The Routledge Handbook of British Politics and Society

Mark Garnett, Mark Garnett

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781317194613
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

The Routledge Handbook of British Politics and Society conducts a rigorous, innovative and distinctive analysis of the relationship between British politics and society, emphasizing that the UK is now far from a monolithic, and unshifting, entity.

Examining the subject matter with unrivalled breadth and depth, it highlights and interrogates key contemporary debates on the future of the UK, the nature of 'Britishness', and the merits of multiculturalism, as well as contemporary criticisms of traditional institutions and the nature of representative democracy itself. Including contributions from key authors in their respective fields who bring their authority to bear on the task of outlining the current state of the art in British Studies, the book provides a fresh examination of the contrasts and the continuities across the whole field of British Politics and Society, while setting out agendas for future research.

The Routledge Handbook of British Politics and Society will be essential reading and an authoritative reference for scholars, students, researchers and practitioners involved in, and actively concerned about, research on British politics, society and culture.

Part I

Institutions and practice

1

The Core Executive

Peter Dorey

The ‘Core Executive’ is the term applied, since the 1990s, to the key individuals and institutions that collectively constitute the centre of British government as the main locus or source of decision-taking and policy-making. As Rod Rhodes (1995: 12) explains:

… the ‘core executive’ is the heart of the machine, covering the complex web of institutions, networks and practices surrounding the prime minister, cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counterparts [top-level civil service committees] … It also includes co-ordinating departments, chiefly the Cabinet Office, the Treasury and [the] Foreign Office.

To this definition, Martin J. Smith adds the other, non-co-ordinating government departments, which are ‘the core policy-making units within central government’, each of which has a senior minister as its head, these being ‘key actors within the institutions of the core executive’ (Smith, 1999: 5). Smith (1999: 1) asserts that:

The Core Executive is the heart of British government. It contains the key institutions and actors concerned with developing policy, co-ordinating government activity and providing the necessary resources for delivering public goods.

There were two main reasons why the concept of the Core Executive acquired academic significance from the 1990s onwards. The first concerned empirical developments at the heart of British government during the 1980s and 1990s, and the second was the consequent need for a new intellectual framework or paradigm for explicating these developments and their implications for the operation of central British government; old accounts and models would no longer suffice, because they had been superseded or rendered too simplistic. Much of this chapter focuses on the key individuals and institutions which collectively constitute the Core Executive, paying particular attention to their roles, their relationships with each other, and to relatively recent changes or developments which have impacted upon their functions or importance.

Later, we will also consider some of the conceptual and intellectual developments and debates which these empirical changes and developments have yielded, as political scientists have developed new accounts, models and theories to explain the changing roles of, and relationships between, these key political actors, and inter alia, the operation of central British government and policy-making.

Membership of the Core Executive, and recent trends

Empirically, the concept of the Core Executive reflects the expansion of the actors (individuals and institutions) in and around central government, this deriving both from an increase in the actual number of individuals and institutions at the heart of British government, and/or the increased prominence and importance of other policy actors who had previously been relatively marginal, or perhaps were perceived to be peripheral. There have also been consequent developments and changes in the political and personal relationships between the actors who collectively comprise the Core Executive. We will look first at the key individuals, and then at the institutions.

Key individuals

The prime minister

As the leader of the governing party, the prime minister is formally the most powerful figure in British politics and central government. Many of his or her constitutional roles and functions remain as they have always been: appointing and dismissing ministers, chairing the Cabinet and some of its committees, framing the government’s policy agenda, representing Britain at many international summits, personally defending the Government’s record by regularly answering questions from MPs¹ and generally presenting the public face and voice of the Government via the media.

Yet, since the 1960s, various writers have claimed that the prime minister’s power has steadily increased, to the extent that Cabinet government had been replaced by ‘prime ministerial government’ (Benn, 1980; Crossman, 1963: 51; Mackintosh, 1977: 629), or indeed has been superseded by a ‘British Presidency’ (Foley, 1992, 2000; Pryce, 1997), the latter claim being underpinned by the dominant premiership styles of both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair.

