Authoritarian Backlash

Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union

Thomas Ambrosio

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754673507
• eBook ISBN: 9781317177098
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Authoritarian Russia has adopted five strategies to preserve the Kremlin's political power: insulate, bolster, subvert, redefine and coordinate. Thomas Ambrosio examines each of these in turn, all of which seek to counter or undermine regional democratic trends both at home and throughout the former Soviet Union. Policies such as these are of great concern to the growing literature on how autocratic regimes are becoming more active in their resistance to democracy. Through detailed case studies of each strategy, this book makes significant contributions to our understandings of Russian domestic and foreign policies, democratization theory and the policy challenges associated with democracy promotion.

Chapter 1
The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy

[C]elebrations of democracy’s triumph are premature. In a few short years, the democratic wave has been slowed by a powerful authoritarian undertow, and the world has slipped into a democratic recession.

Larry Diamond (2008)

In 1989, at the height of the ‘third wave’ of democratization, Francis Fukuyama (1989) proclaimed an ‘end of history’—by which he meant that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe represented ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ over its rivals. Soon afterward, some were concerned that this would lead to a ‘reverse wave’ of renewed autocracy.1 By the mid-1990s, democratic consolidation appeared threatened in various countries and the spread of democracy seemed stalled, leading Diamond (1996) to ask whether the third wave was at an end.2 Around the same time, Robert Kaplan (1997: 55-6) argued that democracy promotion was becoming counterproductive: ‘the democracy we are encouraging in many poor parts of the world is an integral part of a transformation toward new forms of authoritarianism’.

However, beginning in 1999 with the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and reaching a fever pitch with the so-called ‘color revolutions’ of 20032005 in the former Soviet Union, it appeared that a resurgence of democracy was in the making.3 Whether this constituted a new wave of democracy or a delayed extension of the third depends on how one categorizes this phenomenon in terms of time frame and political dynamics.4 Nevertheless, it appeared that something qualitatively different was stirring and these revolutions were seen as sharing certain common characteristics: electoral fraud exposed by vote monitors, a central role for nongovernmental organizations in mobilizing anti-regime activities, and mass street protests which eventually brought down the autocratic leader. Just as important, they were perceived by many authoritarian regimes as representing a new and distinct political threat—not an extension of the events which precipitated the collapse of communism. Therefore, it would be appropriate to call this a ‘fourth wave’ of democracy.5 The fact that the November 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia was followed by the November 2004-January 2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the spring 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, vividly raised the prospect of further democratic revolts on at least a regional scale, possibly setting an example outside of the former Soviet Union which might lead to a global ‘rainbow of revolutions’.6 Optimism about the prospects for democratization proved to be premature, however.

There has recently been a growing sense that this fourth wave of democracy has reached the high-water mark and has begun to recede. In contrast to Eastern Europe in 1989, when communism eventually fell in all of the Eastern Bloc countries,7 the color revolutions were limited to three. The proposed Denim Revolution in Belarus failed to materialize, the Tulip Revolution was not replicated elsewhere in Central Asia, the new Kyrgyz government backslid on its commitment to democratic norms, and the autocratic leaders of the former Soviet Union seemed well-entrenched. This pattern could be seen elsewhere around the world with a noticeable erosion of democracy in a number of countries and clear evidence of an active ‘backlash’ against democracy promotion by authoritarian states (Diamond 2008). This reverse wave was precipitated, in large part, by the revolutions themselves as regimes sought to prevent further democratic contagion.

