Democracy and Civil Society in a Global Era

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Marguerite Marlin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781498707039
• eBook ISBN: 9781317246800
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Democracy and Civil Society in a Global Era addresses challenges to the strengthening of active citizenship. In this highly-structured work, the themes presented are linked to fostering a culture of peace and non-violence, the lessening of fear and insecurity in political, economic, social, and cultural terms inherently detached from the conceptualization of political delineations and physical boundaries, and the ability to live dignified lives. The various regions that are represented in the case studies include: the Indian sub-continent, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, China, the Middle East, Nigeria and the EU. The commonality and universality of the topics allows readers from any region of the world to relate to them.

This book presents a dynamic combination of theory and field research, and is an iconoclastic tour-de-force of studies in democracy. Policy makers, think tanks and development practitioners may be particularly be interested in this book because it is about action rather than mere ideas and processes. It demonstrates how social movements can introduce and strengthen equality, inclusion, accountability, and the free flow of information. These elements, in turn, can contribute to the acculturation of freedom and social justice, in the developed world just as much as in the developing world.

DEMOCRACY

I

Chapter 1

Constitutional Democracy for Divided Societies*

Munafrizal Manan

International attention to democracy, both theoretical and practical, has been increasing significantly since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974 (Huntington 1991). According to Samuel Huntington (1991), from the 1970s to 1990s, more countries moved toward democracy, resulting in the emergence of an optimistic view about the future of democracy—including the much-appraised perspectives and movements centering on the concept of liberal democracy. For Francis Fukuyama, this dynamic reveals that the victory of liberal democracy over its ideological rivals—authoritarianism and totalitarianism—represents “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992: xi).

Since Fukuyama composed his work on the ending of struggles between two rival systems, an increase in fundamentalist religion and the ascendance of the developed world into “a paroxysm of ideological violence” (Fukuyama 1989: 114), democracy has grown in popularity and has even come to be an influential factor in international relations. Apart from the emerging current of democracy in the contemporary world, upholding the ideals of democracy in the modern state is no easy task, particularly as many societies in the global era remain, or are becoming further divided in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and gender.

Rather than making a positive impact on societies overall, democratic movements actually give rise to or potentially stimulate tensions and social stratification, and even alight horizontal conflicts among societies with variegated backgrounds. Snyder (2000) shows that the early phase of democratization triggered nationalistic conflicts in some countries, and provides a solid reason for the failure of democracy and democratic institutions in pluralistic societies. Moreover, democracies also tend to fail in states with weak capacity; this has been the case in many third-wave democracies (Dominguez and Jones 2007: 7; Tilly 2007: 15–21).

As a result of the inherent challenges and obstacles that surface in the face of democratization in the modern age, one cannot rule out the possibility that a different brand of democracy is more suitable for divided societies. Scholars in the field of political science have debated the issue, with some attempting to present a remedy for issues that bedevil divided society in the context of budding democracy. This chapter presents the single and straight forward argument that constitutional democracy is best suited for divided societies. It begins by discussing the suitability of several types of democracy for divided societies, and follows with an examination of constitutional democracy in the Indonesian context.

Democracy and Its Many Forms

Scholars in the recent and distant past have introduced many forms of democracy and democratic practice, indicating that there are many views on this inclusionary form of government and governance (see Held 1987; Heywood 1997). Electoral democracy emphasizes the importance of the right of universal suffrage in which one person can cast a single vote. Electoral democracy defines democracy merely as voting in elections in order to choose public officers to represent a wide array of public interests (Schumpeter 1987). In this regard, electoral democracy has a close relation with representative democracy. The problem with these democracies is that they are inclined to benefit the majority and neglect the minority. In such democracies, the will of the majority must be obeyed (Mueller 1997: 84).

