The Roots of Political Instability in Nigeria

Political Evolution and Development in the Niger Basin

E.C. Ejiogu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754679875
• eBook ISBN: 9781317016953
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

The constant drumbeat of headlines about Darfur, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Somalia, as well as the other states in Africa that are beleaguered by political instability have made the causes of failed states and intra-state political conflicts a major issue, both academic and practical. Using Harry Eckstein and Ted R. Gurr's congruence-consonance theoretical framework of regime classification, E.C. Ejiogu examines the internal variations of society evident in the Nigerian state to explain why the country experiences political conflict and instability. The first time this theoretical framework has been applied to an African country; E.C. Ejiogu offers a balanced and interdisciplinary analysis of the evolution in the Nigerian political system and the role played by evolved social traits in society. Exploring themes such as colonial rule and legacies, economic development, political authority and religion, Ejiogu insists that it is critical to examine Africa's diverse nationalities in terms of their geography, social, economic and authority patterns as critical elements that are disregarded in accounts of their political development. At a time when the question of state building in Africa is still unresolved, this timely book is a major contribution to the literature on transition processes in African politics and is particularly relevant to scholars and policy makers wanting to grapple with the issues associated with Africa's political disorder and the other social problems it spawns.

PART I
Issues, the Land, the Inhabitants and History

Chapter 1
Introduction: A Chronology of Continuing Instability

One of the several arguments made in subsequent chapters is that the absence of political stability in Nigeria can partly be linked to the entrenchment and dominance of the autocratic Hausa-Fulani authority patterns in Nigeria’s body politic over a duration of time that spans its existence as a corporate entity following the amalgamation of the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria on January 1, 1914 by Frederick Lugard. In Nigeria, Hausa-Fulani authority patterns have become so deeply entrenched and their dominance is so profound in the exercise of state power and authority that more than any other factor, they now determine to a considerable degree, the course of political development in the country. In the discourse presented in this current work, some aspects of the analysis establish that amongst the distinct inhabitants of the Niger basin that were made by British colonialism to constitute Nigeria, in those of them that the practice of authority is normatively democratic, there was a consistent resistance to colonial rule particularly because of their perception of colonial rule itself as being autocratic, and of the authority that derived from it as being grossly illegitimate. This was the case in especially the nationalities in the south of the Niger basin. Thus, for as long as it lasted, colonial rule provoked acts of insubordination in those nationalities in the south that translated to political instability in the Nigerian state. Whereas in the north, especially within the core of the Hausa-Fulani Caliphate society, the opposite was the case. There are also nationalities in the upper Niger that evolved democratic authority patterns. Some of them were conquered by the Fulani in the jihad of 1803–1904, and made part of the Sokoto Caliphate Empire. But their aversion for Hausa-Fulani political control entailed that those parts of the Caliphate Empire that they inhabit remained restive, which translated to some measure of political instability in the Empire up until and even after colonial conquest (Adeleye 1972). In contemporary times that restiveness is indicative of the aversion for Hausa-Fulani control in those nationalities that are often targeted with orchestrated sectarian violence against Christians in the north.

Although, colonial rule officially ended in Nigeria since October 1, 1960 with achievement of independent nationhood, the negative impact continues to flourish and distort the cause of Nigeria’s politics in every sense of the word. Those negative effects have continued to provoke events that impact the country’s contemporary socio-political development in ways that translate to continuing instability of the Nigerian state (Badru 1998a). The Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967–70 which represented a bold attempt by the Igbo to secede from Nigeria on the auspices of the Republic of Biafra is one such event. Ever since the end of the war in 1970, the irregular systems of governance that Nigeria continues to experience including the highly unstable military regimes that manifested immediately after the war; the bogus democracy experiments involving civilians—epitomized by the shaky Second Republic (1979–83), the Third Republic (1999–present)—the new and bold agitations for autonomy by nationalities in the south, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta from where much of the hydrocarbons that fund state revenue are extracted, are also related events that are symptomatic of the instability that threatens Nigeria’s existence and viability as a modern state.

