Reason, Faith and History

Philosophical Essays for Paul Helm

Martin Stone, Martin Stone

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317070740
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Teología y religión
• Subtopic: Religión

Spanning the breadth of philosophical, historical and theological interests articulated in the work of Paul Helm, including chapters on Calvinism, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, Christian Doctrine and epistemology, Reason, Faith and History offers an accessible text for students of contemporary philosophy of religion as well as those interested in philosophical theology more broadly. Reason, Faith and History offers a unique collection of essays on key topics in the philosophy of religion. Published in honour of Paul Helm, a major force in contemporary English-speaking philosophy of religion, this book presents newly commissioned chapters by distinguished philosophers and theologians from North America, Israel, the UK and Continental Europe. Contributors include: Robertson, Trueman, Hughes, Swinburne, Torrance, Clark, Robinson, Pink, Gellman, Cross, Byrne, Hossack, and Crisp.

Chapter 1
Mind, Language, and the Trinity in Basil of Caesarea

David G. Robertson

It has often been said that the fourth-century debates that followed the landmark Council of Nicaea in 325 were conducted in such a way that Greek philosophy had been finally and decisively purged from orthodox trinitarian thought. In honor of the unity of philosophical and theological concerns exemplified in Paul Helm, I will try to bring to light a remarkable case of the power of philosophical ideas within Christian theology in even the most eminent of Greek theologians, even when discussing the Trinity. I hope to show that philosophical ideas about mind and language inherited from the Stoics inform the theological use of the distinction between inner speech (logos endiathetos) and language expressed (logos prophorikos) in the work of a cornerstone of trinitarian orthodoxy, Basil of Caesarea.¹

I

Although the Stoics were not the first philosophers to draw a distinction between inner and outer speech, they developed the notion as received from Plato (Soph. 263E3-9; 264A1-2; Phil. 38E; Theaet. 189E6-190A; 206D1ff.) and Aristotle (An. Post. 76b24; Cat. 4b34), and gave it their stamp.² Following Plato and Aristotle, the wide dissemination of the Stoic logos-distinction in Hellenistic and Later Greek philosophy must also be taken into account. Of the many uses of the distinction, the Hellenistic debates on speech and human rationality are particularly relevant to the theological uses of the distinction I will discuss. So I will introduce the Hellenistic debates with the Stoics.

The Stoics do not seem to have concentrated on thought and its precise relation to language, as is now such a focus of interest in philosophy, cognitive science, and related fields. At least we can see that the Stoics have a notion of inner speech or ‘linguistic thought’. The distinction is key to marking off human beings from other animate creatures, in such a way that there is a close relation between language and the rationality of human thought. The Stoics seem to take up this distinction in the first part of their dialectic, the part dealing with signifiers rather than what is signified (Diogenes Laertius 7.55ff.; 7.62).

The Skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus reports the Stoics on the relevance of the distinction between inner and outer logos:

A human being differs from other animals not by using speech which is uttered (for crows, parrots and jays pronounce articulated words), but rather inner speech.³

This idea is loosely in accord with the views of the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon on human rationality reported elsewhere (Diogenes Laertius 7.55-56), so perhaps Sextus is drawing from Diogenes.⁴ We also find from the doxagraphy of Diogenes Laertius (7.55-56) that for Diogenes of Babylon, the human voice as distinguished from animal sounds is articulate and sent forth from the mind; animal voices are merely bits of air struck by impulse. Thus in its semantic capacity, human vocal sound becomes speech. Speech is defined as signifying vocal sound sent out from the mind.

