The Evolution of Culture

The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome

Leslie A White

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781598741445
• eBook ISBN: 9781315418551
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

One of the major works of twentieth-century anthropological theory, written by one of the discipline's most important, complex, and controversial figures, has not been in print for several years. Now Evolution of Culture is again available in paperback, allowing today's generation of anthropologists new access to Leslie White's crucial contribution to the theory of cultural evolution. A new, substantial introduction by Robert Carneiro and Burton J. Brown assess White's historical importance and continuing influence in the discipline. White is credited with reintroducing evolution in a way that had a profound impact on our understanding of the relationship between technology, ecology, and culture in the development of civilizations. A materialist, he was particularly concerned with societies' ability to harness energy as an indicator of progress, and his empirical analysis of this equation covers a vast historical span. Fearlessly tackling the most fundamental questions of culture and society during the cold war, White was frequently a lightning rod both inside and outside the academy. His book will provoke equally potent debates today, and is a key component of any course or reading list in anthropological or archaeological theory and cultural ecology.

PART ONE Primitive Culture

Chapter 1 MAN AND CULTURE

Man is unique: he is the only living species that has a culture. By culture we mean an extrasomatic, temporal continuum of things and events dependent upon symboling. Specifically and concretely, culture consists of tools, implements, utensils, clothing, ornaments, customs, institutions, beliefs, rituals, games, works of art, language, etc. All peoples in all times and places have possessed culture; no other species has or has had culture. In the course of the evolution of primates man appeared when the ability to symbol had been developed and become capable of expression. We thus define man in terms of the ability to symbol and the consequent ability to produce culture.

Man, as an animal, possesses a number of characteristics which qualify him for culture. Among these may be mentioned erect posture, which frees the forelimbs for nonlocomotory activities; an opposable thumb, which makes the hand an effective grasping organ; stereoscopic, chromatic vision; gregariousness; and possibly a few other traits. But the most important qualification of all is the ability to symbol.

We call the ability freely and arbitrarily to originate and bestow meaning upon a thing or event, and, correspondingly, the ability to grasp and appreciate such meaning, the ability to symbol. Holy water provides us with a good example of this. Holy water is a liquid that exists in nature plus a meaning or value derived from man. This meaning or value cannot be grasped or appreciated with the senses. Symboling, therefore, consists of trafficking in meanings by nonsensory means. Keepsakes and fetishes provide us with other examples of symboling. But perhaps the best example of all is articulate speech or language; at any rate, we may well regard articulate speech as the most characteristic and the most important form of expression of the ability to symbol.

Dogs “can understand words and sentences,” as Darwin observed long ago. And today laboratory rats can distinguish the food meaning of green circles from the electric-shock meaning of red triangles. But this is not symboling. In neither case does the animal originate and bestow the meaning; it is man who does this. And in each case dog and rat grasp the meanings with their senses because these meanings have become so identified with their physical bases through the operation of the conditioned reflex that sensory comprehension becomes possible.

Darwin declared that “there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties,” that the difference between them consists “solely in his [man’s] almost infinitely larger power of associating together the most diversified sounds and ideas … the mental powers of higher animals do not differ in kind, though greatly in degree, from the corresponding powers of man” [italics supplied].”¹ This view has been held by many psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists down to the present day.² It can be readily demonstrated, however, that this is not the case; that the difference between the mind of man and that of subman is indeed one of kind, not merely one of degree; that man’s mind is unique among all species of living beings.

There are many things that man can do that no other creature is capable of. Only man can appreciate the difference between holy water and ordinary water; no ape, rat, dog, or any other subhuman animal can have the slightest conception of the meaning of holy water. Many primitive peoples distinguish parallel cousins from cross-cousins; all peoples classify their relatives, distinguishing cousin from sibling, uncle from grandfather, etc. No subhuman animal can do this; no monkey can tell an uncle from a cousin. No nonhuman animal can remember the Sabbath to keep it holy; in fact, he cannot distinguish the Sabbath from any other day, and he can have no conception whatsoever of holiness. No animal other than man can grasp the meaning or value of fetishes. The lower animals can ascertain the intrinsic properties of commodities, but they can know nothing at all about their prices. Incest and adultery exist for man alone; all other animals must remain forever innocent. Human beings can be killed by magical practices; no other animal can suffer this kind of death. Only man has gods and demons, heavens and hells, and immortality. Only man knows death.