However, these two premierships also provide a salutary lesson in the folly of positing historical trends or general conclusions, on the basis of just one or two exceptional examples or events. After all, since 1990, Britain has witnessed the premierships of John Major, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May, none of whom were comparable in leadership style to Thatcher and Blair (at the time of writing it is too early to draw conclusions about May’s successor, Boris Johnson).

In contrast to the ‘Presidential’ approach, Core Executive studies illustrate the changing and contextual character of prime ministerial authority, and thus the need to distinguish between constitutional, formal and de jure power(s), and actual or de facto power(s), especially with regard to the context and constraints within which it is exercised. While it is widely accepted that prime ministers have become more powerful in principle (House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2011), many prime ministers have found that their ability to exercise their powers has often been compromised or constrained both by domestic circumstances and external events (Dowding, 2013a): a narrow (or non-existent) parliamentary majority, a divided Cabinet, less deferential or loyal backbench MPs, a strong and credible opposition gaining public support and thus posing an electoral threat, the state of the economy, and success (or otherwise) in responding to major events and crises, etc.

In effect, as a prime minister’s apparent or perceived power has increased, so their actual ability to exercise mastery over all issues and problems has often diminished or been limited, particularly in an era of globalisation and the growing internationalisation of events and problems (Rose, 2001), such as the 2008 financial crash, climate change, new forms of terrorism, human trafficking and sex slavery, etc.

It is also important to note that, in addition to – or perhaps as a consequence of – such circumstances or constraints, prime ministers will adopt different styles of leadership (Norton, 1987); some aim to be predominant or proactive, while others consciously pursue a more collective or collegial approach to decision-taking. As such, it is not just the formal and actual powers of a Prime Minister which are important in characterising their Premiership, but their respective personalities, a point emphasised by well-placed observers such as Sir Gus O’Donnell, a former Cabinet Secretary, and the renowned contemporary political historian, Lord (Professor) Peter Hennessy (House of Lords Constitution Committee, 2010: 12, paras. 28 and 29), Also crucial is the prime minister’s relationship with his/her Cabinet colleagues, and their attitude towards her/him.

Cabinet ministers

The ministers who are members of the Cabinet are the most senior figures in a government, and usually have the title of Secretary of State (for Education, Health, Transport, etc.,), although a few have other appellations, such as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The vast majority of Cabinet ministers are the political heads of the main government departments, and are thus responsible for specific spheres of public policy and associated legislation. However, one or two Cabinet ministers will have a non-departmental role – ministers without portfolio – with titles such as Lord President of the Council, or Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Their roles will usually be decided by the prime minister; they may be tasked with organising and co-ordinating the government’s parliamentary business, or perhaps asked to pursue a particular policy which does not fit into the remit of a specific government department, such as House of Lords reform.

However, very few Cabinet ministers possess a deep understanding, or have direct experience, of their department’s policy remit and responsibilities, and so the more detailed or technical aspects of policy development and administration are often delegated (as we will see). Consequently, the role of Cabinet ministers is generally to establish the key policy goals of their department, in accordance with their Government’s objectives and priorities (as decreed by the prime minister and/or endorsed by the Cabinet), provide strategic leadership and overall management of their department, and explain or justify their policies, both in the House of Commons (mainly at ministers’ Question Time, and by answering detailed questions in front of a select committee) and via media interviews. They are both the political heads of their department, and its public face.