For the Stoics, the key characteristic of human rationality is the capacity for language.⁵ Standard Stoic theory defines thoughts in terms of ‘rational impressions’, which are internally ordered and articulated in sentences, but also have a certain correspondence to non-corporeal things which are said or can be said.⁶ In fact, the ‘impressions’ of rational creatures are spoken of as ‘thoughts’ or ‘cognitive processes’,⁷ and it is clear that the Stoic notion of thought which follows a ‘presentation’ or ‘appearance’ is directly associated with language. ‘The presentation precedes, and then thought, which possesses the capacity for speech, expresses with language that which is experienced by the agency of the presentation.’⁸

Accordingly, the Stoics have a sense in which they regard mental speech as unspoken, an internal phenomenon. The linguistic character of thought is important.⁹ In an argument attributed by Galen to Chrysippus for locating the ruling part of the soul in the heart, what goes on in the mind is spoken of as inner discourse.

He [i. e. Chrysippus] seems to me to be making use in this argument of his work on vocal sound. I prove this on the basis of what he says in addition: ‘Then from the mind’, he says, ‘must come speaking and speaking in oneself or producing vocal sound and thinking and producing vocal sound in oneself and sending outwards.’ For he takes something agreed as his first premiss, namely that speaking and speaking in oneself belong to the same part [of the soul], then he takes as his second premiss that speech is a work of the heart, and from these two premisses he deduces the conclusion, that speech in oneself takes place in the heart.¹⁰

This bit from Chrysippus contains obscurities, but there seems to be a notion that speakers articulate language within the mind which is then reflected in the utterance spoken to other (hearers, that is) speakers. The relation between inner and outer speech is not causal like the relation of speaker’s mind and speaker’s utterance but rather is a relation of having the same character.¹¹

Later Peripatetics were happy to appropriate the Stoic terminology. For our purposes, let us take up the influential Stoicizing Peripatetic philosopher Porphyry, who wrote an entire (extant) treatise on animals. Porphyry says in On Abstinence from Animal Food that the definition which he gives of logos prophorikos is not the sole property of any philosopher or philosophical school, but is very widely recognized and contains a notion inherent in the concept of logos. The logos which is speech articulated by means of the tongue is ‘signifying of the inner and psychic affections’.¹² Presumably, Porphyry thinks that the notion is found in Plato and Aristotle as well as the Stoics, representing philosophical consensus.¹³

II

Next we will see how the Stoic distinction between inner and outer speech is used in the Hellenistic rationality debates. The legacy of these philosophical arguments will then be traced in some of Basil’s work.

Much of what is known today of the Hellenistic debates is preserved from the Skeptics. To start with, there is a valuable report of the third-century AD Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus (Hyp. 1.65ff.), who attacks the Stoics within the framework of internal and expressed speech. Sextus is here presenting his ten modes of skepticism. The first mode has to do with sense-perception; it is an argument which points to the physical variations among animals on account of which different animals do not receive the same impressions from the same objects. On these grounds Sextus argues (Hyp. 1.59) that human beings can only know how things appear to us, and must suspend judgement as to what they are like in their nature. Accordingly, human beings cannot determine whether the impressions of animals are to be preferred to those of humans. Sextus provides strong evidence for the Stoic use of the logos-distinction in this debate, for the Stoics are said (Hyp. 1.62-65) to argue for a fundamental divide between irrational animals and rational humans. (He often refers to ‘dogmatists’ but in this passage picks out the Stoics by name, while his attack is clearly preoccupied with Stoic ideas.)

So then, let us move on to reason. There is reason which is internal and there is reason which is expressed in language. So let us first look at the former kind. According to the dogmatists who think in a way particularly opposed to us, those from the Stoa, inner reason is anchored in these things, in the choice of what is appropriate (with a view to the fulfillment of our rational nature) and avoidance of what is alien to it, in the knowledge of the skills which contribute to this end, in the grasp of the virtues in accordance with our nature and the virtues which concern the passions.¹⁴

Significantly, Sextus of all the animals chooses the dog as his example for discussion in the passage immediately preceding (Hyp. 1.64). To support his position, namely that the perceptions of animals are no less trustworthy than those of humans, Sextus argues that animals possess rationality to the same degree as humans. Thus he takes up ‘internal reasoning’ first (Hyp. 1.66ff.),¹⁵ in order to show that his representative animal, the dog, is ‘perfectly equipped’ in every respect that humans are perfectly equipped: The dog chooses what is ‘well-suited’ to himself and avoids what is harmful, the dog has a ‘technical skill’, namely hunting with which to obtain what is suitable, and the dog possesses virtue.

