching implications for inter-Korean relations, Northeast Asian security, and the U.S. global war on terrorism; Korea’s peaceful unification seemed remote, Northeast Asian security became unpredictable, and the U.S. war on terrorism faced new challenges.

This book is designed to present in-depth analyses of the inter-Korean and international dynamics of North Korea’s second nuclear crisis, provide new insights into the on-going six-party talks, and offer some creative formulas to resolve the nuclear crisis through peaceful, diplomatic means. This volume specifically delves into the following questions: Why did the second North Korean nuclear crisis begin and how has it evolved?; How has North Korea’s nuclear issue affected inter-Korean reconciliation (or lack thereof) and vice versa?; What are the interests and policies of the major powers, that is, the U.S., China and Japan, at the six-party negotiating table?; What are the short-term and long-term implications of North Korea’s nuclear blast?; and How should the two Koreas and the surround powers untangle North Korea’s nuclear knot for a lasting peace and security in and around the Korean peninsula?

A Brief Historical Overview

The six-party nuclear talks were held on-again, off-again since Summer 2003 but failed to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Hostile policies, inflexible attitudes, mutual distrust, and incompatible positions of North Korea and the U.S. led to the stalemate at the six-nation negotiating table. North Korea has demanded direct negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue and insisted that the U.S. make appropriate compensations for abandoning its nuclear programs. The George W. Bush administration, however, preferred a multilateral framework for resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue and insisted on complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korean nuclear programs. Although main differences among the six participants, particularly between the U.S. and the DPRK, remained unresolved, the talks proved useful. The six nations had substantive discussions about North Korea’s nuclear problem. The U.S. and the DPRK showed some flexibility on certain issues, but remained stubborn on key issues such as North Korea’s suspected HEU program and CVID of North Korea’s nuclear programs.

The six-party talks made substantial progress on September 19, 2005 when the parties produced a Joint Statement of Principles for establishing the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Although the terms of the accord were broad and general, the Joint Statement marked the first concrete agreement among the six parties. It was designed to serve as the basis for further talks on the timing of the North Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs and the corresponding provision of economic aid, diplomatic relations, and other incentives for the DPRK. The U.S., however, imposed financial sanctions against North Korea in the same month, and North Korea refused to return to the six-party negotiating table to devise a roadmap for implementing the 9.19 Joint Statement. The DPRK maintained that it would not return to the six-party talks unless the U.S. lifted the financial restrictions first. The U.S., in contrast, held that the financial sanctions were imposed to prevent money laundering and other illegal activities and should be separated from the nuclear talks. The U.S. financial sanctions and North Korea’s stubbornness regarding the sanctions proved the major obstacle to the resumption of the six-party talks.

North Korea escalated the crisis by test-firing seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006. Among the missiles test-fired was a long-range Taepodong-II, which is potentially capable of reaching the U.S. west coast. This move invited immediate, negative reactions from the international community. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 on July 15, condemning the tests and paving the way for other countries to impose financial sanctions against the DPRK. Additionally, South Korea and Japan unilaterally took punitive actions against North Korea. Pyongyang’s defiant missile tests mounted pressure from all other nations of the six-party talks and produced a high level of tension and anxiety between the DPRK and other state parties. North Korea may have carried out the missile tests in order to increase its leverage at the six-party negotiations. After concluding that the six-party negotiating process was futile and counter-productive, Kim Jong-Il may have wanted to vent out his frustrations and at the same time demonstrate the formidable military capability of his country.

The DPRK announced on October 9, 2006 it had successfully conducted its first test of a nuclear weapon. The historic event shocked the world. It appears that Chairman Kim Jong-Il calculated that a nuclear-armed North Korea could better induce the U.S. to direct bilateral negotiations. The North’s nuclear test promptly led to the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the UN Charter aimed at punishing North Korea for its nuclear test through economic sanctions. The DPRK rejected the resolution and threatened “physical countermeasures” against any state that tried to enforce the UN sanctions. The North Korean nuclear test failed to push the U.S. into bilateral talks but instead put more pressures on Pyongyang through the UN Security Council. It also posed a grave security threat to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. As a result of China’s active, skillful mediation, the DPRK announced on November 1, 2006 that it would return to the six-party talks if the U.S. would discuss and resolve the financial sanctions issue within the framework of the six-party talks.