All the above examples of behavior are “either-or” situations; one is either capable of the kind of behavior in question, or he is not; there are no intermediate stages. It is not that man has a greater, the ape a lesser, conception of sin, or that man has merely a superior appreciation of the significance of holy water, or a better understanding of prices. The lower animals are utterly and completely incapable of any of the acts and conceptions cited above. No one, so far as we know, has brought forth convincing or even plausible evidence to indicate or prove that any of the lower animals are capable of the sort of behavior illustrated above, even to the slightest extent. No one, so far as we know, has even tried to argue that rats, apes, or any other subhuman animal can have any comprehension whatever of holy water, fetishes, prices, uncles, sin, Sabbaths—or Wednesdays—incest, adultery, etc. None of the lower animals can enter the world of human beings and share their lives. Nothing demonstrates the “great gulf”—as Tylor put it—that separates man from subman more dramatically and convincingly than the life of Helen Keller. Prior to her association with her teacher, Miss Sullivan, Helen Keller lived on a subsymbolic plane. Under the tutelage of Miss Sullivan, she crossed the threshold between subsymbolic and symbolic and entered the world of human beings. And she did this instantly.³

The fundamental, qualitative difference between the mind of man and that of lower species has, of course, been recognized for centuries. Descartes⁴ identified and characterized it. John Locke⁵ recognized a “perfect distinction between man and brutes.” Edward B. Tylor,⁶ one of the great founders of modern anthropology, discoursed upon the “great gulf that divides the lowest savage from the highest ape.” And today distinguished neurologists like C. Judson Herrick,⁷ biologists like Julian Huxley⁸ and George G. Simpson,⁹ and anthropologists such as A. L. Kroeber¹⁰ see the distinction clearly. Since the author has discussed this matter at some length in his essay “The Symbol: The Origin and Basis of Human Behavior,” and since this essay has been reprinted a number of times,¹¹ we shall not deal with it further here.

Man and culture originated simultaneously; this by definition. Where they originated and whether there were many origins, a few, or only a single origin are questions that are not relevant to our discussion here, since we are not writing a historical treatise, and hence are not concerned with particular events in time and place. The time of origin, however, is very significant since it will provide us with a temporal perspective necessary to an appreciation of the evolution of culture. The time of man’s and culture’s origin cannot be fixed with precision, of course, but one million years ago represents a fair consensus among authorities of the date of their beginning.

We may assume that culture came into being in the following way: Neurological evolution in a certain line, or lines, of anthropoids culminated eventually in the ability to symbol. The exercise of this ability brought culture into existence and then perpetuated it. We may elucidate and justify this conception by showing that culture in all its parts and aspects is dependent upon symboling, or, more specifically, upon articulate speech. For this purpose we may divide the components of culture into four categories: ideological, sociological, sentimental or attitudinal, and technological.

The ideological sector of culture is composed of beliefs, and all beliefs—at least all beliefs of man as a human being—are dependent upon symboling, or articulate speech, for their origin and for their perpetuation. A belief that the world is round or flat, that owls bring bad luck, that when tempering material is added to clay better pottery can be made, that man has a soul, or that all men are mortal would be impossible without articulate speech. All the philosophies of mankind—or as components of cultural systems—are therefore dependent upon symboling.

The sociological component—i.e., the customs, institutions, rules and patterns of interpersonal behavior, etc.—of cultural systems likewise is dependent upon articulate speech. How could one know without speech that two mates are permissible if possessed one at a time but not if held simultaneously? Or that marriage with a cross-cousin is permissible, or even obligatory, but marriage with a parallel cousin is incestuous and therefore criminal? How, indeed, could one tell a cousin from an uncle without language? How could one distinguish between mine and thine, or right and wrong, or know what is a polite and acceptable way to behave toward one’s mother-in-law, or how to dispose of the dead, etc., without verbal expression and communication? It is plain, therefore, that the behavior of man as a human being¹² in his social life is dependent upon symboling.

With regard to sentiments, or attitudes, as components of culture, we find the same situation. The feelings or attitudes that constitute the subjective aspect of the mother-in-law taboo, for example, require symboling for their existence. No ape, dog, or rat is capable of feelings cast in such form, or attitudes so organized and directed. The loathing of milk, attitudes toward chastity, snakes, bats, death, etc., are all produced and given form and expression in human society by the exercise of the ability to symbol; without it man would not differ from beasts.

But how is it with the technological sector of culture, the manufacture and use of tools and implements? The definition of man as the tool-using animal, often attributed to Benjamin Franklin—but with a justification open to question—is obsolete. Apes not only use tools with ease, skill, and versatility; they make or “invent” them as well.¹³ They seem to be almost as much at home with tools that require a fine and delicate touch as with those requiring great muscular strength. One ape may learn the use of a tool from another by observation and imitation. But for all this, there is a profound difference between man’s use of tools and the technology of anthropoid apes. The use of tools in the human species is, on the whole, a cumulative and progressive process; it is this that distinguishes neolithic from paleolithic cultures, and the Age of Coal and Steel from the Middle Ages. In the human tool process, one generation may begin where the preceding generation left off. It is otherwise with the anthropoids. Tool using with them is not a cumulative or progressive process; each generation begins where its predecessor began. There is no reason to believe that apes are any farther along technologically today than they were ten, or a hundred, thousand years ago. Why this great difference?

