Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations

Thomas L. Ilgen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754647539
• eBook ISBN: 9781317123750
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The dynamics of transatlantic relations in the twenty-first century have been shaped by an American preference for the exercise of its considerable 'hard power' capabilities while Europeans have preferred to draw upon the considerable 'soft power' resources that have grown from their enviable internal processes of integration. These diverging power preferences have differential impacts on the management of Atlantic security, economic, and social and cultural relations. The contributors, long-time observers and analysts of the Atlantic partnership, debate how problematic security relations are likely to continue to be, discuss how successfully economic affairs will be managed, and examine the continuing frictions in domestic politics of social and cultural matters that should be manageable if both European and American leaders work actively and responsibly to encourage policy convergence.

PART I
THE LEGACY OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Chapter 1
Introduction: Decline or Renewal?

Thomas L. Ilgen

The disagreements between the United States and several prominent European states leading up to the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 were among the most contentious and potentially damaging that the Atlantic partnership has experienced over the last half century. A few politicians and pundits on both sides of the Atlantic claimed that we were witnessing the beginning of the end of this storied relationship, that America preferred to act alone in global affairs, and that a unifying Europe would increasingly chart its own common foreign policies (Boot, 2003; Fukuyama, 2003; Krauthammer, 2002; Newhouse, 2003). While the Atlantic alliance had weathered frictions and crises in the past, the differences over ends and means in Iraq identified an unbridgeable gulf that would only grow wider in the early decades of the twenty-first century.

While predictions of the partnership’s imminent demise were certainly premature, this Atlantic crisis has provoked long-time students of the relationship to re-examine it more systematically and to speculate about its future (Ash, 2004; Cohen-Tarugi, 2003; Daalder, 2002; Reid, 2004; Lundestad, 2003). Consequential changes such as the end of the Cold War, the integration of both European and global markets, the emergence of global terrorist networks and the impact of events such as those that occurred on September 11 in the US, on March 11 in Spain, and in July 2005 in the United Kingdom have had impacts that have registered differently in Washington, Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels. Moreover, the domestic politics in the Atlantic countries, as the recent referenda in France and the Netherlands over the European constitution demonstrate, may complicate the efforts of their leaders to find common ground with their Atlantic counterparts. It is no longer so clear that a broad and comprehensive partnership is the appropriate response to this changing world. Do these and other changes suggest that Atlantic relations are entering a period of steady decline or are there the building blocks available for a renewed relationship animated by redefined goals and objectives and sustained by a modified division of labor among the participants? Can such a renewed relationship respond effectively to the common challenges of the new century?

The authors of this volume, many of whom have been hands-on participants in managing these relations or long-time observers and analysts of Atlantic affairs, aim to contribute to this more careful and systematic examination of the Atlantic relationship and to offer some modest predictions about its future. The chapters that follow address three broad dimensions of US-European relations—security concerns and strategy, monetary and trade matters, and the domestic politics of issues such as agriculture, the environment, and political ideology. The hypothesis that informs the work is that security relations are likely to continue to be the most problematic in US-European relations, that economic relations are likely to be the most successfully managed, and that the domestic politics of sensitive issues like agriculture, the environment, and ideology are likely to be less problematic than security but more troublesome than economic matters. The hypothesis grows from lessons learned from the history of both the Atlantic Alliance and the process of integration in Europe resulting in the formation of the European Union.