On the one hand, this reverse wave has been quite traditional in the sense that countries have sought to counter internal threats through domestic actions, such as consolidating power, undermining potential challengers, and, in some cases, using violence against opponents. On the other hand, what distinguishes this authoritarian backlash from those which came before is its emphasis on the international level. This manifests itself in four ways. First, the rise of democracy assistance, coming primarily from the West, and the growing realization that external forces can spark or nurture anti-regime activities, has meant that authoritarian governments have been increasingly concerned about how to protect themselves against cross-border pressures. Thus, for example, there has been a global drive to crack down on liberal nongovernmental organizations in an effort to push back against external democracy promotion (Carothers 2006, Gershman and Allen 2006). Second, authoritarian countries are increasingly active in creating an international environment conducive to the survival of autocracy. Burnell (2006) observed that some countries are engaged in ‘anti-assistance’ and ‘counter-promotion’ aimed at strengthening authoritarian governments abroad. States which need economic, military, or political assistance no longer either have to go to the democratic West or go without; they can now turn to countries such as China, Russia, and Venezuela whose growing economic clout has allowed them to gain allies by not requiring the good governance procedures or human rights standards often demanded by the West (Collins 2007). Third, authoritarian countries are beginning to band together to resist what they see as forced democratization from the West in general and from America in particular. While these states are not establishing formal alliances in a traditional sense, the positive relationships between countries such as China, Russia, Myanmar, Belarus, Iran, and Venezuela8 are examples of how authoritarian regimes are increasingly aligning with each other. The strength of the international authoritarian backlash has been helped by the fact that two of the great powers of the system, Russia and China, are non-democracies (Gat 2007). Finally, the legitimacy of both democracy promotion and liberal democracy itself will be increasingly questioned in the international system. In a clear response to Fukuyama, Robert Kagan (2008) published an article entitled, ‘The End of the End of History’, in which he argued that we are now seeing greater ideological competition between democracy and a new, confident, and global authoritarianism. Kagan cited Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech before the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in which he asserted that ‘for the first time in the last decade and a half a real competitive environment has formed in the market for ideas’, in particular in regard to ‘value [systems] and development models’.9 This challenge will likely grow in the future. This is not to say that democracy’s days are numbered. Far from it. Instead, it is clear that the international system is in the midst of a substantial reverse wave against international-level democracy promotion. How authoritarian countries seek to resist or counter the fourth wave of democracy is the central concern of this study.

The Russian Case Study

In order to begin to understand the political dynamics and future implications of this renewed authoritarian resurgence, there very well might be no better case than to look at Russian domestic and foreign policies. The Russian Federation is one of the strongest examples of the rollback of democracy in the past two decades. Its post-Soviet democratic experiment was short-lived and replaced by a discernable shift toward autocracy. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, this process accelerated and now Russia’s political system can be best classified as authoritarian, with the centralization of power, the erosion of civil and political liberties, and the return of the state’s dominance over the economy and the media.10 Therefore, the Kremlin has a strong interest in ensuring that regional and global democratic trends do not affect its hold over the Russian political system and that the legitimacy of democracy promotion and regime change are subverted.

More importantly, however, Russia was at the very heart of the fourth wave with two of its neighbors (and a third within its sphere of influence) ‘falling’ to democracy. The specter of democratic contagion in the region, like the political wave which brought down the East European communists in 1989, became a real possibility. There were a number of similarities between the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the post-communist autocrats in the former USSR which were worrying for the Kremlin. Just as the pro-democracy forces in Eastern Europe were motivated by events in Poland and Hungary in 1989, the organizers of the Orange Revolution took their cues from events in Georgia, and Kyrgyz opposition forces likewise sought to follow earlier models. These achievements would later inspire those advocating for an uprising in Belarus. Furthermore, Georgian activists gave direct organizational and logistical support to their Ukrainian counterparts who, in turn, sought to aid the opposition in Belarus and Russia. Thus, although ultimately based upon local dynamics, the color revolutions were linked as success in one place helped spark similar upheavals elsewhere. In addition, like 1989, the international environment was very supportive of democratization, as demonstrated by American and European Union public statements urging free and fair elections and by its provision of aid to pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations. This meant that these anti-regime uprisings were occurring within an environment of active democracy promotion. Consequently, given Russia’s place at the center of this phenomenon, understanding how the Kremlin reacted to these events can provide important insights into how authoritarian regimes confront powerful democratic pressures.

Predictably, the Kremlin’s reaction to these color revolutions was quite negative and reflected grave concerns about their political implications. This was echoed in the Russian press, with some referring to these events as an ‘orange plague’ or Orange virus’, and asking whether they could spread and possibly threaten the Russian government itself.11 Consequently, the Kremlin’s authoritarian tendencies intensified after the color revolutions and the government adopted a wide-ranging set of policies aimed at undermining cross-border, democratic forces at home and creating a politically-favorable, regional environment abroad. In addition, Russia emerged as a principal opponent of democracy promotion globally and its relationships with other like-minded states formed the core of the authoritarian alignment in the international system. Russia therefore represents an excellent example of a ‘guardian’ state—one which actively seeks to halt, resist, or contain democratization in order to preserve its autocratic political system (Lynch 2004).

Central Questions

This book explores the recent authoritarian backlash against democracy and the various ways in which authoritarian regimes react to regional and global democratic trends and attempt to counter democracy promotion at the international level. It utilizes Russia as an in-depth case study of this phenomenon. It seeks to answer three questions. What can the scholarly literature tell us about the reaction by authoritarian states to this fourth wave of democracy? How has this backlash against democratization been reflected in Russian domestic and foreign policies? What can the Russian case study tell us about the future of democracy and the growing challenge of authoritarianism?