The Niger Delta, which is home to the Ogoni, the Ijo, and others, is engulfed in a low intensity warfare which is not ebbing even in the face of documented and brutal attempts by Nigeria’s military and security forces to suppress it. Elements of Igbo youth have spear-headed the resuscitation of Biafra’s secession on the auspices of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). Yoruba youth formed the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) and have made it a platform on which they now agitate for the re-structure of Nigeria along the lines of the nationalities that constitute it. All of these represent real threats to Nigeria’s existence as a corporate entity. It is interesting that these events and issues that surround them have been unfolding in ways that are indicative of the longevity of the core problems they represent in Nigeria. These events and the issues that derive from them underscore the extent to which political instability in Nigeria is deeply rooted in the arbitrary and flawed state building—as subsequent arguments made in the book show—that brought the country into existence in the first place.

The Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967–70

The Nigeria-Biafra war that lasted from 1967 through to 1970 was preceded by an orchestrated revolt in the army, which in turn was followed by riots that were also orchestrated in cities all over the upper Niger. Indeed, the riots and the war remain remarkable events that the Igbo people have found difficult to erase from their collective psyche. The revolt in the army targeted Igbo officers and enlisted men in the army who were systematically killed en mass, while the riots targeted and killed Igbo civilian residents of many cities in the north (Jacobs 1987). The revolt and riots were related events that manifested in open hostility directed towards the Igbo by Hausa-Fulani ruling elite. That hostility gave sustained impetus to the war after it broke out, and for the duration of time that the war lasted. The riots that started in the north in May 1967 were reportedly orchestrated by influential members of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite who were aggrieved by the death of their colleagues who lost their lives in the January 15, 1966 coup d’état in which Igbo middle- and lower-rank officers played prominent roles (Luckham 1971b, Jacobs 1987).

According to Robin Luckham (1971b) and Dan Jacobs (1987), the intention of the Hausa-Fulani orchestrators of both events and those who participated in them was to avenge the death of particular Hausa-Fulani politicians who died in the coup d’état. The riots were preceded by the said revolt in the army, which was also orchestrated by the same categories of people to achieve two specific goals—avenge the death of Hausa-Fulani politicians killed in the coup d’état, and initiate the separation of the upper Niger from the rest of Nigeria (Luckham 1971b, Jacobs 1987). The revolt later metamorphosed into a coup d’état when the British reportedly convinced its orchestrators, executors, and subsequent beneficiaries “that the interests of Northerners lay in a strong Federal Nigeria that those who controlled the North could dominate” (Jacobs 1981: 25).

At about the time when the prospects of Igbo secession from Nigeria and the war it provoked when it eventually happened loomed ominously in the horizon, the Igbo had developed a “growing sense of isolation … and the conviction that they were being unjustly persecuted for their success in the competitive struggle for modernization” (Luckham 1971b: 214). The Igbo have been associated variously with an achievement motivation that paralleled the Calvinist cultural traits exposed by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930) as the core catalyst that gave birth to rational capitalism in Western Europe, because of their legendary penchant for industry and their inclination to acquire modernization-inducing Western education and learning (LeVine 1966) in Nigeria.

The propensity of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite to incite their masses and beneficiaries of their patronage in the core Caliphate society to rise and inflict targeted political violence on perceived adversaries is legendary in Nigeria. Political violence was first deployed in Nigeria as a repertoire by the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite in 1953 in the northern city of Kano when it was used to intimidate “delegations of southern politicians [who] had come up to the Northern cities … in order to campaign for early independence” (Luckham 1971b: 210) for Nigeria which was considered a threat to an educationally and economically backward north by the Hausa-Fulani elite (Luckham 1971b). The repertoire was effective in that those politicians from the south who made that call for early independence backed down, and it was not until seven years after then that self rule from British colonialism was achieved. Ever since, the repertoire has often been deployed quite quickly and used to intimidate targeted groups to achieve specific political goals. The ease with which the repertoire is deployed derives from a ubiquitous patronage-clientage system that underpins the practice of authority in the Caliphate society, and aides in the nurture and sustenance of the cultural conditions that support political corruption among the Hausa-Fulani (Smith 1964). It is therefore understandable why beneficiaries of deliberate measures of affirmative action put into place in the period 1958–66 by Hausa-Fulani politicians to realize significant presence of men from the upper Niger in the officer corps (Luckham 1971b: 243–4) were also the principal participants in the execution of the revolt. Lt.-Colonel Murtala Muhammed, the ring-leader of the revolt was one such beneficiary on several counts. Muhammed was one of the secondary school boys from the north who enlisted as officer cadets because Hausa-Fulani politicians toured the north to convince secondary school boys to enlist. According to Luckham, sequel to the January 15, coup d’état, Muhammed received an affirmative action-type rapid promotion from the regime headed by the late General Aguiyi-Ironsi to whom the rump of the corrupt civilian government which was the specific target in that event handed the reins of government. Muhammed was a maternal cousin of Alhaji Inuwa Wada, a member of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite who was the minister of defense at the time, i.e. 1965–6 (Luckham 1971b: 112).