The volume is structured in four parts. The first part looks broadly at the legacy of Atlantic relations since World War II and the kinds of power resources that have evolved in the United States and Europe. In Chapter 2, Thomas L. Ilgen compares the dynamics of the Atlantic Alliance with those of European integration, arguing that institution building in both experiences has very much shaped the successes and failures in both experiments. Ilgen argues that security arrangements were problematic from the earliest days of both the Atlantic Alliance and efforts to promote European integration. Security arrangements were successful in the alliance largely because the threats posed by the Cold War permitted the US to dominate Atlantic security developments. The Europeans were never fully happy with this asymmetry in Atlantic power and showed their displeasure by resisting American domination on a number of fronts. Within the European integration process, common security arrangements were set aside, mindful of the reluctance all European states to relinquish their sovereign control over national security matters. Only very recently have Europeans begun to think about a common foreign and defense policy and even now there is great suspicion of losing control to regional security institutions. Institution building has been much more successful on economic matters both within the Atlantic alliance and in the European movement. Trade and monetary institutions served to entangle all Atlantic nations in a network of economic relationships that all came to value highly; a parallel set of entanglements accompanied the steady march toward economic integration in Europe. The economic aspects of the alliance provide resources that neither side will give up easily and, as a consequence, are a source of future strength for the alliance.

In Chapter 3, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. elaborates his concept of “soft power” both to encourage Atlantic partners to think more broadly about the resources they have at their disposal to meet twenty-first century challenges and to specify the kinds of “soft power” resources available both in the United States and Europe (Nye, 2004). The American preeminence in “hard power” resources coupled with the growing European repository of “soft power” capabilities permit the alliance partners to employ a “good cop/bad cop” dynamic in areas of the world where Atlantic interests are shared. Nye also shows the benefits to be gained if the US works diligently to develop and expand its considerable potential for “soft power” resources while Europe makes efforts to build “hard power” capabilities.

Part two examines security relations. Gregory Treverton, in Chapter 4, reminds us of the long history of friction and crisis in Atlantic security relations but believes that the current crisis is of a different order of magnitude that requires some fundamental restructuring if the alliance is to meet contemporary challenges. He identifies changes in Europe—an expanded membership, new governance structures, and splits between “old” and “new” members—that will make alliance management more difficult. Moreover, he points to structural changes following the end of the Cold War and new power asymmetries that make business as usual more difficult to conduct. Following Robert Cooper, he calls for what he terms a “post-modern” alliance that would be based on common or shared values to replace the old alliance that responded to common threats (Cooper, 2003). He acknowledges that such an alliance will be more difficult to craft but that it is in the interest of both Americans and European to do so.

In Chapter 5, Christopher Coker examines the diverging security cultures in the US and Europe and finds the prospects for effective security cooperation to be shrinking. He suggests that security cultures are rooted in attitudes toward and experiences with war. In Europe, a view of war as tragedy prevails, informed in large measure by twentieth century experiences where all sides suffered extraordinary losses and even victory diminished the influence and prestige of the prevailing powers. In the US, war is experienced as victory over militarism and imperialism paving the way to American-style democracy. Different views of war give rise to contrasting security ethics and strategies. The EU is driven by an ethics of commitment where ethical principles are prominent and recourse to the use of force is minimized. The US is motivated by an ethics of responsibility that is more prone to unilateral action and military engagement. These contrasting cultures diminish the common ground for building an alliance security posture particularly when the common threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War gives way to the more diffuse threats of regional instability and global terrorism in the contemporary world. Like Treverton, Coker is not optimistic about the prospects for Atlantic partners to craft common approaches to security.

The third part of the volume treats Atlantic economic relations. In Chapter Six, Benjamin J. Cohen analyzes the potential of the euro to challenge the dollar as the preeminent reserve currency in the international monetary system. The quick acceptance of the new currency by government officials and currency traders and its recent steady appreciation against the dollar have led many to believe that it is already a worthy rival of the American currency. A more limited role for the dollar could constrain American macroeconomic flexibility at home, limit economic policy options abroad, and diminish American prestige. However, Cohen uses the logics of market competition and government preferences to argue that the euro is not yet a viable threat to the dollar and that the American currency will remain the primary global reserve asset for the foreseeable future. Inertia, higher transactions costs for the euro, the EU’s anti-growth bias, and the lack of a strong central monetary authority are among the reasons for the holders of currencies to continue to prefer dollars to euros. Only in the Middle East where oil riches remain and European trade is considerable might the euro mount a strong challenge to dollar. In Cohen’s view, European leaders will be cautious in pressuring the dollar for fear of upsetting other important aspects of the Atlantic economic relationship.

