Getting to Yes in Korea

Walter C. Clemens Jr

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781594514074
• eBook ISBN: 9781317259190
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

President George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an "axis of evil" but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea's plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward. Clemens distils lessons from U.S. negotiations with North Korea, Russia, China, and Libya and analyses how they do-and do not-apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era.

CHAPTER ONE

HOW KOREA BECAME CRITICAL

Getting to yes in Korea will never be easy. But all parties to tensions there owe it to themselves and the world to try. The actions of a militant but nearly failing state in the north could intensify arms buildups and even spiral into war involving the world’s greatest powers. The confrontation between North Korea and the United States over nuclear and other issues marked “the first 21st century conflict between a failed state relying on the threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation to ensure regime survival, and a world power intent on preventing such flexing, blackmailing, and transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to potential terrorists.”¹ Behind this confrontation, of course, is a long history of enmity, misunderstandings, and crossed signals. The past is not past. It continues today and will shape the future. Nonetheless, this book inquires whether—and how—a multifaceted conflict could be transformed into multifaceted cooperation advantageous to all parties.

Neither Pyongyang nor Washington nor their other negotiating partners could be sure of one another’s intentions or capabilities. When former U.S. president Bill Clinton went to Pyongyang in June 2009, he received red carpet treatment. He dined and talked with Kim Jong Il for several hours before bringing home two U.S. journalists jailed by Pyongyang for “illegal entry” and efforts to conduct a “smear campaign” against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The government’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said Clinton held “candid and in-depth discussions on the pending issues between the DPRK and the United States in a sincere atmosphere and reached a consensus of views on seeking a negotiated settlement of them.” It also reported that Clinton had delivered a verbal message from President Barack Obama, a claim denied by the White House. But whether or not Clinton carried a message from Obama, DPRK media could boast that a former U.S. president had come and met with the Dear Leader. Concurrently, Pyongyang initiated a series of conciliatory gestures to Seoul, including renewed but limited family reunions.

Did all this signal that North Korea was ready to “get to yes” on nuclear and other controversial issues? Or, as cynics suggested, did Pyongyang merely seek relief from recently tightened UN-approved sanctions? Did it conciliate and promote negotiation just to neuter outside pressures? Was Pyongyang ready to give up its incipient nuclear arsenal, or did it strive to win international recognition as a nuclear weapons state? Did it intend to open the DPRK to economic and other reforms or only encourage more relief shipments of food and fuel? Did it want to normalize relations with all its neighbors, including South Korea, or to deal one on one with the White House while diminishing the Blue House in Seoul? Some experts on the DPRK opined that the regime would never open up because the ensuing revelations would erode the system and devour the ruling elite. Others said that North Korea had no choice but to risk liberalization and hope for a “Chinese” solution. The tea leaves permitted both interpretations.

North Korea’s leaders also had to question the intentions of their interlocutors. Did China and Russia wish to bolster old comrades in Pyongyang or reestablish their imperial influences? Did Washington and its ROK and Japanese partners seek a modus vivendi with the DPRK, or were their tepid handshakes and fuzzy promises aimed at regime change? Even if the Obama administration did not plot regime change, it reiterated the George W. Bush administration’s dual mantra: The United States would not reward bad behavior and would insist on “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” in North Korea. Pyongyang had to consider whether, if DPRK denuclearization became irreversible, Obama or his successors might renege on U.S. commitments.

These and other uncertainties paired with an unquestioned reality: Nuclear war, even on a “limited” scale, would bring catastrophe to Northeast Asia and perhaps to the world. Policy-makers had reason to prepare for the grimmest scenarios but even more reason to find solutions to the security dilemmas facing each party. They needed to develop structures and build habits to foster cooperation and make “defection” unlikely. In the decades between Josef Stalin and Boris Yeltsin, the Kremlin and White House transformed their relations in a positive direction. Could Pyongyang and Washington—despite asymmetries of power and much bloodletting—do the same? Could they get the other concerned players, especially those in Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Moscow, to support the peaceful transformation of Northeast Asia?

The path to a harmonious transformation faces major obstacles within each actor and across the world stage. Some features of politics and culture within South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia as well as the United States favor accommodation with Pyongyang, but other agents and structures in each country work against a deal. The weakness of the United Nations coupled with asymmetries of power and values among the key players add to the difficulties. But even if most concerned actors labored in unison for harmony on the Korean peninsula, they would still face a tough and often defiant partner. North Korea’s regime has long been among the most aggressive players in international affairs and the most repressive at home—doing little even to address mass hunger. North Korea—officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—became the first country after World War II to invade and seek to annex a neighbor, South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK). The DPRK may hold the modern record for state sponsorship of terrorism and assassination. The Pyongyang regime has dealt harshly not only with its own subjects and with the ROK but also with its patrons in Moscow and Beijing. No other government has defied the UN Security Council for so long and so resolutely. None has accepted and then stepped back from formal commitments so often and so dramatically. No other government has treated so shabbily the relief agencies whose programs save millions of its citizens from acute hunger and disease. Would any other government kill an authorized guest and then demand an apology? (See Box 1.1)

