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Part I
Dialects in localised and delocalised contexts
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1
Nonstandard dialect and identity
John Edwards
Introduction1
It is hardly necessary, here, to provide a definition of dialect ā but, for what follows, it is important to point out how difficult definitions and distinctions can be. A common distinction between language and dialect, for instance, hinges on the idea of mutual intelligibility, or the lack of it. No one expects speakers of French and English to understand one another, but English speakers from Perth and Pittsburgh are theoretically able to. In practice, however, there may be very considerable impediments to cross-dialect communication. The point is made clearer, perhaps, when we think of dialect continua. Considering hypothetical dialects A to D, Petyt (1980: 14) suggested: āif A can just understand C, but cannot really be said to understand D, does [a] language division come between C and D? But C and D may understand each other quite wellā. On the other hand, the exigencies of politics mean that Norwegian and Danish are to be seen as separate languages, even though their speakers ā like those of the adjacent dialects C and D ā understand each other very well.
A recent discussion by Xu (2016: 8ā9) deals with a perennially interesting and instructive example here, posing the question: āare the different idioms of northern and southern China dialects or languages?ā He cites the views of several scholars. Karlgren (1962: 18) points out, for instance, that these varieties have diverged widely in terms of pronunciation and sounds, but āin other grammatical respects they agree so closely that they cannot be called different languagesā. Kratochvil (1968: 15) suggests that the major Chinese dialects are like the Romance languages, going on to argue that they are linked by āa common cultural heritageā¦ which makes them different from speakers of Tibetan, Burmese, Thai and other languagesā (see also Ramsey, 1987). Chao (1943: 66) makes the less familiar point that levels of intelligibility may differ with levels of education. Through social and personal contact, educated non-Mandarin speakers would āspeak Mandarin of sortsā¦ dialect differences are quite negligible.ā For the illiterate, however, a limited vocabulary and lack of mobility makes it impossible to cross group boundaries without losing mutual intelligibility. And Xu himself notes that language-dialect distinctiveness can vary with the provenance of descriptions: a āpurely linguistic classification tends to be narrower than the classification invoking attitudinal, cultural and political factors, resulting in a larger number of languages than [does] the sociolinguistic approachā (2016: 8).2
In all this, one is reminded of the observation attributed to Max Weinreich (1945): āa language is a dialect that has an army and a navy.ā3
The longstanding (and still widely held) idea that some varieties ā standard dialects ā have achieved their prominence through some inherent qualities is now thoroughly discredited. The work of linguists over the past two generations or so has shown that all dialects are valid and ālogicalā expressive systems. Labovās investigations of urban African American English (AAE) were of great importance here; see Labov (1969, 1976). The variety was an excellent ātest caseā precisely because it was so poorly regarded, so likely to be branded as some sloppy and inaccurate approximation to āproperā English, so āsub-standardā. Labovās quite simple investigations supported a very important correction: nonstandard dialects, like all others, have regular and regularly-observed grammatical structures, and, while these differ in some regards from standard forms (and from other nonstandard ones), no system, operating in its own time and circumstance, can be seen as inherently better or worse than another. All scholarly opinion thus agrees with Trudgill (1975: 26; see also Edwards, 1989):
just as there is no linguistic reason for arguing that Gaelic is superior to Chinese, so no English dialect can be claimed to be linguistically superior or inferior to any otherā¦ . There is no linguistic evidence whatsoever for suggesting that one dialect is more āexpressiveā or ālogicalā than any other, or for postulating that there are any āprimitiveā, āinadequateā or ādebasedā English dialects.
It is a commonly-held observation among linguists, anthropologists and others that language varieties are always sufficient for the needs of their speakers. This is not to say, of course, that languages and dialects are equal in their expressive power, in the range of their vocabularies, and so on. Why would we expect this, in any case? On the one hand, it would be āuneconomicalā of speakers to develop fluencies and capacities beyond their immediate needs; on the other, and relatedly, it is logically impossible for words to outstrip concepts. If we find that small groups living in the Amazon basin have no terms to describe things like lasers, or abstract concepts like Einsteinian relativity, we should not be surprised. We would be surprised, on the other hand, if ā once acquainted with new things and new ideas ā we found that their language could not expand appropriately.
