The Gentile Zionists

A Study in Anglo-Zionist Diplomacy 1929-1939

N.A. Rose

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781135158729
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

First Published in 1973. This is an account of the political activities of Gentile Zionists. This title is a portrait of how the Zionist movement reacted to the crises that emerged with persistent regularity in its relations with the government throughout the 1930s. This study seeks to examine Anglo-Zionist relations not only on the official level but also, perhaps mainly, on the more personal plane.

1
The Crisis of 1929-31

From 23 until 29 August 1929 serious communal disorders erupted throughout Palestine. In all, some 472 Jews and 268 Arabs were either killed or wounded.¹ These events came as a climax to eleven months of mounting communal tension.² But the ferocity and general nature of the outbreak came as a rude shock to the Zionists. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, received the first news of the riots on the morning of 25 August while on holiday in Switzerland. He was, as he recalls, “struck as by a thunderbolt”.³

He did not wait upon events. The same day he contacted London, pressing the government for speedy action.⁴ By 28 August he had already conferred with Lord Passfield, the colonial secretary.⁵ Pass-field proved most responsive to Weizmann’s admonitions, assuring him that the Yishuv (the Jewish community resident in Palestine) would not be disarmed and that an instruction had already been sent to Jerusalem to that effect. In fact, on the previous day forty-one Jewish constables had been disarmed in Jerusalem, a pertinent reminder that communications between Palestine and the government were not as efficient as might be imagined.

Passfield also concurred in Weizmann’s strongly worded complaints about the behaviour of the Palestine administration, and even agreed to suspend two senior officials, Mr. Luke and Mr. Cust,⁶ on the grounds of incompetence. Weizmann emphasised the need for “a complete restatement of policy . . . The Jewish people must know how the government will react!”⁷ Passfield promised to be in constant communication and invited Weizmann to approach him directly whenever he felt so inclined.

Two days later Passfield’s initial sympathy had evaporated. In a letter to Weizmann he expressed agreement only on the need to settle the Wailing Wall question, for the rest there was merely prevarication or total disagreement.⁸ This was particularly evident over the central issues of a favourable government statement which Passfield described as “premature”, and an increase in the immigration quota.

Was this change due to the influence of his officials who had meanwhile reinforced his feelings of esprit de corps? It seems more than likely. The Palestine administration had come under extremely heavy fire and this was bound to reflect upon the efficiency and good name of the colonial office. Passfield’s letter was clearly his attempt to defend his officials’ reputation; but his swiftly changing opinions did not augur well for the future.

Meanwhile, the Gentile Zionists had also been active. Colonel J. C. Wedgwood⁹ suggested that a parliamentary commission be sent to Palestine to investigate the working of the mandate; he volunteered his services as “something must be done to put the matter right”.¹⁰ Colonel R. Meinertzhagen¹¹ wrote to his uncle, Lord Pass-field, castigating the Palestine administration and pleading for a full and impartial enquiry into their responsibility [sic] for the riots. The most eminent Gentile Zionist of the day, Lord Balfour, although bedridden, was “waiting for the signal when he can be of some use”.¹² Blanche Dugdale¹³ forwarded Balfour’s message of support to the Zionists : “[the National Home] is in harmony with the best opinion of Western civilisation ... to its fulfillment is promised the support of the British Empire. That pledge has been given. Depend upon it, it is not going to be withdrawn.”¹⁴

It was generally acknowledged that a commission of enquiry would be sent to Palestine. The question of its composition and its terms of reference now became crucial. The Zionists wished for an investigation unlimited in scope and conducted by persons who commanded world-wide respect. And they did not want the mandate per se to be investigated, only the manner in which it had been administered.¹⁵

Such a position had an inherent weakness in that the appointment of an eminent body might mislead public opinion into believing that the government was considering radical changes in the mandate. The government, fully alive to this danger,¹⁶ issued a communique to the effect that a commission under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Shaw, a former chief justice of the Straits Settlement, had been appointed to investigate the immediate causes of the outbreak, not questions of major policy.¹⁷ Thus, initially, the Zionists failed to attain the kind of commission they wanted to investigate the issues they considered most important.

