The Korean War

An Encyclopedia

Stanley Sandler

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781135767136
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia mondiale

First major clash with a communist army The Korean War was America's first ideological conflict and the first large-scale clash between U.S./UN forces and a Communist army. More than any other event, it signaled the beginning of Cold War mobilization for the U.S. and NATO, and even though the specter of international communism had since faded away, the animosities of The Forgotten War threaten to flare up even today. Focuses on military topics The Korean War contains articles of varying lengths on key topics that range from the origins of the conflict, ground, naval and air operations, and tactical planning to the Truman-MacArthur face-off, the POW issue, and armistice negotiations. The bulk of the Encyclopedia focuses on such military topics as the use of artillery, the pioneering concept of helicopter evacuation of wounded, new infantry tactics dictated by Communist POW riots, civil affairs, larger military units, and communications. There are also articles on civilian and military leaders, including President Eisenhower, General Ridgeway, Kim Il Sung, Chou En lai, Syngman Rhee, and others. Special features *Articles written by experts in the field *Useful to librarians, scholars, researchers and students alike *Includes 48 maps and photographs *Covers an extraordinary range of key topics *A chronology, extensive bibliography, and a subject index are included

A

Acheson, Dean (1893–1971)

Dean Gooderham Acheson served as U.S. secretary of state from 1949–1953 and spear-headed the Cold War policies of containment of communism following World War II. He served as advisor on foreign policy to four presidents, and his book, Present at the Creation, which won the Pulitzer Prize in history in 1970, was dedicated to Harry S. Truman—“The Captain with the mighty heart.” A graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School, he served Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis as his private secretary, worked for President Franklin D. Roosevelt as undersecretary of the treasury in 1933, then entered the State Department in 1941 as assistant secretary and later undersecretary from 1945–47. Acheson gathered Senate approval of U.S. entry into the United Nations (U.N.). After the refusal of the Soviets to evacuate Eastern Europe, and because of perceived threats to the Middle East, Acheson designed what became known as the Truman Doctrine in 1947, securing aid to defend Greece and Turkey when Britain could no longer shoulder the burden in that region. Acheson was also present at the creation of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe as a bulwark against Communism. During the Berlin Blockade, he initiated the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western alliance against the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites.

As secretary of state, he first received word of the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel into South Korea on June 24, 1950, while he was at his "Harewood Farm" estate outside Washington, D.C. A cable had been sent to the White House from John Muccio, American ambassador in Seoul, and relayed to Acheson. An emergency session of the U.N. Security Council was called after consultation with General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Louis Johnson, secretary of defense; Frank Pace, secretary of the army, and former Senator Warren Austin, U.S. ambassador at the U.N. Acheson endorsed this call, Trygve Lie, U.N. secretary general, responded, and the Security Council adopted the resolution that an armed attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace. Soviet representative Jacob Malik was not present; he was boycotting the council over the issue of a Nationalist Chinese rather than a People's Republic of China representative being seated. This resolution was adopted 9-0 (Yugoslavia abstained, USSR absent) on Sunday, June 25, 1950. Acheson's goal was not victory but to see that the North Korean attack failed.

Acheson authorized General Douglas MacArthur to supply Korea with arms and other equipment over and above that already allocated under the military assistance program; the U.S. Air Force was directed to protect Kimpo Airfield during the evacuation of U.S. dependents; the Seventh Fleet was ordered to proceed from the Philippines north to prevent any attack from China on Formosa, or vice versa. Secretary Acheson urged additional aid to Indochina and sent a survey team to Korea to appraise the military situation. Acheson supported the South Korean ambassador’s pleas for U.S. military protection and accompanied the ambassador to a White House session with President Truman. Acheson manfully took partial responsibility for the war’s outbreak, as he explained that his January 12, 1950 speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. had appeared to be an invitation to attack when he had wrongfully implied that South Korea was outside the defensive perimeter of the U.S. However, Acheson took swift and sure action to halt aggression and defend South Korea once the war had broken out. He spoke against the challenges raised by Senator Robert A. Taft, who complained of Truman’s use of “executive actions” to aid South Korea. Acheson from the beginning felt that the Chinese might intervene to aid North Korea in its invasion of the South, but that the Russians would not, and he was proved correct. Acheson would not accept an offer from General Chiang Kai-shek to contribute 33,000 troops to the Korean action, desiring to keep these forces where they were needed—to defend Formosa (Taiwan). This was in contrast to the friendliness shown by General MacArthur, who visited Chiang on Formosa, and his order that three squadrons of jet fighters be sent to Chiang without Pentagon approval. As a result, Acheson would be supportive of President Truman in Truman’s later differences with MacArthur.