There is the general understanding that if competition is solely based on the number of votes, then the minority will ultimately lose. Subsequently, it can be concluded that these kinds of democracies do not provide divided societies with adequate playing fields for democratic growth or practice. For this reason, it is argued that electoral democracy combined with other forms of democracy present an ideal model for societies characterized by intense social, cultural, political, and economic stratification. Arend Lijphart (1977) offers what he terms consociational democracy for divided societies, and sketches a range of favorable conditions for consociational democracy. He and other scholars pay a great deal of attention to the importance of a constitution as the pivotal pillar in the overall democratic machine (Horowitz 2000; Issacharoff 2004; Lijphart 2004; Reynolds 2005).

Deliberative democracy is another type suitable for a plural society. Theorists of deliberative democracy argue that the democratic process should include open spheres for public involvement in policymaking that relate to public interest or the so-called “common good” (Chambers 2003). Deliberative democracy is useful to prevent the domination of the majority group in the democratic process while simultaneously providing an opportunity to minority or marginalized groups to voice their interests in all walks of society. Deliberative democracy is a remedy to reconcile the clash between democracy and rights, as well as between the majority will and individual rights of those belonging to underrepresented peoples and their communities (Chambers 2003: 311). Some theorists of deliberative democracy stress the importance of the rule of law and constitutional rights (Chambers 2003: 309–311); however, less attention has been paid to the relationship between deliberative democracy and the constitution as a critical coupling in the successful democratic process. Although deliberative democracy and constitutional democracy seem to be similar ideas, the main focus of deliberative democracy is not on the constitution, but rather on how peoples retain equal opportunity in within the democratic process.

There can be little doubt that democracy is a complicated practice; as such, it is somewhat difficult to claim that one type of democracy operates or meets the needs of a state’s citizens better than any other type of government. In practice, it is common to apply a mixed type of democracy to states with a variegated population base. However, a well-functioning democracy within the framework of a divided society requires the existence and legal establishment of a constitution. Constitutional democracy is necessary for divided societies as it regulates and guarantees the enforceability of democracy for a divided society. Any type of democracy may be referred to as constitutional democracy so long as it is supported by a constitution. Constitutional democracy thus might well be seen as an octopus, with other types of democracy as its tentacles; this form of democracy is often considered primus inter pares among other types.

Constitutional Democracy

Although in literal terms constitutional democracy may be accepted as the combination of constitutionalism and democracy, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of what both constitutionalism and democracy truly are. One source explains that the first use of the word “constitutionalism” was made in 1832 (Gordon 1999: 5). According to Jon Elster, constitutionalism pertains to “limits on majority decisions, more specifically, to limits that are in some sense self-imposed” (Elster 1988: 2). Scott Gordon argues that the notion of constitutionalism refers to the coercive power of the state being constrained (Gordon 1999: 5). For Gordon, “the problem of controlling the power to coerce” is the most important aspect of constitutionalism (Gordon 1999: 7). Meanwhile, the origin of the term “democracy” is the Greek language, and consists of two words: those of (1) demos (the people) and (2) kratos (rule or authority) (Gordon 1999: 60). One of the simplest and most popular definitions of democracy was introduced by Abraham Lincoln, who argued that democracy is a government from the people, by the people, and for the people.

According to Charles Tilly, “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly 2007: 13–14). In discussing constitutional democracy, some scholars argue that there exists tension between democracy (democrats) and constitutionalism (constitutionalists). Such a tension has appeared as early as the eighteenth century (Holmes 1988: 198). One of the historical debates centering on constitutionalism and democracy occurred between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (Sunstein 1988: 327).

