Chapter 1
Introduction
What shapes business performance for social goals such as safety? Why are some firmsâ products inherently safe while others endanger safety? How do state imposed legal obligations and enforcement influence business conduct, and how does their influence compare with that of non-state actors in global markets and supply chains? What role do knowledge and motivational factors play in shaping firmsâ actions and performance for safety, and how are they constituted? Are specialist bodies of knowledge, such as those for human factors and safety engineering, applied in practice? What are the implications of all of this for safety policy and practice?
These are some of the significant social issues discussed in this book. They are topics that span the interests of researchers, regulators and policy makers, specialists, practitioners, educators and students across multiple fields in safe design, human factors and safety engineering, work and product safety, risk management, regulation and socio-legal studies, sociology of work, standard setting, and professional and vocational education, among others. The book offers readers from these diverse perspectives fresh insights into business responses to public policy, regulatory and professional imperatives, through an in-depth study of risk management in machinery design and construction. The research blends different literatures and theoretical approaches with empirical investigations to enrich understanding of how, to be effective in regulating and managing risks, we need to pay greater attention to the real nature of work and corporate life, and appreciate the complex contextual influences that shape business conduct.
The rationale for examining safety in machinery design and construction stems from the heavy toll that machinery takes globally in work deaths and injuries. Statistical data are not directly comparable between countries but as a broad indication, each year in the European Union machinery is a contributing factor in more than 300,000 injuries, which is 11 per cent of all injuries involving more than three days off work (European Commission, 2008), while machinery is an even more prominent cause of work injuries in China where 30 per cent of injuries treated in hospital emergency departments are machinery-related (Fitzharris, et al., 2011). Annually there are at least 65,000 injuries involving days away from work in the United States (Harris and Current, 2012), 15,000 injuries involving time off work in Canada (AWCBC, 2012), and around 3,500 hospitalizations from machinery-related injuries in Australia (Safe Work Australia, 2009; 2011; 2013a).
From hand-held power tools to complex production systems, machinery may pose genuine and serious risks to health and safety. Most well recognized are mechanical hazards as the following, not uncommon, examples illustrate:
A machine operator was fatally crushed in a machine. He had entered the service area of a production line to clear an obstruction, triggering an automatic safety device, which stopped the machine. The machine was turned on again by an operator who sat at a console, in a position from which he could not see the operator in the service area.
A farm worker suffered fatal injuries when his jacket caught on the auger of a drilling rig, pulling him into the machine. There was no caging around the drill, interlock or dead-man control on the operating panel. (Examples from NOHSC, 2000, pp. xiii, 86).
As well as the inadequately guarded danger zones and poorly positioned controls that these examples highlight, machinery may be hazardous through weak structures that collapse or break apart, hazardous chemical emissions and leaks, noise and vibration, the ergonomic problems of awkward postures or repetitive movements in machinery operation, and complex humanâtechnology interfaces that give risk to mental strain, human error and hazardous incidents (Al-Tuwaijri, et al., 2008; Backstrom and Döös, 1997; 2000; Brauer 1994; 2006; Gardner, et al., 1999). There is also compelling evidence that a high proportion of machinery-related deaths and injuries are attributable to its poor design and construction in the first instance (Driscoll, et al., 2005; 2008; NIOSH, 2013; Safe Work Australia, 2009, p. 15).
The importance of inherently safe design has been recognized in a series of public policy and professional initiatives in the United States, Europe and Australia, based on the premise that one of the most effective ways to prevent work-related deaths and injuries is to design out hazards and integrate risk control measures at the source (ASSE, 2011; European Commission, 2008, pp. 209â10; Kletz, 1998a; 1998b; Manuele, 1999a; 2008; NOHSC, 2002; Safe Work Australia, 2012a,b; Swuste, 1997; Schulte, et al., 2008). There is also a substantial specialist body of knowledge, originating in the disciplines of human factors and safety engineering, to support the structured analysis and resolution of safety problems from early in the life cycle of machinery (for example Brauer, 1994; 2006; Corlett and Clark; 1995; Green and Jordan, 1999; Karwowski, 2005; Karwowski and Marras, 1999; Morris, Wilson and Koukoulaki, 2004; Stanton and Young, 1999; Stanton, et al., 2005).
On the legal side, the pre-eminent regulatory regime requiring the safe design and construction of machinery is the law of member states in the European Union giving effect to the Machinery Directive (European Commission, 1998a; 2006). Australian occupational health and safety (OHS) law also has a well-developed framework of legal obligations for machinery designers and manufacturers (Bluff, 2004; Johnstone, 1997, pp. 260â3; 2004a, pp. 275â80). In other countries the OHS legal obligations of employers may be the impetus for machinery producers to conform to safety standards, as with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards for safeguarding machinery (Harris and Current, 2014; OSHA, 2014).
The empirical research presented in this book was conducted with Australian firms that manufactured and supplied a wide variety of machinery into international markets, as well as locally. By virtue of the transnational application of the policy, professional and regulatory imperatives outlined above, and the international scope of the literature underpinning them, this research has relevance for an international readership grappling with issues of safety in the design and construction of products, and business responses to policy and regulatory interventions more generally.