The Bush administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea proved counterproductive, and North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests were a testimony to the limits of the U.S. hostile approach to Pyongyang. Additional pressures on North Korea were likely to be ineffective since China and the ROK refused to push North Korea into the corner. China has argued that the problem of financial sanctions must be resolved for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the U.S. should engage in bilateral talks with the North for the six-party talks’ resumption. Russia shared the international community’s deep disappointment and anger over North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, but did not want to push for Pyongyang’s regime change or collapse. South Korea reluctantly began to apply limited economic sanctions against the North for the first time in the wake of the missile tests, but still refused to go along with far-reaching, comprehensive sanctions against its communist neighbor. Like the U.S., Japan maintained a hard-line stance toward the North. Japan was already taking measures to incrementally increase sanctions in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. The U.S. and Japan were seeking to apply the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to North Korea. PSI is a policy of the U.S. as part of its global war on terror. If implemented, it will allow states to search and interdict North Korean ships and aircraft for contraband items (the weapons of mass destruction, missiles, illegal weapons, and others). China, Russia, and the ROK have resisted to full participation in PSI.

Following the missile and nuclear tests, inter-Korean relations sunk to the lowest point since the inter-Korean summit of June 2000. After the missile tests, Seoul suspended its regular food and fertilizer aid to the North. The nuclear test jeopardized inter-Korean economic projects such as the Gaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Geumgang tourism resort. Furthermore, the nuclear test compelled the ROK to re-evaluate its engagement policy of national reconciliation and cooperation with the DPRK. The debate over the engagement policy divided and fragmented South Korean society.

North Korea’s nuclear test had multiple implications. In the short-term, the test appeared to weaken the China-DPRK alliance, but strengthen U.S.-China cooperation and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Its long-term impact on the Northeast Asian security was to be manifold. First, it would pose a major challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and might spark a chain-reaction of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and around the world. For now, Japan and the ROK may settle with the extended nuclear deterrence offered by the U.S. but, in the long-run, they might want to acquire nuclear deterrence of their own. Taiwan would be tempted to go nuclear as well. Iran might follow in the footsteps of North Korea, accelerating and securing nuclear weapons for itself. Should this happen, Turkey and Saudi Arabia would be likely to follow suit. Second, the North’s nuclear test certainly prompted Tokyo to accelerate a missile-defense (MD) system in cooperation with Washington, which would in turn push Beijing to spend more money developing advanced nuclear weapons. Thus, a new nuclear arms race among Japan, China and other countries of Northeast Asia might ensure. Third, North Korea might sell nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups. President George W. Bush said, “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action.” ¹ If the North would sell a nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda that could use it against the U.S. or one of its allies, then the U.S. would very likely retaliate militarily against Pyongyang.

1 “World Aligns against N. Korea for Nuclear Test,” Associated Press, October 9, 2006.

The Nuclear Agreement (February 13, 2007)

The third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks, convened on February 8–13, 2007, produced a landmark agreement titled “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement.” The 16 hour marathon-like, all-night negotiating session finally led to a compromise. In the accord, the six nations agreed to take the initial actions as the first step toward the implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action.”

The Gist of the Agreement

The following are key points of the February 13 agreement. ² This action plan has two phases—the initial phase and the disablement phase—to implement the September 2005 joint agreement.

2 The full text of the February 13 Agreement is available online at <http://americancorners.or.kr/e-infousa/wwwh5668.html>

