Soft Targets and Crisis Management

What Emergency Planners and Security Professionals Need to Know

Michael J. Fagel, Jennifer Hesterman, Michael J. Fagel, Jennifer Hesterman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781315451077
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Sicurezza nazionale

Uniting the best of Michael Fagel and Jennifer Hesterman's books in the fields of homeland security and emergency management, the editors of this volume present the prevailing issues affecting the homeland security community today. Many natural and man-made threats can impact our communities—but these well-known and highly respected authors create order from fear, guiding the reader through risk assessment, mitigation strategies, community EOC planning, and hardening measures based upon real-life examples, case studies, and current research in the practice.

As terrorist attacks and natural disasters continue to rock the world, Soft Targets and Crisis Management emphasizes the vulnerability of soft targets like schools, churches, and hospitals, and presents the methodology necessary to respond and recover in the event of a crisis in those arenas.

Features:

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• Based on ASIS award-winning texts

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• Provides a multi-faceted look at crisis management principles

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• Offers community-specific examples for diverse locales and threat centers

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• Includes up-to-date case studies on soft target attacks from around the world

A must-read for security, emergency management, and criminal justice professionals, Soft Targets and Crisis Management: What Emergency Planners and Security Professionals Need to Know is a crucial text for practitioners seeking to make the world a safer place for others.

1

Soft Targets

Hesterman Jennifer

Contents

Introduction

The Difference in Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk

References

I’m still at the Bataclan. 1st floor. Hurt bad! They are faster on the assault. There are survivors inside. They are cutting down all the world. One by one. 1st floor soon!!!!

Facebook post

November 13, 2015

INTRODUCTION

When hundreds of music lovers walked into the historic Bataclan concert hall in Paris, they were looking forward to an evening of good music, fun and fellowship. As American rock band The Eagles of Death Metal played its first set, laughing and joking with the crowd, ISIS terrorists were circling behind the Bataclan, preparing for their violent assault. At 9:42 pm, the gunmen sent a text to an unknown contact stating “We’ve left” and “We’re starting.” After throwing the mobile phone into a trash can, the group stormed the concert hall and began their assault with a barrage of AK-47 gunfire. People thought the action was part of the show, perhaps pyrotechnics or firecrackers, until the horrified band ran from the stage. What started as a night of fun in one of the world’s most revered cities ended in tragedy, not only for those at the concert hall but at a stadium and several outdoor cafés. ISIS successfully carried out its first coordinated soft target attack against a western city, killing 130 people and injuring 350.

In the post-9/11 world, the United States has made great strides to further reinforce already hardened targets such as military installations, government buildings, and transportation systems. Those facilities now employ concentric rings of security, more cameras, and increased security manpower, serving to repel would-be terrorists and violent criminals. However, as these hard targets are further reinforced with new technology and tactics, soft civilian-centric targets such as those attacked in Paris are of increasing interest to terrorists. But this concept is not new; although lost in the news at the time, evidence collected following the 9/11 attack proved the aircraft hijackers also accomplished preliminary planning against soft targets, surveying and sketching at least five sites including Walt Disney World, Disneyland, the Mall of America, the Sears Tower, and unspecified sports facilities (Merzer, Savino, and Murphy 2001). Despite horrific terrorist operations against civilians such as the 2002 Beslan school massacre, the 2005 Moscow theater siege, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2013 Nairobi shopping mall assault, few resources have been applied toward hardening similar soft targets in the United States. A very small portion of our national security budget and effort is spent protecting civilian venues. Responsibility for security is often passed on to owners and operators, who have no training and few resources. In military terms, we are leaving our flank exposed.

Photo 1.1 Man grieves for victims of the November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris for which the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks in which multiple operatives attacked soft targets. (From the New Jersey Department of Homeland Security.)

The problem is far more complex than a simple lack of funding; the challenges are also psychological and tactical. First, contemporary terrorism has no moral boundaries. Who could have predicted, even 10 years ago, that schools, churches, and hospitals would be considered routine, legitimate targets for terrorist groups? Outrage and outcry at the beginning of this soft targeting era has given way to acceptance. Psychologically, it is more comfortable to pretend there is no threat here in the homeland, that these heinous attacks will always happen “somewhere else.” Americans also have a very short memory—a blessing when it comes to resiliency and bouncing back from events like devastating civil and world wars, the Great Depression, and 9/11. However, in terms of security, this short-term memory can be our Achilles heel when faced with a determined, patient enemy. In fact, we almost have a revisionist history, downplaying and explaining away previous attacks as individual acts of violence by groups of madmen, not seeing the larger trends.

