The Small Gulf States

Foreign and Security Policies before and after the Arab Spring

Khalid Almezaini, Jean-Marc Rickli, Khalid S. Almezaini, Jean-Marc Rickli, Khalid Almezaini, Khalid S. Almezaini, Jean-Marc Rickli

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138665972
• eBook ISBN: 9781317214342
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Small states are often believed to have been resigned to the margins of international politics. However, the recent increase in the number of small states has increased their influence and forced the international community to incorporate some of them into the global governance system. This is particularly evident in the Middle East where small Gulf states have played an important role in the changing dynamics of the region in the last decade.

The Small Gulf States analyses the evolution of these states' foreign and security policies since the Arab Spring. With particular focus on Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, it explores how these states have been successful in not only guaranteeing their survival, but also in increasing their influence in the region. It then discusses the security dilemmas small states face, and suggests a multitude of foreign and security policy options, ranging from autonomy to influence, in order to deal with this. The book also looks at the influence of regional and international actors on the policies of these countries. It concludes with a discussion of the peculiarities and contributions of the Gulf states for the study of small states' foreign and security policies in general.

Providing a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the unique foreign and security policies of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) before and after the Arab Spring, this book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Middle East studies, foreign policy and international relations.

1
Small States in the Gulf

Khalid Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli

Most small states in the Middle East are located in the Gulf, with the exceptions of Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Tunisia. Those states include Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The small Gulf states, however, emerged in the regional system late, unlike other states in the Middle East. The continuous political instability and the hostile environment that characterize international relations in the Middle East present small states with major security challenges. Conflicts with Israel (occupied Palestine) and Iran have, for many years, been among the main security threats these states faced. New geopolitical tensions have, however, emerged. In addition, the rise of non-state actors in the region has created new security problems for both large and small states.

Scholars of international relations have very often argued that small states are confined to the margins of international politics. In contrast, the behaviour of larger states contributes to shaping regional politics and regional security dynamics. This, in turn, forces small states to modify their behaviour so as to adapt to the characteristics of their environments. Although most small states endure their new environment, some try to contribute to the construction and maintenance of regional dynamics or security, such as Qatar and the UAE, for the stability of the Gulf environment. The end of the Cold War magnified this phenomenon. Indeed, due to the increasing number of small states following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international environment dramatically changed for small states, offering them traditional security options ranging from alliances to neutrality, but also opening up the opportunity to conduct risk-management strategies based on hedging.

The increase in the number of small states, however, forced the international community to incorporate them in the global governance system and allowed some small states to play limited, but influential roles. This is evident in different regions, particularly in the Middle East, where small Gulf states have emerged and played an increasing role in regional politics. This includes the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. Those small states usually were weak and threatened by other states at the regional level. As a consequence, they have relied heavily on the security support of Western powers, particularly under the umbrella of the United States. Thanks to this security umbrella and their vast financial capabilities, however, the small Gulf states have managed to become important players in the changing dynamics of the Middle East in the last few years.

The so-called Arab Spring has indeed created new security challenges for the Gulf states. As a reaction, they have increased their domestic and regional activities to contain the rise of non-state actors and are playing various supporting roles in states such as Libya and Egypt. The weakening or collapse of major actors in the region such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq led to the creation of a power vacuum and to major instabilities in the Middle East. Surprisingly, the small Gulf states have found opportunities in these uncertainties and instabilities and have shored up not only their financial power but also their social and political influence. They have managed, for the first time, to intervene in other Arab countries that experienced the centrifugal forces of the Arab Spring by using both their military and soft power in order to control the fragmented and weak governments of their fellow Arab countries. This has been evident in the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen. For that matter, the UAE and Qatar have played a more visible and influential role in North African countries than the other small Gulf states.

During the Arab Spring, two countries indeed played a major role in the international relations of the Middle East: Qatar and the UAE. Although there are great similarities between small states in the Gulf, Qatar’s and the UAE’s perceptions and reactions towards the rise of non-state actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, differed in nature and in policy. Consequently, the differences in the support, or lack thereof, of particular groups has become one of the main determinants of their foreign policies since 2011. Very often, these two small states have ended up competing for influence using various tools and mechanisms of regional security.

