Peace and Conflict 2012

J.Joseph Hewitt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351554763
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

Peace and Conflict is a biennial publication that provides key data and follows trends in national and international conflicts ranging from isolated acts of terrorism to internal civil strife to full-fledged inter-country war. A major trend it tracks is the incidence of wars beyond the protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Peace and Conflict 2012 focuses on the theme of policy guidance for preventing conflict. It covers special topics with original contributions that focus on mediation, economic recovery, and the impact of elections. Peace and Conflict is a large-format reference book including numerous graphs, tables, maps, and appendices dedicated to the visual presentation of data. Crisp narratives are highlighted with box quote extracts that summarise trends and major findings such as the continuing increase in high casualty terrorist acts and risk of genocide in certain areas.

1. Introduction to Peace and Conflict 2012

As we go to press, movements of historic proportions are sweeping parts of the Middle East and North Africa, with potentially far-ranging consequences for the region and indeed for the entire international system. Only in Tunisia and Egypt have there been clear-cut political changes, whereas the outcomes of the violent events in Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen are still undetermined. Other countries in the region, like Jordan and Morocco, have experienced public protests, but neither the protests nor the government responses have escalated or led to substantial political changes.

This wave of pro-democracy protests against autocratic rulers is the latest manifestation of a historically familiar but also rare phenomenon. The domino-like collapse of Communist Party rule in seven Eastern European states from 1989 to 1992, beginning with regime change in Poland, is the most recent analog. Other prominent examples can be found during the decolonization process after the Second World War (e.g., the collapse of the French colonial empire in South East Asia during the early 1950s and in sub-Saharan Africa in 1960). Episodes of violent protest within countries have similar dynamics, from expanding waves of riots against rising food prices in 18th century English villages to violent protests by the black, urban poor in US cities from 1964 to 1968. In such instances, one dramatic episode of political resistance provides a demonstration effect that inspires people with similar grievances elsewhere into action. Recent events illustrate just how topical research on diffusion has become in 2011.

What insights do the data-based studies in Peace and Conflict 2012 provide into events transpiring in the Middle East and North Africa? At first glance, a reader might conclude that the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger is off the mark. Yemen has the highest risk score in the region and yet does not appear in the global list of the 25 most-at-risk countries. Egypt and Tunisia are near the regional median, but risk scores in Syria, Libya, and Bahrain are low—in fact little higher than those of European countries. The Ledger is based on analysis of the drivers of internal war and regime collapse, not mass protest. Nonetheless, it does give clues about the apparent fragility of Middle Eastern governments in the face of such protests. First, regimes with a mix of democratic and autocratic features are inherently more unstable than governments that are consistently autocratic or democratic. Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen have a potentially volatile mix of autocracy with some democratic trappings. Neighborhood (in)security is another risk factor. Armed conflict and, by extension, massive popular protest in any one country increase conflict risks in adjacent countries—a process that, given modern communication systems, has rapid effects not fully captured in our current model. These diffusion effects, beginning with events in Tunisia, appear to have been at play in catalyzing recent events in the region.

Meanwhile, other potential dynamics at play in the Middle East and North Africa are not captured in our risk analysis. One is an autocratic fatigue effect: the longer a Ben-Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, or Gaddafi is in power, the more likely he is to be challenged and ousted—a relationship for which we will test rigorously in future editions of Peace and Conflict. Second is the growth of grievances, especially among urban youth, that may contribute to very rapid mobilization in response to external cues and domestic opportunities. While there is no easy way to index the intensification of popular grievances in a global study, country and regional assessments can identify them. Third may be the growth of political associations, even in autocratic regimes, facilitated by the explosion of social networking. Asal, Johnson, and Wilkenfeld (2008) present clear evidence specific to the Middle East and North Africa about the exponential growth in numbers of such associations over the last 20 years, well before the eruption of popular protest that they—to different degrees—may have helped facilitate. The organic spread of democratic principles through grass-roots organizations is likely more conducive to regime reform than is a top-down approach. Associations that embrace democracy have meanwhile been significantly less likely to use violence to address grievances.

