Anatomy of Violence

Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa

Belachew Gebrewold

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754675280
• eBook ISBN: 9781317181385
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Violence connects people - whether directly or indirectly financing violence or by fighting the war against terror. Violent incidents are often deeply rooted in structures and systems. With a focus on Africa, this study examines three structurally interdependent conflict systems to highlight the complexities of transboundary and transregional conflict systems. The systemic approach to studying violence is highly suitable for courses on security, peace and conflict, political sociology and African politics. You will come away from the book with a better understanding of the underlying currents of violent conflicts and thus a clearer idea of how they might be handled.

Chapter 1
The System of the State

State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. (Max Weber 1972)

War-making and state-making are organized crime. (Charles Tilly 1985)

African States Systems

Various scholars of state theories or international relations have been adopting some aspects of the system theory into their respective fields. Deutsch, in his analysis of political and state systems, suggests that systems may have different characteristics than the components or subsystems they comprise (Deutsch 1974: 156). And he defines system as ‘a collection of recognizable units or components which hang together and vary together, in a manner regular enough to be described’ (Deutsch 1974: 229). In his ‘world-systems’ theory, Wallerstein underlines that it is not about various systems (such as economies etc.) of the whole world, instead about these systems as a world. It is about ‘spatial/temporal zone which cuts across many political and cultural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and institutions which obey certain systemic rules’ (Wallerstein 2006: 17). World-systems theory shows the limits of reducing complex situations to simpler variables, and complicates and contextualizes all so-called simpler variables in order to understand real social situations (Wallerstein 2006: 19).

States ... exist within the framework of an interstate system, and their relative strength is not merely the degree to which they can effectively exercise authority internally but the degree to which they can hold their heads high in the competitive environment of the world-system. All states are theoretically sovereign, but strong states find it far easier to ‘intervene’ in the internal affairs of weaker states than vice versa, and everyone is aware of that. Strong states relate to weak states by pressuring them to keep their frontiers open to those flows of factors of production that are useful and profitable to firms located in the strong states, while resisting any demand for reciprocity in this regard. (Wallerstein 2006: 55)

This systemic understanding has effected considerable impacts on the theory of states and international relations. In the global war on terror and state collapse, failure and weaknesses, state-building is a goal-oriented process and political project that attempts to create reliable organizations and interdependence of relationships (Fukuyama 2004; Carothers 2003; Crocker 2003; Eizenstat et al. 2005; Hippler 2004).

On the international level, studies on international relations discuss the ‘international structure’ (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2006) or ‘international system’ (Clapham 2003; Buzan and Little 2000; Emmott et al. 1997; Hanson 2006; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Waever 2006; Jackson and Sorensen 2003); and states are systems (Bull 1995). For Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2005), system is a ‘sustained and structured pattern of interaction among agents’. For Neuman ‘system’ is ‘characterized by its interconnectedness and the sensitivity of each unit to change within and among other member units’ (Neuman 2005: 4). For any analysis of international relations as system it is indispensable to discuss state as system or subsystem of the international relations system.

This system implies order. Hobbesian strong state as well as Lockean division of powers in the state aim to create order in the state. Kant’s Enlightenment suggests a ‘way out’ of ‘immaturity’, which is a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for (Kant 1900). These concepts imply a state is an organized or ‘civilized’ system or order. On the national level the state fulfils its task by organizing the interests and relationships of the citizens. According to Kant’s Enlightenment, the liberating reason of humankind organizes international relations and enables perpetual peace through creating organizations like the United Nations to end the state of immaturity prior to the organized system. If a state is not able to organize itself in an ordered structure, it can be designated a ‘failed state’ or failed system. Hence, a successful state system is indispensable to establishing international relations as an organized system.

For understanding conflict or state systems, it is important to discuss whata ‘system’ is. According to von Bertalanffy:

... there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems or their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, and the relationships or ‘forces’ between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal principles applying to systems in general. (Bertalanffy 1968: 32)

According to system theory, ‘system’ means a number of objects and their relations among each other. This relationship characterizes the system as totality, which consequently differentiates itself from its environment. Environment in this context means all other systems beyond the borders of the focal system. Though other systems have an impact on the focal system, each system owns its characteristic dynamic in which all its elements contribute to self-reproduction. Luhmann suggests that the modern society differentiated into political, economic, scientific, educational, etc., subsystems and their respective environments are building up an unprecedented degree of complexity, and their boundaries do not correspond to the common territorial frontiers. But at the same time the political subsystem (the sovereign state) continues to maintain its territorial frontiers, while other subsystems, and with this the society itself, are spreading over the globe (Luhmann 1990a: 177–8).