One of the interesting aspects of the small states in the Gulf is that they are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a political organization created at the initiative of Saudi Arabia after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1981. It is therefore expected that the small Gulf states cooperate under the umbrella of one regional organization. However, numerous concrete examples have demonstrated that their behaviours and foreign policy approaches within the organization have been different and sometimes even in opposition.

The small Gulf states’ foreign and security policies exhibit unique characteristics in the behaviour of small states that are worth exploring. This book gathers the reflection started at a workshop on small Gulf states’ foreign and security policies after the Arab Spring at the 2014 Gulf Research Meeting at the University of Cambridge. It presents a detailed analysis of the foreign and security policies of the small Gulf states before and after the Arab Spring. The book addresses two main questions: How do we explain the external behaviour of the small Gulf states? Why are the small states’ foreign and security policies in the GCC different than other states in the Middle East? This book answers these questions by looking at specific issues in the foreign and security policies of selected small states in the Gulf (Oman, Qatar and the UAE). In addition, the book looks at the changing security dynamics in the Gulf and their impact on small states, as well as at the ways Iran and the United States perceive and influence small states in the Gulf.

The changing security dynamics in the Gulf and small states’ foreign and security policies

States that are characterized as being small are very often perceived as being weak (Handel 1990). This is not only due to their small size, but also due to the hegemony of larger states. Although the decolonization period produced a great number of small states, most of them considered as vulnerable (Commonwealth Secretariat 1997), the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of new small states with various degrees of power, as well as to the empowerment of some existing small states. The European Union, for instance, has provided small states with institutional mechanisms that leverage their influence if used wisely (Panke 2010, 2011; Thorhallsson 2015). Thus, globalization, though presenting major challenges for small states, also provides them with new opportunities. Indeed, the pursuit of soft power by small states allows them to play new roles in the international system (Nye 2004). Small states moved from being passive to active actors with the ability to play significant roles in different regions.

The Middle East and the Gulf region is no exception to these developments. In particular, some small states of the GCC; Oman, Qatar and the UAE have developed active foreign policy approaches which aim at influencing the regional economic, social–political and security dynamics in the Middle East. Two main factors contributed to the emergence of small states as actors in Middle East politics. First, the diversification of international and regional alliances through the pursuit of bandwagoning, balancing and hedging strategies (Rickli 2016). Second, the decline of regional powers such as Egypt under Hosni Mubarak or Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The Arab Spring, in a similar way to globalization, has weakened some small states such as Tunisia and empowered others. Qatar and the UAE in particular have found opportunities to control, support and modify some of the regional dynamics. The role that both states played in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia reflects how such small states from the GCC managed to rise at the regional level and cooperate with great powers to influence regional security dynamics.

These small states have used four main tools: foreign aid, the media, mediation and interventions. Although the GCC small states used foreign aid in the 1970s and 1980s, the new inflow of money due to the rise of the oil and gas prices in the 2000s provided them with enormous financial resources to conduct influential foreign policies in the weak Arab republics. Similarly, the establishment of the Qatar-based television channel Al Jazeera in the 1990s and its success in providing a new voice and perspectives in international affairs paved the way for similar initiatives in the 2000s, such as the Dubai-based Saudi Al Arabiya TV channel. The control of the media influence has indeed become an important area of competition among the Gulf states. Thirdly, with increased financial resources, the small Gulf states have been able to diversify and reach out further through international mediation. The fact that the centre of gravity of international security moved away from Europe to the Middle East after the Cold War also contributed to giving more importance to the mediation opportunities provided by the small Gulf states.

