Organisations and Humanisation

Perspectives on organising humanisation and humanising organisations

Myrte van de Klundert, Robert van Boeschoten, Myrte van de Klundert, Robert van Boeschoten

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317085119
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

The term humanisation was introduced in humanistic studies to develop a humanist way of thinking about organisations and human relations. It stems from a need to think about questions of justice and living a good life in practice but not from some absolute or abstract point of view. As it is often framed, humanisation is concerned with working towards a more human type of organisation.

Organisation studies are concerned with understanding organisations and their role in our society, and developing perspectives and methods to improve them, while humanisation theories, on the other hand, do not represent a managerial blueprint as they tend to incorporate notions of situated knowledge, sense-making and relational value, drawing our attention to specific processes rather than offering universal truths. Although Critical Management Studies counters mainstream managerialism, it still tends to produce the same kind of 'truths' that are supposed to apply to all organisations.

Much of the existing management literature is related to control and offers strategies on how to do things but this is not about prescriptions, rather how to explore possibilities from both theoretical and practical perspectives. It offers managers as well as theoreticians of organisations the possibility to question their grounding principles. In the variety of contributions to this book the authors reflect on their understanding of what it is to be human and whether this can be found in the way that organisations are run. They consider the value of humanisation to understand and intervene in organisations and the challenges they face.

1 The process of humanisation¹

Fernando Suárez-Müller

10.4324/9781315599076-1

Introductory remarks

This paper develops a first sketch of what could be called a general theory of humanisation. (1) I will start by making a distinction between ‘humanisation’ understood as a mere activity of individuals or groups (it is in this sense that Douwe van Houten, one of the initiators of a general theory of humanisation, uses the concept) and ‘humanisation’ understood as a historical process taking place at different levels of society. (2) I will then consider the philosophical presuppositions and foundations of such a theory in order to show that humanisation presupposes the possibility of a universal ethics that is already a subject of philosophical research. (3) This will enable us to understand that humanisation is about both open and closed societies, and (4) that the specific case of a humanisation of organisations must be understood in the light of a historical dynamics that involves profound institutional changes.

Humanisation as an activity and as a process

The concept of ‘humanisation’ is often used in the sense of an activity.² It refers to the activity of actors contributing to the creation of a more humane world. ‘World’ has a wider sense than ‘society’ and in this wide sense it means that humanity cannot be the only object, the only terminus ad quem of humanisation, because other living beings and, in a derived way, natural organisations (ecosystems, the biosphere, the earth itself) can also occupy the place of the object. In our era it is not too hard to imagine that a more humane world would also include an ecological dimension.³ When it comes to the ultimate termini ad quem of humanisation we should not only speak about humans but rather about rightholders in general.

It is possible to make a distinction between activities taking place on the micro-, meso- or macro-level of society. The micro-level of humanisation constitutes activities concerning individuals either as subjects or objects (recipients, rightholders) of humanisation. Individuals are the ultimate rightholders and therefore objects of humanisation at all levels of society (organisations and institutions on higher levels only have derived rights), but they are not, as I will argue, the only rightholders. At the micro-level, the actor is always an individual person. Humanisation here is concerned with the reflective control that actors have over their own actions. It is at this level that individuals give direction to their own reflective processes and actions. In the philosophy of the last decades of the 20th century this dimension was given a strong impetus by the works of Michel Foucault (1984a, 1984b) and Charles Taylor (1989). These authors however do not use the concept of humanisation because for them the general commitment to a more humane world presupposes a positive interpretation of a determinate sphere of values which should be filled in by the individual subjects themselves without there being any need for a general theory of humanisation. These authors prefer to speak of an ‘ethics of the self’, but they address this ‘ethics’ within large cultural and historical considerations that in fact belong to the macro-level of humanisation (Foucault, 1984b, p. 51–86; Taylor, 1989, p. 25–52). The structure of the hermeneutic circle, which was clarified by Hans-Georg Gadamer, characterizes the way in which Foucault and Taylor conceive their ‘ethics of self’ (Gadamer, 1990, p. 270–80). This concept takes the self to be both the actor and the terminus ad quem of humanisation.