Whether the Shaw commission exceeded its terms of reference or not aroused great controversy. The Zionists later complained that this had occurred. However, this was no simple matter of black or white. From the outset the commission had been placed in a false position by its limiting terms of reference. Where do immediate causes end and fundamental ones begin? It is possible to investigate the former without considering the latter and still produce a balanced report? Equally, and this was the Zionists’ main complaint, to allow the investigation of the mandate by unqualified and inexperienced persons would be clearly irresponsible. This dilemma, played up by the Zionists, went undetected by the government.¹⁸ Consequently, the Zionists entered this crucial period with profound suspicions of government intentions and, as events unfolded, these suspicions grew in intensity.

The prime minister’s assurances of the government’s good intentions did little to allay Weizmann’s fears.¹⁹ On the contrary, he was more concerned than ever before, hinting at resignation unless definite proof were given that the mandate would be enacted in the letter and spirit of its conception. The notion that the commission was intended as “a whitewashing affair” haunted him, and he promised his friends that this would never happen.²⁰

For this reason Weizmann wanted the commission to hear counsel and permit the calling of witnesses.²¹ This issue assumed such significance that Balfour tentatively suggested that Weizmann bypass the government and appeal directly to a League commission of enquiry. This might “have the advantage of frightening the C.O. . . . and be looked on with favour by a large body of public opinion”.²² No such action was taken.

Weizmann was due to leave for the Continent on 27 September; he had been ordered by his doctors to rest for a week or two and was bound for the Italian resort of Meran.²³ Before his departure he formulated certain demands for the benefit of Passfield and MacDonald. These included the implementation of the mandate; a liberal immigration policy—a figure of 15,000-20,000 a year was mentioned; a progressive economic policy with regard to land settlement, public works, and taxation; and adequate security measures, including fuller Jewish participation in the police and frontier defence forces. Weizmann dealt also with the Arab problem, asking the government to convene a round table conference, but only after the Arabs had been informed that the Jewish position in Palestine was inviolable. The prime minister listened attentively and agreed to forward a minute incorporating these proposals to the colonial office.²⁴ The interview with Passfield followed the same lines. Weizmann taking the initiative, Passfield expressing sympathy but hinting that he might have to square his conscience with the opinion of the cabinet.²⁵

Weizmann’s return to England coincided with the arrival of another staunch Gentile Zionist, J. C. Smuts.²⁶ They met on 25 November.²⁷ Later, Weizmann summarised the discussion.²⁸ He gave vent to his growing feeling of apprehension.

We feel an atmosphere of hostility ... at present it seems practice to explain away our rights and whittle down our claims on immigration, security or compensation ... it would be a terrible blow to us if Great Britain gave up the Mandate, but both as a British subject and a Zionist, I would prefer her to give it up than she should continue the methods of the past ten years.

These words were written by a dedicated Anglophile, a man who had spent his political life in furthering Anglo-Zionist relations. Clearly Weizmann intended exploiting the present crisis to effect a radical change in the government’s attitude towards the National Home; and the intensity of his feelings had their effect upon Smuts.

Smuts spent the weekend of 29 November in the company of Passfield and A. Henderson, the foreign secretary.²⁹ As one of those statesmen responsible for the Balfour declaration, he explained to his companions its meaning. It was not merely a platonic declaration but implied active assistance to facilitate the development of the National Home. There were two essential requirements : adequate security and increased immigration. Later, Smuts told Weizmann that Passfield is “a rather tired man ... he thinks the Jews are well represented . . . [Passfield said] ‘they have their Weizmanns and Melchetts and Readings . . . Weizmann is rather formidable and the Arabs are not represented, they are nowhere’.”³⁰ Smuts believed that Passfield saw it as his duty to protect the Arabs. But he was warned not to tamper with history; no Empire could afford to be unjust to the Jews, Smuts claimed, invoking the terrible example of Russia.