Finally, the weakening of regional powers and smaller states provided opportunities for the small Gulf states to conduct direct military interventions in the framework of a multinational coalition. Indeed, the shift of global security dynamics towards the Middle East has, however, not only offered new opportunities for the small Gulf states but also faced them with new threats. In particular, the political instabilities in many Arab countries as well as the rise of non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, has directly posed domestic threats to the Gulf regimes and influenced the internal stability of these states. This has forced the small GCC states to adopt new external behaviours, which completely break with their foreign and security policy traditions. For instance, the military intervention of the Qatari and the Emirati air forces among a NATO-led multinational coalition in Libya in 2011, as well as their direct intervention on the ground, left many observers of international relations baffled.

Even so, more traditional security challenges related to great power politics and the regional balance of power have not faded away. The disappearance of Iraq, since the US intervention in 2003, and Egypt, since the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, as influential actors in the Middle East has directly modified the basic balance of the power equation of the small Gulf states. Similarly, the perceived disengagement of the United States from the Middle East and the Gulf under the Obama administration has changed the fundamentals of their alliance policy. This has forced the small Gulf states to review their policy towards regional powers, especially Iran. The signing of a landmark nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers, comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany in July 2015 only heightened the urgency of the redefinition of their relationship with Tehran.

These changes and the resulting new configuration of power in the Middle East and the Gulf call for new insights about the foreign and security policies of the Gulf states. Therefore, this book seeks to understand the new external behaviour of these states and the way they have managed to survive within these new security dynamics over the past five years. Moreover, contributors of this book also seek to explain the extent to which oil prices can affect the foreign policies of the small states in the Gulf. From a theoretical point of view, this book contributes to enhancing our knowledge of how small states develop different strategies to compensate for their power deficit.

The structure of the book

The ultimate purpose of the book is to provide a new and critical analysis as well as coherent and informative data of small states’ foreign and security policies in the Gulf. In particular, we seek to examine the new behaviours of the GCC small states after the so-called Arab Spring. We are particularly interested in enhancing our understanding of the way these small states have adapted their foreign and security policies not only to guarantee their survival and their security but also to prosper and, for some, even to influence the regional security dynamics. Most contributions focus on the past and present of the politics of external relations.

In chapter two, Jean-Marc Rickli and Khalid Almezaini review the theories of foreign and security policy analysis and the way they could be applied to small states. They suggest that neoclassical realism provides a good starting point to think about the development of small states’ foreign and security policies. Moreover, they also look at foreign policy outcomes by providing a theoretical framework that identifies foreign and security strategies available to small states. They argue that, due to their deficit of power, small states have to choose between favouring autonomy or influence in their foreign and security policies. It follows that small states can opt for one of three main strategic orientations: alignment, defence or hedging strategies. This chapter then looks at the factors that make the GCC states peculiar in the realm of international relations.

In chapter three, Victor Gervais provides a general analysis of how the changes in the security dynamics of the Middle East are impacting on the GCC states’ external and internal alliance choices and policies. In particular, this chapter looks at the most active small states in the Middle East, Qatar and the UAE, and the way these states contributed to undermine the traditional alliance model established in the Gulf more than three decades ago. To do this, the chapter provides a strong theoretical analysis of the GCC small states’ alliance and cooperative strategies, relying notably on Barry Buzan’s concept of regional security complex theory. The changing regional dynamics that occurred since the so-called Arab Spring provided the small Gulf states with new opportunities to seek multiple cooperative strategies and alliances that can provide not only protection but also opportunities to intervene in other states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), yet at the expense of undermining the current alliance system of the small GCC countries.

In the fourth chapter, Andreas Krieg develops a theoretical framework revolving around a liberal normative approach to security. The latter argues that foreign and security polices of the Gulf states ought to be more individual-centric in order to achieve long-term sustainable security and stability. The author demonstrates that security in the Gulf is not a product of state-centric national security agendas, but rather depends on the ability of the monarchical regimes to cater for individual security needs. His argument is then tested in two small Gulf states: Qatar and Bahrain. These two states have adopted two different approaches to individual security, which has in turn shaped their long-term stability.