Acheson advised the president, in preparations to aid South Korea, not to ask for a resolution of approval from Congress, but to rest on his constitutional authority as commander in chief of the armed forces. He was instrumental in securing support from the British (as was Omar N. Bradley) to place their warships in Japanese waters at General MacArthur’s disposal, to aid South Korea. Acheson convinced the president not to agree on a forced trade of Formosa to the Communists for their withdrawal from Korea. Acheson’s policy aimed at ending the Korean problem swiftly without concessions that would encourage Communist aggressions elsewhere. He aimed at a peaceful solution to the Formosa question, possibly through the U.N. On the question of which nation should represent China, the Nationalist government on Formosa or the People’s Republic of China (PRC), he felt the resolution should come through peaceful negotiation and not under blackmail or the duress of the Korean invasion. Acheson skillfully maneuvered to bring the Soviet Union’s delegate back into the Security Council’s meetings, not giving in to pressure from Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who demanded that the PRC be admitted instead of Taiwan as a price for negotiating the end of the Korean War.

In addition to defending South Korea, Acheson also took the point position in drafting the peace treaty with Japan in 1950. Acheson oversaw the end of military control over Japan, the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and the transformation of Japan into a bastion of democracy in the Pacific friendly to and allied with the U.S. He suggested that John Foster Dulles prepare the draft of the peace treaty with Japan, and later claimed that he, in doing so, had elevated Dulles to become the future secretary of state, saying Dulles was ambitious to succeed him. Simultaneously, Secretary Acheson oversaw the transformation of the other former enemy, Germany, into an anti-Communist power, and shepherded West Germany into NATO and the integrated defense system of Europe. On the homefront, Acheson did not bow to the McCarthyites; he did not fire any of his employees in the State Department, even refusing to “turn his back” on Alger Hiss, a former high-ranking State Department officer later convicted of perjury in lying about his former Communist connections.

The People’s Republic of China entered the Korean War in late 1950, and Acheson spearheaded the American nonrecognition policy, stepping up aid to the Nationalists on Formosa. Truman and Acheson, responding to the Communist threat, also gradually increased American commitments to sustaining the French attempts to rebuild the wreck of their colonial regime in Indochina (Vietnam).

After the elections of 1952 brought Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Republicans to power, Acheson, paradoxically pilloried as an “appeaser” of the communists, returned to private law practice and to additional writing, producing Power and Diplomacy in 1958, Morning and Noon in 1965, and The Korean War in 1971. His Grapes from Thorns was published after his death October 12, 1971.

Barbara Peterson

See also STATE DEPARTMENT, U.S.

Bibliography

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (1969).

Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War (1967).

Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress, 1st Session. Hearings to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in that Area.

Truman, Harry S. Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II, Memoirs (1956) Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, July 3, 1950, October 9, 1950, November 27, 1951.

ADCOM: GHQ Advance Command, Korea

When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief, Far East, was responsible for the support of KMAG (U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea) and the American embassy in Korea. The next day President Harry S. Truman authorized the dispatch of a survey team to Korea to determine the facts and to arrange for support of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA).

MacArthur formed a survey team of thirteen officers and two enlisted men. Brigadier General John H. Church, a section chief of GHQ (general headquarters) Tokyo, was placed in command. On June 27, at 0400, the group departed Haneda Airfield bound for Seoul. They arrived at Itazuke Air Base in southern Japan two hours later and while awaiting further orders their destination was changed to Suwon, as Seoul was in imminent danger of falling.

Meanwhile MacArthur had received the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive giving him control of U.S. military activities in Korea. General MacArthur then renamed the survey team as the GHQ Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM). Its duties were expanded to assuming control of KMAG and to providing as much help as possible to the Republic of Korea Army.

General Church and his ADCOM group arrived at Suwon at 1900 on June 27 and set up shop in the experimental agriculture building. The next morning Major General Chae Byung Duk, ROKA chief of staff, arrived at ADCOM and established ROKA headquarters there. The first task for ADCOM was to assist the ROKA in bringing order from chaos, and to stop the crumbling of the South Korean forces. Road-blocks were established south of Seoul to collect fleeing ROKA soldiers and to reorganize them into units to be returned to the Han River line. The first day some 9,000 troops were returned.

That following day, June 28, 1950, General Church radioed MacArthur his momentous assessment that it would be necessary to commit United States troops to restore the preinvasion boundaries. Two days later General Church traveled to Osan, twelve miles south of Suwon (the site a little over a week later of the first clash between U.S. and North Korean ground forces) to telephone GHQ Tokyo and report the near-collapse of the Han River defense. At GHQ, Major General Edward M. Almond, chief of staff, indicated that MacArthur had received the authority to commit U.S. ground troops to Korea and that they would start to arrive the next day.

While General Church was making his call to Tokyo the situation at ADCOM briefly turned to panic. Fearing that the enemy was about to overrun Suwon, the headquarters staff destroyed signal equipment with Thermit grenades and abandoned the headquarters. They fled to Suwon Airfield, planning to establish a defense perimeter but on arrival decided to move south instead. General Church returned from Osan as his staff was withdrawing south to Taejon. An angry Church halted the withdrawal but after a review realistically ordered the move continued.

Enroute to Taejon, Church stopped at Osan for another call to General Almond. Church informed the chief of staff of the move and changed the destination of incoming troops from Suwon to Pusan. ADCOM was reestablished at Taejon during the morning of July 1. That same day American ground troops arrived to delay the North Koreans and to improve South Korean morale.