First, at the initial phase, the DPRK must shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days. IAEA inspectors should be allowed to monitor and verify the process. In return, North Korea will get energy, food, and other aid worth 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO). Second, at the disablement phase, the DPRK must provide a complete list of its nuclear programs and disable all existing nuclear facilities. In return, the DPRK will get aid in corresponding steps worth 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or the equivalent in the form of economic or humanitarian aid, from China, the United States, the ROK, and Russia—details of which will be addressed in later working group discussions. It would be worth around $300 million at current prices for Asian benchmark high-sulfur heavy fuel oil, which is used in power stations, shipping, and elsewhere. Third, the United States and the DPRK will begin bilateral talks to normalize their diplomatic relations and the U.S. will begin the processes of removing North Korea from its designation as a terror-sponsoring state and also ending U.S. trade sanctions against the DPRK. However, no deadline has been set. Fourth, Japan will begin bilateral talks with the DPRK to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, an agreement made between the two nations on September 17, 2002. Fifth, after 60 days, foreign ministers of all six nations will meet to confirm the implementation of the joint agreement and discuss security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties, that is, the U.S., China, and two Koreas, will hold a separate forum on negotiations for a permanent peace regime to replace the 1953 Korean armistice agreement. Sixth, five working groups will be established to carry out the initial actions and implement the joint statement: (1) denuclearization of the Korean peninsula chaired by China, (2) normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations, (3) normalization of Japan-DPRK relations, (4) economic and energy cooperation chaired by the ROK and (5) Northeast Asia peace and security cooperation chaired by Russia. Seventh, the sixth round of the six-party talks will be held on March 19, 2007 to discuss actions to be taken for the next phase.

In short, at the initial phase, the six parties agreed on the beginning steps toward eventual dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear arms programs. The deal requires the DPRK to shut down its Yongbyon reactor within 60 days in exchange for 50,000 tons of fuel oil or equivalent aid. After the 60-day period, the DPRK will receive another 950,000 tons of fuel oil, or equivalent aid at the disablement phase, when it takes further steps to disable its nuclear facilities.

Bush Administration's New Flexibility

The nuclear deal on the initial actions was made possible largely because President Bush was willing to take a new more flexible approach to reach an agreement with North Korea. ³ Ever since North Korea’s second nuclear crisis started in 2002, the Bush administration had insisted that North Korea should not be rewarded for its “bad behavior” and that it should first give up its nuclear ambitions before it could receive anything in return. After the November 2006 mid-term elections, hard-liners in the Bush administration, such as former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and former Ambassador to the United Nations John R. Bolton, who had opposed concessions to North Korea left the administration. As a result, the hard-liners’ position considerably weakened and the pragmatists’ stature in the Bush administration enhanced.

3 Glenn Kessler and Edward Cody, “U.S. Flexibility Credited in Nuclear Deal with N. Korea,” Washington Post, February 14, 2007.

The decision-making process of the Bush administration in the case of the February 13 nuclear deal differed from the usual procedures. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice bypassed a usual policy review process to get approval of a deal with North Korea from President Bush. Four key members in the Bush administration—Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley, and President Bush—were directly involved in the decision-making process when a deal with North Korea was vetted after Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kyegwan engaged in negotiations in Berlin in January 2007. The usual procedures in the Bush administration were to review “the details though an interagency process that ordinarily would have brought in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, the Defense Department and aides at the White House and other agencies who had previously objected to rewarding North Korea before it gives up its weapons.” But this time the usual procedures were curtailed. ⁴

4 David Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal,” New York Times, February 16, 2007.

Fierce attack on the deal came from neo-conservatives. John R. Bolton bluntly stated that it was a “bad deal” and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Disarmament Robert Joseph criticized the deal, stating, “the new agreement was no better, and perhaps worse, than one signed by President Clinton in 1994.” ⁵ President Bush and Secretary Rice wanted a deal, because “as the Bush presidency enters its final years, two foreign policy goals have risen higher on the agenda: peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and disarming North Korea.” ⁶ President Bush approved a deal with North Korea and Hill signed it in Berlin in January 2007, which led to the February 13 nuclear agreement in Beijing.

The Bush administration has shown a new flexibility in dealing with North Korea. The Berlin bilateral...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• 1 Introduction
• 2 North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis and the Six-Party Talks
• 3 The Bush Administration and North Korea’s Nuclear Policy
• 4 U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Under George W. Bush: A Critical Appraisal
• 5 China and the North Korean Crisis: The Diplomacy of Great Power Transition
• 6 Japan and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis
• 7 Russia and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
• 8 U.S.-North Korean Negotiating Behavior and the Six-Party Talks
• 9 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) A Bridge Too Far?
• 10 The Six-Party Talks and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia
• Index