After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations

Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations

R.J. Ross

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781315502274
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

As relations between the United States and China move into a period of intense activity and sensitivity, this timely book addresses the impact of domestic factors in both countries on their post-Cold War/post-Tiananmen relations. The contributors examine the issue from a number of distinct perspectives: the increased impact of domestic factors in both countries due to changing strategic circumstances; the politics of China policy in the United States, with emphasis on the role of interest groups vis-a-vis Congress, the media, and other domestic institutions; the importance of domestic factors in U.S.-China economic conflicts; the combined impact of domestic factors in both China and the United States on the most important conflict of interest in U.S.-China relations -- the Taiwan issue.

1

The Strategic and Bilateral Context of Policy-Making in China and the United States

Why Domestic Factors Matter

Robert S. Ross

Successful management of U.S.-China relations is of central importance to the interests of both countries and to the interests of their neighbors throughout East Asia. It is no exaggeration to say that the two countries’ ability to maintain cooperative relations and avoid escalated conflict and hostilities will determine the prospects for peace in East Asia in the next century. Nonetheless, the most prominent characteristic of post–Cold War U.S.-China relations, despite summitry and periodic improvement in relations, is persistent animosity and friction and constant threats to continued cooperation. Despite recent U.S.-China summitry and greater cooperation, the relationship remains turbulent and subject to recurring conflict, with implications for regional peace and stability.

The underlying sources of instability in U.S.-China relations are numerous. As subsequent chapters reveal, instability arises from such factors as historical legacies, elite and societal ideological differences, interest groups, and domestic economic and political interests. But the bilateral and regional contexts affect the changing salience of such factors. International sources of conflict and cooperation and bilateral negotiating dynamics create the parameters in which statesmen first address what policy should be and provide the expanding or contracting opportunities for other factors to affect ultimate policy choices.

The major dilemma in contemporary international relations is the diplomatic management of formerly minor issues that have assumed greater importance in the absence of any imperative for strategic cooperation. This is particularly the case for U.S.-China relations. The rapid disappearance of the Soviet threat led to escalated U.S.-China conflict over a wide range of issues and the emergence of a new bilateral bargaining relationship reflecting new dependencies and new sources of negotiating leverage. In this context, domestic factors have assumed greater importance in U.S.-China relations than at any time since the late 1960s. The post–Cold War foreign policy challenge for American and Chinese leaders is to build a new foundation for a cooperative relationship in the absence of important common interests and despite difficult negotiating dynamics.

The United States and China in East Asia

U.S.-China interactions in East Asia are characterized by minimal common security interests. Rather, Washington and Beijing frequently find themselves on opposite sides of regional security issues. But the resulting U.S.-China conflicts of interest do not entail immediate challenges to either side’s non-negotiable vital interests. Rather, U.S.-China regional conflicts concern interests over which Washington and Beijing can reach a modus vivendi which preserves both their respective interests and stable U.S.-China relations. Their conflicts of interest are amenable to great-power management.

It is difficult to establish what common security interest the United States and China have in East Asia. Perhaps the most widely heard statement is that the two countries share an interest in regional stability. Chinese and American diplomats frequently insist that this common interest provides the foundation for cooperation across a wide range of areas and the basis for resolving conflicts of interest. In his banquet toast in the United States, Jiang Zemin argued that the United States and China “share broad common interests in … the maintenance of world peace and security, the promotion of global economic growth and prosperity, and the protection of the living environment of mankind.” China’s Ambassador to the United States Li Daoyu argues that the foundations of the relationship are the U.S.-China common interests in peace and stability in East Asia.¹

Yet peace and stability are not common interests. They are merely the environment in which nations pursue objectives. Although it is far less expensive to achieve objectives with peaceful means, nations often opt for conflictual methods when peace is not conducive to their interests. Conflict over the terms of peace is not unusual. Such was the case in Sino-Vietnamese relations, when Hanoi sought peaceful relations with China while it occupied Cambodia. Similarly, the Soviet Union and the United States both insisted that they wanted a stable international order; they simply could not agree on what that order should look like.

This is the dilemma faced by the United States and China. Both would prefer to achieve their international objectives without incurring the costs of instability and heightened conflict. But whether they can do so depends on whether or not they can develop a peaceful order that can accommodate each of their respective interests.