Democracy facilitates a political competition by which a decision is made based on majority power. By contrast, constitutionalism limits majority rule, which potentially leads to majority tyranny. Moreover, to use Walter Murphy’s words, “whereas democratic theory turns to moral relativism, constitutionalism turns to moral realism” (Murphy 1993: 6). Therefore, those who believe that there is tension between the two argue that “constitutional democracy is a marriage of opposites, an oxymoron” (Holmes 1988: 197). However, other scholars rebut such a view; Cass Sunstein presents the argument that there is no inherent tension between the two poles of democracy and constitutionalism (Sunstein 1988). Similarly, Jon Elster also believes that constitutional constraints on democracy represent the means of strengthening democracy (Elster 1988: 9). Stephen Holmes comes to the same view, asserting that the two are “mutually supportive,” and thus argues that the tension between the two is a myth of modern political thought (Holmes 1988: 197). Both of these views should not be overly contrasted or their differences over-exaggerated (Murphy 1993).

Constitutional democracy attempts to compensate for the weaknesses of constitutionalism and democracy by combining them. Dennis Mueller argues that the possession of a constitution by all democracies indicates that there is a close relation between constitutionalism and democracy (Mueller 1997).¹ Although constitutional democracy is able to overcome potential conflicts in divided societies, it is important to note that what is meant by constitutional democracy here is not only based on the existence of a constitution, but also on the idea that a constitution regulates and guarantees the balance of majority and minority relationship.² This is needed to prevent the potential tension and conflict in divided societies. Thus, while the existence of a constitution is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition unless it is not intended to enforce the harmony and stability of divided societies.

Constitutional democracy is more effective in enforcing the stability and harmony in divided societies as compared to other forms of democracy given that constitution is a supreme law. As the fundamental and the highest law, the constitution is the heart of power. A constitution is very important for all parties in divided societies because it is a social contract that stipulates the rules of the game politically (Mueller 1996). Furthermore, as Walter Murphy contends, constitutional democracy has the tendency to “accept the centrality of human dignity” (Murphy 1993: 6), which is very useful for divided societies. In short, constitutional democracy implies that democracy should be based on constitutional legitimacy; conversely, the constitution should be one entrenched in the ideals and values of democracy and democratic practice.

Constitutional democracy is a global phenomenon. A large number of countries having applied a combination of democracy theory and constitutionalism to their national systems (Murphy 1993); indeed, most countries around the world that employ so-called democratic systems should essentially be labeled as constitutional democracies (Murphy 1993). While a positive constitutional design affects the enforceability of constitutional democracy overall, a democratic constitution is needed to provide the framework of a sound relationship between societies in the future. Drafters of constitutions should, therefore, consider the plurality of the society for which that specific constitution is designed. Most importantly, the many interests and perspectives that exist within divided societies should be taken into consideration when drafting a constitution; the inclusion of both majorities and minorities should exist (Dominguez and Jones 2007: 7).

A constitution is a crucial aspect of enforcing and stabilizing democracy in its early stages. The process of transition to democracy should be followed by the (re)construction of a democratic constitution. The (re)construction of a democratic constitution is a starting point to democracy; this is a reason why almost all new democratic states consider constitutional amendment a top priority for building, maintaining, and strengthening democratic growth. The undemocratic constitution inherited from an authoritarian regime is replaced by a democratic constitution.

An effort to anticipate potential conflict in a divided society should also inform the constitution of the state in question. However, the building of a constitution in transitional democracies is not an easy task to accomplish given that all parties have to agree to achieve constitutional settlements, which requires constitutional negotiation among them. In spite of all good intentions by conflicting sides within a divided society, constitutional negotiation can lead to a deadlock (constitutional crisis) if each party only focuses on their own interests —particularly if there are adversarial interests between the majority and minority. To be clear, it is difficult to reconcile the need for constitutional constraints on the majority and the desire of the majority to become dominant. It is also difficult to balance the empowerment of majorities and the safeguarding of representation and participation of minorities in democratic governance. The experience of the democratization process in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in Africa have shown that the most important challenge for deeply divided societies is to strike a proper balance between unity and diversity (Simeon and Turgeon 2007); this is commonly related to the relationships between the majority and minority, as previously stre...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Notes on Editors
• Notes on Contributors
• Preface
• Part I: Democracy
• Part II: Civil Society
• Index