Rethinking Sociological Theory

Introducing and Explaining a Scientific Theoretical Sociology

Stephen K. Sanderson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317252771
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Stephen K. Sanderson s latest book recaptures a scientific theoretical sociology, one whose fundamental aim is the formulation of real theories that can be empirically tested. Sanderson reviews the major theoretical traditions within contemporary sociology, explicating their key principles, critically evaluating these principles and their applications, and showcasing exemplars. He judges each tradition by asking whether it has generated falsifiable research programs. Although principally a work of theoretical critique, "Rethinking Sociological Theory" is also a valuable textbook for both undergraduate and graduate courses in sociological theory."

Chapter One

Functionalism

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Functionalism is a term that has been widely used in the social sciences, sociology and anthropology in particular, to identify a variety of related lines of thought. For my purposes, a crucial distinction must be made between functionalism as a theoretical tradition and a functionalist mode of social explanation. The former incorporates the latter, but the latter can stand on its own and can be (and sometimes is) associated with other theoretical traditions. Functionalism as a theoretical tradition began in anthropology in the early part of this century with the works of such prominent figures as Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown.¹ These thinkers sought to identify the parts of society, show how they were interrelated, and demonstrate their function or functions for the maintenance of society. Both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, especially the former, were greatly influenced by Emile Durkheim, whose ideas also had a major influence on sociological functionalism. Functionalism came into sociology partly by way of importation from anthropology and, more substantially, through the work of Talcott Parsons and his students and disciples. In The Social System, Parsons generated a functionalist model of societies as social systems.² He was preoccupied (virtually to the point of obsession) with the “problem of order,” and his sociological theory is overwhelmingly devoted to dealing with this problem. Like Durkheim, Parsons strongly rejected nineteenth-century utilitarian thinking. Society could not be composed simply of individuals pursuing their own interests, for such a thing would not be stable. People require constraints in the form of values and norms, to which they commit themselves, in order for a stable social order to emerge and persist.

The functionalist school as a whole generally adhered to the following set of basic propositions, although not every functionalist would necessarily agree with every single proposition:

1. The System Principle. Societies are complex systems of interrelated and interdependent parts, each of which significantly influences the others.

2. The Vital Function Principle. Each part of a society exists because it has a vital function to perform, or essential role to play, in maintaining the existence or well-being of the society as a whole.

3. The Principle of Functionalist Explanation. The existence of any part of a society is explained when its function(s) for the society is (are) identified.

4. The Consensus Principle. All societies have mechanisms that integrate them, or that allow them to hold together; one of the most important of these mechanisms is the commitment of a society’s members to a common set of beliefs and values.

5. The Equilibrium Principle. Societies tend toward a state of equilibrium or homeostasis, and disturbances in any part of a society tend to bring about adjustments elsewhere in the society in order to restore the equilibrium.

6. The Differentiation Principle. Social change is less common than social continuity, but when change does occur its principal form is the differentiation of structures and functions of a society. This differentiation improves a society’s overall functional efficiency.

It has been said many times but perhaps bears repeating that the functionalists’ image of society is that of an organism. Indeed, forerunners of functionalism in the nineteenth century, such as Herbert Spencer, often described society as an organism. Just as organisms were complex systems of interdependent parts, so were societies. And just as the parts of an organism performed some essential function for the organism’s well-being, so the parts of society performed important functions for its well-being. The functionalist explanatory logic of greatest interest here is contained in the second and third principles above. Functionalist explanations are those that explain some social phenomenon as existing and taking the form it does because it contributes to the overall well-being of the larger society or some subsystem of it. Functionalist explanations in sociology are the equivalent of what evolutionary biologists call group selection.

In the late 1940s, Parsons’s student Robert Merton tinkered with the functionalist mode of explanation in order to make it more useful and empirically accurate. In his famous essay “Manifest and Latent Functions,” published in his book Social Theory and Social Structure, Merton argued that functionalism had taken on some unnecessary baggage and had become too rigid.³ It needed to be reformulated in some respects and made more flexible. Merton was officially reacting against some of Radcliffe-Brown’s and Malinowski’s ideas, but he must have had Parsons in mind too. Merton argued for the importance of at least four basic distinctions that had not been a part of functionalist thinking. First, a distinction had to be drawn between manifest and latent functions, or those that were intended and recognized by society versus those that were unintended and that generally went unrecognized. For example, a manifest function of the educational system is the transmission of knowledge, but a latent function is that it delays the entry of millions of college students into the job market. Merton spent a lot of time analyzing latent functions, which he sometimes referred to as unintended consequences. The unintended consequences of social action were to him a major part of social life. In addition, Merton argued that it cannot be assumed that all of a society’s parts contribute in a positive way to its survival and well-being. Some of the parts may be dysfunctional, that is, impede the efficient functioning of society. We must therefore always be on the outlook for dysfunctions as well as functions. Merton also said that it is not always the whole society that is the reference point for functions and dysfunctions. A social structure may be functional for some segments of society and at the same time dysfunctional for other segments. We must always take into consideration whether something contributes to (or subtracts from) the whole or simply one or more of the parts. Finally, Merton asserted that we cannot assume that just because a part fulfills a function it is the only part that can do so. We must recognize that there are functional equivalents or substitutes. This means that not every part of a society is necessarily vital to that society (or its parts).⁴