There is also a tendency to hide behind numbers; for instance, the number of violent crimes committed in our country is down, which makes us feel good about our security efforts. However, the scale of violence and deaths resulting from those crimes is rising, an underlying trend that is far more important. Some facility owners and managers may even choose to roll the dice, sacrificing a robust security posture to provide a more pleasant experience for students, worshippers, shoppers, or sporting or recreational event fans. We must remember the choice of target for terrorists is not random, particularly for radical religious groups seeking elevated body counts, press coverage, and a fearful populace in order to further their goals. Hardened targets repel bad actors, and unprotected soft targets invite.

Attacks against soft targets have a powerful effect on the psyche of the populace. Modern terrorist groups and actors have redrawn the battlefield lines, and places where civilians once felt secure have been pulled into the war zone. Persistent, lethal attacks by ISIS and al-Qaeda–affiliated terrorists against churches, hospitals, and schools in the Middle East and Africa have even successfully shifted the center of gravity in major conflicts. When places formerly considered “safe” become targets, frightened civilians lose the will to fight. They may flee and surrender the territory to the aggressor or rise up en masse, compelling the government to make concessions to insurgents to stop the brutality against noncombatants.

Due to our country’s adherence to the Geneva Conventions, we will not attack soft targets without military necessity, even if the enemy takes shelter among the people. Civilians are not treated as combatants and therefore are not targets. Injured civilians are protected, not fired upon. Places of worship are never purposely hit. Schoolyards filled with children are not a target. We are intellectually unwilling to imagine an enemy who does not share what we believe to be universally accepted moral codes; therefore, we have a severe blind spot and are wholly unprepared to protect soft targets in our country. We must understand that our enemies see a busload of children and a church full of people as legitimate targets. Terrorists do not care about “collateral damage,” a phrase Timothy McVeigh unremorsefully used to describe the daycare children killed in his attack at the Alfred Murrah Building. We also tend to forget that domestic terrorists have routinely hit soft targets in our country, from arson to shooting, and bombings. And, no matter your gender, race, religion, or sexual preference, there is a hate group in the United States actively or passively targeting you. Therefore, we must prepare both psychologically and tactically to harden our soft targets and lessen their vulnerability.

Protecting soft targets presents unique challenges for law enforcement because the buildings are privately owned and responsibility rests on the owners to secure the property and its occupants. Therefore, partnering is critical: educating the owners on the threat, assisting with vulnerability assessments, and helping to harden the venue or establishment. However, many soft target venue owners and operators we’ve spoken with about the possibility of a terrorist attack on their property convey a feeling of hopelessness (there is not much we can do to prevent or mitigate the threat), infallibility (it will never happen here), or inescapability (it is destiny or unavoidable, so why even try). Those who frequent soft target facilities—employees and patrons alike—typically believe “It can’t happen to me,” showing a sense of invulnerability. Even worse, others may believe that “If it is going to happen, there is nothing I can do about it anyway,” expressing inevitability. People with these mindsets are a detriment in an emergency situation, with no awareness of the threat, mental preparation, or sense of determination to engage during the situation. In an emergency, those without a plan or resolve may wait for first responders and law enforcement to arrive and rescue them before taking steps to save their lives and those of others. The Sandy Hook shooting event was over in 6 minutes, with twenty-six dead: there is no time to wait for help when the attacker is determined and brings heavy firepower to the fight. You are the first responder.

Most experts agree that, with our newly robust intelligence capabilities, another coordinated mass casualty event in multiple locations such as the 9/11 attacks is unlikely. However, the threat of a Paris- or Mumbai-style event in a city with multiple avenues of approach (water and land) or a mass casualty bombing at a soft target location is more probable and will have an associated shock factor. There is a general hesitation for the government to share specific threat information with the public, perhaps because we do not want to cause panic; however, education is the best way to lower fear, as people will feel they can protect themselves and their loved ones. As witnessed in several natural disaster events in our country since 9/11, citizens are generally overly reliant on the government, lacking supplies at home as simple as flashlights, radios, batteries, nonperishable food, and water. Unfortunately, many police departments and hospitals have taken large funding cuts due to our country’s financial crisis, meaning response time may be slower than anticipated. During mass casualty events such as shootings or a fire, victims routinely are unable to locate emergency exits and they have no plan to defend themselves and others. Furthermore, most people do not understand what it means to “shelter in place” or how to follow other orders given during a serious emergency. The combination of lack of education about the threat, a feeling of invulnerability regarding soft target attacks, overreliance on the government for help, and lack of first-response resources is potentially disastrous. Citizens must be educated on the threat and response and become valuable force multipliers instead of adding to challenges at the scene.

