Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security

The Politics of Identity and Security

Shireen Hunter

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780765612830
• eBook ISBN: 9781315290119
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

This richly detailed study traces the shared history of Russia and Islam in expanding compass - from the Tatar civilization within the Russian heartland, to the conquered territories of the Caucasus and Central Asia, to the larger geopolitical and security context of contemporary Russia on the civilizational divide. The study's distinctive analytical drive stresses political and geopolitical relationships over time and into the very complicated present. Rich with insight, the book is also an incomparable source of factual information about Russia's Muslim populations, religious institutions, political organizations, and ideological movements.

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I
Islam in Russia, Past and Present

An Overview

1
Islam in Russia

The Historical Background

It is difficult to establish exactly when Islam first appeared in Russia because the lands that Islam penetrated early in its expansion were not part of Russia at the time, but were later incorporated into the expanding Russian Empire. Islam reached the Caucasus region in the middle of the seventh century as part of the Arab conquest of the Iranian Sassanid Empire, many centuries before Russian expansion into this region,¹ and the archeological evidence points to the existence of links between the people of Bashkortostan, located in contemporary Russia’s Ural Mountains region, and the Islamic world dating back to the eighth century.² By the tenth century, the Bulghar Kingdom on the banks of the Volga River had accepted Islam and incorporated Bashkortostan into its domain, almost half a millennium before Russia’s conquest of the region under Tsar Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible). Before the arrival of the Russians, the Bulghar Kingdom developed into an important center of Islamic civilization, with extensive ties to the rest of the Islamic world, especially Central Asia and Khorasan.³ This fact prompted the nineteenth-century Russian philosopher and historian S.M. Soloviev to state, “When the Bulghar was already listening to the Qu’ran on the shores of the Volga and the Kama, the Russian Slav had not yet started to build Christian churches on the Oka and had not yet conquered these places in the name of the European civilization.”⁴

Despite the proximity of these Muslim lands to Kievan Russia and their later incorporation into the Russian Empire, as long as they were beyond Russian rule, Islam remained only a neighbor of Russia and not a component of its religious fabric. Nevertheless, interaction between Russian and Muslim peoples, both peaceful and conflictual, dates back to at least the tenth century A.D. During this period, Russians conducted raids as far south as the Transcaucasus and in 942–44 destroyed a number of prosperous Muslim cities in South Caucasus.⁵ If some legends are to be believed, Russia’s embrace of Christianity instead of Islam owed as much to chance as to somber reflection. According to one such legend, Prince Vladimir of Kiev decided in the year 988 to choose a religion for his people—a common practice among ruling elites in those days—and met with representatives of the great religions. Although the prince was tempted by Islam, the religion’s prohibition of alcohol persuaded him to reject it because, as Vladimir purportedly said, “The joy of Russia is drinking; we cannot be without it.”⁶ Although perhaps apocryphal, this legend underlines the growing importance of Islam as an external, if not yet internal, factor for the emerging Kievan Russian state.

During this period before Islam became an important internal social and political factor, Russians began forming a common identity, heightened by the adoption of Orthodox Christianity, that separated them from the Muslim peoples to the east and south. In the Russian perception, “in the early tenth century, the borderline between ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’ followed more or less exactly the frontier which today separates the Slavic ‘European’ people of the [former] USSR from areas populated largely by Muslims.”⁷ However, in the tenth century, it was not clear who were the barbarians and who were the civilized peoples. The Islamic world, from the tenth century to the middle of the thirteenth century, was experiencing its golden age, which would end with the Mongol conquests of 1206–1405. However, in due course, the various Turko-Mongol dynasties that ruled over vast areas stretching from Central Asia to the Urals would become significant centers of Islamic and Turko-Iranian civilization and would expand the frontiers of Islam to the Indian subcontinent. If the Russians viewed the Muslims as barbarians, the Muslims had a similar view of the “Rus” as “wild and primitive natives… and dangerous neighbors.” Thus in the tenth century, from the Muslim perspective, “‘Barbary’ was represented by the ‘European’ ancestors of the Russians.”⁸

Mongol Conquest and Islam

Despite these mutually reinforcing negative views that the Russians and neighboring Muslim peoples had of one another, until the Mongol invasion, Islam and Muslims were only distant neighbors and not part of Russia’s religious and political landscape. This occurred only after the Mongol conquest of Kievan Russia in the thirteenth century, and especially after the conversion to Islam by Özbek Khan of the Golden Horde in the early fourteenth century. The latter development was a pivotal point in the formation of the Russian view of Islam, with lasting influence and far-reaching consequences. Islam became identified with the Mongol conquest and the period of the “Tatar yoke,” which is considered the greatest calamity that befell the Russians. Islam’s introduction to Russia as a result of the Mongol conquest and Tatar rule has had significant implications for the development of Russia’s perceptions of Islam and the character of its relations with the Muslim peoples and countries. A significant majority of Russians believe that their cultural and political development was thwarted by Tatar-Mongol domination because it created a gap between Russia and the rest of Europe. They attribute the worst aspects of Russia’s political culture to Tatar-Mongol rule and maintain that the requirements of surviving and eventually overcoming Mongol rule forced Muscovy to adopt their ways, namely, tyranny, despotism, serfdom, and lack of liberty.⁹