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Merton’s distinctions and clarifications were valuable at the time and made functionalism into a more useful approach. However, Merton failed to do what was really needed, which was to break free from a functionalist mode of analysis altogether. As Randall Collins has said in perhaps the most insightful comment ever made on Mertonian functionalism, “Merton rose to prominence in the dark ages of American sociology, the cold war years of the 1940s and 1950s. He helped guide sociology across those mindless and repressive years, even as he helped perpetuate the darkness.”⁵

As all sociologists today know, in the 1960s functionalism came under heavy attack and by the mid-1970s had declined markedly in influence. The work of Parsons became the target of severe criticism, but functionalist work in general fell into disrepute. The leading criticisms were basically as follows:⁶

1. Functionalism tended to overemphasize the degree to which societies are harmonious, stable, and well-integrated systems. Some sociologists, radicals in particular, called functionalism the “sunshine view” of society. Parsons, in particular, was obsessed with the “problem of order,” and he gave too much attention to norms and values as determinants of that order.

2. Because of its overemphasis on harmony and stability, functionalism tended to neglect or play down the degree to which social conflict is a basic feature of social life.

3. With its exaggeration of harmony and underemphasis of conflict, it was charged that functionalism encouraged, at least implicitly, a conservative view of social life. That is, it tended to say that those aspects of society that do exist must exist because they make an important contribution to societal functioning. It was not necessarily charged that the functionalists were politically conservative, only that their perspective had conservative implications.

4. Functionalism generally limited itself to the study of a society at a single point in time (the present), and thus represented a markedly ahistorical approach.

5. Since functionalism tended to ignore the historical dimension of social life, it had great difficulty accounting for social change.

6. Functionalism presented a teleological and reified view of society by treating it as an organism, or at least like an organism. Functionalism treated societies as if they had “minds” or “consciousness” in the same sense that individuals do. Societies were said to adapt, to make decisions, and so on, but it is only individuals, many critics charged, who have these characteristics and who can do these things. It is only individuals who have needs, adapt, make decisions, and so on. In the words of Anthony Giddens, “functionalist authors have been unable to see human beings as reasoning agents.”⁷

I essentially agree with all of these criticisms, but it is the last one that most concerns me. Basically, as Jonathan Turner and Alexandra Maryanski have argued, functionalism as an explanatory theory is dead (or at least should be dead).⁸ Not only does its teleological structure and its reification of society render it invalid on logical grounds, but functionalist theories can easily be shown to be inaccurate on empirical grounds. This can be demonstrated by way of a critical analysis of some well-known functionalist arguments.

EXEMPLARS

Functionalism and Stratification

Over half a century ago Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore presented a functionalist analysis of stratification that was one of the earliest functionalist theories in sociology; it has become perhaps the single best-known functionalist theory of all time.⁹ Davis and Moore argued that stratification—by which they meant inequalities in the distribution of material and symbolic rewards—was a societal universal, and that it was so because it was necessary to the survival, or at least the smooth and efficient functioning, of any society. A crucial task faced by every society was that of motivating a sufficient number of its members to fill its most functionally important roles, and it accomplished this task by establishing greater rewards for those who would undertake the sacrifices necessary to perform these roles. Stratification thus evolved because it provided benefits for society as a whole, and no society could function effectively (or perhaps even survive at all) without it. As Davis and Moore put it, stratification is an unconsciously evolved mechanism whereby societies motivate enough of their members to fill their most functionally important social positions.

This theory has been one of the most frequently and extensively criticized theories in all of sociology. The most basic objections, and my responses to them, can be summarized as follows:¹⁰

1. The concept of “functional importance” is both subjective and circular. Davis and Moore seem to identify a position as functionally important simply because it is highly rewarded, and then leap from there to the conclusion that it must be highly rewarded because it is important to society. (Response: I am not sure that this is what Davis and Moore have done, but it is possible.)

2. The assumption that stratification systems help to promote the most efficient use of a society’s talents is questionable. In fact, the more highly stratified a society is, the less it can discover just how much talent it has because social rewards will be determined mostly by social inheritance rather than by ability. (Response: This criticism can only be evaluated in terms of the type of society being considered. In preindustrial societies the criticism has considerable force because of the powerful effect of social heredity. However, modern industrial societies are much more meritocratic, and thus Davis and Moore’s assumption is to some extent applicable in this case.)

3. Economic and symbolic rewards are not the only ways in which societies can motivate their members. They could be motivated by such incentives as “social duty” or “joy in work.” (Response: This may be technically true, but the criticism has little force because the struggle for status, wealth, and power seems to be a primary human motivation that usually overrides other motivations.)

4. The theory is more an attempt to justify or legitimize stratification than an attempt to explain it. (Response: This criticism is badly misplaced and there is little evidence to suggest that Davis and Moore were ideologically rather than scientifically motivated. In fact, the sociologists who make this criticism may well be the ones with the ideological motives.)

5. The theory assumes a level of equal opportunity in society that is more an ideal than a reality. (Response: This criticism has some force, although it is probably overstated.)

6. The theory is unable t...