Today in contemporary Nigeria, patronage-clientage has become a normative instrument central in the conduct of state affairs at every level. Increasingly, patronage-clientage enables the insertion of unqualified and incapable individuals especially from the north into every political office—including the presidency—and appointments into positions in every facet of the bureaucracy in Nigeria. It breeds the corruption and the abuse of public office that are now the staples of politics and economy in Nigeria. In Nigeria, clientalism sustains political instability in the polity by fueling the poor legitimacy perception of the state and its functionaries by citizens who are rightly chagrined by the ineptitude and poor governmental performance that result when mediocre personnel are put in-charge of vital structures of the state and the economy. On the direct relationship between the predominance of mediocre personnel in vital structures and establishments of the state and low governmental performance in the polity, there is need here to refer to Harry Eckstein’s assertion on the inevitable adverse consequences in society of the cultural socialization that individuals receive and bring along with them in every role they play: “Men”, he [Eckstein] observed, “are able effectively to perform political roles if their previously learned norms and behavior substantially prepare them for such roles and if the norms and practices demanded by their concurrent social roles do not create strains or painful ambivalences and contradictions with their political ones” (Eckstein 1969: 278). One salient implication of Eckstein’s assertion is that culture matters in politics and their outcome in society. Eckstein’s assertion applies aptly to what currently obtains in Nigeria ever since the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite successfully acquired and continue to retain state power. Individuals who constitute the ruling elite amongst the Hausa-Fulani are socialized to perceive and wield political and social authority as autocrats in whatever leadership position they assume in society. Patronage-clientage which is anathema to democratic governance is the normative hallmark of their cultural socialization. Under their charge, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has been transformed into a de facto unitary state in which the practice of authority is personalized and the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite function as the extension of the state. The outcome in terms of political and economic mismanagement and continuing political instability in Nigeria has been both huge and extensive. In a heterogeneous polity where authority patterns peculiar to the constituting nationalities clash like they do in Nigeria, the consequences in terms of poor governmental performance and political instability are inevitable and often extensive. Chinua Achebe’s (1983 and 1984: 1) assertion that: “The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership” could probably have been distilled from this immediate argument about the burden that continuing Hausa-Fulani control of state power represents in Nigeria’s political development. The logic of my interpretation of Achebe’s assertion derives from the evidence inherent in the Eckstein-Gurr framework that political leaders are products of their societies and cultures. An autocratic socio-cultural milieu often begets a political leadership, which is true-to-type, inspires fear and sustains itself through patronage-clientage reciprocity that reproduces itself. Murtala Muhammed whom Achebe used albeit erroneously to typify dynamic leadership that jolted tardy civil servants to turn out early to work in Lagos in the morning on the day he staged his coup d’état and ousted Gowon from power in 1975 is instead a good example of a true-to-type leadership that derived from Hausa-Fulani autocratic socio-cultural milieu. It momentarily intimidated civil servants into compliance and quickly frizzled out. Here was an individual whose inglorious antecedence encompassed the execution of the 1966 revolt in the army as well as alleged war crimes that he ordered and supervised as a battle commander in Asaba, who had garnered prominence as a ruthless military leader in the media for so doing. Mere mention of his name in the airwaves that fateful morning inspired the fear that jolted civil servants out of their notorious tardiness. Apart from that jolt, which frizzled out almost immediately, no lasting fundamental re-structure of the Nigerian state ever emanated from his short-lived dictatorial regime.

