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Chapter 1
Body schema
A number of psychoanalysts have made a distinction between body schema, an anonymous neuronal organisation, and body image, which is subjectively invested by its owner (Berthaud and Gibello, 1970; Dolto, 1984). Other authors have contrasted the aut omatic functioning of the body schema with the âreflexive intentionalityâ directed to the body image (Gallagher, 2006). In any case, since Bonnier (1902) and Head (Head and Holmes, 1911), most researchers have agreed on the following postulate: Some brain circuitry structures a non-conscious body representation whose functioning we remain unaware of. This body schema allows us to automatically adjust our movements to the surrounding space (see Coslett, 1998). Such definition might lead us to place the body schema in the physiological realm rather than in the psychological, subject ive field. However, it is in fact impossible to speak of the body in a âneutralâ way and this holds true for the body schema as well: We cannot talk about it without necessarily âsubjectivatingâ it. This becomes clear when looking at the history of the notion itself, which was introduced by Pierre Bonnier and Henry Head in the early 1900s (see Morin and Thibierge, 2004; Morin and Thibierge, 2006). Previously, the term that was used to refer to the body representation was cenesthesia, a notion that Bonnier argued should be abandoned in favour of his concept of body schema.
Cenesthesia
Cenesthesia (HĂŒbner, 1794, quoted by Starobinski, 1977) was first defined as âa general sensitivity (GemeingefĂŒhl), which represents the state of the body to the soul, while sensitivity informs it about the external world, and inner sense (inner Sinn) provides it with representations, judgments, ideas and conceptsâ. Schiff (1894, quoted by Starobinski, 1977) later explained the function of cenesthesia:
If, for example, an irradiation (from excitation toward centres) goes to a sensory centre, it will awake there the image of a colour, a tone or an object; an auditory impression may thus produce a visual sensation or an auditory impression or both together; such a secondary sensation will in turn produce a tertiary one and so on. In this way, a unique sensation may awake an infinite chain of central sensations, of sensory images, and, since all our thought moves in such images or, to express it more exactly, is nothing but a series of central images, i.e., of excitation of central end of sensory nerves, it happens that a sensation may produce a series of thoughts which, when linked to the primary sensations, must complete or rather create cenesthesia.
(quoted by Starobinski, 1977, pp. 7â8, translated for this edition)
From this description, cenesthesia seems to be an essential element of hu man psychic life. In line with this, SĂ©glas (1895) considered that disorders of cenesthesia were chiefly responsible for melancholia: according to him, âdue to disorders that happen in the field of organic functions, the normal cenesthetic state of well-being produced by the harmonious consensus of organic sensations is replaced, once the balance has been disrupted, by a new and uncomfortable state of general uneaseâ; this state is the âfirst cause of moral painâ. Similarly, DuprĂ© and Camus (1907) wrote:
We propose to designate under the term of cenestopathy the distortions of those sensations that continuously reach the brain, coming from all areas of the body, and which in a normal state do not attract our attention through any particular characteristic in either their intensity or their mode. We know how important the field of cenesthesia is; beneath the field of conscious perceptions, it constitutes the primary foundations of our personality.
(Dupré and Camus, 1907, p. 616, translated for this edition)
Psychic life is thus thought to consist of interactions between the body and the external world, both of which are at the origin of multiple stimulations, the combination of which constitutes the psyche.
The invention of body schema
When using the term body schema, one ordinarily refers to the âpostural model of ourselvesâ proposed by Head and Holmes (1911). Head considered this model as a ba sis for representing oneâs own body: all new perceptions are referred to this âpostural standa rdâ. Head insisted on its plasticity, on the fact that it is continually revised and updated. However, it was Pierre Bonnier (1902) who first introduced the term âschemaâ; this new term linked body representation to a form, rather than a set of more or less defined sensations. Bonnier believed that âthe word cenesthesia cannot have any valuable signification in either physiology or psychology, since it does not involve the notion of topographic figuration, which is necessary for any definition of corporealityâ. Our âsense of attitudesâ, Bonnier claimed, âgives us an idea where each part of ourselves is located, and is the basis of any sense of orientation, be it objective or subjective and psychic. Its object is the topographic figuration (ÏÏηΔΌα) of our ego. I have also suggested the term schematia for the kind of images created by this senseâ. It is worth noticing that the formula âtopographic figuration of our egoâ explicitly associates body representation to the psychic agency Bonnier calls the ego. He adds: âThe topographic distribution of things around us, in relation to ourselves and to each other, which allows us to localise sensations outside, creates the notion of objectivity; in the same way, the notion of subjectivity depends on the localisation of things inside ourselves, and these two terms, of ego and non-ego, arise from the most direct operations of the sense of attitudesâ (Bonnier, 1902, p. 147). As Bonnier and Head had argued, it has been confirmed that body schema mainly consists of spatial relationships and does not directly depend on sensory input. This was shown by a unique observation reported by Paillard (1999): His patient, who was deprived of any conscious sensitivity in one side of her body, was nevertheless able to precisely locate a tactile stimulus on this side, meaning that she retained a topographic representation of an insensitive bodily area. It should be noted that the term body schema is mostly used in reference to limbs, i.e., to the visible parts of the body that are involved in our gestures and movement in the outside world. The term is very rarely employed when speaking of anal, urethral or sexual areas or viscera; indeed, these body parts are absent from the canonical representation of the human body, as seen in drawings of school-age children or in the drawing made as part of the Harris-Goodenough test (Harris, 1963) or âDraw a Personâ test (Machover, 1953).