The U.S. contingent, named Task Force Smith, pulled into the Taejon railroad station at 0800, July 2. Its commander, Colonel Charles B. Smith, met with General Church for instructions. Task Force Smith was to stop the North Koreans just north of Osan. But the force, as it turned out, lacked the firepower to halt the enemy armor column.

The next day United States Forces in Korea (USAFIK) was activated with General William F. Dean as commander and General Church deputy commander. The ADCOM and KMAG staffs were assigned to USAFIK. On July 13, Eighth U.S. Army assumed command of ground operations and General Church and the ADCOM group were ordered back to Tokyo. ADCOM, on the ground and often on the run, had made recommendations that led the U.S. into its fourth-bloodiest war.

D. Colt Denfield

Bibliography

Appleman, Roy. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June–November, 1950. (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1961).

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: 1987).

Republic of Korea. History of U.N. Forces in the Korean War, Vol. IV (Ministry of National Defense, Seoul: 1975).

U.S. Army Second Infantry Division (Historical Center, Camp Casey, Korea: n.d.)

Air Attacks on Power Plants

See POWER PLANTS, U.N. AIR ATTACKS ON

Airborne Operations

Airborne assaults during the Korean War were limited to two operations. The first was conducted by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT) at drop zones near Sukchon and Sunchon, North Korea. The second involved both the 187th and the 2nd and 4th Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) at Musan. Both operations were on a fairly small scale.

Early in his planning for the Inchon operation, General Douglas MacArthur identified the need for an airborne regimental combat team. Airborne troops during World War II had proven themselves fully capable of dropping behind enemy positions, severing lines of communication, and disrupting rear areas. The North Koreans might be vulnerable to such an assault, especially if conducted in conjunction with an amphibious operation.

Unfortunately, MacArthur did not have any airborne units at his disposal. He requested an RCT from the 82nd Airborne Division, but since that unit constituted the country’s only combatready strategic reserve, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) denied his request. Instead, they offered an RCT from the less-ready 11th Airborne Division which had returned to the United States from occupation duty more than a year earlier. The 11th Airborne, however, was in a much depleted condition, as many of its personnel had been stripped in order to keep the 82nd manned. Without relying on replacements from the 82nd, the 11th could not field even one full-strength RCT until well into September 1950. MacArthur protested that such a delay would disrupt his Inchon timetable, but he was unable to convince the joint chiefs of a sufficient need for an earlier deployment of the RCT. He would have to adjust his plan to exclude an airborne operation in the initial stages of the offensive. In the meantime, however, the 187th Airborne RCT left Camp Stoneman, California, on 6 September and arrived in Japan on 20 September with a strength of 4,400 paratroopers. Its date for operational readiness in the Far East command was set for 21 October.

Even without the airborne RCT, MacArthur’s Inchon landing was brilliantly successful. By the later part of September, he was prepared to continue his attack across the 38th parallel into North Korea. At this point he found an opportunity to make use of his new paratrooper asset.

As the Eighth Army advanced, MacArthur held the RCT in GHQ reserve around Kimpo Airfield near Seoul. He directed its commander to prepare to conduct an airborne drop north of the enemy capital of Pyongyang in an effort to cut off enemy withdrawal routes, disrupt communications, and rescue POWs. The original date of the operation coincided with the 187th’s operational readiness date, 21 October. However, MacArthur later moved the date to 20 October.

The plan called for two drop zones (DZs) some thirty miles north of Pyongyang. The main one was DZ William at Sukchon, and the other one was DZ Easy at Sunchon. Both drop zones would cut highways which ran north from Pyongyang.

The regiment boarded 133 C-119s and C-47s of the 314th and 21st Troop Carrier Squadrons, and by noon on 20 October the first plane was airborne. This was the first time that C-119 “Flying Boxcars” had been used in a combat jump. A typical C-119 carried forty-six men divided into two even “sticks,” fifteen monorail bundles, and four door bundles. Each paratrooper carried his main parachute, a .45 caliber pistol, and a carbine or Ml rifle.

The transport planes were preceded by fighters which strafed and rocketed the drop zones. Paratroopers from the lead plane began jumping into Sukchon at about 1400. There was no enemy antiaircraft and only sporadic sniper fire.

The first drop landed 1,470 men of the 1st Battalion, the regimental headquarters and headquarters company, and supporting engineer, medical, and service troops. Some seventy-four tons of equipment accompanied the personnel. At least one man was killed by enemy fire while still in his parachute, and twenty-five paratroopers were injured.

Heavy equipment, including seven 105mm howitzers of the 674th Field Artillery Battalion and 1,125 rounds of ammunition, followed. Six howitzers were recovered in usable condition, and about 90 percent of the shells were undamaged. This was the first time heavy equipment had been dropped in a combat opera...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Original Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chronology
• Maps
• Photograph Credits
• The Encyclopedia
• Bibliography
• Contributors
• Index