Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 1560–1713

Siobhan Talbott

• Publisher: Routledge
• Edition: 1
• Year: 2015
• Topic: Economics
• Print ISBN:
  9781848934078
• Subtopic: Economic Theory
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317319597
• Index: Economics

Using untapped archival sources from Britain, France and America, Talbott presents a comparative view of British relations with France over the long seventeenth century.

1 Beyond 1560: The Auld Alliance

On 5 July 1560 the commissioners of Elizabeth I of England and the Scottish Lords of the Congregation, along with French representatives in Scotland, drew up the Treaty of Edinburgh. This treaty formally concluded the Siege of Leith, the twelve-year occupation by French troops of that port. It was agreed that 'all the military forces pertaining to either party [England and France] shall depart out of Scotland' and that 'all manner of warlike preparations ... in France against the English ... shall hereafter cease'.¹ Shortly after the signing of this treaty the Reformation Parliament met, approving the Scots Confession and confirming Scotland's conversion to Protestantism. Both of these events have contributed to a tradition of scholarship that sees the year 1560 as marking the end of the historic Auld Alliance between France and Scotland: a mutual, defensive, military alliance against the might of England that had been in force since 1295.² This chapter tests such claims, highlighting certain facets of the Auld Alliance that remained in place after 1560. In the process, a fundamental contention of this book will be established: that the Auld Alliance contributed to the ongoing development of the Franco-Scottish relationship throughout the early modern period. This perspective not only alters our view of this specific association, but changes how we should view the development of Great Britain domestically, her overseas relationships and the broader political dynamic within Europe.

I.

On 23 October 1295, prompted by the ambitions of Edward I, France and Scotland agreed a mutually defensive alliance against England in the Treaty of Paris.³ The alliance was conceived as a military one, intended to guarantee both parties support from the other in the case of an English invasion. The Treaty was ratified at Dunfermline on 23 February 1296, cementing Scotland's 'inward love and affection' for France 'on an ever more solid basis'.⁴ Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Auld Alliance – and specifically its military nature –was confirmed through numerous renewals and specific references to assistance in conflict.⁵ The terms of the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560, then, with the French agreeing to withdraw 'all military forces' from Scotland and to 'cease warlike preparations' against the English, seems to undermine fundamentally the central component of this alliance.

Crucially, however, the Treaty of Edinburgh did not provide for the formal conclusion of the Auld Alliance. Not all military ties were severed, and

a certain number of French soldiers excepted, as shall be condescended upon by the commissioners of France, and the lords of Scotland ... remain in the castle of Dunbar, and fort of Inch-keith ... untill the Estates should find means to maintain the said forts upon their own charges.⁶

Though retrospectively the Treaty of Edinburgh seems to mark a shift from a Franco- to an Anglo-Scottish accord, English as well as French forces were asked to leave Scotland, and France still held the advantage in Scottish relations in the form of the French dowager queen, Mary Stuart – indeed, her marriage to Francis II in 1558 has been heralded as the apogee of the Auld Alliance.⁷ Further, the Treaty of Edinburgh was wholly concerned with the military aspects of the Franco-Scottish relationship, making no mention of other benefits and privileges that had, by 1560, become central to this association. As Elizabeth Bonner recognizes, by 1560 the Auld Alliance 'had long ceased to be just a military alliance. It had developed many other social, cultural, architectural, commercial, artistic, literary and educational links which certainly did not cease in 1560'.⁸ Though Bonner, focusing on the medieval context, does not elaborate further on her claim, it is clear that by 1560 the Auld Alliance had grown into far more than simply a military agreement. Though the Treaty of Edinburgh certainly shaped and altered the historic Franco-Scottish relationship, it did not formally conclude the Auld Alliance, nor did it put an end to many established aspects of it.