At the meso-level the actor is a human organisation which, in the sense I am using the term here, has a very wide range from two-person associations to very large institutions. A human organisation is an acting body primarily constituted by the people working in it. The terminus ad quem of humanisation is always formed by the specific rightholders or stakeholders involved with the activities of the organisation (a customer, an employee, a citizen, a stock- or shareholder, an eco-system, etc.). Strengthening the normative basis of people working inside organisations, which has been called ‘normative professionalization’ (Jacobs, 2008), could be one specific strategy of humanising organisations. Another strategy of humanisation could be to restructure the organisation itself with the purpose of creating a more humane working environment and a more respectful use of nature (since not all rightholders are humans). This of course applies to all human organisations, including institutions that are social organisations embodying core values of society and having a relatively stable existence. Institutions are the pillars of society, while other organisations (associations, clubs, companies, research institutes, etc.) have a shorter lifetime. In general, organisations are more dynamic: they can also easily adopt an international extension. Institutions however provide a powerful means of restructuring other organisations. The state as an overall institution is a recursive (self-centred) body that, by means of government, is constantly changing society's own constitution thereby largely determining the dynamics of society. Again, individual rightholders are the ultimate object of all humanising activities.

The macro-level, as I am using the term here, concerns the historical dynamics of culture. Culture is the whole set of ideas that transform our mentality and these are mainly based on reflective processes carried out by art, religion and philosophy (including science). These reflective processes progressively transform society, the changes being both bottom-up and top-down. The macro-level conveys the idea of what I call the ‘process character of humanisation’ (and of course affects the other levels of society). Actions on the macro-level concern humanity and are of historical importance, but this does not mean that all people are actually involved in these actions. It means that such an action or process contributes to social changes, giving a deeper understanding of what we call ‘human dignity’. The actions and processes taking place within a general cultural and historical process are steps towards a society in which on the one hand, people get all the opportunities required to develop independently their ideal (potential, true and legitimate) self, and in which on the other hand, people do justice to all entities considered to have fundamental rights. It is clear that the macro-level of humanisation cannot be separated from the image of an ideal society (a so-called ‘utopia’), even though this image may be very basic, vague or general. Those who want to describe humanisation (or dehumanisation) as a cultural and historical process must methodologically presuppose such an ideal imagery. The idea of humanisation must therefore be complemented by a philosophical grounding of social and normative ideals of what humanity is.

Summarising, we may say that the micro-level of humanisation is based on humanising activities made possible by individuals, the meso-level concerns activities made possible by organisations in a broad sense (including institutions) and the macro-level concerns humanising activities affecting historical and cultural processes of socialisation.

Philosophical foundation of the process of humanisation

In the sense stated above, humanisation means that we have a more or less elaborated idea of what progress in cultural history could be, of those elements strengthening the essential characteristics of humanity. The idea of a desirable society depends on our perception of humanity. A theory of humanisation needs to be complemented by a philosophical anthropology. Although complementary, such a philosophical anthropology must be distinguished from biological and cultural anthropologies, which are only descriptive, because it focuses on human characteristics that are both essential and normative when it comes to formulating the idea of a desirable society. Neither biological nor cultural anthropology transcends the empirical domain unless they add a philosophical step. A philosophical anthropology on the contrary focuses on normative aspects related to humanity's essence. Those characteristics are essential which, once developed, give people their full humanity. To renounce the development of these abilities would cause an alienation from the human ideal, from an existence that is worth pursuing. A certain cultural development is necessary in order to allow human potential to prosper. So, we need to presuppose a more or less articulate conception of a desirable society or world.

