The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience

Ian Phillips

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138830745
• eBook ISBN: 9781351979689
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Experience is inescapably temporal. But how do we experience time? Temporal experience is a fundamental subject in philosophy – according to Husserl, the most important and difficult of all. Its puzzles and paradoxes were of critical interest from the Early Moderns through to the Post-Kantians. After a period of relative neglect, temporal experience is again at the forefront of debates across a wealth of areas, from philosophy of mind and psychology, to metaphysics and aesthetics.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience is an outstanding reference source to the key debates in this exciting subject area and represents the first collection of its kind. Comprising nearly 30 chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is organized into seven clear parts:

• Ancient and early modern perspectives
• Nineteenth and early twentieth-century perspectives
• The structure of temporal experience
• Temporal experience and the philosophy of mind
• Temporal experience and metaphysics
• Empirical perspectives
• Aesthetics

Within each part, key topics concerning temporal experience are examined, including canonical figures such as Locke, Kant and Husserl; extensionalism, retentionalism and the specious present; interrelations between temporal experience and time, agency, dreaming, and the self; empirical theories of perceiving and attending to time; and temporal awareness in the arts including dance, music and film.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience is essential reading for students and researchers of philosophy of mind and psychology. It is also extremely useful for those in related fields such as metaphysics, phenomenology and aesthetics, as well as for psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists.

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PART I

Ancient and early modern perspectives

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1

HOW NATURAL IS A UNIFIED NOTION OF TIME?

Temporal experience in early Greek thought

Barbara M. Sattler

Introduction

Whatever our metaphysics of time, today we usually work with the assumption that we have one unified temporal framework which allows for situating all events, processes and happenings. What do I mean by this? Let us say that today there may be a battle in Syria, you are reading a philosophy paper, the Dalai Lama may be engaged in some meditation, and in the Austrian Alps the first avalanche of the season may come down – these things have nothing to do with each other, they are very different things, some of them are physical things, some mental, some occurrences in nature, others in the human world, and yet we would note down all these occurrences in the very same calendar; we could, for example, say of each event that it happened on Wednesday, 4 January 2017 (if that is when they happen). For us, all these things happen in the same time, we have a common framework for them all so that no matter which occurrences or processes we talk about, they can be put in a temporal relation to each other; they are either before, after, or simultaneous with each other.

For the early Greeks, by contrast, the very idea of such a unified notion of time would be foreign; instead they assume different temporal (and not necessarily comparable) structures belonging to different events. Not only do we not find a unified calendar throughout the ancient Greek world; more importantly, we also do not find a unified notion or idea of time before Plato. In this chapter, I want to show that such a unified framework is lacking in the very beginning of Western thinking and the effect this lack has on the quality of temporal experiences – it means that different temporal experiences are thus seen as experiences of genuinely different kinds.

With the exception of Anaximander and Empedocles, the philosophers before Plato hardly ever discuss temporal notions. For this reason and in order to make sure that we capture the earliest expressions of temporal notions, I will mainly discuss temporal ideas in non-philosophical authors before Plato. But these texts will not be looked at for merely historic reasons; rather they shall be shown to articulate an understanding of temporal structures that questions many of our modern temporal conceptions. A look at ancient notions of time suggests that our notion of time as unified is not something we gain directly from experience, but rather that such a unified conception is an interpretative or theoretical overlay.

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Lack of unification

Today, we distinguish different aspects of temporal experience,¹ such as duration, sequence (i.e., the temporal order of before and after), those aspects that we express in terms of different tenses (recalling the past, facing the present and anticipating the future), and, perhaps, the passage of time.² But all these features are seen as different aspects of one unified time (“time” in the singular). If we look at the early ancient Greeks, by contrast, what we count as different aspects seem to be different types of experiences altogether. There are different kinds of temporal notions capturing different kinds of temporal experiences that are in the beginning not connected with each other: (1) there are notions of duration; (2) notions indicating sequence; (3) notions indicating measurable time; (4) notions linking time with agency; and (5) notions marked by tense.

Some of the literature on memory has pointed out the fragmented character of memory, that it contains gaps, as well as different and, in part, disjoint narratives³ – features that also could be seen as suggesting that our conception of time as unified may not be something we can take for granted. We will see, however, that the disunity for the early Greeks is of a somewhat different kind – with them we are not dealing with gaps that are due to things being forgotten, some lack of memory; rather there are several temporal aspects that are not seen as belonging to the same kind of experience; furthermore, these disunities cannot simply to be brought into a linear succession, as, for example, John Campbell thinks is ultimately possible for all autobiographical memory.⁴

Let us have a closer look at the different kinds of temporal notions in early Greek thinking; due to constraints of space, I will only be able to give a very rough sketch and to point to a few examples for each notion.⁵

(1) Chronos is the most important notion of duration; scholars often understand it as the equivalent to our term “time” in such a way that other temporal notions could be subsumed under it. However, this is in fact only the case from Plato onwards. In the very beginning of Greek thinking, chronos indicates solely a particular time span – it is either qualified as a long or short time, or simply by itself understood as a long time. But chronos originally does not indicate a time that is measured with the help of any units; rather we are just experiencing something as lasting for some duration or as (too) long. Let me give you two of the earliest examples, from Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey.

In Iliad Book III, the old leaders of the Trojans sit upon the wall and, when they see Helen coming upon the wall, they say to each other:

There is no blame on Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans if for a long time (πολὺν χρόνον) they suffered hardship for such a woman; wondrously like is she to the immortal goddesses to look upon.