The Scottish Reformation, confirmed a few days later in the Reformation Parliament, appeared to indicate further a shift in allegiance, with France remaining Catholic and England having already asserted her Protestant faith. If we accept the notion that a common religion was a crucial force in early modern political relationships,⁹ this shift seems both inevitable and obvious. The Scottish Reformation has been seen as fundamental in breaking the Auld Alliance, fostering the belief that 'a significant element [of the Reformation of 1560] was rejection of the long-established association with France'.¹⁰ Recent work has repeated past assertions without question, perpetuating the notion that 'the onset of the Protestant Reformation shattered Scotland's close relationship with France (enshrined in the "Auld Alliance")'.¹¹ These contentions build too on a tradition of scholarship believing Scotland's change in religion to have been fundamentally linked to a move towards England, as 'confessional realignment was accompanied by a radical shift away from the traditional political axis of the Auld Alliance between Scotland and France ... England became a focus of Scottish diplomatic attention as the two converged through the Protestantism of both nations'.¹² As with the Treaty of Edinburgh, however, the Reformation Parliament made no formal provision for formally concluding the Franco-Scottish relationship. While Scotland's religious conversion would of course have some impact on its overseas associations, a formal break with France was neither provided for nor, as we shall see, desired by either party.

The events of 1560, as well as being seen as a move away from France, have been heralded as a move towards Protestant England, as 'the progress of Protestantism, meat to the Scottish Anglophile party, was poison to the French alliance'.¹³ Retrospective knowledge that Scotland and England were to be formally united in 1603 and 1707 has fuelled acceptance of this notion. In reality, however, the remaining bonds between France and Scotland 'were much stronger than the fairly fragile peace with England'¹⁴ directly following the events of 1560. Further, as the remainder of this volume will demonstrate, this in some aspects remained the case throughout the long seventeenth century, with Scotland and England being far from fully united in 'British' relations with France after the Union of Crowns or of Parliaments.

II.

Thomas Moncrieff's Memoirs Concerning the Ancient Alliance between the French and the Scots, published in the mid-eighteenth century, states that 'it is unquestionable, that, to begin from Philip the Fair [r. 1285–1314], there runs an uninterrupted train of alliances between the Kings of France and Scotland, down to Henry IV and James VI'.¹⁵ More recent research confirms that the Auld Alliance was indeed renewed by every Scottish and French monarch up to the mid-sixteenth century – except Louis XI (r. 1461–83).¹⁶

The obvious question, then, requires an answer. If the Auld Alliance was not brought to an end in 1560, when did it cease to exist? It is true that by 1560 the military defence on which the alliance was originally based had become anachronistic, but as Bonner points out, military concerns were no longer its crux. Throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century there were persistent overtures from both France and Scotland seeking to confirm the continued existence of the alliance and the 'privileges' it granted to both parties. French and Scottish representatives, monarchs and governments consistently referred to the 'ancient friendship' or 'ancient alliance' when it was politically or economically expedient to do so – but this was not simply rhetoric. Both Scotland and France strongly asserted their desire to have at least some of the terms of the Auld Alliance confirmed in their pre-Reformation form. The trading privileges enjoyed by both parties took centre stage, though military concerns were not absent, despite the implementation of the Treaty of Edinburgh.

The first formal overtures came in 1561, and came from France. The senator of Bordeaux, Noalins, came as an ambassador to Scotland, 'craving that the league betwixt Scotland and England might be brokin, the ancient league betweene Scotland and France might be renued'.¹⁷ The events of the previous year did lead, it would seem, to concerns that Scotland's allegiance would shift from France to England, but Noalins's advance indicates an immediate desire that the historic, 'ancient league' remain unchanged. It is all the more interesting that the first overtures to secure the continuation of the Franco-Scottish alliance were instigated by France. Auld Alliance scholarship has not seen the relationship as an equal one but one in which Scotland was the weaker partner, needing the alliance more than France and gaining more from it than she contributed.¹⁸ Some have gone so far as to say that between 1550 and 1560 'Scotland was in some danger of becoming a French province'.¹⁹ Indeed, it has been suggested that attempts at renewal came solely from Scotland after 1560, as 'it was only by constant embassies and agitation by the Convention of Royal Burghs that ... exemptions [and privileges] were maintained'.²⁰