According to Luhmann, system is the difference to the environment. Systems characterize themselves by constructing differentiation between themselves and the environment through operations (differentiation) or events (Ereignisse in German) (Stark 1994: 38). Therefore, system is the connection between operations that differentiate the system and environment. System as ‘form’ is characterization as well as differentiation: characterization is on the side of the system and differentiation is on the side of the environment. Based on the systemic principle of recursivity, the difference between system and environment necessitate specific operations that continuously constitute this difference. The difference emerges through operations: system–environment differentiation is reproduced by which short-term operations systemically interconnect subsequent operations. The wholeness of the system exists because of the ‘interconnectibilities’ (Anschlussfähigkeiten in German) of the system-specific operations that are produced in the system itself.

System is characterized by:

• varieties of objects, which can be perceived as units from the perspective of the observer;

• institutions, interconnections between individual units that, as system structure, keep the system together as totality;

• system-specific environment, while the environment is understood as a multitude of objects whose interconnection with the focal system can be differentiated empirically and theoretically from the system structure (of the focal system) (Stark 1994: 10).

According to Parsons, social system is about coordination or mutual relationship of social positions (not individuals) (Parsons 1969). This means, social system as general system of action is an integrative function through which structures and processes are related to system stability and system transformation in a given environment (Parsons 1964: 3–6). This function implies certain contribution of a system to another system (Parsons 1968). Functions are related to the problematic existence of systems in an environment that does not belong to the system. The environment is on the one hand the source of the means for the functioning of the system, on the other hand a threat to the existence of the system; and since the system has to maintain an identity towards the environment, the structural border between the system and environment should not be destroyed. Hence, system/environment observation is the basis for the functioning of the system (Parsons 1964: 27–31).

For Willke, each system is a self-referential structure in which it as observer observes its own observing through reflection of consciousness (Willke 2005: 67). Luhmann understands this act of differentiation (through observation) as system formation (Luhmann 1999: 7). Autopoiesis, or self-reproduction, of the system is possible only through this self-referentiality and differentiation. ‘Systems constitute and maintain themselves by creating and maintaining a difference from their environment, and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference ... Boundary maintenance is system maintenance’ (Luhmann 1999: 17). According to Maturana, autopoiesis not only determines by itself the relations of its elements but also it produces its elements by the elements of the system (Maturana 1987). Autopoietic system suggests that system-specific operations are reproduced by system-specific operations; the integrity of the system is reproduced by the integrity of the system, so that the difference between system and environment is continuously reproduced. One of Luhmann’s theses suggests that all operational systems are operationally closed because any operation for maintenance of the system–environment differentiation has to be on the system side of the differentiation (self inward observation of the outward observing system) (Luhmann 1993: 53). According to Luhmann, autopoietic systems reproduce all elementary units through the network of the elements themselves which the systems consist of, and through this reproduction they delimit themselves from the environment. However, internal interdependencies of a system are not greater than system/environment interdependencies.

Therefore, it is about how to organize the intrasystemic as well as intersystemic relations. System theory deals with organization and interdependence of relationships, or configuration of parts. The system concept attempts to disprove the reductionist theory, which focuses on single parts or elements. This is important for analysis of conflict as system. System theory maintains that system is composed of regularly interacting elements that form a new whole which has properties that cannot be found in the elements (Luhmann 1984, 1999, 2004). The relationship of elements creates ‘emergent properties’ which may not be found in any analysis of the parts, i.e. the ‘wholeness’ can’t be seen in them. Relationships of elements in the system are goal-oriented processes. This suggests that in the states system, state as system and states’ relations as system are essentially interrelated, that neither part can be understood separated from the other part.

System is the selected unit (focal system), whereas environment is the totality of the other (excluded) unit. But as constructivism suggests (based on relativity and contingency), this reality could be differently cognized than it is, and each cognition is construction (Guggenberger 1998: 35). Even if the reality as such is not dependent on cognition, the acceptance of the reality is dependent on constructivism, i.e. the accepted reality is reconstructed through the act of acceptance. Construction of a new reality as an objective and pre-existent system is especially relevant for discussing ‘state’ or ‘state system’. While discussing the act or process of construction of the state it is important to discuss what the state is built for.