We also know something about the dynamics and outcomes of civil wars like those being fought in Libya and Yemen, based on surveys of autonomy movements. Of the 136 civil wars fought since 1940 (as reported by Toft and Saideman in Peace and Conflict 2010) 74 aimed at gaining control of the state and 62 aimed at separation. Since the end of the Cold War, about half of the internal wars fought for control of the state ended in negotiated settlements and power sharing; in most others, regimes won. A third of the wars of separation ended in agreements that recognized regional autonomy, another third were defeated, and the others were stalemated. Extend this analysis to the contemporary Middle East and North Africa. Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Iran have national identities that are stronger than regional or sectarian ones—and the protestors demand power at the center. Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and most other states in the region —including Iraq—are new, arbitrarily bounded countries in which clan and religious identities are strongest, thus making them more prone to sectarian violence and fragmentation. One implication is that public protests in the “old countries” can be resolved by opening up their political systems, as is happening in Tunisia and Egypt. Or in Syria, as in Iran, they may be contained by violent repression rather than changing the political systems. In Libya and Yemen, however, public protests are more likely to escalate into civil wars, likely to end in negotiated regional autonomy or stalemate, rather than resolution to a more open political system.

Political mass murder is the worst possible response by autocratic rulers who are challenged by popular protests. In Chapter 6 Harff updates her global analysis of “Assessing Risks of Genocide and Politicide in 2011.” Three Middle Eastern countries are among the 20 countries with the highest risks today, based on conditions assessed in 2009-10. Syria ranks second; Iran ninth; and Saudi Arabia twelfth. Her comparative research has shown that the potential for genocide and politicide is only likely to be activated during political upheavals, which were imminent in Iran in 2009 and Syria in 2011. Thus the likelihood of deadly repression in reaction to any groups that challenge the regime was and continues to be high in both countries. The risks in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain, by contrast, are significantly lower.

Recent developments have prompted widespread speculation about the likelihood that autocracies in the region will give way to democracy. Frantz points out in Chapter 4 “Trends in Democratization” that the region’s political systems differ from one another in important ways. At the most basic level, classifying these countries according to whether they are autocratic or anocratic (hybrid democracies and autocracies) can shed light on the likelihood that stable democracy will emerge. For example, Frantz shows that anocratic interludes are more likely to pave the way for the consolidation of democracy than autocratic ones. This historical record suggests that Tunisia and Egypt, both with mixed systems prior to mass protests, have a greater likelihood of transitioning to stable democracies than do autocracies like Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

The issue of elections is one of the symbolic and consolidating foundations of democratic systems. Regarding the democracy movements and calls for elections, Hyde in “Elections and Democratic Consolidation” (Chapter 11) speculates that international actors may want to be involved in political transitions toward democracy, particularly the first elections. But this is not without difficulty. For example, whether the current care-taker government in Egypt invites international election observers could be an important indicator of whether it plans to adhere to international standards for democratic elections. It is also worth noting that in some traditional societies, elections may in and of themselves constitute destabilizing events. It thus remains to be seen whether upcoming elections will result in electoral victories for democratic forces.

This historical record suggests that Tunisia and Egypt have a greater likelihood of transitioning to stable democracies than do autocracies like Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

Several of our authors analyze the application of international conflict prevention and crisis management techniques to civil wars and other instability events. Eralp, Quinn, and Wilkenfeld argue, in “Delivering Peace: Options for Mediators in African Intrastate Crises,” (Chapter 9) that international and/or regional actors and organizations should be prepared to mediate in response to conflicts between existing or transitional governments on the one side and protest movements or rebel groups on the other. The best-case scenario is to identify the relevant actors and get in early to prevent crises from escalating to violence. But even after violence occurs, mediators can open lines of communication between the two sides and use leverage when necessary to achieve a ceasefire and start negotiations on political solutions. In cases where governments and armed opposition organizations are engaged in full-scale hostilities—as in Libya—mediators can aim to arrange for security guarantees that help deescalate tensions, check additional violence, and pave the way for negotiations. Mediators can provide guarantees themselves or arrange for other actors to do so while they focus on the diplomatic aspects of crisis management.

