Foreign Policies of EU Member States

Continuity and Europeanisation

Amelia Hadfield, Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman, Amelia Hadfield, Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780415670050
• eBook ISBN: 9781351997218
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Relaciones internacionales

Foreign Policies of EU Member States provides a clear and current overview of the motivations and outcomes of EU Member States regarding their foreign policy-making within and beyond the EU. It provides an in-depth analysis of intra-EU policy-making and sheds light, in an innovative and understandable way, on the lesser-known aspects of the inter-EU and extra-EU foreign policies of the twenty-eight Member States. The text has an innovative method of thematic organisation in which case study state profiles emerge via dominant foreign policy themes. The text examines the three main policy challenges currently faced by the twenty-eight Member States:

• First, EU Member States must cooperate within the mechanisms of the EU, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
• Second, EU Member States continue to construct their own inter-EU foreign policies.
• Third, the sovereign prerogative exercised by all EU Member States is to construct their own foreign policies on everything from trade and defence with the rest of the world.

This combination of clarity, thematic structure and empirical case studies make this an ideal textbook for all upper-level students of European foreign policy, comparative European politics and European studies.

Part I
Geographic orientations/geopolitics

1
The Northern European Member States

Hiski Haukkala, Tobias Etzold and Kristi Raik

Introduction ¹

In the EU debates, it is commonplace to lump the three Nordic (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and three Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) Member States together and assume a high degree of commonality within and even between these two groupings. To a degree, this is understandable as the countries are indeed bound together by deep ties stemming from geographical and cultural proximity. They have also undertaken attempts at developing cooperation on the regional and EU levels. However, all six have different historical experiences; have to a degree varying economic and societal models; and, as Table 1.1 summarizes, have also adopted differing foreign and security policy orientations during the post-Cold War era.

Therefore, instead of assuming a high level of natural commonality between the Northern European Member States, this chapter sets out to analytically map out core areas of potential commonality as well as differentiation between the countries. The role of geography and cultural and economic closeness are all factors that suggest that potential for commonality does exist (see Miles, 2000; Smith et al., 2002; Ingebritsen, 2006). However, there are also significant differences that in fact inhibit the emergence of a fully shared perspective on foreign policy throughout the region. Being all small states, even in the EU context, external factors and events obviously play the key role in their foreign and security policies. But at the same time they all have their own national histories, attitudes, traditions and consequent roles and reflexes in the external domain. None can afford the luxury of a fully indigenous policy formation, but their responses are not a mere function of their external environment either (Elman, 1995). For the past two decades, Europeanisation has played a strong role in shaping these countries’ foreign policy, but more recently, the development of Russia has once again risen to the fore in shaping their attitudes.

Table 1.1 The basic security policy orientations of the Northern European EU Member States

Country	Role in the CSDP	Relationship with NATO
Denmark	Opt-out	Member
Estonia	Participant	Member
Finland	Participant	'Enhanced' partner
Latvia	Participant	Member
Lithuania	Participant	Member
Sweden	Participant	'Enhanced' partner

This chapter will look at how the countries in the region pursue their foreign policies individually as well as how they interact within the EU context to gauge to what extent true commonality – or potential for that – actually exists in the North. It is divided into three parts. First, key changes and continuations in the individual foreign policies of the Northern European Member States are discussed. This is then followed by a case-study concerning the roles the Northern Europeans have played in the formation of the EU’s policies towards the East. It is argued that an analysis concerning Russia, EU enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) shows both the potential as well as the limits of joint approaches between the Northern Member States. The chapter ends with some conclusions that ponder the degree and likely future trajectory of foreign and security policy commonality at the regional level and within the EU context. These conclusions also discuss the roles and modes the countries have adopted and are indeed likely to adopt in the future.

Changes and continuities in foreign policies of Northern European Member States

The defining feature of the post-Cold War era for Northern European Member States has been constant change. In this respect, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was merely a starting point in a process that still continues. The big issue with clear geopolitical ramifications was the dual enlargement(s) of the EU and NATO in 2004. Also the development of Russia and its role in Northern European security is a key in understanding the foreign policies of the countries in question as they all are either direct neighbours or located in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood.