This ‘what for’ implies to meaning of the system according to system theory. The meaning of the system through its referential structure forces the next step to selection in its relation to the environment (Luhmann 1999: 61). The meaning of the state system is crucially in formation of national identity and interests. The intention of meaning is self-referential because it takes care of the self-realization of the system. Meaning in general and boundaries constituted in meaning in particular guarantee the irrevocable nexus of system and environment in a form distinctive to a meaning (Willke 2005: 6). State identity is essentially dependent on this. No meaningful system can conclusively lose itself in its environment or in itself because there are always implications that refer back over the boundary (Luhmann 1999: 62). This takes place while defending national identity and interests. Such a conception of state system is crucial for a conflict system.

According to system theory, the understanding of the meaning of the system depends on the understanding of communication (relation) and action (elements) in the system (Guggenberger 1998: 49). Communication and action cannot be separated and they form a relationship of complexity (Luhmann 1999: 137–8). Complexity is ‘selection drive’ (Selektionszwang in German) from plenty of various and mutually interdependent factors that create environmental interconnectedness. According to Willke, complexity implies that system has to react to the demands of its environments. This means, it is about system–environment relation in which the abundance of possibilities as well as dangers in relationship with the environment becomes a problem for the system. Such abundance of possibilities results in contingency (varieties of alternatives the system has got) (Willke 2006: 30). For example, traditional societies have lower contingency than the modern capitalist and democratic societies. Retention (of the existing) is the negation of contingency (Willke 2006: 33–4).

For communication and action of the system the relationship to the environment is constitutive in system formation because everything that happens belongs to a system and always and at the same time to the environment of other systems (Luhmann 1999: 176–7). This type of relation results in interpenetration: an intersystem relation between systems that are environments for each other means that systems interpenetrate each other (Luhmann 1999: 211–15). In the complex interpenetration, each effect of a system has infinite causes, and each cause has infinite effects. At the same time each cause can be combined with or replaced by other causes because of the various differences of effects that can happen. Therefore, each causal process can be split or traced back into the infinite (Luhmann 1974: 18; Luhmann 1990b: 70). This effect–cause mutual interaction is a kind of systemic self-creation (Willke 2005: 31).

In interpenetration and complexity an important phenomenon for conflict is the so-called ‘negative double contingency’: A will not do what system B wants if system B does not do what system A wants, leading to a vicious circle (Luhmann 1999: 389). With increasing contingency, conflict potential increases too (Willke 2005: 30). Double contingency creates the problem of mutual intransparency in the interaction between two autopoietic systems. However, if both parties would like to establish contact, interest in negation of the negativity (mutual intransparency) increases (Luhmann 1984: 172). Hence, double contingency suggests that, first, system elements are bound to the system structure through positive and negative sanctions; second, that inputs into the system influence the focal system (Parsons 1964: 36–41). Therefore, the task of the ordered and organized social systems is to solve the problem of double contingency

System is characterized by asymmetrization: to make its operations possible, a system chooses points of reference that are no longer put in question and which must be accepted as given. This is especially true for national identity that is dogmatized and intolerant of any revision. Very often, national identity is not something that can be reflected critically; it becomes a kind of a supernatural entity beyond the sphere of criticism, because critical reflection implies insecurity and transience. The state system and conflict system are closely related.

The nature of the state system is based on this systemic change of the state from constructed system into pre-existent system. Studies of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ (2000), Michael Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’ (1995), the ‘pathological homogenisation’ of Rae (2002), etc., show how the state system changes through nationalism. Through a stream of collective memories, social mobilization of group awareness based on existing symbols and institutions, a nation regenerates itself, or even becomes a supranational church (Deutsch 1979: 27). Nationalism is the last instance that tries to secure the order of the system. Order is the balance and stability of the systems (Luhmann 2004: 44). In this order, the external threat or the environment as possible danger indirectly creates internal cohesion. This is significant for the conflict system.