From 1561, though, the desire to rekindle the Auld Alliance lay with the French as much as with the Scots, with the 'gude freindschip and amytie standing betuix the realmis of France and Scotland' reported in 1577 being felt on the French as much as on the Scottish side.²¹ Scotland's reaction to French overtures tells a story that belies her apparently inferior status in the relationship, for rather than bending to France's desire she used the opportunity to strengthen her political position within the British Isles.

On the 14^th [May 1583] there arrived an embassy from Scotland ... [Colonel Stuart] is to request this Queen [Elizabeth, of England] to give a firm assignment for £12,000 to pay the pensions and the guard that holds the King, and to lend him a sum of money to repair the fortresses, some of which are in ruins. It is even said that if she will not agree to it they will be obliged to renew the alliance with France, and accept the subsidy and pensions from that country, which are again being offered by the French.²²

Reports such as this suggest that Scotland was fully capable of maintaining diplomacy with both France and England on her own terms, rather than being the inferior partner in either relationship. Five years later, while acting as ambassador to France, the Bishop of Glasgow suggested to the Queen Mother that 'it would be detrimental to France if you should fall into other hands in default of the friendship and continued alliance of the French crown'.²³ Into the mid-seventeenth century, France continued to demonstrate desire to renew the ancient terms of her alliance with Scotland. In 1644 French diplomats, concerned with the visit of Sir Thomas Dishington of Ardross, reported that

the first thing to be done is to re-establish promptly and efficiently the privileges of his nation and its ancient alliance with France. That without this re-establishment nothing can be done in the present state of things ... It is necessary that those of his country be satisfied with the treatment they receive here.²⁴

When Charles I authorized the Privy Council of Scotland in 1644 to appoint an ambassador to the French court to ask that Scotland 'micht be restored to the former priviledges and enjoy the samene in tyme cuming without diminutione',²⁵ Scotland would not officially commit to any French alliance but instead obtained all she could from France without offending England.²⁶

Despite her political candidness, Scotland did seek to re-enforce her trading privileges in France after 1560. In 1570 the Privy Council of Scotland voiced concern that a proclamation that no-one may 'repair in the pairtis of France in their accustumat traid of merchandice without a testimonial frome the Queen' was being

sinisterlie purchest be the malice of wickit persounes to steir up occasioune of trubill and unquyetnes betuix our Soverane Lord and his darrest brother, the maist Christian King of France, their realms, dominions, and subjectis, in hurt and prejudice of the ancient league and constant amitie that so lang hes continewit betuix the nationis.²⁷

In 1597 James VI opened formal negotiations for 'observing the old liberties and privileges granted to Scottish merchants trading with France, and for obtaining discharge of customs and imposts raised on goods imported into that realm or transported furth thereof', prioritizing the maintenance of specific commercial links.²⁸

It is unsurprising that either nation pushed for the continuation of this relationship, or that Scotland sought to strengthen her own position by maintaining diplomacy with both her auld ally and auld enemy, and there were wider motivations at play. Though James sought to maintain the 'old liberties and privileges', his assertion that 'benefits redounding to the merchants of this country from the discharge of the said customs and exactions to be annexed to the crown' suggests financial motivation.²⁹ In 1561 France's overtures were governed by the wider European political climate: a fractured Britain was more attractive than a united front. Further, it was a relationship that could be used to strengthen France's position with England – in 1570, 'the French ambassador continues his audiences wit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Dedication
• List of Figures and Tables
• Introduction
• Part I: Frameworks
• Part II: Experiences
• Conclusion: 'The Said Privileges are Still in Vigour'
• Appendices
• Notes
• Works Cited
• Index