In illuminating the mechanisms underlying manufacturersâ responses for machinery safety the research also makes wider conceptual and theoretical contributions. It provides insights into knowledge and motivational factors as principal elements shaping firm performance for social and regulatory goals, and advances understanding of how these elements are constituted in the everyday operations of firms and their interactions with external actors.
Overview of the Research
The research presented in this book focused on the design and construction of machinery, as distinct from supply or end use, because in the earlier life cycle stages there is the opportunity to produce machinery that is inherently safer.1 This can be achieved if those making decisions about design and construction choose structures, materials and components which eliminate hazards, and risk control measures that are integral to the design, compatible with machine functionality, and hence less likely to be removed or disarmed (Kletz 1998a; 1998b; Polet, Vanderhaegen and Amalberti, 2003; Reunanen, 1993, p. 108; Swuste, et al., 1997; Seim and Broberg, 2010).
Centre stage in the research are the European regulatory regime for machinery safety based on the Machinery Directive (European Commission, 1998a; 2006), and the obligations of designers and manufacturers in Australian OHS law (Bluff, 2004; Johnstone, 1997, pp. 260â3; 2004a, pp. 275â80). These are leading examples of state regulatory requirements for the safe design and construction of machinery, and the regimes most applicable to the study firms. Although by no means harmonized, the European and Australian regimes contain some common elements. Among these are obligations for the management of risks and provision of safety information, and both regimes are underpinned by detailed technical standards2 for particular types or aspects of machinery.
Taking a wider, de-centred view of regulation the research also examined the non-state actors in local, national and transnational domains that influenced business conduct (see also Black, 2001a; Hutter and Jones, 2007; Parker and Nielsen, 2009). For machinery manufacturers, the state and non-state actors differ according to each firmâs operations and markets. They might include state regulators or policy bodies in a firmâs home or export countries, national and international standards bodies, business contacts in supply chains or networks (suppliers of component parts, customers or distributors of end products), providers of education and training, professional bodies, industry and trade associations, unions and insurance companies, among others.
The research set a substantive goal of both the Australian and European regulatory regimes for machinery safety as the overarching benchmark of firm performance and compliance. This was the goal of preventing death, injury and illness (the regulatory goal of prevention). For prevention purposes it was critical that manufacturers comprehensively recognized hazards, eliminated those hazards or incorporated risk control measures to minimize the risks, and provided safety information that was accessible to and comprehensively informed end users about machinery safety matters. Keeping the regulatory goal of prevention clearly in focus, the research examined manufacturersâ actions and standards of performance for the substantive safety outcomes of hazard recognition, risk control and provision of safety information, and the factors and processes shaping their responses.
The research design and methodology are set out in full in the Appendix. In brief, the sample for the empirical study with machinery manufacturers was drawn from firms in two Australian states (Victoria and South Australia), and included a cross-section of small, medium and large businesses,3 in capital city and regional locations. Collectively the 66 firms in the sample produced more than 30 different types of machinery or equipment including various types of cranes, hoists and lifting equipment, agricultural and horticultural machinery, boilers and compressors, industrial cleaning systems, and an array of machinery for processing, handling or packaging food, beverages, wood, minerals, vehicles, and other products or waste materials. The study firms supplied their machinery in international markets in Europe, Asia, North America or the Middle East, as well as 15 different industry sectors around Australia. In each study firm, the informants were key individuals responsible for making and implementing decisions about machinery design and construction as directors, owners, or managers overseeing production, engineering and other technical or specialist functions.
A second empirical study with OHS regulators investigated their inspection and enforcement policy and practice for machinery design and construction. Data collection for the two empirical studies involved in-depth, face-to-face interviews in manufacturing firms and with the regulators, supplemented by review of documentation and, for manufacturers, observation of machinery to identify potential sources of harm and risk control measures incorporated or absent. The two empirical studies were underpinned by a legal review and analysis of the principal legal obligations (Australian and European), applying to the safe design and construction of machinery.
The research provided evidence of the mixed performance of manufacturers for hazard recognition, risk control and safety information. More importantly, the research contributed to understanding why some firms performed well for these safety outcomes while others failed to do so. It distinguished knowledge about machinery safety matters and motivational factors (motivations, values and attitudes) as the principal elements shaping firm action and, in turn, performance for substantive safety outcomes. The research also demonstrated the highly contextualized nature of knowledge about machinery safety matters and of motivational factors, as they were constituted in the operations of firms and through interactions with external actors. These external actors might help build capacity or spread misinformation, and they might motivate or constrain preventive action by manufacturers. Key decision makers in firms also shaped firm behaviour through the influence of their personal histories, values and attitudes. State regulation (Australian and European) contributed to the knowledge and motivation to address machinery safety in some firms but, even when state regulation had some influence it had to compete with other constituents of knowledge and motivations. As a consequence, firm behaviour was idiosyncratic and performance for substantive outcomes was often insufficient for firms to comply with the regulatory goal of prevention.