Recognizing these and other problems, this book asks, Is it possible to transform the divided Korean peninsula from a cockpit for nuclear war into a zone of cooperation for mutual gain? Can bitter and distrustful adversaries deal with their differences by diplomacy, or can they be resolved only by brute force? If a negotiated settlement is thought to be potentially useful and feasible, how can it be achieved? What approaches have proved useful, and which have failed? Are there lessons from these interactions that could be applied to other confrontations between avowed antagonists—even to those between nuclear weapon haves and have-nots aspiring to join the nuclear club?

Box 1.1 Shoot First and Add Insults Later

In July 2008 a DPRK soldier shot and killed a South Korean woman as she walked along a beach in an area that Pyongyang later claimed was marked as off limits to foreigners. The killing took place on the very day that ROK president Lee Myung Bak spoke in favor of more North-South engagement without preconditions. Not swayed by the president’s message, Pyongyang’s authoritative newspaper Rodung Sinmun (July 27, 2008) asserted that the “Lee Myung Bak group of traitors is touting ‘pragmatism’ and the policy of confrontation with the DPRK based on it,” which the DPRK oracle called a “fundamental factor bedeviling north-south relations.” Pyongyang expressed no regret for the incident but demanded that Seoul apologize for the transgression.

The bellicose words and deeds of North Korea’s leaders raise doubts about whether other governments can ever reach an accommodation with Pyongyang about “high” politics (security issues such as nuclear weapons and boundaries) or even issues of “low” politics (trade, the environment, culture). For Pyongyang, nearly everything is high politics—from energy to human rights. The regime’s behavior challenges any view that DPRK diplomacy arises merely from a “high context” culture that requires polite and patient nurturing to settle differences. North Korea’s diplomacy seems driven by deeper aspirations than maintaining “face” (cheymyeon) and nourishing the “inner spirit” (kibun) of negotiations.²

As the twenty-first century began, the Republic of Korea offered a model of economic dynamism, self-government, educational excellence, and “wired” infrastructure. Its pop culture animated Japan, China, parts of the United States and Europe, and even—underground—North Korea. By contrast, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea menaced the world not only with its weapons but also with its economic and political fragility. Washington and Tokyo worried about North Korea’s military strength; Beijing and Seoul feared its weakness. Both concerns were justified: The DPRK could become a failed state equipped with nuclear weapons.

But why worry about Korea—a small corner of Northeast Asia dwarfed by its neighbors? Not long after the Korean War halted, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave this answer: “Never has fate been secreted in so unlikely a receptacle.” Reviewing recent history, Acheson wondered: How could so much in world affairs depend on what happened in Korea?³ More than half a century later, in a world more closely interdependent than ever, a smile or a grimace in Korea reverberates far and wide.

“Location, Location, Location”—in a Tough Neighborhood

Size is not everything. But in world affairs, as in real estate, value is often shaped by location. Korea is the hub of security concerns in Northeast Asia and beyond—a crossroads for commerce but also a cauldron for war. A map of the peninsula shows a potential dagger pointed at Japan, China, and Russia. Indeed, Koreans at times have ruled Manchuria, but they have seldom encroached on their neighbors. Instead, outsiders—Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, Manchus, Russians, Americans—have taken turns trying to dominate Korea. As CIA analysts put it: “Victimized by its strategic location throughout history,” Korea has been and continues to be “the scene of competition for dominant influence by its powerful neighbors.”⁴

Proximity counts. As a Chinese general noted: “China and Korea are separated by only a river. They depend on each other like lips and teeth. What concerns one concerns also the other. The security of China is closely connected with the survival of Korea.”⁵ China, followed by Japan, sought hegemony over Korea and exclusion of other external influences. Japanese forces left in 1945, but Japanese interest in Korea remained. An early Japanese version of Encarta had 216 articles on Korea—compared to just 46 in the U.S. edition.⁶ A single comic book on North Korea’s “dear leader” Kim Jong Il (portrayed as a depraved despot) published in Japan in 2003 sold half a million copies in a few months—probably more than all the books ever published on Korea in English.⁷

Patterns in U.S. Policy toward Northeast Asia

How has the United States responded to the challenges and opportunities in Northeast Asia? Despite long distances and dangers, Americans have engaged in trade and in mortal combat with Koreans for nearly two centuries. U.S. actions and inaction were inspired by what policy-makers conceived to be the realities of power—bolstered by pressures from firms hoping for business in Asia. For most of America’s aspiring realists and merchants, however, Korea was less important than its neighbors. Washington readily sacrificed Korea to America’s larger concerns with Japan and, later, with the USSR. American officials paid little heed to U.S. diplomats, missionaries, and educators in Korea wishing to preserve its independence.