Thus Islam and Muslims were seen by Russians as aggressors, conquerors, and oppressors from whose domination Russia must free itself and prevent future challenges by Muslims to Russian interests and independence. The latter concern contributed to Russian expansion into Muslim lands beginning in the sixteenth century with the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible.¹⁰ Even before that, the Russians had tried to rid themselves of Tatar rule. In 1380, Dimitrii, the prince of Moscow, defeated the Tatar-Mongols in the Battle of Kulikovo.¹¹ This victory, which is still celebrated today, became a source of tension between Kazan and Moscow in June 2001, with the Tatars demanding that the celebration be abolished.¹² This controversy illustrates how historic events and their legacy for the collective memories of Russians and Muslims affect contemporary developments. The centuries following the Russian capture of Kazan witnessed an inexorable—albeit, at times, difficult—process of Russian expansion into Muslim-inhabited regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia. By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the tsar’s Muslim subjects numbered nearly 20 million.¹³

Throughout this centuries-long period of expansion, the memory of the Mongol conquest and the negative impact of Mongol rule heightened the Russian view of Islam and Muslims as “hostile others” against whom the Russians, to some extent, would define themselves and their national and cultural mission. Other rival cultures and external foes—notably the non-Orthodox Christian West—played a role at least as important as that of Muslim peoples in the Russian perception of external threats.¹⁴ Nevertheless, two central aspects of the Russian view of Islam that developed during Mongol rule and the subsequent Russian expansion became fundamental components of Russian national identity and maintain significant relevance in Russia’s present cultural and political contexts. First, Russia came to see itself as the eastern flank of the defense of Christendom against Islam and Asian nations, as Spain was in the west. Russians deeply believe that Europe would have succumbed to the Mongols and could not have either retained its Christianity or developed culturally and scientifically if Russia had not absorbed the shock of Mongol invasion. Therefore, they believe that the West owes a debt of gratitude to Russia. Moreover, Russia still sees itself as a bulwark against the Islamic South, which continues to threaten Europe. Second, Russia developed a sense of duty to perform a civilizing role, both in parts of Europe and in Asia, especially among its Muslim subjects. This experience, frequently viewed by Russians as suffering for the sake of others, has strengthened the messianic tendencies of Russian culture.¹⁵

As Russia pursued this mission and steadily expanded its reach, it became integrated, albeit incompletely, into the European political and, to a lesser degree, cultural system, especially following the reforms of Peter the Great and the Westernizing policies of Empress Catherine II (Catherine the Great). The Muslim world simultaneously entered a long period of decline. These parallel processes enhanced the Russians’ sense of civilizational superiority and their belief in their civilizing role vis-à-vis the conquered peoples. Yet despite their decline and subsequent subjugation, Muslims of the Russian Empire retained memories of a rich cultural heritage, and a large segment of Russia’s Muslim population rejected the notion of the inherent superiority of Russian civilization. This continued belief in the value of their civilization has been an important factor both in the preservation of Islamic traditions and ethnic identities of Russia’s Muslims and in periodic efforts by successive generations at cultural revival, including those under way since the beginning of perestroika in 1987.

Over the nearly five centuries of this often troubled relationship between the Russian state and the subject Muslim peoples, Russia’s treatment of its Muslim population evolved in accordance with the duration and difficulty of Russia’s conquest of the different Muslim peoples, the basic characteristics and ideology of the Russian state, and the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the Russian government. Also important were the personality traits of key Russian figures in charge of governing Muslim regions. During the evolution of Russian policy through both the tsarist and Soviet periods, essentially four patterns of behavior dominated: (1) pervasive repression and, in some cases, elimination of national cultures and ethnic groups; (2) periodic tolerance; (3) assimilation; and (4) limited religiocultural autonomy and a measure of cooperation. In the post-Soviet era, there was a brief period of growing tolerance and moves toward accepting greater cultural and political autonomy for Russia’s Muslims. However, since 1999, the dominant trends have been toward greater government control over Muslims’ religious and cultural life, the reversal of trends toward cultural and political autonomy, and growing anti-Muslim sentiments—Islamophobia. In accordance with the historical pattern, Russia’s troubles with some of its Muslim population, notably in Chechnya, and perceived threats to its security from Muslim autonomist aspirations have contributed to this trend.

Islam and the Russian Empire: Patterns of Russian Imperial Rule

From Ivan the Terrible to the Beginning of Catherine II’s Reign: Repression and Assimilation

The period from the conquest of Kazan in 1552 to the coming to power of Catherine the Great in 1762 was marked by a policy of systematic repression of Muslims and the destruction of Muslim civiliz...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Tables, Figures, and Maps
• Foreword
• Preface
• Introduction
• I Islam in Russia, Past and Present An Overview
• II Identity Politics in the Russian Federation The Islamic Factor
• III Russia and Islam The Islamic Factor in Russia's External Relations
• Selected Bibliography
• Index
• About the Authors