S. Linn Williams treats EU-US trade relations in Chapter 7 and makes the case that commercial relations are strong and stable, a pattern that has been in place since the 1950s. Williams treats efforts in the multilateral Doha Round and a wide range of bilateral disputes and argues that they are being handled in a fashion that can best called ‘business as usual.’ He identifies the globalization of business, the role played by the WTO, and the long legacy of personal diplomacy in Atlantic trade management as stabilizing factors in these relations. However, he does acknowledge that the internal integration agenda within the EU, different approaches to economic competition in the US and Europe, and the extension of commercial negotiations to what he calls “trade-related” areas will challenge Atlantic trade relations in the future. While he is confident that the strong and valuable Atlantic trade relationship can be sustained, efforts to protect it come at a time when both the US and Europe have less control over global trade matters.

Part 4 treats the impact of domestic politics on Atlantic relations on sensitive issues such as agriculture, the environment, and ideology. In Chapter 8, Adam Sheingate looks at the domestic politics of agricultural policies in the US and the EU, policies that have contributed to a long history of rancorous relations in Atlantic agricultural trade. In an analysis of recent trends in regulatory regimes in the United States and Europe, Sheingate finds, somewhat surprisingly, that those regimes have been converging over time, albeit slowly and inconsistently. He finds the level of subsidies paid to farmers to be moving together and a trend toward the use of direct government payments as opposed to price supports. He identifies both internal and external pressures that help to explain this convergence. At the same time, tensions in agricultural relations between the two sides of the Atlantic remain high and Sheingate concludes that such tensions derive from domestic politicians seeking to deflect blame for policy failures at home to external trading partners.

In Chapter 9, Paulette Kurzer addresses the current dispute over genetically modified food and feed in order to evaluate whether it signals a much greater Atlantic rift over environmental regulation and consumer protection. She argues that environmental policy initiatives of the sort current in Europe come in waves, often in response to highly publicized events or crises. Environmental regulatory fervor was high in the United States in the 1970s and European concerns were modest by comparison. That situation has now been reversed. Kurzer identifies different perceptions of risk and levels of public trust as well as divergent cultural attitudes about farming and food as responsible for the different regulatory responses to GMOs. However, she believes some of these factors to be transitory and that other factors will push for a convergence in regulatory response over time. Risk and trust are the most easily altered by regulatory failures or publicized crises. Large firms dislike divergent regulatory regimes and are likely to push for convergence even if they raise regulatory costs. And as Kurzer discusses in detail, the common EU position masks considerable diversity among national actors, many of whom take positions not dissimilar to that of the US. There is much evidence to suggest that regulatory differences will fade with time.

In Chapter 10, Patrick Chamorel examines the philosophies of neo-conservatives and Euro-skeptics in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the role of anti-Americanism in Europe. While such philosophies have gained increased voice as they have been embraced by some leading politicians and their advisors, he argues that they are part of a diverse and varied ideological debate on both sides of the Atlantic that does not necessarily suggest a growing divergence among Atlantic partners.