(lines 156–158)

Chronos qualified by the adjective “long” is also what we find in Odyssey book V, where we hear that when Odysseus is sailing off from Calypso, he gets into a storm, his mast breaks and he is thrown into the sea:

As for him, long time (πολὺν χρόνον) did the wave hold him in the depths, nor could he rise at once from beneath the onrush of the mighty wave, for the garments which beautiful Calypso had given him weighed him down.

(lines 319–321)

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In both passages, chronos is qualified as a long time; and both passages show that chronos is not only used to express a long duration, but, fairly typically for the early understanding of chronos, a particular long time, namely a negative time (the time Odysseus is under water, the time suffered in the case of the Trojans). There is a lot of waiting and wandering around in the Iliad and Odyssey and it is here especially where chronos comes in. This suggests that chronos is not simply understood as a neutral temporal framework (which embraces all events and lets us situate every process and event), but rather as expressing a specific emotional experience of duration. And chronos does not seem to be used to serve the interest of chronology. This does not mean that there cannot be a very sophisticated architecture of narrative time. For the Iliad, for example, Taplin has shown how the fourteen actually narrated days in the Iliad are marked by clear signs of closure and anticipation, and the role that the sequence of night, dawn, midday, etc. plays.⁶ But if we attempt to reconstruct the exact sequence of events of the Trojan War with the help of the Iliad, we get entangled in inconsistencies.⁷ There is no suggestion that chronos provides us with an overall framework or is an essential part of a chronology (as the different days and nights are). While we do find relations of order in the Iliad and Odyssey – with the unfolding of the narrative as well as with the sequence of night, dawn, midday, etc. – these definite relations are not explicitly linked to the experienced duration; there are no points that can serve as markers within chronos in its earliest occurrences.

This usage of chronos in Homer also suggests that our sense of duration need not be connected with measurability⁸ in the sense that we can say at least roughly how long something lasted⁹ – a connection, which, for example, Mayo assumes as naturally given.¹⁰ According to Mayo, we “cannot endure through an interval of time without measuring it” (1950: 71).¹¹ By contrast, in Homer, we find the idea that a certain duration is just experienced as too long, or even endless seeming. It is not connected with the idea of measurability by the narrator, and we have no reason to assume that Odysseus had a sense of how much time had elapsed since he got under the wave.

(2) There are basic notions indicating sequence, like “before” and “after”. These notions do not yet give us measurability, but are in some sense more basic: for it may be the case that we can tell whether one event X happened before or after another event Y (or simultaneously, for that matter), without thus necessarily knowing how much before or after they took place or how long either X or Y lasted; all we may be able to say is that X occurred before Y. Usually, earlier and later ordering is asymmetric, not reflexive, and transitive.¹²

In early Greek thinking, notions like “before” (proteron) and “after” (hysteron) are often expressed as adjectives, but never as adjectives qualifying chronos.¹³ Rather they seem to qualify people or things, in the way properties do, so we find talk about “andres proteroi” (“former men”, Iliad XXI.405) and “anthrôpoi proteroi” (“former human beings”, Iliad V.637, XXIII.332 and Theogony, line 100). In translations, the adjective “former” or “old” is usually applied to times, but for Homer and Hesiod it is literally applied to human beings.

(3) There are a couple of temporal notions that express certain temporal units bound to natural processes and thus indicate what we can call measurable time; for example, hêmera, the day, meis, the month, or eniautos, the year. But it is only from the fifth century bce onwards that chronos is seen as what is measured with the help of these temporal units. So in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus lines 607ff. we find the idea that “chronos brings forth countless nights and days”. Here measurable time (expressed in terms of units of time like night and day) is connected with long time (chronos) by having chronos bring forth nights and days – presumably as its parts, so that we can say how much chronos has passed. But before the tragedians, these temporal units do not seem to measure something else, time, as we would assume. For example, in Homer we find the expression “as the year rolled round, and the seasons came on” as a standard phrase expressing long time – “year” and “season” do not measure time; rather they themselves are what rolls around and comes on.

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Moreover, these units are not always primarily used for exact quantitative measurement; rather they often also have a qualitative sense. Thus different days of the month can be seen as suitable or unsuitable for certain activities, for example, the twelfth day is good for weaving since then also the spider allegedly weaves its web.¹⁴ A day is the unity that connects different experiences together¹⁵ and can also be identified with the fate experienced.¹⁶

(4) There are temporal notions indicating agency, like kairos, which means the right or a critical time. Kairos as the appropriate or critical time has no connection with measurable time, and it is also not connected with the duration expressed by chronos. Its original meaning is “due measure”, “proportion”, “what is vital”, which is then interpreted in a temporal sense to mean the critical time or opportunity to act.

Kairos is a notion that is of special importance in early medical writings: in the process of healing, certain times are especially critical for applying a treatment and for the success of the healing process. For example, in the treatise Regimen in acute diseases, a part of the Hippocratic corpus, we find a discussion of kairos as the right time to administer gruel (one of t...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience
• Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Notes on Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: TheSignificance of Temporal Experience
• Part I Ancient and Early Modern Perspectives
• Part II Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Perspectives
• Part III the Structure of Temporal Experience
• Part IV Temporal Experience and the Philosophy of Mind
• Part V Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
• Part VI Empirical Perspectives
• Part VII Temporal Experience and Aesthetics
• Index