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PART I
The current situation
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1
The justification for local government
Throughout its history, the value of having a strong local government system in England, with the ability to make local choices that affect the quality of life of local residents, to whom local authorities are accountable through periodic local elections, has been widely accepted, indeed, for the most part unquestioned. It is a view that the authors of this book whole-heartedly endorse. However, over the past 35 years, this value has come to be questioned, not by local residents, but by successive governments who have taken a series of measures to reduce its powers and diminish its status. It has become important to remind ourselves why local government is so important an element in the government of our nation, in a way which 40 years ago would not have been necessary. This aim forms the focus of this chapter.
At times, the cavalier attitude to local government adopted by the coalition government of 2010–2015, and in particular by Eric Pickles, the secretary of state with responsibility for it, leads one to wonder whether there is an emergent view in Westminster, shared by (some) ministers and senior civil servants, that it might be better if local government were dispensed with altogether! It is hard to imagine a democratic state without a significant level of governmental responsibility at a sub-national level, and there is no Western democracy that has taken this unprecedented step. But we cannot just assume that some form of local government is necessary. To develop a case for a strong system of local government with significant devolved powers, it is necessary to work our way through a series of basic questions about its role and the appropriate scope of its responsibilities, starting with the most fundamental question: do we need local government at all?
A local government-free state?
Can a persuasive ‘in principle’ case be made for dispensing with local government altogether? In its absence, there would necessarily have to be some system for the local administration of centrally prescribed services (as is currently the case with Job Centre Plus). But this kind of local administration is not local government. Local government requires a capacity for exercising local choice (which may be subject in certain circumstances to central government constraint), and a mechanism by which it can be held accountable for the choices made at the local level. To some extent appointed bodies such as the former health Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) met the first criterion, but they did not meet the second.
What would be the arguments against the centre taking formal responsibility for the entire range of services and functions currently allocated to local authorities? What would be the problem if groups of locality-based civil servants (or other unelected appointees), operating from sub-national offices, were to administer education, social services, refuse collection, and land-use planning in line with centrally specified rules over admissions criteria for schools, frequency of refuse collection, and allocation of social housing? It would certainly be possible to organise local decision-making in this way. But could it ever be justified?
There are five reasons why, in the total absence of some kind of local government system, local administration by appointed officials, on a service-by-service basis, would inevitably prove a vastly inferior alternative.
First, it would struggle to recognise and respond to the diversity of local circumstances, traditions, and preferences that are to be found amongst our cities, towns, and counties. There are significant differences between the socio-economic profiles of affluent suburban authorities such as Richmond-on-Thames, decaying seaside resorts like Hastings, traditional cities struggling to reinvent themselves, such as Stoke-on Trent, and new-town based authorities like Telford and Wrekin. All these places have their distinctive histories, culture, and priorities, which can be recognised, understood, and responded to by a democratic politically led institution, in a way that local administration could not hope to replicate.
Second, local administration would inevitably lack the capacity to respond to the public protest that would inevitably develop over issues such as how central rules were applied in contentious planning applications, closures of schools, or elderly persons homes, and loss of funding experienced by arts/cultural organisations. It would be limited in its ability to respond, because it would lack the capacity for local choice, and a mechanism for local accountability.
Third, there would be a lack of capacity to prioritise local services (which is always necessary, and becomes particularly challenging at times of financial constraint) or to join them up to realise potential synergies amongst them. To develop this kind of capacity would require some form of integration of the various service agencies concerned into a collective mechanism: either a partnership (but how could a partnership be expected to make the difficult prioritisation decisions required?), or something which would resemble a multi-purpose local authority (but how would decisions be reached and how could those taking them, in what would in effect be a complex and unwieldy QUANGO – quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation – be held accountable?).
Fourth, an unelected body of this nature would not be accountable to local people for local choices, since national accountability through ministers could never reflect nor respond to local views. Finally, it would further overburden an already overstretched and flawed system of national government and national accountability.
To meet these challenges of inter-service choice and service-interconnection (to achieve goals which transcend individual services) it is inevitable that there would have to be created in each locality an institution closely resembling a local authority, but it would be one which was totally dominated by outposts of central departments, without a vestige of the democratic accountability which local authorities provide.
All of the questions we have so far raised (and answered) as to why local government is needed have been premised on the assumption that the key purpose of local government is to deliver (and to co-ordinate and prioritise) local services. But important though the service provision role is, we would strongly dispute that that is the primary reason for the existence of local authorities. As influential thinkers such as Michael Lyons and Simon Jenkins have emphasised, the primary purpose of local government transcends the responsibility for service provision. It encompasses – or should encompass – ‘community governance’ – identifying and responding to the full range of local problems, challenges, aspirations, and opportunities which face the locality (see Stewart 2000). Central government does not see itself simply (or indeed primarily) as a multi-service-providing or-commissioning agency. Neither should local authorities be seen in this way, if they are to merit the characterisation of local government.