Are there common regionwide interests that might bring the United States and China together so that conflicts of interests are negotiated within a stable framework? Such interests clearly existed during the latter half of the Cold War. Common U.S. and Chinese interests in resisting Soviet power compelled the two countries to reach compromise solutions to fundamental conflicts of interests, including the volatile Taiwan issue.² It is also clear that such a compelling vital strategic interest does not exist today. Both U.S. and Chinese analysts stress that in the emerging East Asian balance of power, crosscutting relationships exist in various policy arenas, so that competition and cooperation coexist in the bilateral relationships among all of the great powers.³ There has not emerged a great power whose capabilities and ambitions have galvanized any of the great powers, including the United States and China, into developing common comprehensive security policies based on immediate security threats.

It is also clear that neither China nor the United States has identified the other as posing an immediate threat to their respective vital interests or to the stability of the regional balance of power. Beijing is pleased that China’s borders are more secure now than at any time in the last 150 years and that the United States does not have significant strategic or political influence with any of China’s immediate neighbors. The United States is secure in its status as the world’s sole superpower and in its overwhelming superiority in strategic missiles. China is secure with the conventional balance of power on the mainland of East Asia, and the United States enjoys uncontested supremacy in maritime East Asia. Washington carefully observes China’s rise in power, but still assesses China as a “potential” threat.⁴

Because Beijing and Washington do not identify each other as an immediate threat to vital interests, their foreign policy interactions focus on the long-term implications of regional and third-party issues. Consideration of such issues inherently allows governments greater flexibility to incorporate domestic factors into foreign policy-making. This flexibility is compounded because the United States and China have so little in common regarding policy toward regional issues and third parties. Indeed, to the extent that Beijing and Washington consider likely sources of future threat in the regional balance of power, their estimates are wildly different. Chinese and American policymakers also have conflicts of interests regarding regional disputes and territorial conflicts.

Contrasting Chinese and American perspectives regarding Russia reflect these differences. Chinese leaders consider Russia the least likely of the great powers to threaten Chinese interests. They consider Russian domestic political and economic turmoil as impediments to Russian ability to challenge Chinese interests. In contrast, American leaders remain apprehensive over Russia’s nuclear arsenal, oppose its proliferation practices, and consider Russian military and political presence in Eastern Europe as a major security concern. They also are wary of Russian objectives in the Persian Gulf region. Washington is thus alarmed by the prospects of heightened Russian domestic instability and the potential for increased foreign policy nationalism.

These differing perspectives translate into conflicts of interest over contemporary Sino-Russian relations. Sino-Russian security cooperation reflects the combination of the absence of strategic conflicts of interests and the presence of complementary economic and even political interests. Denied access to Western weaponry in the aftermath of its repression of the June 1989 democracy movement, China turned to Russia for advanced military equipment to upgrade its antiquated armed forces, in return offering Moscow the hard currency it needs to acquire Western goods. China also provides the Soviet Far East with inexpensive consumer goods, plentiful manpower, and investment capital, all of which are important elements in Moscow’s effort to maintain stability in that region. In this context, the Russian ambassador to China considered the problems associated with Chinese migration into the Russian Far East a minor issue. Even more important, China and Russia have made extensive efforts to control Chinese migration into the Russian Far East, so that from 1995 to 1997 Chinese border violations had been reduced by over 80 percent.⁵ Sino-Russia cooperation also reflects their mutual interest in resolving conflicts that could lead to heightened tension in the future. Their success in negotiating their territorial dispute and completing the demarcation of the eastern border in 1997 reduces the likelihood that their long border could once again become a source of military conflict.⁶

Equally important, the two sides find reassurance in their common difficulty in dealing with the United States. In particular, American efforts to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance into Eastern Europe arouses Russian concern just as improving U.S.-Japan security relations arouse Chinese concern.⁷ Chinese and Russian “resolve” at the April 1996 Beijing summit to establish a “strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination toward the twenty-first century” reflected the wide range of common bilateral interests and their mutual concern for the direction of U.S. foreign policy.⁸ Their support during the November 1997 Beijing summit for a multipolar world reflected an effort to accentuate their ability to counteract U.S. policies in Europe and East Asia.⁹

From Washington’s perspective, Sino-Russian cooperation not only assists Beijing’s effort to modernize its military but also creates the option of strategic cooperation should U.S. relations with either or both deteriorate. Russian transfer of Su-27s, Sovremennyy-class destroyers, surface-to-air missiles, Kilo-class submarines, and other equipment to China creates security concerns among America’s strategic partners in East Asia. Although U.S. officials remain unruffled by current Chinese-Russian cooperation, the prospect of Russian transfer of SS-18 long-range ballistic missile technology to China prompted Secretary of Defense William Perry to warn Moscow that such a transfer would be a “big mistake.”¹⁰ Further Sino-Russian strategic cooperation could thus become an issue in both U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations.

