The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947

The Road to the Cold War

Barry Rubin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780714631417
• eBook ISBN: 9781135168773
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

First Published in 1981. The objective of this study is to reconstruct the difficulty faced by American and British policy-makers in 'determining the capabilities and intentions' of their two main wartime allies regarding the Middle East. Specifically, it seeks to explore the role of great power relations in the Middle East in the breakdown of the wartime alliance and in the origins of the Cold War.

Chapter 1
Modes of United States Policy

American relations with Great Britain and with the Soviet Union were central in the development of US Middle East policy during and immediately after World War II. The changing perceptions of US policy-makers on the goals and tactics of these two countries in that region are analyzed in this study.

The period under discussion falls into two sharply defined eras. Between 1941 and the end of the War, the military effort against Germany and Italy was primary in shaping US actions in the Middle East. Beginning in 1943, postwar planning began in earnest but implementation, of course, awaited the end of hostilities. After the defeat of the Axis, a new set of factors came into play. Until the issuance of the Truman Doctrine, in March 1947, these months were marked by the growing tensions between the US and Britain, on one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.

During the War, a number of issues were closely watched by the State Department, the War Department and the Executive Branch. First in importance was insuring continued friendship with Saudi Arabia, in order to guarantee a post-war supply of petroleum. Conflict with the British developed on several occasions over the distribution of influence by the two allies in Saudi Arabia.

In the struggle between nationalist forces in Syria and Lebanon and the Free French over the question of independence for the Levant states, the United States supported de-colonization. Similarly, in Iran, while the United States at first tried to avoid involvement through 1941, gradually American policy-makers conceived a US role as a ‘third force’, intervening in the Anglo-Soviet rivalry, opposing a de facto great power partition and trying to make Iran a model of cooperation by the ‘three policemen’. There was also some State Department sympathy with Turkish resistance in the face of British and Russian pressures on her to enter the war.

Three basic principles determined American policy toward its allies during the war. First, the war effort, and thus the maintenance and strengthening of the US-UK-USSR tripartite alliance, was of great importance. Second, the United States should seek to play a greater commercial and political role in the region vis-a-vis Britain. This stand was developed with the postwar situation in mind, particularly the desire to guarantee American oil requirements. Third, that in order to promote both the war effort and the United States’ position in the region, it would be useful to develop mutually beneficial bilateral relations with the states and peoples of the Middle East. This involved support for development assistance and a policy in the ‘open door’ tradition, of opposing permanent spheres of interest by individual great powers.

The weight to be placed on these various factors by different individuals and groups produced much internal debate within the government. The Division of Near Eastern Affairs, in particular, was characterized by strong fears over the expansion of British power at the expense of American interests.

In Iran, the Russians and British were equated as imperialist advocates of a sphere of interest policy. Both countries had occupied Iran in 1941 in order to displace Reza Shah, whom they considered potentially pro-German, and to open a secure supply line to the embattled Russians. For Iranians, though, the situation brought back unpleasant memories of the virtual partition of Persia in the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement.

As the United States became more deeply involved in Iran, the Roosevelt Administration sought to avoid identification with any imperialist ventures there. In January 1943, John Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs warned:

Although Russian policy has been fundamentally aggressive and British policy fundamentally defensive in character, the result in both cases has been interference with the internal affairs of Iran (which has) created an ingrained distrust of both powers in the Iranian people and has not been without effect upon the attitude of the other weak peoples of the Middle East.¹

Generally, though, until the closing days of the war in 1945, State Department Middle East specialists and US Ambassadors in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq considered Britain to be America’s most serious rival. There was constant discussion on how to avoid a perception by Middle Easterners of the United States as a satellite of London. Secretary of State Cordell Hull told Admiral Leahy in May 1943 that he felt ‘it would be highly damaging to American prestige throughout the Arab world and prejudicial to the maintenance of good relations with the countries of that region and ... to vital American economic interests to permit’ the impression that the United States was merely Britain’s junior partner.²

Rather than use British-controlled institutions as conduits for American aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to establish direct American control of Lend-Lease merchandise, in response to Hull’s warning.³ The Office of Near East and African Affairs was created in January 1944 to facilitate the presentation of an independent American position in the region.⁴

