Franklin D.Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World

William D. Pederson, Steve Howard

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780765610300
• eBook ISBN: 9781315290478
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: North American History
• Index: History

No event shaped the twentieth century more than World War II, and no leader shaped the conduct of the war and the formation of the modern world more than President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In this anthology, leading scholars examine Roosevelt's role in the international arena, focusing on his diplomacy with Europe, Russia, the Baltic States, Canada, and the Caribbean; his relations with American Jews in the face of the Holocaust; his military appointments; and the operation of the Civilian War Services Division.

1
FDR’s Foreign Policy Persona

Chris Van Aller

The conduct of international affairs is usually a difficult proposition for a democracy, particularly one blessed with the geographic insularity of the United States. Alexis de Tocqueville understood this dilemma only too well when he stated, "Foreign policy does not require the use of any of the good qualities peculiar to democracy but does demand … almost all of those which it lacks."¹ This problem is alarmingly apparent as war threatens the state, especially large-scale modem conflict that necessitates the involvement of almost all citizens. The fragmentation of power in the American system remains a final impediment. The President and Congress have feuded since the beginning of the Republic for authority in foreign policy. The "Pacificus-Helvidius" debates reveal that the Framers themselves remained divided, and challenges since that time have not ended the controversy.

Pacificus (Alexander Hamilton) could have been writing about the pre—World War II period when he stated, "In reference to the present war in Europe, it was necessary for the President to judge for himself … as executor of the laws, to proclaim the neutrality of the nation…."² Franklin Roosevelt might have agreed with the reasoning, if not the recommended option, as possible involvement in World War II loomed nearer. A number of modem authorities have felt that in times of potential emergency, the Executive, lacking strong powers in foreign policy compared to other democracies, should educate the public and Congress toward a solution to the crisis in question. The President "must put events and policies in context and must gradually prepare the public for new departures."³

For over half a century scholars have considered the performance of Franklin Roosevelt in foreign relations before World War II and have arrived at many different conclusions. George Kennan has suggested that the United States might have acted sooner in the 1930s, with regard to both German and Japanese expansionism. Others have gone so far as to accuse FDR of plotting American involvement from perhaps as early as 1936.⁴ An examination of the accomplishments and failures of FDR at "educating" a traditionally isolationist public about the perils of the world crisis should give us greater appreciation of the obstacles that he faced and help reach a more balanced appraisal of his accomplishments. That Roosevelt considered one of his roles to be that of public educator is to be found in a number of sources. In a letter to Lord Cecil in 1937 he wrote, "I know that you are deeply disappointed, as I am, with the trends of world affairs … I still believe in the eventual effectiveness of preaching and preaching again."⁵ He later observed that the presidency is "predominantly a place of moral leadership."⁶

Roosevelt's long political career had taught him, often through painful experience, the ability both to understand what the citizenry was thinking and to appeal to these sentiments. As assistant secretary of the Navy during the Wilson administration he was quick to assert America's rights in world affairs, and expressed disparaging views of the public's ignorance of defense matters. He advocated sometimes jingoistic policies with regard to the Mexican debt crisis in 1914. He appeared a somewhat spoiled, sometimes condescending public servant in both state and federal posts. Francis Perkins, later a member of his Cabinet, felt that before his polio attack, "I was not much impressed by him."⁷

The terrible experience with polio, in the view of some contemporaries and his wife Eleanor, helped transform the man. But he had begun to learn his "teacher" role even earlier. As Geoffrey Ward points out, FDR initially emulated his boisterous cousin Theodore Roosevelt, but later found "the creative uses of indirection."⁸ Indirection is precisely the term for FDR's cautious public preparation of the country for World War II. He also displayed strong intuitive qualities from an early period, although they were not put to good political use for some years. Even his limitations would paradoxically help him in his struggle against the isolationists, such as his dislike of purely abstract reasoning revealed by his poor performance in most law school courses.⁹ But this weakness helped later in his common sense explanations of complex international necessity. His lack of success on the playing fields led him to the Harvard Crimson, which began to prepare him for what was to become perhaps the best relationship with the press (though not the newspaper owners) in presidential history. He also revealed a concern for the welfare of the less fortunate in this early period, perhaps in emulation of his Uncle Teddy. This sympathy helped in foreign policy education, as the future President could understand the remoteness of such matters to a population in terrible economic circumstances.

The challenge of his illness propelled his communication and listening abilities beyond the social blinders of someone with his material advantages. In short, the experience taught him skills that later helped him reach millions of people, first on domestic issues and then on foreign policy. Francis Perkins pointed out "how he had walked away from bores … when he was in the New York State Senate. Now he could not walk away." Roosevelt amplified this point, so very important in a democracy, when he said, "everybody wants to have the sense of belonging … no one wants to be left out."¹⁰ Not only did this idea imply actually helping the less fortunate; it also indicates the importance of explaining complex affairs of state to the widest possible audience. His sympathy for his fellow Americans grew to encompass other cultures and points of view, as evidenced in his Good Neighbor policy. Coping with the disease also taught him another essential lesson: patience. Just as medical treatment can often be slow and tortuous, so too is the process of citizen education in foreign affairs. Hence Tocqueville's admonition that such a society is like an enormous beast that takes a long time to anger (and to pacify).¹¹ Interestingly, one visitor to the FDR farm noted the pleasure the President took in solving apparently hopeless tasks.¹² He needed both optimism and patience in the years before the Second World War.