Finland had a fairly well-established identity as a neutral country, stemming from the Cold War. Although during the post-Cold War era the notion of neutrality was quickly replaced with military non-alignment a certain hesitance towards the issue still remained (Ojanen, 2002). This is perhaps best exemplified by the difficult relationship Finland has enjoyed with NATO: while Finland has become a keen Partnership for Peace (PfP) member and provider of troops for crisis management, it seems to have a very limited appetite for becoming a full member of the Alliance in the foreseeable future. The same hesitance has been visible in Finland’s take on the development of the ESDP/CSDP: the Finnish eagerness to push the project forward has only been matched by the certain awkwardness the country has signalled when more ambitious – and potentially binding – forms of solidarity and perhaps even security guarantees have been discussed in the EU context (Ojanen, 2008).

A good deal of the Finnish sitting on the fence becomes understandable only by bringing the Russia factor into the equation. A well-respected retired Finnish diplomat, Jaakko Blomberg has characterized the leitmotif of Finnish foreign policy as ‘yearning for stability’ (Blomberg, 2011). Indeed, one way to interpret the variance in Finnish activism concerning EU-level foreign and security policy is to interpret it against this background. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s, there was certain hesitance towards the project, which was then replaced by a willingness to develop the policy and become more Europeanised. More recently, a growing disillusionment with the prospects of genuinely common European foreign policy could be detected, entailing a return to a more national take on Finnish foreign policy, giving grounds to envisaging Finnish foreign policy as being in a pendulum swing in slow motion (Haukkala and Ojanen, 2011). That said, in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict, some noises have been made by Finland suggesting that the pendulum could be swinging more in the European direction once again. For example, President Sauli Niinistö has repeatedly called for enhanced cooperation on the EU level in tackling the potential hybrid threat from Russia (Niinistö, 2015).

Although for Finland the EU has become the key multilateral forum in terms of foreign and security policy, it is not the only one. In fact, a multilateral reflex is still important for Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2012a). For example, Finland sought, although unsuccessfully, the UN Security Council membership for 2013–14, a process that nevertheless had the beneficial outcome of ‘forcing’ Finland to re-think and develop its UN agenda (Gowan, 2015). Finland has also continued to emphasize the role of the OSCE in the field of security in Europe. All in all, Finnish foreign policy can be seen as deeply enmeshed with EU and other multilateral structures in Europe and even globally.

For Sweden, too, joining the EU in 1995 shortly after the termination of the Cold War was a major change in the country’s foreign policy. Before, owing to its policy of neutrality and proximity to the Soviet Union, membership was regarded as impossible (Wedin, 2008: 38). However, after joining, Sweden has revealed a certain EU-scepticism. It did not negotiate any opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty but did not join the euro-zone although formally the country would have been obliged to. In the accession negotiations, Sweden also reserved its right not to participate in any future EU defence alliance. Like Finland, Sweden pursues a policy of military non-alignment but supports international cooperation in response to threats against peace and security. In this respect, Sweden puts a special emphasis on international issues such as disarmament, arms control and nuclear non-proliferation and contributes to UN- and NATO-led peacekeeping missions. Sweden has a privileged position amongst NATO’s partners; it is regarded as security provider and operational partner and even considered a closer ally and a more reliable contributor to NATO than several of its members (Dahl, 2012: 1). The Ukraine conflict and related tensions with Russia even triggered a debate on joining NATO, which had been almost unthinkable until then but in 2014 found a majority of voters for the first time. Yet an accession will not be a quick fix. Instead, Swedish cooperation with NATO as well as bilateral security arrangements with neighbouring countries and multilateral Nordic and Nordic–Baltic defence cooperation became even closer since 2014.

Sweden is also supporting a common European foreign and security policy that safeguards respect for human rights, democracy and the principles of the rule of law (Bildt, 2012: 2). Sweden also wishes to take a pro-active role in strengthening the EU’s capacity in civilian and military crisis management and even assumed a leadership role in the Nordic Battlegroup (Bildt, 2011: 3). Jointly with his Finnish counterpart, then Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt launched an initiative supporting EU peace mediation in 2010. They proposed to establish the ‘European Institute for Peace’ as an independent body for conflict resolution, peace mediation and related training. Despite not being willing to participate in any future EU defence alliance, for Sweden, EU membership also implies to being part of a political alliance and taking its share of responsibility for Europe’s security in the spirit of solidarity (Bildt, 2012: 3).