The relationship between the Arab Gulf states and the United States has been strong for many years. This has encouraged the small Gulf states to take advantage of this security umbrella for adopting sometimes passive and sometimes active roles in the Middle East. David Goldfischer examines in chapter five how the new foundations of this relationship between the United States and the GCC countries have also created some set-backs. Further, due to the active roles that the small Gulf states have played in the last five years in the MENA region, the United States has been put in an awkward position, having to constantly assess whether it should actively support these new policies or rather take some distance and stay silent. This new situation has created some risks for this relationship. In particular, the chapter aims, in the words of the author, “to partially penetrate the fog through which the United States views current Middle East dangers, and through which Saudi Arabia and the UAE struggle to understand the United States”.

Sharham Akbarzadeh, in chapter six, examines Iran’s foreign policy towards the smaller Gulf states since the Iranian revolution in 1979. In particular, the author highlights how the small states, despite being members of a regional organization (GCC), have not had unified policies and experiences towards Iran. Due to the regional changes in the 1980s, the 1990s and particularly since 2003, Iran’s relations with the GCC until the so-called Arab Spring shifted to increase its influence in various areas of the region, specifically in Iraq, following the collapse of Saddam Hussein, Palestine (during Ahmadinejad’s presidency) and Lebanon. This increased influence has also been in effect more recently in Syria since 2011, as well as in Yemen. This Iranian interventionism has increased the tension with the Gulf states, especially the destabilization of Bahrain in 2011. Due to the changes at the regional level and increased sectarianism, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have been more visible, especially after the Houthis coup in Yemen and then the ensuing Saudi intervention. The author concludes that Rouhani’s government has brought some cautious optimism to the GCC states, however.

In chapter seven, Abdullah Baabood provides an insightful analysis of Oman’s foreign policy. There have been very few studies that have attempted to explain what makes Oman’s external behaviour unique and different from all other small states in the Gulf. While the other chapters demonstrate that Qatar and the UAE have pursued very active and visible foreign and security policies, Oman in contrast has been the active invisible player in the Middle East. Its unique and pragmatic foreign policy made Oman less vulnerable than the other GCC states towards its relations to Iran. In order to demonstrate this, Baabood examines Oman’s relations using foreign policy analysis approaches at three different levels of analysis: societal, state and systemic. This chapter also shows that Oman’s foreign policy is not an easy case to analyse due to its unpredictable external behaviour.

The next chapter, written by Emma Soubrier, critically examines the evolving foreign and security policies of Qatar and the UAE. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of these two small states’ policies that have competed for influence and control since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring. The chapter not only looks at foreign policy outcomes but emphasizes foreign policy processes by looking at the origin of the different foreign and security policy options adopted by Abu Dhabi and Doha. The chapter particularly looks at the role of leaders’ perceptions and strategic culture.

Leah Sherwood provides an in-depth analysis of the UAE foreign and security policy strategy in chapter nine. The author seeks to understand how small states formulate security strategies that fluctuate between proactive and defensive security postures, using the UAE as a case study. Due to the regional changes, notably the threats from Iran and non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, this chapter demonstrates that the UAE has adopted risk-diversification strategies. This chapter first identifies these strategies and then examines how they are chosen. Adopting a relational perspective of power, this chapter argues that the variations of the UAE’s power dictate its risk-diversification strat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• CONTENTS
• Contributors
• 1 Small states in the Gulf
• 2 Theories of small states’ foreign and security policies and the Gulf states
• 3 The changing security dynamic in the Middle East and its impact on smaller Gulf Cooperation Council states’ alliance choices and policies
• 4 Gulf security policy after the Arab Spring: considering changing security dynamics
• 5 The United States and its key Gulf allies: a new foundation for a troubled partnership?
• 6 Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council sheikhdoms
• 7 Oman’s independent foreign policy
• 8 Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
• 9 Risk diversification and the United Arab Emirates’ foreign policy
• 10 Gulf states’ engagement in North Africa: the role of foreign aid
• 11 The foreign policies of the small Gulf states: an exception in small states’ behaviours?
• Bibliography
• Index