Security training and resources are typically the first to go during budget-cutting drills. When leaders are faced with a budgeting dilemma, a good question might be: “What is the cost for not protecting our people?” Certainly, most schools, churches, and hospitals are not flush with cash and find it difficult to spend valuable dollars on security. Often, decisions are arbitrarily made instead of using a system to assess vulnerability and threat, and then obtain the right mitigation tools to lower risk and protect the unique venue. With regard to profit-making soft targets such as malls and sporting and recreational venues, there is a desire for balance between security and convenience minimizing the impact to the customer. Business owners see customer backlash when other facilities add layers of active, hands-on security; it likely discourages them from pursuing similar activities. For example, the addition of backscatter technology at airports drew the ire and scrutiny of millions of people, many of whom did not even fly on a regular basis. Even news of the almost-catastrophes in flight with shoe and underwear bombs did little to persuade the public for the necessity for the systems. Security may not be popular and decisions should not be made by consent.

If businesses are concerned about garnering a reputation for long security lines and visitor frustration due to security measures, owners should consider the consequences should a mass casualty terrorist or violent criminal attack happen on their property. For instance, the movie industry as a whole was impacted by the shootings at the Cinemark Theater in Aurora, Colorado, on July 20, 2012, at the premiere of the movie The Dark Knight Rises. In response to the violent attack, the film’s producer, Warner Brothers Studios, pulled that movie and all of its violent movies from theaters. As attendance dropped dramatically worldwide, theater owners paid extra for increased security to reassure their customers. Cinemark not only paid for the burial expenses of the twelve victims, but also gave each family $220,000. The company was able to avoid paying millions of dollars of hospital bills for the seventy injured theatergoers, as they were forgiven and funded by the state. However, despite these actions, Cinemark was still sued by the families for not preventing the event, with decisions pending.

The lavish Westgate Mall, which was portrayed as a symbol of Kenya’s future and cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build, had high-end stores and affluent customers who generated millions of dollars in weekly revenue. The mall was completely destroyed in the 4-day siege with al-Shabaab terrorists, and only half of the store owners had terrorism insurance (Vogt 2014). Stores were looted during and after the event by corrupt soldiers, adding to the financial ruin of shop owners. Rebuilding the mall was a must to show resilience and national pride; however, the cost is exorbitant for the country and insurers. Also, the inability of mall personnel to detect the planning stages of the attack, the ineffective response by armed mall security to put down the offensive, and the lack of communication with shoppers and store owners inside the mall about the unfolding events have been widely criticized. The downplaying of the severity of the situation by the government and its sluggish, uncoordinated response cast doubt on its ability to handle violent events in the country. The tourism industry, critical to Kenya’s fragile economy, was hit hard, with 20 percent fewer visitors in the months following the attack, and hopes for hosting future Olympic Games and World Cup soccer events dashed. Lax security at one mall sent devastating ripples through an entire national economy and harmed future prospects for development.

Although international terror remains a viable threat to our country, domestic terrorism from right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue groups is perhaps a greater daily concern for our law enforcement agencies. The growing propensity of these organizations and their members to “act out” on soft targets and to step up and engage law enforcement is alarming. The radicalization of Americans continues, with several successful attacks by ISIS and al-Qaeda-inspired homegrown jihadists and more than sixty more thwarted since 9/11. Exacerbating the threat, a lack of a rehabilitation program means there is no way of ensuring those who serve their prison sentence and return to society will not go back to their old terroristic ways … with a vengeance. Furthermore, the threat of the lone wolf, already embedded in society and acting alone with unyielding determination, is extremely worrisome. Factor in an unprecedented increase in hate groups and gangs in our country, and the domestic terrorism picture becomes quite grim, with resource-constrained law enforcement agencies struggling to juggle myriad challenges. Finally, brutal Mexican drug trafficking organizations are now operating in the United States; cartels are using gangs to move product and corrupting border patrol officers who open lanes and permitting people and drugs (and potentially worse) into our nation. As a paramilitary organization with the tactical knowledge and equipment of a small army, the Los Zetas cartel, now as far north as Chicago, provides the most vexing threat. Cartels use brutal tactics against soft targets in an effort to influence the political process and instill fear in the populace—factors elevating them beyond mere criminal groups.

Photo 1.2 Westgate Mall, Kenya, following the attack by al-Shabaab terrorists, September 21, 2013. (From the U.S. State Department.)

This book explores the psychology of soft target attacks, our blind spots and vulnerabilities, and attributes that make civilian-centric venues appealing to bad actors. Next, looking through the lens of past, current, and emergent activities, the research yields an estimate of the motivations and capabilities of international and domestic terrorist groups, as well as drug trafficking organizations (arguably terrorists), to hit soft targets in our country. A current assessment of soft target attacks worldwide will give insight to trends and operational tactics. Studying the activities of terrorist groups that successfully and repeatedly strike soft targets, such as Chechen extremists, reveals security vulnerabilities and how poor government engagement and response can intensify ...