The revolt in the army and the riots that are described above achieved the ultimate “pacification” of the Igbo who are deemed troublesome and anathema to the Nigeria project—“a nation in name only … formed to suit the convenience of colonial trading interests … which faced the problem of absorbing dissimilar peoples” (Jacobs 1981: 18)—for reasons that derived from their democratic authority patterns that ill-disposed them to play the subservient roles that they were required to play in a polity that was by all intents and purposes, built by the British to be dominated by the Hausa-Fulani who are ardent autocrats. Dan Jacobs infers as much when he observed inter alia that:

For Britain, and for the British civil servants who continued to work in the Northern Region, the Ibos (sic) had always been a troublesome element in the federation, a people with democratic traditions who were not easily controlled. Many British were as glad to see them out of a central position in the federation as were those who had driven them back to their homeland and those who now held civil service and other jobs they had left. (Jacobs 1981: 25)

Not only that state building by the British consciously placed the entire upper Niger and the other distinct nationalities that also inhabit it under the control of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite, de facto British rule enabled the latter to perceive and engage the former as an “imagined community” which they ruled, treated and related to paternalistically. In a similar vein, it was not only that British rule used the amalgamation of the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria to predispose the rest of what became Nigeria for Hausa-Fulani rule, it subsequently handed the reins of power and state control to the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite by manipulating the outcomes of the 1951/2 national census and the 1959 general elections that ushered in political independence on October 1, 1960. That was why Luckham (1971b: 90) aptly described Nigeria’s post-independence government as “a civilian regime strongly dominated by the Emirates structures of the North”. That was how it came to pass that during the First Republic, 1960–66, political power according to Chunun Logams (1987: 55) “was based in Kaduna [the Northern Region’s seat of power] rather than in Lagos [Nigeria’s federal capital] and its exercise was personified in the Sardauna”, the then premier of the Northern Region.

Related to all of these and also pertinent to factors that triggered the war are “the social structure of the Hausa-Fulani emirates in the North, and the consequent determination [of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite through their political party, the Northern Peoples Party] NPC to dominate the Federation” (Diamond 1988: 300). Larry Diamond underscores the line of thought expressed above even further when he asserts that:

The structure of class domination in the North interacted in complex fashion with the other casual agents. The federal structure preserved it intact and served its domineering ambitions. The coincidence of party, region and ethnicity, in turn flowed partly from the monolithic dominance it insisted upon throughout the North …

Nothing was so fundamental to the peculiar political balance of,

the First Republic as the NPC’s determination to control the Federation and to continue to control it indefinitely. Part of this was the pride of a dominant class that was more established and culturally quite different from its emergent counterpart in the South, orientated to the Islamic Middle-East rather than to the West. Part was the resent and insecurity of a class and a people who were far behind the South in every dimension of modernization … Part involved the familiar hunger for the modern instruments of power, wealth and status. And part was the need to control the Federation in order to preserve the structure of class domination.

That the structure of class domination in northern Nigeria was still,

fundamentally intact at Independence owed heavily to the British strategy of colonial rule, coupled with the skills and ‘savvy’ of a new generation of Northern leaders using the new political institutions to modernize the traditional social structure without altering its hierarchical and religious character. (Diamond 1988: 300–301)

Larry Diamond believes that as far as the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite was concerned, the only way that its elements would “continue to preserve the essence of the traditional structure—the power of the Native Authorities (if not the Emirates themselves), the alkali courts, complete control over the pace and content of modernisation in the North” (Diamond 1988: 300–301) would be to ensure that state power and authority in Nigeria remained in their firm grips.

The individuals who constitute the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite were quite aware of the fact that democratic re-alignment of power in Nigeria to achieve vigorous and unfettered participation of the Igbo, Yoruba and others would pose serious threats to the continued existence of a monolithic north. As far as they were concerned that would entail a situation in which “men from profoundly different cultures could use federal power to level traditional social gradations and alter or eliminate [the] traditional institutions” (Diamond 1988: 301) that they rely on to retain their cling on power in Nigeria. The bid by members of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elite to prevent that fostered their determination to retain control of state power in Nigeria by all means. On the other hand, the attempt by the Igbo to secede and the war that it provoked were therefore, inevitable. The Nigeria-Biafra war is a good indicator of political instability in Nigeria. There is indeed ample evidence that have been provided in subsequent chapters in the book to show that the war and other indicators of political instability in Nigeria partly derived from the flawed state building processes that brought Nigeria into exist...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Maps and Figures
• List of Tables
• Maps
• Preface
• Part I: Issues, the Land, the Inhabitants and History
• Part II: The Nationalities
• Part III: Advent and Prospects of a Beleaguered Supra-National State
• Appendix 1 Synopsis of the Eckstein-Gurr Scheme
• Postscript Patterns of State Instability in Africa
• Bibliography
• Index