Since the 1980s, some political scientists have highlighted how cabinet ministers adopt different styles and strategies in heading their department and pursuing policies (see, for example, Marsh, Richards and Smith, 2001: chapter six; Norton, 2000: 109–10). Some are generally content to delegate to their junior ministers and senior civil servants, perhaps playing a more reactive role (only really intervening if a serious problem arises), while other cabinet ministers are much more pro-active or ideologically-motivated in energetically pursuing policy objectives and providing strong leadership in their department. Whilst these different ministerial styles have always existed, there has been a trend, since the 1980s, for the latter type to have become more prevalent – as personified in recent years by political figures such as Michael Gove (education), Jeremy Hunt (health) and Iain Duncan Smith (welfare), who have become personally associated with particular – often politically controversial – policies or reforms. Indeed, this shift towards ministerial activism and agenda-setting is itself a major reason why the distinction between ministerial ‘styles’ or ‘types’ has been more readily recognised by political scientists.

Junior ministers

As governmental responsibilities have expanded, and many spheres of public policy have become administratively, scientifically or technically more complex, so has the number of junior ministers increased – along with their political importance. In 1914 there were just 15 junior ministers, whereas in 2014, there were 66. This increased to 75 in Theresa May’s post-June 2017 Conservative Government, and to 82 when Boris Johnson succeeded her.

The actual number of junior ministers in a department varies slightly, depending on the size or complexity of its policy remit and responsibilities, but normally there are between three and six. Junior ministers are usually responsible either for a particular sphere of policy in their department, or a small number of very specific policies (Minister of State for Higher Education; Immigration; Pensions, etc). This reflects the point made above, about the inability of a Secretary of State to possess expertise in all aspects of their department’s remit, coupled with the limited time which a cabinet minister can devote to each individual problem or policy issue, due to the sheer range or volume of their political responsibilities, including attendance at sundry meetings (a few of which will be international summits). Hence regular delegation to junior ministers, who focus on specific or technical aspects of policy in their department, is unavoidable.

As Kevin Theakston (Britain’s foremost academic expert on junior ministers) explained in his evidence to a 2011 parliamentary committee inquiry, ‘cabinet ministers are already overloaded; without the support of junior ministers their jobs would be impossible’, and as such, the departmental and policy-making roles of junior ministers have grown more important in recent years. However, Theakston emphasises that

what the job of a junior minister has amounted to in practice has usually varied between one department and another, and has depended greatly on the style of the cabinet minister involved and his or her relations with the junior minister(s).

(House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2011: Ev w7, para.3 and para.1. See also; Theakston, 1987: 93–94, 1999: 235, 236; Theakston, Gill and Atkins, 2014: 690–96; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2011: 355–56, 365–66; McMaster and Bairner, 2012)

Senior civil servants

Until the 1980s, senior civil servants – generally those in the three highest bands or grades, of which Permanent Secretary was the most senior – were often suspected of being the real source of power in (or, rather, behind) British government. This was largely attributed to their longevity in a department, which imbued them with decades of experience and wisdom, against which transient ministers, lacking expertise, were often at a distinct disadvantage. Many senior civil servants had also been educated at Oxford or Cambridge University, and thus had the inner confidence and higher self-esteem that such an elite education often instils in people. These characteristics allegedly meant that some cabinet ministers were unduly influenced by their senior civil servants, to the extent that the Minister might be persuaded to abandon, or at least dilute or delay, a policy which the civil servant(s) deemed too radical: ‘This is a very ambitious proposal, minister’, ‘I wonder, minister, if this is perhaps quite the right time to be pursuing this?’, ‘Perhaps, minister, such a bold policy warrants more careful consideration and wider consultation. We don’t want to appear too hasty’, etc., all voiced with a somewhat sceptical or discretely disapproving intonation and slightly raised eyebrow!

As a consequence, by the 1980s both the Left and the Right (academics and politicians alike) had become convinced that senior civil servants constituted a conservative – small ‘c’ – establishment that steered governments towards the supposedly safe and cosy centre ground, encouraged policy continuity, and thereby opposed or obstructed policies which threatened the status quo. Ministers who explicitly wanted to transform British politics or otherwise pursue radical reform were therefore highly likely to view senior civil servants as part of the problem; risk-averse defenders of the s...