The System of the State

State is the system of tension between legitimate power monopoly (ideal state) and organized crime (real state). According to Max Weber’s famous definition, ‘state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1972: 822). State is simply ‘institutionalization of power’ (Nettl 1994: 9). The important question in this section will be ‘what constitutes state as system?’ Before we deal with this question, let us see what the system of the state from the point of view of system theory is. Willke suggests that in the form of politics the state creates its own principles. Since secularization dynamics and the awareness of contingency have undermined the external (such as supernatural) justifications of politics, the politics has to create its own legitimacy by replacing dangerous contingency by formal necessity as a form of operation. Social systems as communicative and symbolically constituted systems – in the face of lacking religious plan of salvation or objective truth – are exposed to the power of contingency determined by changeable and selectable alternatives and operations. Consequentially, social systems change their modes of operation from unity to difference, from the continuation of the always identical to the contingency of particular identity. It is about how the system (state) sees and understands itself in comparison with the other systems or other sides of its world or environment (Willke 1993: 216). State is neither a supra-societal and autonomous reality nor a mere means of power elites and their interests; instead it is a specific function of a political system for a differentiated society as well as it is preconditions of operations in a self-legitimating politics by excluding arbitrariness or contingency (Willke 1993: 219). The notion of territory is a good example here.

Territory becomes a ‘homeland’, ’fatherland’, or ‘motherland’ that has to be commonly defended by those who share similar obligations for its protection and because it defines ‘them’. They sacrifice their blood and taxes for its defence because it ‘clearly’ distinguishes ‘them’ from ‘others’ (Goemans 2006: 27). Specification of homeland requires focal principles: natural frontiers (by reference to nature and topographical features: mountains, rivers, seas), common culture (pre-existing principles: language, religion, ethnicity, ‘nationality’), prior historical formation, and cartography (conventions and maps) (Goemans 2006: 32–40).

The political organization of space is not limited to notions of the state but it equally, perhaps even more importantly, impacted at the local and micro levels of daily behaviour and practices ... Territory constitutes an important component of our individual, group, and national identities, not simply because our state territories are delimited by fixed boundaries but because territory has a symbolic dimension which determines our attachment and affiliation to particular spaces and places, attachments which are thought consciously – through political and territorial socialization ... Since we reject the absolute notion of deterritorialization (in favour of a continuing process of reterritorialization and changing territorial configurations of power) we must, by definition, reject the notion of a borderless world. (Newman 2006: 87)

For the system of the state, national ‘memory’ is crucial. Deutsch asserts that ‘memory is the storing and recall of past information that constitutes the self’, and on the group level it is the common memory of the group-self as well as a self-steering system or an autonomous political self. Therefore, ‘identity is the recognition and awareness of one’s own memory and of one’s self’ (Deutsch 1974: 178). As Billig neatly put it, ‘every nation must have its history, its own collective memory. This remembering is simultaneously a collective forgetting: the nation, which celebrates its antiquity, forgets its historical recency. Moreover, nations forget the violence which brought them into existence...’ (Billig 1995: 38).

Identification with territory has substantial impact on national, group and individual behaviour, identities and practices and it determines their attachment and affiliation to particular spaces and places, attachments which are thought consciously – through political and territorial socialization – based on historical and mythical events in the nation’s history (Newman 2006: 96). ‘Territory is important, not so much because land contains important natural resources that can be translated into tangible assets, but because it plays the more important role of defining one’s social, spiritual, and communal world’ (Walter 2006: 289). ‘Territorial attachments and people’s willingness to fight for territory appear to have much less to do with the material value of land and much more to do with the symbolic role it plays in constituting people’s identities and providing a sense of security and belonging’ (Walter 2006: 288). Further, Walter correctly argues that:

measuring the value of land strictly in terms of its tangible assets and making these assets the basis of a settlement is unlikely to bring long-term peace. To date, policymakers have tended to focus disproportionately on issues related to border length and placement, and the distribution of natural resources, rather than dealing with the deep psychological bonds that may exist among individuals at the local level. (Walter 2006: 294)

Such psychological bonds have huge impacts on nationalism and violence.

In the state system state-building can become a pathological homogenization (Rae 2002). This homogenization is a process o...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The System of the State
• 2 Africa in the International Security System
• 3 State and Security as Systems of Conflict and Violence
• 4 Conflict Systems in the Democratic Republic of Congo
• 5 The Intrastate Conflict System in Somalia
• 6 The Intrastate Conflict System in Sudan
• 7 Regional and Global Conflict Systems in the Horn of Africa
• Conclusion: Ending Conflict and Violence as System Transformation
• References
• Index