Anthropologically, what differentiates humans is based on the idea that people are capable of moral insight, capable of thinking and acting in terms of rights and dignity. These fundamental characteristics are linked to our capacity for abstract thought. The most important differentia specifica of humans is not so much the ability to act morally, as it is the capability of articulating moral insights. Homo sapiens is a product of biological evolution but there is also a cultural evolution started by earlier hominids. Homo erectus knew how to use relatively sophisticated tools and mastered fire. These first human beings must also have possessed a relatively well-developed capability of abstract thought and a primitive form of speech. These cultural developments contributed to the success of the human species. Cultural processes not only influenced, but in fact determined by natural selection. Humankind is not only a product of natural evolution, it is also a product of a self-initiated cultural process. Hominisation was at some point in history part of the humanisation process. We know that homo sapiens buried their dead ritually, that they possessed such a level of abstract thought that they could deploy the imagery of the ‘double world’, adding transcendent beings to their view of reality (Leroi-Gourhan, 2006, p. 145–56). Homo sapiens is a being that lives in a deep (vertical), and not in a flat (horizontal) world.

This highly developed capacity of abstract thought determines other essential properties, which are typically human (Leroi-Gourhan, 1964). The influence of abstract thought on feelings, on the emotional or affective dimension, is crucial. And this can be characterised as a deepening of the world. Although rationality and feelings are often considered to be opposites, the deepening of the internal experience, of feelings and emotions, is, as Antonio Damasio has argued, reinforced by abstract thought and reason (2006, p.127–64). The development of abstract thought, verbal language and deep emotionality could not but affect the social manifestations and constructions of humans. Abstract thinking and verbal interactions make a concomitant development of specialised powers possible (Dewey, 2000, p.166–207; Jonas, 1997, p.162–94). Abstract thinking and language seem to be based on an inner ‘communicative and dialogical capacity’ that has its deep origin in life, making cooperation and sociality possible.

This anthropology brings us to consider the ontological foundation of our abilities to think in an abstract way. What do we need, philosophically, to presuppose and enable these abilities? Several philosophers and biologists indicate that there is in life a proto-dialogical power at work. Jonas suggests that it is possible to define life as the proto-dialogical ability of a ‘Self’ deploying a hermeneutical relationship with its environment (Jonas, 1992, p.11–34; Bauer, 2008; Morin, 2008, p. 703–04). This ‘Self’ would be a bundle of cognitions, skills and desires which are all used in an interpretative and ‘inner dialogical’ relationship with the world. As has already been made clear by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the process of perception presupposes the existence of a communicative relationship with an environment, setting aside the level of consciousness of the self (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 228–32). It is clear that this demarcates a very speculative domain of philosophical biology. But there is nothing that precludes a further deepening of philosophical speculation recognising dialogical structures even in the centre of being itself, in which these structures become more and more explicit from the moment that life – and eventually the human mind – appears.⁴ In this sense dialogue would be a very profound metaphysical principle constituting the ultimate grounding of the idea of humanisation.

Basically, the concept of humanisation combines a descriptive with a normative perspective and this is only possible as long as we are prepared to legitimate and ground our normative assumptions. A philosophical anthropology reconstructs essential human features as a compound of descriptive and normative elements. Abstract thinking, language, dialogue, reflection, rationalised feelings and self-consciousness are properties that define important aspects of our essence, and they are in themselves intrinsically dynamic. These properties have in fact an intrinsic desire of development. Their interrelatedness constitutes a dialogical power characterised by a will to understand and to unfold understanding. But this being said, we have still not grasped where this unfolding dynamic is heading. There exists an intrinsic connection between this dialogical power on the one hand and the determination of justice on the other. The dialogical faculty leads to the discovery of the domain of rightholding entities. This is an important insight made possible by the theory of communication of German philosophers like Karl-Otto Apel (1973) and Jürgen Habermas (1981), and their successors Dietrich Böhler (1992) and Rainer Forst (2007). Dialogue activates a set of normative principles that are essential to ground human rights. These principles are, as Apel explains, ‘transcendental structures of dialogue’, in fact normative ideals, constituting a necessary a priori condition for real dialogue. They are enacted from the moment that we are involved in communicative action. Important normative ideals implicit in this transcendental domain are: symmetry, equality, liberty, openness, peace (renouncement of violence), tolerance, respect, solidarity, cooperation, helpfulness, responsibility, recognition and reciprocity. This is not to be taken as an exhaustive list, since there could be more, and surely many others can be derived...