Economies and diseconomies of scale
There is a further argument to address which is made by those who consider that services should be specified centrally and then administered by means of local implementation machinery. It is the familiar efficiency argument associated with ‘economies of scale’. Hospital rationalisation provides one familiar example of this kind of thinking, and the ill-considered move towards large-scale ‘unitary’ authorities another.
The ‘economies of scale’ arguments are by no means conclusive. Some analysts have argued that economics of scale operate only up to a particular level (for example, of population served), after which diseconomies set in, and that there are diseconomies of scale that reflect the complexities of communication involved, which inevitably increase as scale increases.
Linked to the ‘economies of scale’ position is the ‘disadvantages of decentralisation’ (see Allen 1990) – the argument that decentralisation is more costly than centralisation, because it duplicates scarce financial resources and staff. Things can be run more cheaply from the centre, it is claimed, whether the centre is central government, or a large local authority such as Birmingham. But Wilson and Game (2011, p39) point out that Birmingham’s experience challenges this assumption. The city council (England’s largest local authority) has devolved significant elements of its service delivery and policy-making to neighbourhood offices and district committees. In an in-depth Overview and Scrutiny review of devolution (including its financial costs), the following conclusion was reached:
More likely than not, a more centralised model (of service delivery) would entail higher operating costs than the current devolved structure. Savings only arose if functions were dropped.
(Birmingham City Council 2006, p43)
But is this finding so surprising? The 1960 Royal Commission sought evidence of economies of scale, but failed to find any, and we have already noted the phenomenon of ‘diseconomies of scale’. Indeed, as one Birmingham officer put it, there can also be ‘economies of smallness, that can be enormous when you get local engagement and volunteering’ (cited in Wilson and Game 2011, p40).
It is also important to recognise that the ‘economies of scale’ argument is closely linked to the service provision role of local government, and focuses on considerations of efficiency and expediency. But, as Chandler (2010) argues, there are equally important issues of ethics, moral purpose, and local integrity – long established in the history of thinking about local government – which imply different conclusions as to what should be the most appropriate roles and scales of operation of local authorities.
We also need to recognise the centralist argument about ‘equality’ in standards of service provision across the country, which has come to be associated with the criticisms of the ‘unfairness’ of the so-called ‘post-code lottery’ (which could equally be characterised as ‘post-code choice’). We find it hard to equate an awareness of the diversity of local traditions, circumstances, and preferences with the (intrinsically centralist) arguments in favour of uniformity in service standards and provision. However, the influence of the ‘post-code lottery’ is such that a fuller critical response is needed, which is provided in Chapter 5.
Accountability and representative democracy
We have argued that an appointed multi-purpose body with responsibility for local services (and local community governance) could not be ‘held accountable’ to local people in any meaningful sense. There are a range of different meanings attached to the term ‘local accountability’ but no-one has yet succeeded in identifying any accountability mechanism which would be appropriate in the above circumstances, and which does not involve citizens having opportunities to judge the performance of the elected individuals and parties in their area, and their proposals and policies for the future, at regular local elections.
Much has been written about the shortcoming of local representative democracy, typically citing the low turnout at local elections, the alleged low and declining quality of local councillors (but without any evidence to justify the allegation), and the tendency of electors to vote in response to the performance of national government rather than on local issues or the qualities of local councillors and candidates, ignoring the evidence of variations in voting patterns between authorities. These assumed problems do not invalidate the principle of local representative democracy. Such problems may well have come about partly (or mainly) through the decline in powers and status of local authorities over the years (see Chapter 2).
What other possibilities are there for expressing local representative democracy? There are a whole range of operational options that can and should be considered: council size, number of tiers, frequency of election, the form of local elections (for example, first-past-the-post or some form of PR), and the nature of political leadership (including elected mayors). These various choices are explored in Chapter 7. The important point to emphasise is the link between representative democracy and accountability, and the absence of any viable alternative to it. Local representative democracy is by no means a sufficient condition for healthy local government; as we argue below it needs to be supplemented by some form of participatory democracy. But it is a necessary condition. Far from participatory democracy being seen as undermining representative democracy, it should be seen as a necessary support.