United States and Chinese estimates of Japan are equally divergent but are mirror images of their views of relations with Russia. Washington considers Japan a force for strategic stability in East Asia and an ally in U.S. efforts to maintain a favorable regional balance of power. As President Clinton explained during his April 1996 visit to Japan, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance is “key to maintaining a Pacific at peace.” Similarly, Secretary of Defense Perry argued that the U.S.-Japan security relationship is a “linchpin” for “all of the security issues in East Asia.”¹¹ Thus, U.S. concern for alliance cohesiveness after the demise of the Soviet Union and for Japanese readiness to cooperate in military crises has encouraged the United States to enhance U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation. In addition, Washington has sought expanded cooperation with Japan to enhance U.S. ability to contend with growing Chinese power as well as American leverage over China regarding U.S.-China conflicts of interest.¹² These concerns led the United States to initiate negotiations with Japan over revised guidelines for security cooperation, resulting in the September 1997 U.S.-Japan revisions of the “Guidelines of U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.” The revised guidelines call for the extension of security cooperation “in the areas surrounding Japan,” including greater Japanese naval activities throughout the region, and greater U.S. reliance on the Japanese military in maintaining regional stability.¹³

Common interests with Japan, including concern for the development of Chinese power and for alliance stability in the post–Cold War period, also encourages Washington to cooperate with Japanese military modernization, confident that Japan will use expanded capabilities and regional authority in ways compatible with American interests. Washington has helped Japan develop the advanced F-2 fighter and, despite Japanese reluctance, has promoted U.S.-Japan cooperation in developing theater missile defense and deployment of such a system in Japan.¹⁴ In this strategic context, U.S.-Japan economic conflict is problematic for the United States only insofar as it interferes with consolidation of strategic cooperation.

China, on the other hand, considers Japan a major regional competitor and a potential security threat. Beijing opposes Japanese defense acquisitions, which it characterizes as signs of resurgent “militarism” and intentions to become a strategic power. It is apprehensive over Japan’s current military capabilities as well as its financial and technological ability to develop sophisticated power-projection capabilities on very short notice. Chinese analysts focus on Japanese development of nuclear capabilities, missile technologies, and military aircraft. They conclude that Japan is now developing sufficient military capability so that it will become a player in the regional balance of power and a potential source of regional instability.¹⁵

Apprehension over Japanese capabilities and intentions shape Beijing’s assessment of U.S.-Japan relations. Although Beijing shares with the United States an interest in a demilitarized Japanese foreign policy and it values U.S.-Japanese security cooperation as a restraint on excessive Japanese rearmament, it is concerned that U.S.-Japanese cooperation contributes to Japanese military expansion and that the security alliance might actively focus on China should China’s relations with Japan and/or the United States further deteriorate. In 1996 People’s Daily explained that U.S.-Japan security cooperation “gives the feeling” that the two countries “work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region.” Another report explained that the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security issued a “dangerous signal” that Japan has been “brought into the U.S. global military strategy.”¹⁶ In 1997, as the United States and Japan moved toward finalizing the treaty revisions, Chinese analysts explained that simultaneous expansion of NATO and U.S.-Japan security cooperation was part of U.S. global expansion. In East Asia, the United States was using U.S.-Japan cooperation to contain China.¹⁷ Beijing is wary of U.S.-Japanese discussions of deploying a theater missile defense system in Japan, which would degrade China’s second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability. It is especially suspicious that the guideline’s ambiguity regarding the scope of the treaty obscures U.S. and Japanese intent to cooperate on the Taiwan issue. In 1998, for example, as Japan considered legislation to implement the revised guidelines, Chinese leaders repeatedly warned that the alliance should not interfere in China’s domestic affairs and that the course of Sino-Japanese relations depended on this issue.¹⁸

Chinese and American interests also diverge over issues involving local powers. The most disruptive of such conflicts is the Taiwan issue. The domestic an...