Research Contributions
The research builds on the growing body of scholarship demonstrating the influence of the social and economic contexts of firmsâ operations on their compliance with state regulation, and performance for safety specifically. Examples of such scholarship are studies of business responses to safety-related legal obligations and enforcement (Fairman and Yapp, 2005a; 2005b; Genn, 1993; Gray and Scholz, 1993; Haines, 1997; Hutter, 2001; 2011; Kagan and Scholz, 1984; Mendeloff and Gray, 2005), and studies of business responses to social and economic regulation more generally (Braithwaite V, 2009; Braithwaite V, et al., 1994; Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton, 2003; Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan, 2005; May and Wood, 2003; Parker, 2002; and see generally Parker and Nielsen, 2011, and contributors therein).
The rich data generated for machinery manufacturers enabled a nuanced account of the principal elements shaping their performance for substantive safety outcomes. These elements are motivations, values and attitudes (motivational factors); knowledge about machinery safety; state regulation (Australian and European legal instruments and enforcement systems); and non-state institutions and actors in the form of technical standards bodies, parties in firmsâ supply chains and networks, and health and safety professionals. In turn this enabled the development of explanation and theory about the nature of and interplay between these elements and substantive safety outcomes, through inductive reasoning grounded in the empirical data, and deductive reasoning drawing on the literature to interpret the data and interrogate emerging explanation (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, pp. 161â2; Morse and Richards 2002, pp. 169â70; Neuman, 1997, pp. 46â8; Richards, 2005, pp. 128â34; Silverman, 2001, pp. 237â40).
At one level the empirical findings and theorizing from this research converge with and reinforce Parker and Nielsenâs (2011, pp. 5, 9â26) conclusion that to explain business behaviour we must understand the influence of and interplay between the goals or priorities that motivate that behaviour, organizational capacities and characteristics that shape decision making and implementation, state regulation and enforcement, and non-state influences. At a deeper level the research makes conceptual and theoretical contributions to understanding and explaining motivational factors and knowledge, their constitution in the everyday operations of firms and interactions with external actors, and how these factors and processes shape firm behaviour and whether or not they comply with state regulation. In essence the research uncovers the web of influences that create plural responses among manufacturers and differentiate their performance for substantive safety outcomes.
The principal motivational factors for machinery manufacturers could be characterized, in a general way, as legal, economic or normative, but not social (see also Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, pp. 23â5; Kagan, Gunningham and Thornton, 2011; May, 2004; Parker and Nielsen, 2011, pp. 10â12). It was, however, more useful to describe them precisely so as to reveal and make clear their origins and how they influenced firm behaviour. By exploring the mix of influential motivations, values and attitudes it also became clear that, within a particular firm, these factors might be mutually reinforcing or conflicting. Apparent drivers for firms to take action on machinery safety could be cancelled out by barriers to taking such action, as when an espoused moral obligation to protect human health and safety was counteracted by over-riding business concerns about the functionality and marketability of machinery. Moreover, when the relationships between motivational factors and substantive safety outcomes were examined it was evident that only some factors were actually linked with good performance for these outcomes; those that cast machinery safety as in some way integral to the success of the business. Others, for example manufacturersâ reputational concerns, were simply espoused motivations, sometimes termed psychological compliance (Parker and Nielsen, 2009, p. 57), which did not necessarily drive constructive preventive action.
With regard to knowledge, the research established that key individuals (key decision makers) in manufacturing firms constructed knowledge about machinery safety matters from multiple bases but differences in constituents of learning did not, in themselves, explain differences in knowledge about machinery safety. A social constructivist perspective of learning (Billett, 2001; Palincsar, 1998) was useful in theorizing learning about machinery safety in firms, as the research suggested that both social and individual processes were involved in the construction of knowledge about machinery safety. Key individuals constructed safety knowledge principally through participation in everyday activities and interactions with others, within and outside their businesses, and interpreted what they experienced through the lens of their personal domains of knowledge due to their different personal histories, capacities and agency (Billett 1996; 2001; 2003; 2008a; Scribner and Beach, 1993).
State regulation and enforcement were part of the mix of motivational factors and constituents of knowledge in manufacturing firms, although state regulatory demands were generally not well understood and were rather lost among other inputs with which they competed for authority. Intriguingly, specialist human factors and safety engineering sources, which offer information, methods and tools to support the integration of safety in design, were little used in study firms, and only in firms that employed or engaged human factors or other safety professionals. In contrast the influence of the wider external environment of non-state actors was considerable. This influence was represented in firms, and key individuals in firms, privileging parties in supply chains and their industry contacts as drivers of action and sources of information. Yet this research suggests caution in regulators relying on or harnessing such non-state actors to motivate or build the capacity of regulatees, as some safety and socio-legal scholars have proposed (see for example Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002, pp. 17â18; Hopkins and Hogan, 1998; Lamm and Walters, 2004, pp.103â5; Walters, 2001, pp. 52, 375â6; 2002, pp. 45â6). There was little evidence that market and industry influences were linked with manufacturers performing well for subst...