The case against ‘single-purpose authorities’
Even if the arguments we have put forward about the need for an election-based system of local accountability are accepted, there remains the possibility that elections (and accountability) could be considered separately, function by function. Elections were held in 2012 for police commissioners in English counties (with pathetically low turnouts). Elections for mayoral candidates are now established in some authorities, although by no means widespread (and are in addition to, not a replacement for, council elections). In principle, it would be possible to extend this practice to hold elections for a number of commissioners with responsibility for specific services or functions (children’s services, town planning, transportation, and housing), who would each then be subject to re-election, after a specified period.1 But such a development would reinforce narrow service perspectives and undermine the potential of local government as community governance.
Although there are benefits in enabling the public to judge performance of those responsible on a service-by-service basis, there are major disadvantages with this approach. It would not be a form of local government which facilitated an overall assessment of the needs and priorities of an area. It would not facilitate ‘joined-up thinking’ nor ‘joined-up action’. The integration of services and functions in line with a wide-ranging vision for the future of an area would be almost impossible in these circumstances. There could be a requirement that these individuals form part of a ‘Partnership’, but without a mechanism for requiring commissioners to respond to the priorities of other commissioners, it would prove a relatively toothless innovation. And if the ‘Partnership’ were to be given significant powers, one would be back to a close approximation to an indirectly-elected local authority as currently exemplified by the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, which has recently been allocated a range of service responsibilities. It would reflect this model: a de facto local authority, but not directly-elected.
The requisite characteristics of a viable local government system
Wilson and Game identify a set of distinctive features of a viable local government system (2011, p37), as follows:
• a form of geographical and political decentralisation
• in which directly elected councils
• created by and subordinate to Parliament
• have partial autonomy
• to provide a wide variety of services, through various direct and indirect means
• funded in part by local taxation.
This list is a useful starting point in seeking to remedy the shortcomings of the current diminished role and status of local government. The various alternatives discussed earlier in this chapter – single-purpose authorities, indirectly elected authorities, and government-appointed bodies of local administration – would not be consistent with this widely recognised broad concept of what local government should entail. But in developing the case for a long-term solution, we would want to go beyond this set of ‘minimum requirements’. It would, for example, be important to add an explicit clause referring to the role of local authorities in developing an overview of community needs and a responsibility to formulate a strategy to facilitate the well-being of the area, which includes the capacity for exercising significant local choice. This inclusion would highlight our emphasis on the importance of the community governance role. In addition, it is important that local choice should be exercised in a way which is responsive to the needs and priorities of local communities, to whom local authorities should be accountable through periodic elections, and that it should be facilitated by a scheme of local government finance which provides the budgetary flexibility to exercise local choice (a capacity very much limited by the current centrally imposed financial restrictions). All these themes are developed in Part II of this book; they are simply highlighted here to give a sense of our intentions. However, at this stage in the argument, it is helpful to discuss other potential strengths of local government, which should be recognised and exploited in the move to a strengthened, genuinely governmental system.
Core values of local government.
There are a further series of values which should form the building blocks of a healthy local government system. These values fit within Chandler’s definition of the ethical (or moral) purposes of local government, which are to be distinguished from the efficiency-related purposes. They include (amongst others):
• building and articulating community identity;
• promoting citizenship and participation;
• dispersing power (subsidiarity).
These values are interrelated, and could usefully be synthesised into a wider principle of localism in a way that overcomes the confusion around the use of the term by the coalition government, following the 2010 election (see Chapter 3), and its subsequent ineffectiveness.
The importance of community identity
In recent years, the word ‘community’ has been used so loosely that it has become almost meaningless (the use of the term in the 2011 Localism Act provides one such example). But it has an interesting history and an emotive resonance, so it remains important to discuss it here. First, it needs to be distinguished from ‘locality’. Whatever else it involves, the term ‘community’ implies some kind of network of social interaction, or nexus of social relationships. ‘Locality’, on the other hand, refers to a spatial territory which can be identified on a map, for example, an overspill estate or an inner-city neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods may contain within their boundaries significant levels of social interaction, to the extent that they can reasonably be characterised as ‘communities’ as Wilmott and Young discovered in Bethnal Green in the 1950s. But they do not necessarily possess this quality. It is unlikely that inner-city areas dominated by expensive blocks of flats aimed at upwardly mobile single people or childless couples would qualify in any meaningful sense as ‘communities’. Second, it is important to acknowledge that, whilst ‘community’ has most commonly been linked with territorial space (that is, ‘communities of place’, such as mining villages, market towns, or seaside resorts), the term can also appropriately be applied to social groupings that are not location-specific, but are based on common interests or ethnic origins – for example, the gay community in Brighton or the Bangladeshi community in Tower Hamlets.
The extent to which locality-based communities still exist is an important conside...