In the volume’s conclusion, the editor argues that the dynamics of the Atlantic partnership are not unlike the dynamics of integration within Europe. Economic relations have been most successfully managed and have led to an interdependence that is the foundation of the larger relationship. States have incrementally relinquished national sovereignty in this arena, most notably the recent European states’ willingness to give up national currencies for the euro. This complex web of Atlantic relationships, both public and private, will sustain this partnership well into the future. Security relations both within the EU and between the Atlantic partners have been the most difficult to manage from the end of World War II and they continue to be the thorniest today. Perhaps because national security cuts to the heart of national sovereignty concerns, political leaders have been most reluctant to relinquish control to other partners or to supranational institutions. As the Iraq war demonstrated, cooperation within Europe and between Europe and America is difficult to achieve, and even more so following the end of the Cold War and the American first-hand experience with terrorism. Cultural and ideological differences have been accentuated in recent years, exacerbated in some measure by divergent strategic visions held by powerful political leaders. However, such differences are likely to be idiosyncratic or cyclical over time and are not likely to pose a larger threat to the Atlantic partnership. In sum, EU-US relations are much more complex and complicated than pundits would have us believe. There is much to make us confident that the United States and Europe will remain active and important partners in global affairs. We should also expect that any such complex relationship will have ongoing frictions and problems that will require persistence and ingenuity to manage and resolve.

References

Ash, Timothy Garton (2004), Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West, New York: Random House.

Boot, Max (2003), “Power: Resentment Comes with the Territory,” Washington Post, March 3.

Cohen-Tanugi, Laurant (2003), An Alliance at Risk: The United States and Europe Since September 11, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Cooper, Robert (2003), The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, London: Atlantic Books.

Daalder, Ivo H. (2002), “The End of Atlanticism,” Survival, (Summer), pp. 147-166.

Fukuyama, Francis (2002), “The West May be Cracking,” International Herald Tribune, August 9.

Gordon Philip and Jeremy Shapiro (2004), America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Krauthammer, Charles (2002), “Reimagining NATO,” Washington Post, May 24.

Lundestad, Geir (1999), “Empire by Invitation in the American Century,” Diplomatic History 23: 2, pp. 189-217.

___________ (2003), The United States and Western Europe Since 1945, New York: Oxford University Press.

Newhouse, John (2003), Imperial America: the Bush Assault on the World Order, New York: Vantage.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs.

Reid, T.R. (2004), The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy, New York: Penguin Press.

Chapter 2
The Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe

Thomas L. Ilgen

Much has been written about the causes of the current rift in relations between the United States and Europe (Ash, 2004; Reid, 2004; Gordon and Shapiro, 2004; Cohen-Tanugi, 2003; Kagan, 2002; Steinberg, 2003; Drozdiak, 2005). Some focus on structural changes in the global order following the end of the Cold War (Treverton, Chapter 4). The absence of a balancing superpower not only reduced the need for US and European solidarity on security issues but it also encouraged the US to act unilaterally rather than engage in the cumbersome and time-consuming process of building alliance consensus and agreement. Others point to diverging interests and goals between the Atlantic partners, with the US pursuing wide-ranging interests around the globe and Europe focusing on regional goals on the continent and in Eurasia. Still others center their analysis on the diverging set of means that the two partners have evolved to act in international affairs over the last half-century—the Europeans mastering the art of negotiation, consensus building, and compromise while the US has increasingly come to rely on military force to overcome resistance to its views and to resolve differences. Robert Kagan’s conclusion that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars emphasizes this quite different arsenal of foreign policy tools (Kagan, 2002, 2003). The European reliance on diplomacy is a function of military weakness—one uses what is at one’s disposal and champions its utility and effectiveness. The American preference for military force follows from its largely unchallenged military position—one uses military might because it appears to produce quick results and one can do so without fear of reprisal. Still others trace this divide between diplomacy and compromise versus recourse to the use of military force to entrenched cultural and ideological differences in Europe and America that grow from different experiences with and attitudes toward war in the twentieth century. For Europeans, war has been a tragedy for losers and winners alike; societies must move beyond the use of force if they are to avoid future tragedies. For Americans, with the notable exception of Vietnam, wars have produced decisive victories and they have validated principled struggles for freedom and democracy (Coker, Chapter 4). Those that regard Atlantic differences as ephemeral, temporary, and...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Part I The Legacy of the Transatlantic Alliance
• Part II Security Affairs
• Part III Economic Relations
• Part IV Domestic Policies and Transatlantic Values
• Index