The discussion then turned on the question of the Palestine administration. Smuts admitted that he had received an invitation from Amery³¹ requesting him to take the post of high commissioner, but, owing to his many other commitments, he had refused. As they parted company, he told Weizmann, “I shall always be your friend and help you, because I am honour bound to help and I believe in it."³²

Weizmann attached a great deal of importance to gaining the active support of Smuts and repeatedly turned to him in times of crisis. Whether the South African possessed any real influence over a British cabinet is highly questionable. There was, however, a certain mystique attached to his name. He was regarded as a world statesman and not as a party hack. It was assumed that he had the best interests of the Empire at heart and would not lend his name to any scheme detrimental to British imperial policy. Widely esteemed by the general public, respected by most politicians, Smuts could always be relied upon to drop the right words in the right ears at the right time.

In parliament there was no great flurry of activity on behalf of the Zionists. Ormsby Gore³³ explained why : “Questions,” he contended, “merely provoke counter questions by those who are hard at work against us.”³⁴ But the parliamentary scene was not quite barren. On 12 November a parliamentary proPalestine group was formed.³⁵ An executive was elected with Wedgwood as chairman, Dr. Spero as secretary, and Amery, Sir H. Samuel,³⁶ Sir H. Hamilton, Sir M. Conway and James de Rothschild as serving members. The prime purpose of the group was to act as a watch dog for Zionist interests; and in the delicate political balance of forces that had emerged since the formation of a minority (some would say captive) Labour government in May 1929 this factor took on an added significance.

Meanwhile reports from Palestine indicated that the commission was overstepping its terms of reference; it was touching on questions of high policy : land settlement and immigration. It was neither equipped nor instructed to deal with such matters. Weizmann was positive that its conclusions would be both superficial and harmful. The remedy appeared to lie in jerking the government out of its present mood of complacency with a sharp reminder of its previous promises. How to achieve this?

On the evening of 17 December Weizmann met a number of his friends at the House.³⁷ Elliot³⁸ reminded the company that in less than a week the House would rise and when they next met the commission’s draft report would be in the hands of the government and nothing could then be changed. The agreed they must prevent the commission from further transgressing its terms of reference. The concept of a new commission to deal with major policy questions was approved, and it was suggested that a letter to The Times signed by Balfour, Lloyd George, and Smuts to that effect would create the greatest attention. A deadline was set for 20 December.

John Buchan was delegated to draft the letter. On the 18th Weizmann approved the draft, and Lloyd George gave his consent. On the 19th Weizmann motored down to Fisher’s Hill, Woking, and obtained Balfour’s signature. The same day Smuts telegraphed his approval. On the 20th The Times published the letter.³⁹ By any reckoning this was a remarkable exercise in public relations. It was a vivid demonstration of the scope of Zionism’s contacts, and the ability of the movement to conscript the most powerful support on its behalf during periods of government hesitation.

Prior to the publication of the letter it had been shown to the prime minister.⁴⁰ MacDonald reiterated that the commission must not report on major policy issues, but expressed doubt in the usefulness of appointing another commission. Elliot remarked that “Ramsay is at present averse to a [new] commission on the ground that it might report against the mandate as well as for it”.⁴¹

But the letter did force the government’s hand. MacDonald reminded the House that major issues are “clearly outside the terms of reference of the Shaw co...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• 1 The Crisis of 1929-31
• 2 A Note on the Whitechapel By-Election
• 3 The Question of Self-Government
• 4 The Seventh Dominion
• 5 Some Strategic Aspects
• 6 The Debate on Partition
• 7 The Debate on Partition
• 8 The Conference at St. James’s Palace
• 9 The May White Paper
• 10 Some Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index