Some of America’s first encounters with Korea were violent. As we shall see in Chapter 3, a privately owned gunboat in 1866 and a U.S. naval flotilla in 1871 sought to “open” Korea to commerce. Despite these bloody encounters, Korean leaders were soon looking to the United States for help in modernizing and protecting their country. As Japan took over Korea, however, official Washington turned a blind eye. No president spoke publicly of Korea from 1911 to 1942. When the Japanese departed in 1945, one Korea became two—divided north and south—in part because Washington did little to foster a free and independent Korea. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 soon changed all that. President Harry Truman and his secretary of state saw Korea as a battleground between the free world and the communist. For some observers, Korea became a test of collective security; for others, the first in a string of unwinnable wars pointlessly chosen by U.S. presidents.

Despite an armistice in 1953, more than half a century passed with no formal peace agreement between the belligerents in the Korean War. Instead, U.S. and ROK troops confronted DPRK forces along Korea’s demilitarized zone (DMZ). The presence of U.S. troops in Korea reassured some South Koreans but angered others. Some South Koreans wanted closer ties with China to counter U.S. influences. North Korea’s leaders usually demanded withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula but on occasion allowed that American forces might stay. A near constant in DPRK policy was a quest for normalized ties with the United States. One motive was to offset China’s heavy presence. “It would be good for the United States,” a visitor to Pyongyang was told, to have North Korea “as a buffer state in this dangerous area. Who knows, perhaps there are ways in which the United States could benefit from our ports and our intelligence if we become friends.”⁸

Following some brief respites in the 1990s, tensions flared again in the early twenty-first century as North Korea moved to join the nuclear weapons club. Washington worried not only that Pyongyang might acquire the means to destroy portions of South Korea, Japan, and North America, but also that DPRK actions would encourage Iran, Japan, and other states to go nuclear. It might also sell nuclear materials and know-how to aspiring terrorists.

As Washington applied more muscle, Pyongyang resisted. In May 2009 the ROK became the ninety-fifth country to join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. In response, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Mission to Pyongyang challenged the validity of the 1953 armistice. The KPA asserted that “the Lee group of traitors” in Seoul, “steeped in sycophancy and submission to the marrow of its bones,” blindly yielded to its U.S. master. As a result, the KPA would “regard any hostile actions against the DPRK, including checkup and inspection of its peaceful vessels, as an unpardonable encroachment on the DPRK’s sovereignty and counter them with prompt and strong military strikes.” The KPA “will not be bound to the Armistice Agreement (AA) any longer since the present ruling quarters of the United States, keen on the moves to stifle the DPRK, plugged the south Korean puppets into the PSI at last, denying not only international law but the AA itself and discarding even its responsibility as a signatory to the agreement.” Waffling on its position, however, the KPA also said that “in case the AA loses its binding force, the Korean Peninsula is bound to immediately return to a state of war from a legal point of view and so our revolutionary armed forces will go over to corresponding military actions.” Hence, “for the present,” the KPA would not “guarantee the legal status of the five islands under the south side’s control … in our side’s territorial waters … and safe sailing of warships of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces and the south Korean puppet navy and civilian ships operating in the waters around there.” The KPA concluded: “Those who provoke the DPRK once will not be able to escape its unimaginable and merciless punishment” (emphases added).¹¹

Box 1.2 First Impressions of North Korea and the World

December 12, 1952. Soviet troops patrolled their zone not far from central Vienna, where Jean-Paul Sartre gave the opening address to the World Congress of the Peoples for Peace. Sartre later called the congress one of the three experiences in his life that gave him hope.⁹ For me, a nineteen-year-old foreign student with a press pass, the congress provided my first opportunity to meet people from Asia and Africa. Drawing on my high school French, I translated for Vietnamese anxious to tell English-speakers about ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Foreword by Governor Bill Richardson
• 1 How Korea Became Critical
• 2 How Korea Became Korea
• 3 How Korea Became Japan
• 4 How One Korea Became Two
• 5 How North Korea Got the Bomb
• 6 How Kissinger and Zhou Enlai Got to Yes
• 7 How to Get to Yes across Cultures
• 8 How Carter and Clinton Got Closer to Yes with Pyongyang
• 9 How Bush and Kim Jong Il Got to Deadlock
• 10 How Ideas and Free Will Can Trump Hard Power and Fortuna
• 11 How to Avoid the Worst and Foster Better Futures
• 12 How Should Obama Deal with Authoritarians?
• 13 How to Get to Yes in Korea?
• Notes
• Index
• About the Author