The body schema is constantly updated; it is progressively built throughout childhood and integrates the modifications that accompany the process of ageing. However, it is also remarkably stable, since it resists the traumatic or artificial changes of the physical body (Lhermitte, 1939/1998). This stability is shown by the amputeesâ illusions (phantom limb): Despite the amputation of a limb, the body continues to be rep resented as a whole and perceptions are referred to this unaltered schema. Aristotleâs illusion also shows that the body schema may prevail over sensory information. This illusion is obtained by placing one object (e.g., a pencil) between the external faces of two crossed adjoining fingers, i.e., between two areas that cannot but touch different objects in the physiological position of fingers. When the fingers are crossed, the subject then perceives two objects. In this case, the information brought by the cutaneous finger receptors is misinterpreted because of the topography of body schema. The illusion also exemplifies the relationship between space and body schema: from the âbrainâs point of viewâ, the spatial zones external to the two adjoining fingers are necessarily represented as separate spatial zones. Indeed, the brainâs ways of processing the body and space are intertwined. This is why Lurçat and Wallon (1962) chose the title Postural space and surrounding space (body schema) [Espace postural et espace environnant (le schĂ©ma corporel)] for their paper on the development of spatial notions in children. They wrote: âOur research has shown that [âŠ] the body schema was made up of various types of relationships between space, postural space and surrounding space, and that we could not study body schema without taking into account the position of the body in space and without defining the relationships between the body and the acts the children mimicked or performed with objects on other peopleâs bodiesâ (p. 2, translated for this edition). This passage also implies a relationship between body schema and action.
Body schema and space
The relationship between body and space representation can be grasped by looking at what happens when it is artificially inverted. This inversion can be produced experimentally in normal subjects, by asking them to wear ocular prisms: This makes the subject perceive the right-side space on his left side and vice versa. Such experiments alter the representation of both body and space.
Scholl (1926), quoted by Schilder (1935/1999, p. 108), described how he felt after having worn ocular prisms for several days:
In regard to the limbs and other parts of the body, the pre-experimental image intruded into the actual perception. Arms and legs which were actually seen were localized in a double way: There was the localization in which they were seen; but in the background there was the previous localization, closely related to muscle sensations and touch. [âŠ] When one side of the body approached an object, the touch came from the opposite side to that expected.
Body schema, action, sense of agency
Space is where our gestures and movement take place. Following Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), many authors have claimed that the body âcarries alongâ its own space and this space only exists as the space wh ere the individual may engage in action. It is therefore necessary that we mention the notion of the âsense of agencyâ, i.e., the ability to acknowledge oneself as the author of oneâs gestures (see Jeannerod, 2003). One way of studying agency is showing su bjects videos of hand and finger movements while they are simultaneously performing such movements themselves. The videos may either show the movements actually performed by the subjects or show other movements performed by the experimenter. Normal subjects are able to recognise their own movements, an ability which implies an organised body representation.
Body schema and body image in cognitive neuropsychology
In todayâs cognitivist research, the term body image is used to designate a body representation different from the body schema, but this difference has little to do with the distinction between schema and image underlined by psychoanalysis. When using this term, some cognitivist researchers think of the multiple verbal representations of the body, its different parts, its orientation in space and its spatial relationships with other bodies (Buxbaum and Coslett, 2001). Unlike body schema, these notions are acquired by learning (children are taught the names of body parts, the notion of left and right, etc.). Other authors also refer to the âvisual body imageâ, a term first introduced by Head, which, however, takes into account only the visual perception of oneâs body (Holmes and Spence, 2007). The ârubber hand illusionsâ illustrate this predominant role of visual perception: in this experimental framework (Botvinick and Cohen, 199 8), normal subjects see a fake rubber hand instead of their own hand, which is hidden to them. When the experimenter stimulates the fake visible hand and the true hidden hand simultaneously, the subject âfeelsâ the stimulation in the fake hand, as if he had incorporated the rubber hand in his body schema.
Body schema and space representation acquisition
As shown by the progressive acquisition of equilibrium and motor skills in the course of a childâs development, the process of constructing the body schema continues throughout childhood, but it is completely unconscious. As we know â but it is worthwhile to recall â spatial orientation is acquired in all daily life activities, for example when the child learns to dress himself, as well as through contacts with other people (teachers, school fellows, parents). The work of Liliane Lurçat (1974) has helped shed light on the stages involved in childrenâs thinking about their peripe...