First, in order to better frame this analysis, it is necessary to explore how scholars have previously understood democratization. Democracy is inherently an internal process and conducive domestic-level conditions are necessary for democratic openings and consolidation. However, the notion of a democratic wave indicates that there are powerful international-level components to this phenomenon. This study will therefore focus on this level. There is a growing body of literature which makes a strong argument that external actors, forces, and processes play an important role in prompting or facilitating democratization. Too often, however, the primary concern of this literature has been with the positive progression of democracy at the international level. In other words, it has attempted to explain democratic successes, rather than democratic failures, and democracy promotion, rather than autocratic opposition. Consequently, it is necessary to move beyond this traditional perspective in an effort to better understand how authoritarian states counter external democracy promotion and undermine cross-border, democratic forces. To this end, this book proposes five strategies of authoritarian resistance—insulate, redefine, bolster, subvert, and coordinate—which are employed to achieve these political goals. None of these strategies are, in and of themselves, sufficient to prevent democracy or to secure these governments in power. Nevertheless, they represent a wide-ranging policy repertoire for authoritarian regimes when confronting democratization at the international level. These strategies are outlined in Chapter 2 and examined in subsequent chapters.

Second, Russian leaders took seriously the threat that the so-called ‘orange virus’ could spread further in the region and possibly threaten the stability of their regime. They therefore adopted a number of policies designed to undermine democratic forces at home and abroad. This book analyzes some of these policies bundled under the five strategies of authoritarian resistance. Each is covered in a separate chapter which examines how the strategy was applied by Russia in a particular case. An evaluation of the strategies will be provided together in the book’s conclusion. This study seeks to make a substantive contribution to our understanding the nature and processes of the recent reverse wave by exploring how these strategies work in a real world setting through in-depth case studies.

Finally, by seeing how these strategies were implemented in the Russian case, this book also seeks to set the stage for future research and to consider the future of democracy. There are strong indications that Russian policies are a harbinger of things to come as autocratic countries become increasingly active in countering democratic norms. The insights derived from the former Soviet Union will be applicable to other cases, such as China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, which have participated in their own responses to democracy promotion and have sought to ensure favorable regional and global environments. Moreover, by understanding how authoritarian resistance works, the Russian case can also indicate how the democratic world can best advance its values in the current global context.

Limits

Before continuing onto the book outline, it is important to identify the limits of this study. First, this is an in-depth look at one case in order to identify and elaborate the five strategies of authoritarian resistance, as well as to derive insights applicable to future cases. It is an exploratory study and not meant to be a comprehensive examination of the global backlash against democracy. Additional cases and avenues for future research questions are identified in the Conclusion.

Second, Chapters 4–8 are not designed to cover every instance where Russia has adopted a particular strategy. For example, Chapter 6 deals exclusively with how Russia has sought to bolster or reinforce Belarus against regional democratic trends. However, Russia also adopted a similar strategy toward Uzbekistan (though, to a much lesser extent) after Uzbek President Islam Karimov ordered a violent crackdown on anti-regime protests in May 2005. While this latter case may be important, the case studies are designed to illustrate how these strategies were implemented in actual circumstances. They represent the clearest examples that best epitomize these strategies, not comprehensive examinations of all applications in the Russian context.

Third, this study does not argue that the policies outlined in subsequent chapters were sufficient to ensure regime survival. For example, the Putin government has been exceptionally good at consolidating power and proactively sabotaging potential opponents. The survival of authoritarianism, like democratization, can not be attributed to any one cause. While the case studies do yield insights into the political dynamics of the region, they are primarily meant to explore the dynamics of the strategies of authoritarian resistance, not to evaluate the degree to which these strategies were successful in preventing regime change in Russia or elsewhere in the region.

Similarly, this study does not claim that regime type is the sole determinant of Russian policies. Other factors, such as geopolitics, strategic or national i...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• About the Author
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 The Authoritarian Backlash Against Democracy
• 2 The External Promotion of Democracy and Authoritarianism
• 3 Political Trends in the Former Soviet Union: An Overview
• 4 Insulate: Shielding Russia from External Democracy Promotion
• 5 Redefine: Rhetorical Defenses Against External Criticism
• 6 Bolster: Russian Support for Authoritarianism in Belarus
• 7 Subvert: Undermining Democracy in Georgia and Ukraine
• 8 Coordinate: Working with Others to Resist Democratization
• 9 The Russian 2007-2008 Election Cycle
• 10 The Future of Democracy and the Challenge of Authoritarianism
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Index