Sextus’s dog is also a dialectician. This is illustrated (Hyp. 1.69) by means of the famous ‘dog syllogism’ of the great Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. Chrysippus is said to be ‘particularly hostile’ to irrational animals, yet for some reason accords the dog a share in dialectic. For the dog makes use of the fifth undemonstrable argument with several disjuncts when, tracking an animal, he or she arrives at a crossroads, and having sniffed at the two alternative roads, pursues the third without sniffing.¹⁶ With regard to the Stoic view of animal reasoning in this case, Sextus tells us that ‘the old [philosopher] says that he reasons this out virtually.’ So to this counter-example, the Stoics would reply that no syllogism is carried out by the dog in the ‘full’ sense that is exemplified in human reasoning. As Sorabji argues, for Chrysippus the dog performs this in a way that is analogous yet inferior to the way in which human reason operates, for animals only possess a distorted image of complete rationality.¹⁷ However, the behaviour of the dog at the crossroads can be expressed by us as an argument, and the same conclusion reached.

Sextus also addresses the question of rational humans and irrational animals in another passage in the course of his arguments that there is no sign.

The dogmatists...who hold a position which is the opposite, say that man does not differ from the irrational animals by virtue of reason which is expressed (for in fact both ravens and parrots and jays pronounce articulate vocal sounds), but rather by virtue of reason which is internal; nor by virtue of the simple impression alone (for animals too receive impressions), but by virtue of the impression which involves inference and combination. On account of which the human being, when he conceives a notion of consequence, also in that very thought registers the cognition of a sign by virtue of the consequence; and the sign itself is of such a sort, ‘if this, then this’. So then the existence of the sign hinges upon the nature and construction of the human being.¹⁸

Here the distinguishing mark of human rationality according to the Stoics is inference from signs.¹⁹ On top of this, the Stoics would presumably add that the difference also lies in the meaningful quality of human utterances,²⁰ a position that Porphyry labours to overcome in his treatise on animals.²¹

Porphyry in his treatise On Abstinence likewise builds his arguments for the rationality of animals along the lines of the distinction, echoing some of the same points covered by Sextus.²² Porphyry provides valuable testimony on Stoic theory in the course of his concise summaries of the opinions of ‘the ancients’ on reason and language. Before anyone else, he turns to the Stoics.

Seeing that reason is two-fold according to the Stoics, being internal in one respect, and expressed in another, and again being correct in one aspect, and incorrect in another, it is appropriate to distinguish which of the two [kinds] they deny to the animals.... Since then reason is two-fold, being present in speech, while being present in the (mental) disposition, let us take our starting point from the former, which is ordered according to the voice. So if reason expressed is vocal sound [uttered] through the tongue, semantic of the affections which are inward and of the soul – for this definition is the commonest and is not at all the property of a philosophical sect, but only is based on the notion of reason.²³

Porphyry then goes on to defend animal speech according to this definition, insofar as animals have their own language, which they possess not by convention like humans but in conformity to the guidance of nature and the gods.²⁴ It so happens that humans cannot understand animal speech,²⁵ the same line as found in Sextus (Hyp. 1.73ff.).²⁶

By this point, we can see the relevance of the Stoic distinction to the rationality debates. We are now in a position to take up a Greek Christian viewpoint on mind and language. In Hex. 9 and Hom. 3²⁷ of Basil the main strands of the philosophical tradition as sketched above are reworked into a Christian exposition of particularly impressive features of the created order, which show the wisdom of the creator. Basil discusses the untaught, innate nature of all creatures, which bear the mark of their maker’s wisdom.

As with the Stoics, there are important distinctions to be made between humans and animals – Basil points to reason (logos) as the factor which marks the difference. ‘In the case of irrational animals, the famil...