Something also should be said of Roosevelt's two great political role models, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. From them he learned not only what worked to inspire or teach, but what did not. Woodrow Wilson, as a former university professor, was able to carry the country forward toward goals based on reflection and long-term political convictions. Despite his later recantation of support of the League of Nations, FDR shared Wilson's concern for basic morality governing all nations. He nonetheless remained wary of pushing the American people too swiftly toward international involvement lest another backlash occur as after World War I. Theodore Roosevelt; in contrast, "succeeded in stirring people to enthusiasm over specific events, even though these may have been superficial in comparison with the fundamentals."¹³ Certainly FDR's fireside chats and inspirational addresses carried on radio were one powerful interpretation of the "bully pulpit." In a sense he combined the personal energy and warm enthusiasm of his cousin with the more studied principles of his former boss President Wilson. Particularly considering Wilson's legacy of intolerance, Roosevelt understood the importance of publicly and privately compromising with those opposed to his policies. He remained aware that shrill moralism without concession to political reality not only offended many in the present but occasioned trouble later. Needless to say, Wilson's constant idealistic proclamations of neutrality in World War I contrasted with his country's de facto support of the Allies. Roosevelt was careful not to be hypocritical on this point after 1939, as he unambiguously talked of his moral rejection of the foreign militarists. He still understood that an appeal to morality, to decency, could change public opinion; cold realpolitik would not work with an American audience.

America has always had a strong isolationist streak, often sanctioned by reference to George Washington's famous Farewell Address. A retreat from involvement in global affairs was especially strong after World War I and the resulting widespread public sense of betrayal. Woodrow Wilson had promised that if America sent her boys to fight in one last titanic war, then international relations would be transformed. The League of Nations was in some ways an attempt to organize the world according to the American constitutional principles Professor Wilson had once examined so carefully. Unfortunately the postwar world was not to be defined or governed by such principles, and the public sense of betrayal grew, aided immensely by the deprivations of the Depression. The Nye Committee, with Roosevelt's enthusiastic cooperation, attempted to find the "causes" of World War I, substituting another idealistic solution to war for the internationalist vision of Wilson. As Senator Nye stated on the committee's findings, "There may be doubt as to the degree but there is certainly none that the profits of preparation for war and the profits of war itself constitute the most serious challenge to the peace of the world."¹⁴ Conspiracy theories, popular with both right and left down to the present, found abundant support both among the people and in their elected representatives. Hence Senator Connally wrote in his memoirs that the Committee "was probably the most effective medium for channeling American public opinion into isolationism during this period."¹⁵

The pressure of strong interest groups and prominent political figures also preached the doctrine of isolationism, right up to Pearl Harbor. The America First Committee was one of the most powerful anti-interventionist groups, containing some extremely influential people who voiced what many millions thought. To a large extent, they also "taught" the public ideas that supported many heretofore unfocused opinions. One of the more common themes was a deep distrust of Great Britain and British imperialism, though the smarter spokesmen were careful not to attack a now isolated Britain too completely or viciously after 1940.¹⁶ Other spokesmen felt that any aid to the European war would enlarge the struggle and consume America's limited resources. Others pointed out the considerable inequities of the postwar treatment of Germany and the logic of her renewed place in the balance of power. Such a power would contain the Communist Soviet Union, only recently recognized by the United States. Some Cold War revisionist historians point out that many powerful groups were far less alarmed by the Nazis than the Soviets. Studs Terkel noted that those who fought against the Franco forces in Spain were termed "pre-mature anti-Fascists" tainted by association with the Communists and persecuted by the FBI for years afterward Finally, ex-military men like General Wood doubted that Britain would fall and would eventually find a way to co-exist with a Germany dominant in Western Europe.¹⁷

There were other claims made as well, some of them morally reprehensible. Anti-Semitism remained unfortunately strong in the America of the late 1930s, urged on by the fanatical Father Coughlin as well as more moderate voices like Charles Lindbergh. The latter, in a famous address in Des Moines, appeared anti-Semitic in labeling those forces pushing the United States into war. His assertion that Jews were one of these major groups produced numerous denunciations and harmed his credibility, but, behind the headlines, won support from many sympathetic members of the public.¹⁸ The majority of citizens were simply not ready to come to the aid of the Jews. There were also those who felt after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union that the two totalitarian powers should be left alone to cancel each other out, and that the United States should in no way aid an atheist and communistic state like the USSR.¹⁹ America might arm itself, transform perhaps into a hemispheric fortress, but in no way export its war equipment or raw materials.²⁰ World War I veterans groups, such as the Catholic War Veterans (CWV), in contrast to most current ex-military groups, resolutely opposed all war through 1939. The CWV cabled FDR in 1935 that, "you have proven to the world that America loves peace … and desires not to...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. FDR’s Foreign Policy Persona
• 2. FDR’s Leadership before World War II: The Concept of Anticipatory Reaction
• 3. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Strategic Vulnerability
• 4. FDR and Limited War in Europe: A Plausible Middle Course?
• 5. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet Union, 1933–1941
• 6. FDR and the Baltic States
• 7. FDR’s Admiral Diplomats: The Diplomacy of Expediency
• 8. “A Grand and Glorious Thing … the Team of Mackenzie and Roosevelt”
• 9. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Caribbean, and the Postcolonial World
• 10. Soldiers on the Home Front: Protecting the Four Freedoms through the Office of Civilian Defense
• 11. The American Jewish Community, the Roosevelt Administration, and the Holocaust
• Foreign Affairs Chronology
• Biographical Digest
• Selected Bibliography
• List of Contributors
• Index