The definition of a strong US interest in the area often entailed support for local political and economic reforms. America’s future in the region would be strengthened by Middle East stability and, it was claimed, stability would be strengthened by progress toward democracy and economic development. In March 1944, President Roosevelt wrote to Janies Landis, Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East:

The Middle East is an area in which the United States has a vital interest. The maintenance of peace in that area, which has so frequently seen disturbances in the past, is of significance to the world as a whole. A means of insurance against unrest of that character is to encourage the governments of the territories that comprise the Middle East to push ahead with the vigor that they may possess to stabilize and improve their economic systems in terms of the production and distribution of wealth. ... In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the object of the United States is to make certain that all nations are accorded equality of opportunity.⁵

To this ‘open door’ emphasis, he added that ‘special privileges’ should not be given to countries – France in the Levant being the most obvious case – ‘for such privileges have little place in the type of world for which this war is being fought.’⁶

Landis himself made a presentation on US Middle East interests to the State Department Policy Committee, on June 28, 1944. He stated that ‘our long term interests in the Middle East’ were as follows:

(1) it is an area from which we can profit commercially; (2) its political stability is of importance to us; (3) it is an area where we can learn to collaborate with the British and Russians; (4) it is an area where some of the ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter and other pronouncements of the Allied Governments can be worked out in practice; (5) it is an area where, since it is already in many respects in a postwar phase, we can try out on a small scale solutions for dealing with the problems of this phase.⁷

The concept of the Middle East as a testing ground for ‘small scale solutions’ by mid-1944 was generally in line with Roosevelt’s ‘Four Policemen’ concept: the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China would generally play the leading role in the United Nations Organization and in international politics after the defeat of the Axis powers.

In fact, during the second phase of the period under study, 1946–47, the Middle East became one testing ground, in the eyes of US policy-makers, for Soviet intentions in the postwar world. The alternate hypotheses on the objectives behind Soviet behavior were presented in a May 1945 report from the Department of State Coordinating Committee:

The policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East appears to possess two direct objectives: achievement of security along its Middle East frontiers and the prevention of a coalition of the capitalistic countries in the Middle East against the Soviet Union. An indirect policy of the Soviet Union may be the extension of its social and economic systems throughout the Middle East.⁸

Russian security and the maintenance of the tripartite wartime alliance had been acceptable to Roosevelt, but by the time Harry Truman came into the White House, Russian behavior had provoked increasing suspicion in the Near East Division. The belief in the importance of encouraging reform, however, also continued to exercise influence. In an August 1945 memorandum to Truman, for example, the State Department stated, after stressing the danger of Soviet expansion:

The British publicly and officially admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without our help. We are inclined to believe that a policy of inactivity or ‘drift’ on our part will result in a progressive deterioration of the influence of democratic civilization in the Near East.

In view of certain characteristic British failings, we must, however, lend our assistance in a manner which would be in accord with the principles to which we have publicly adhered. ... (Actions) must be based upon the political, educational and economic development of the native peoples and not merely upon the narrow immediate interests of Britain’s or America’s economy.⁹

Similar ideas were expressed in a November 1945 summary of US policy by Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the State Department. He emphasized the desire to strengthen local countries politically and economically, ‘supporting them in their refusal to accord a special position to any foreign power or to any group of foreign powers.’ This included helping them eliminate prewar commitments to great powers. With a period of great change expected in the region, ‘It is important that this movement should be in the direction of Western democracy rather than in the direction of some form of autocracy or totalitarianism which would render sympathetic understanding and cooperation between that part of the world and the US more difficult.’¹⁰

He recommended cultural exchanges, educational assistance and other such measures. Henderson concluded:

We have been supporting the policy of the open door in the Near East with regard to investments and commerce. We believe that the policy of the open door is beneficial to us in our commercial relations and in the end will be beneficial to world peace.¹¹

President Truman endorsed these aims.¹²

By late 1945, then, the State Department and the Truman Administration concluded that, at a minimum, the Soviets were extending their definition of security to include a price the United States was unwilling to pay – the destruction of Iranian and Turkish sovereignty on the model of what had happened in Eastern Europe. The United States must stand firm, as Henderson wrote in December 1945:

The most important interest of the US in the Near East is not based, as a fairly large section of the American public appears to believe, upon American participation in petroleum extraction or in profits to be derived from trade, but upon preventing developments from taking place in that area which might make a mockery of the principles on which the (UN) rests, which might lead to the impairment, if not the wrecking of that organization, and which might even give birth to a third World War.¹³

In the same memorandum, ‘The Present Situation in the Near East’, he analyzed the objectives of the various great powers: the British sought a ‘dam’ against Russian expansion and to protect their own communications; the French sought to maintain their empire; and the USSR wanted to break down the existing structure so its influence could flow into the Mediterranean and across Iran into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.¹⁴

As late as January 1946, Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, could still utilize the concepts of war-time US policy:

The British have in mind cooperating on a basis in which they would lead and guide. Our own ideas, as I understand them, are along the lines of free competition in trade and communications matters, complete liberty on the part of independent countries of the Middle East to select advisors and experts, and in general, a friendly vying among the Powers in the course of which each will put its best foot forward to help the Middle East countries get ahead on a basis of complete respect for their independence and sovereignty.¹⁵

Yet the intensity of the Iranian crisis and the Turkish crisis of 1946, destroyed any pretense that there could be a ‘friendly vying among the Powers’ in the Middle East. The United States responded with a program of military and economic assistance to the two threatened countries. The postwar weakening of Great Britain made impossible the sustenance of its historic Middle East position and, in early 1947, the United States made an important step toward becoming the unchallenged Western leader in the region, though the transition process took ten years. The Truman Doctrine marked this new status and became an important turning point in the Cold War.

America’s role in these events has been criticized from opposite points of view. Left-wing ‘revisionists’ have accused the United States of seeking a neo-colonial empire in the Middle East and of acting provocatively toward a defense-oriented USSR. The record will show that State Department personnel were far more concerned during the war about Britain than about the USSR. US competition with its two allies in the Middle East was based as much on an ideological anti-imperialism as it was on any projected economic interests.

Further, ‘revisionist’ historians usually analyze only American behavior without discussing Russian actions and their immediate impact on US observers. Soviet behavior in 1946 and 1947 in Turkey and Iran was in itself provocative. Contemporary State Department officials actively considered precisely the possibilities which the ‘revisionists’ would later argue. They concluded that -at the least – a ‘defensive’ Soviet stand would involve the transformation of Iran and Turkey into Soviet satellites on the Eastern European model.

A different angle of criticism of American policy has come from British writers such as George Kirk and Llewellyn Woodward and from the former Polish diplomat George Lenczowski. In Lenczowski’s words:

The rather passive character of American policy eventually encouraged unilateral Soviet action, since the Russians were led to believe that the only real opposition to their schemes would come from war-weary Britain.

Lenczowski blamed American ‘reluctance to visualize the future and to get involved in foreign complications’ as an attitude which only encouraged Soviet aggression.¹⁶

Again, events seem somewhat different. In Turkey, for example, if anyone encouraged Moscow to believe that the West would not oppose their plans it was Winston Churchill. As for Anglo-American differences, these were based on conflicts over both material interests and principles. It was not that Washington was too naive to mistrust the Russians; the United States mistrusted Britain and Russia equally. Roosevelt considered a ‘four policemen’ concept a better way of preventing clashes than Britain’s sphere-of-influence approach.

A third, neo-revisionist critique developed by Daniel Yergin suggests that the ‘hard line’ toward Russia was the result of a debate within the State Department, in which those who thought Russia to be aggressive (‘the Riga axioms’) defeated those who belie...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• 1. Modes of United States Policy
• 2. The Battle Over Oil
• 3. Anglo-American Relations: An Overview
• 4. Saudi Arabia and US-British Conflict, 1941-1945
• 5. Iran: A Question of Commitment, 1941-1945
• 6. Turkey: The Burden of Neutrality, 1941-1945
• 7. Anglo-American Relations in the Arab World, 1941-1945
• 8. American Perceptions of Soviet Middle East Policy, 1945
• 9. The Showdown in Iran, 1945-1946
• 10. The Turkish Crisis
• 11. United States Aid and the Truman Doctrine, 1946-1947
• 12. Conclusions: The Road to Cold War
• Bibliography
• Index