If a group begins to take an interest in simple arithmetic and, five hundred years later, develops a theory of quantum mechanics, it is surely reasonable to expect that words will grow with increasing sophistication. This is, in fact, what happens. There is, as well, no need to look at āprimitiveā societies (in whatever sense āprimitiveā might be construed) here: consider our own intellectual and linguistic development. It is the lack of the prerequisite conceptual understanding that prevents a group from possessing modern medical procedures (to cite another instance). Words themselves are only indicators. Thus, the real meaning of a statement like ālanguage is adequate for its speakersā needsā refers to the fact that language keeps pace with conceptual advancement, which in turn determines the very needs of which speakers can even be aware.
Quite apart from scholarly enlightenment on the matter, the notion that any regularly-used language variety could be inherently deficient in meeting the needs of its users ā clearly and without ambiguity ā has never been intellectually sustainable. It simply defies common sense. As with other similarly dismissive assessments ā the ācultural deprivationā allegedly endured by some unfortunate communities, for instance (see also below) ā the conception of a āsub-standardā dialect tells us more about those applying the labels than it does about those being described. More specifically, it reveals the underlying flawed idea that there is, in fact, a correct āstandardā from which all others deviate, a variety which is inherently superior.
There are, of course, dialect varieties that are accurately labelled as āstandardsā. To deny this would be to deny the historical reality in virtually all socially stratified communities. But standards are simply varieties that are used and endorsed by those in positions of social dominance, those segments of society that ā more or less literally ā set the standards. As linguistic systems they may differ ā sometimes greatly, sometimes minimally ā from others, but they are not intrinsically better. One implication, as already implied, is that there can be no āsub-standardā forms (where āsubā connotes basic logical or linguistic inferiority). Another, however, is that a non-pejorative application of the term ānonstandardā makes perfect sense ā if a standard dialect exists in a region, then all others are necessarily ānot standardā.
Nonstandard dialects, in a word, are those that have not received the social imprimatur given to standard forms. The latter rise to the top, as it were, with the fortunes of their speakers; the process typically reflects historical vicissitudes. Standards are the dialects most often used by educated members of society, and are therefore the most likely to appear in official pronouncements, public records, writing and (often) the broadcast media. But, to repeat, there is nothing of a linguistic nature which confers special or superior status here. It is solely because of widespread acceptance and convention that a standard is primus inter pares. If York instead of London had become the centre for the royal court, then BBC newsreaders would sound different and school teachers would long have promoted another form of ācorrectā English in England.
An interesting ā if more minor ā case has occasionally been made for the intrinsic superiority of certain dialects, on aesthetic grounds. Thus, for example, a prominent English linguist wrote the following:
If it were possible to compare systematically every vowel sound in RS [Received Standard English ā i.e., what we now more usually call RP, Received Pronunciation] with the corresponding sound in a number of provincial and other dialects, assuming that the comparison could be made, as is only fair, between speakers who possessed equal qualities of voice, and the knowledge how to use it, I believe no unbiased listener would hesitate in preferring RS as the most pleasing and sonorous form, and the best suited to be the medium of poetry and oratory.
(Wyld, 1934: 4)
(I need hardly say that such sentiments were not ā and are not ā restricted to those speaking in and for English.)
In fact, just as the work of Labov decisively revealed the internal ālogicā ā that is, the grammatical regularity ā of AAE (and, by extension, of all dialects), so work by Howard Giles and his colleagues (Giles et al., 1974, 1979) showed the absence of any aesthetic quality inherent in a dialect. Judgements here, too, derive from social convention, expectation, and stereotype. In one representative study, British students who knew no Greek were asked to evaluate the aesthetic quality ā simply the pleasantness ā of two Greek dialects, the Athenian and the Cretan. As one might reasonably surmise, the variety of the capital is seen, within ...