A simple exercise in logic suggests the answer. We shall write two equations, thus:

Primate organism (Ape) = use of tools

Primate organism (Man) = use of tools + cumulation and progress We must assume that the difference between the use of tools, as indicated on the right side of the equations, is due to a difference in primate organisms as set forth on the left side of the equations. And since the human use of tools is equal to the anthropoid use plus the characteristics of accumulation and progress, we must assume that the human organism is equal to the ape organism plus an additional characteristic that is responsible for the difference in use of tools. This reasoning is simple and sound enough. And, of course, we know precisely what this additional characteristic is that distinguishes man from ape: it is the symbolic faculty. The distinctive feature of the tool process in the human species is due, therefore, to the ability to symbol. In the author’s essay “On the Use of Tools by Primates,”¹⁴ he has gone to considerable length to show, specifically and concretely, how symboling and language have transformed the nonprogressive, noncumulative tool process of anthropoids into a cumulative and progressive process in the human species. Since this essay has been reprinted in The Science of Culture and elsewhere,¹⁵ we shall not repeat the argument here.

We see, then, that everything comprising culture has been made possible by and is dependent upon the symbolic faculty: the knowledge, lore, and beliefs of man; his social systems; his institutions, political and economic; his rituals, paraphernalia, and forms of art; his traditional attitudes and sentiments; his codes of ethics and etiquette; and, finally, his technology.

The function of culture. The purpose and function of culture are to make life secure and enduring for the human species. All species of living beings behave in such a way as to perpetuate their kind. Subhuman species execute this behavior by somatic means, i.e., with their bodies, muscles, organs, etc. Man, as a mere animal, also employs his bodily organs in life-sustaining behavior. But as a human being man employs the extrasomatic tradition that we call culture in order to sustain and perpetuate his existence and give it full expression. We may think of culture, then, as an extrasomatic mechanism employed by a particular animal species in order to make its life secure and continuous.

Specifically, the functions of culture are to relate man to his environment—his terrestrial habitat and the circumambient cosmos—on the one hand, and to relate man to man, on the other. Man is related to his habitat by means of tools, techniques, attitudes, and beliefs. Tools are employed to exploit the resources of nature; clothing and dwellings provide shelter from the elements; and utensils of many kinds are used in the processes of living and survival. The life process in the human species is carried on collectively, as well as individually, and it is the business of culture to organize human beings for this purpose. The exploitation of natural resources and defensive-offensive relations with neighbors, or enemies, may require concerted action. Communal hunts, house building, irrigation enterprises may require organization into groups, and warfare is almost always a collective enterprise. But apart from direct relationship to habitat, the effective conduct of life requires the social organization of human beings into groups of various kinds: families, lineages, guilds of artisans, priesthoods, etc. All the various parts of society must be organized into a coherent whole, and this whole must be regulated and administered in order to function effectively. In short, social organization is as necessary for the effective conduct of life and for survival of the human species as technological adjustment to and control over the natural habitat. And embracing everything is a philosophy, a system of beliefs, weighted with emotion or attitude or “values,” which serves to relate man to both earth and cosmos and to organize and orient his life, collectively and individually.

We might express the functions of culture in another way: the purpose of culture is to serve the needs of man. These needs may be divided into two categories: (1) those that can be served only by exploiting the resources of the external world; and (2) those that can be served by drawing upon the resources of the human organism only. Man needs food and materials of many kinds for clothing, utensils, ornaments, etc.; these must be obtained, of course, from the external world. But man has inner, psychic, social, and “spiritual” needs that can be fed and nourished without drawing upon the external world at all. Man needs courage, comfort, consolation, confidence, companionship, a feeling of consequence in the scheme of things that life is worthwhile, and some assurance of success. It is the business of culture to serve these needs of the “spirit” as well as the needs of the body.

Life is continued only by effort. Pain, suffering, lonesomeness, fear, frustration, and boredom dog man’s steps at almost every turn. He requires companionship, courage, inspiration, hope, comfort, reassurance, and consolation to enable him to continue the struggle of life. Cultural devices serve man here. Mythologies flatter, encourage, and reassure him. By means of magic and ritual he can capture the illusion of power and control over things and events: he can “control” the weather, cure disease, foresee the future, increase his food supply, overcome his enemies. Various devices relate him to the spirit world so that he may enjoy the blessings and avoid the wrath of the gods. Cosmolo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Foreword by Robert L. Carneiro and Burton J. Brown
• Preface
• Part One PRIMITIVE CULTURE
• Part Two THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
• Index