But civil wars are long and difficult to end, as Gartner observes in “Reaching Agreements in Civil Wars” (Chapter 8), especially when the opponents are evenly matched, as in Libya. The more intractable the dispute (e.g., Libya) the more likely it will require mediation and costly actions, which are also likely to fail often before resulting in any success. Given this, and assuming that the pattern of stalemate continues, the armed conflict in Libya is less likely to be resolved in the near future, and at the negotiation table. In contrast, if the current pattern of an absence of involvement by outside states in Syria’s protest holds, then history suggests that the government is likely to remain in power and that the dispute will be comparatively short.

Finally, and from the perspective of the possible economic consequences of the current movements, Koubi in “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery” (Chapter 10) notes that conflict can lead to faster rates of economic growth, but only if entrenched domestic interests with political influence are destroyed and countries rebuild on a more technologically advanced basis. Consequently, she expects the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East will lead to higher economic growth only if new elites reform both the political system, by creating a system with checks and balances, and economic institutions, by enacting and protecting property rights. Such changes are not yet evident. Moreover, even if democracy is introduced, she is skeptical about whether a shift in political power from one group to another will suffice for economic progress. In Eastern Europe, for example, during the post-communist transitions provides other cautionary examples. Neoliberal policies promoted by the international community opened up a “free market” for favoritism, corruption, and crime in which well-connected groups plundered state properties for their own benefit.

In sum, evolving events in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa provide vivid examples of trends and processes that have been tracked by Peace and Conflict authors for a number of years. We recognize the power of unique precipitating events, variations in systems and processes in individual countries, and regional demonstration effects. As the international policy community addresses these fast-paced developments, it must be ever cognizant of their historical context. Policy-relevant understanding needs to be based on analysis of large trends and their dynamics, combined with the specifics of regional and country-based knowledge. Demands for democracy and development are one kind of enduring trend, so is the post-Cold War trend toward negotiated settlement of armed conflicts. Democratization often fails, so do negotiations, but those who persist can expect more successes than setbacks.

Ted Robert Gurr
J. Joseph Hewitt
Jonathan Wilkenfeld

2. The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger: Ranking States on Future Risks

J. Joseph Hewitt

As this volume goes to press, a wave of mass protests is sweeping through multiple countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Longstanding dissatisfaction with autocratic governance, the absence of economic opportunities, and widespread corruption among governmental elites, has motivated people in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen to take action against their respective governments. In some cases, mass demonstrations have led to changes in leaders and promises of democratic reforms. In other cases, demonstrations have led to violent crackdowns and, in the case of Libya, a full-scale civil war. None of these countries qualified for the ‘high’ or ‘highest’ risk category in the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (or, the Ledger, for short) in the previous volume. Nor do any of them qualify in the top two categories for risk in the updated data presented in this chapter. The Ledger’s assessment for most of these seven countries indicated a low level of risk for onsets of major outbreaks of instability.

Since the Ledger provided little guidance in anticipating recent events across North Africa and the Middle East, does that indicate a significant flaw in the Ledger’s method for assessing risk? A clear-cut answer is simply not possible because the events that have transpired, at least in most of the countries, would not qualify as the types of instability events for which the Ledger was designed to estimates risks. The exception, however, is Libya because the onset of a major civil war in that country certainly does qualify as the type of event the Ledger is designed to foresee. By assessing Libya’s risk as low for the past four years, the Ledger projected that the prospects of major armed conflict or instability there would follow clear historic trends exhibited by most consolidated autocracies. In the single case of Libya, that expectation proved to be mistaken.

In the other countries, mass protests led to important political changes, but the events often unfolded without major disruption to the state’s ability to c...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• 1 Introduction
• Regular Features
• Preventing Armed Violence: From Peacemaking to Conflict Recovery
• Appendix—Major Armed Conflicts
• References
• Peace and Conflict Editorial Advisory Board
• Acknowledgments
• About the Authors
• About the Contributors
• About the Center for International Development and Conflict Management