During the early 1990s, Sweden was occupied with negotiating and preparing EU membership. Shortly after joining, Sweden, owing to its aforementioned scepticism towards the EU, has looked for alternative arenas in which it could become active and even take on a lead role. As the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) forms a central element of Swedish regional and foreign policies, Sweden became one of the lead countries in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). At a later stage, Sweden has also strongly supported the EU’s Northern Dimension (ND) policy, which was originally initiated by Finland. The regional dimension, in particular the Baltic Sea area, is still important for Sweden, not so much within traditional regional institutional formats such as the CBSS but increasingly more within the EU context, as exemplified by the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), being the first-ever macro-regional strategy of the EU. Sweden had pushed the elaboration of the strategy which was adopted by the European Council under Swedish EU Presidency in October 2009. Denmark and Finland have put a smaller emphasis on the strategy than Sweden and the Baltic states.

Turning to Denmark, since the end of the Cold War, its traditional ‘adaptive foreign policy’, which was rather pragmatic and reactive (Brun Pedersen, 2012: 334), has been changed into an ‘active foreign policy’ in which human rights, democracy and other values are defended and supported actively (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 1). This active foreign policy rests on a European and an Atlantic pillar (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2011: 1). Denmark has been in the EU since 1973 but is overall perceived as one of the more EU-sceptic members. This scepticism has been reflected in the four opt-outs Denmark negotiated from the Maastricht Treaty in the fields of the European Monetary Union (EMU), ESDP/CSDP, certain aspects of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation and EU citizenship.

Despite this background, Denmark has in fact played an important constructive role in finalizing the negotiations over EU enlargement during its EU Presidency in the second half of 2002, and it has also strongly and actively supported the ENP since its inception. The social-democratic-led government of 2011 until 2015 was overall more pro-EU and more pro-active in European affairs than the previous liberal/conservative governments. The government even considered abolishing the CSDP and JHA opt-outs, arguing that they actually stood against Danish interests but stepped back from its initial plans due to low popular support. It conducted a fairly active and constructive EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2012. Since the conservative liberal Venstre of Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen regained power forming a small minority government supported by the right-wing populist and EU-sceptic Danish People’s Party in the Parliament in July 2015, Denmark has returned to the path of a rather EU-sceptic country leaning more towards Great Britain than the core of the EU. Indeed, a referendum on turning the JHA opt-out into an opt-in in December 2015 failed.

For Denmark as a founding member, NATO continues to be the cornerstone of its defence and security policy. From a Danish point of view, NATO still forms the guarantee of Danish and wider European security (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 8). Denmark has even played an active role in defining NATO’s future orientation and activities and in putting a more pro-active approach to civil-military cooperation on NATO’s agenda. Under previous liberal/conservative governments, Denmark followed a value-based foreign policy that entailed active Danish participation in military interventions, promoting democracy and freedom (Jensen, 2012: 3). Denmark did so mostly on the side of the US and was one of those few EU members that actively backed the US in their military campaign in Iraq. In particular, the former Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001–9) showed a strong and active trans-Atlanticist approach (Brun Pedersen, 2012: 331). The social-democratic-led government followed a slightly different approach and put a smaller emphasis on military interventions while promoting classic peacekeeping and security missions instead. Considerable cuts of the defence budget also allowed fewer military actions abroad (Jensen, 2012: 3). Instead the government intended to more strongly promote democracy, rule of law and human rights by civilian means and to tackle climate change, amongst others (Jensen, 2012: 3), thus bringing Denmark potentially closer to the lines of other Nordics. Furthermore, the Arctic region remains an important part of Denmark’s foreign policies. Of all the Northern European EU members, Denmark has the greatest stake and interest in the Arctic region due to Greenland, which still is a part of the Danish realm. Owing to its national interest in the region, Denmark is interested in a stronger EU role in the Arctic and therefore pushes for an EU Arctic policy.

For the Baltic states, the EU, US/NATO and Russia constitute the three main dimensions of their foreign and security policies that account for a strong degree of continuity. After regaining independence in 1991, the foreign (and domestic) policies of the three Baltic states were dominated by efforts to ‘return to the West’, above all to become full members of the EU and NATO. Belonging to the trans-Atlantic community and making an active contribution to the preservation of that community continue to be an overarching issue for the Baltics (cf. Kuus, 2002). The other side of the coin was and remains an existential concern about national security, with Russia perceived as a latent threat (see Aalto, 2003; Mälksoo, 2006; Berg and Ehin, 2009). Therefore, the Baltic ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• List of acronyms
• Preface
• Introduction: conceptualising the foreign policies of EU Member States
• PART I Geographic orientations/geopolitics
• PART II Foreign policy dimensions
• Index