The Research Act

A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods

Norman K. Denzin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138538191
• eBook ISBN: 9781351475266
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Science Research & Methodology
• Index: Social Sciences

At once a unique textbook for methods courses and a major contribution to sociological theory, this book teaches students the principles of research and how to construct and test theories. It brings coherence to the study of methods by presenting four major approaches to experimentation: survey research, participant observation, life histories, and unobtrusive measures from a single theoretical point of view, symbolic interaction. It demonstrates the need for a synthesis between theory and methods, and shows how different methods limit and aff ect research results.

Denzin's argues that no single method, theory, or observer can capture all that is relevant or important in reality. He argues for the use of triangulation and for a view of theory and methods as "concept sensitizers." His approach enables sociologists to acquire specifi c facts about a particular situation while simultaneously elevating these to the level of shared meaning.

The author shows students how to proceed with research, bringing sharply into focus the possibilities and their limitations. Since his view is integrated rather than eclectic, this is much more than a "how to do it" manual. Denzin points out aspects of research that fall outside the scope of a given method yet aff ect results, and emphasizes the need to employ several methods to cross-check each other. The Research Act covers all the content of conventional methods courses. The presentation is exciting and imaginative, and provides a thorough review of major sociological methods, a cogent statement about approaches to sociological inquiry, and a source from which a understanding of the problems of research can be derived.

To Evelyn, Johanna, and Rachel

1 A Point of View

Nor is it enough to say that research and theory must be married if sociology is to bear legitimate fruit. They must not only exchange solemn vows —they must know how to carry on from there. Their reciprocal roles must be clearly defined.

Robert K. Merton, 1969, p. 171.

We can, and I think must, look upon human Life as chiefly a vast interpretative process in which people, singly and collectively, guide themselves by defining the objects, events, and situations which they encounter. . . . Any scheme designed to analyze human group life in its general character has to fit this process of interpretation.

Herbert Blumer, 1956, p. 686.

Methodology—that vague word sociologists have come to associate with research—has occupied a peculiar role in the sociological enterprise. There are spokesmen who see little connection between methods, research activities, and the process of theorizing. For example, in a particularly perplexing passage, that contradicts the above quotation, Robert K. Merton states:

At the outset we should distinguish clearly between sociological theory, which has for its subject matter certain aspects and results of the interaction of men and therefore is substantive, and methodology, or the logic of scientific procedure. The problems of methodology transcend those found in any one discipline, dealing either with those common to groups of disciplines, or, in more generalized form, with those common to all scientific inquiry. Methodology is not peculiarly bound up with sociological problems, and though there is a plenitude of methodological discussions in books and journals of sociology, they are not thereby rendered sociological in character. Sociologists, in company with all others who essay sociological work, must be methodologically wise; they must be aware of the design of investigations, the nature of inference, the requirements of a theoretic system. But such knowledge does not contain or imply the particular content of sociological theory. There is, in short, a clear and decisive difference between knowing how to test a battery of hypotheses and knowing the theory from which to derive hypotheses to be tested. It is my impression that current sociological training is more largely designed to make students understand the first than the second

[1967, pp. 140-41].

Merton suggests that theory is of greater value than methodology. He further suggests that methods as such have little, if any, substantive-theoretical content. From Merton's perspective, methods are "atheoretical" tools suitable for any knowledgeable and skilled user.

This position, which potentially leads to a wide gap between theory and methodology, contrasts with Blumer's (1931, 1940, 1954, 1956), for as the Blumer quotation beginning this chapter implies, he calls for research and theoretical designs that accurately reflect and capture what he regards as the special features of human interaction. From his perspective the study of methodology demands a consistent theoretical perspective; theory and method must go hand in hand.

Other sociologists have implicitly subscribed to Blumer's position but have tended to use methods with little thought for either their theoretical implications or their differing ability to shed light on theory. Many sociologists now use only one method in their studies—thereby eschewing the potential value of other methodologies. Small-group theorists, for example, rely nearly entirely upon the experiment, while family sociologists primarily utilize the survey technique, and students of organizations overemphasize field strategies such as participant observation. This tendency has given rise to a rather parochial, specialty-bound use of research methods.

Closely related to this position is the tendency to develop within limited boundaries theories resting on special methodologies—what Merton (1967) terms middle-range sociology—and while it brings theory and method closer together, a specific commitment to special areas of inquiry seriously limits the far-ranging value of general or formal theory. To read of a tightly integrated theory of small-group interaction is pleasing because it is theory, but disappointing because it is not developed from a more abstract set of formulations. Small-group theory exists hand in hand with theories of the family, of political sociology, of delinquency, and so on, but seldom do these specialized theories with their localized methods come together in one large and more general theory.

A Point of View

I hold that methods are indeed of great theoretical relevance—that in fact every method has a different relevance for theory, and that significant advances in substantive sociological theory will occur only after sociologists adopt a consistent and viable framework for the dual analysis of theory and method. Each can best be assessed and evaluated in the same general framework, and to this end—out of personal preference—I have selected symbolic interactionism as my perspective (see Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1962, 1966, 1969; Kuhn, 1964). This selection is deliberate because in my judgment interactionism best fits the empirical nature of the social world. It would have been possible to use another theoretical stance—to apply, say, structural-functional theory to the issues treated in this book—but I am convinced that any other approach would lead to significantly different conclusions, even though it would also, at the same time, lend support to my thesis that methods can no longer be viewed as "atheoretical" tools. It should be apparent that each theory demands a special view of methods.

The Interrelationship of Theory and Method

The sociological enterprise may be said to rest on these elements: theory, methodology, research activity, and the sociological imagination. The function of theory, which I define as an integrated body of propositions, the derivation of which leads to explanation of some social phenomenon, is to give order and insight to research activities. Methodology, on the other hand, represents the principal ways the sociologist acts on his environment; his methods, be they experiments, surveys, or life histories, lead to different features of this reality, and it is through his methods that he makes his research public and reproducible by others. As the sociologist moves from his theories to the selection of methods, the emergence of that vague process called research activity can be seen. In this process the personal preferences of a scientist for one theory or method emerge. Furthermore, his selection of a given problem area (e.g., delinquency, the family, etc.) often represents a highly personal decision.

Order is given to theory, methodology, and research activity through the use of what Mills termed the sociological imagination.

The sociological imagination, I remind you, in considerable part consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and its components. It is this imagination, of course, that sets off the social scientist from the mere technician. Adequate technicians can be trained in a few years. The sociological imagination can also be cultivated; certainly it seldom occurs without a great deal of routine work. Yet there is an unexpected quality about it. . . . There is a playfulness of mind back of such combining as well as a truly fierce drive to make sense of the world, which the technician as such usually lacks. Perhaps he is too well trained, too precisely trained. Since one can be trained only in what is already known, training sometimes incapacitates one from learning new ways; it makes one rebel against what is bound to be at first loose and even sloppy. But you cling to such vague images and notions, if they are yours, and you must work them out. For it is in such forms that original ideas, if any, almost always first appear

[1959, pp. 211-12].

The sociological imagination demands variability in the research process. The processes by which sociology is done should not be made too rigorous; an open mind is required. What some regard as doctrinaire will be challenged by others and, therefore, methodological and theoretical principles must always be evaluated in terms of the sociological imagination. Rather than applying just a set of methodological principles to research strategies —which leads to an even greater gap between theory and method—I combine a theoretical perspective with a series of methodological rules, with symbolic interactionism as the theoretical framework and taking certain key principles from the scientific method and applying them to both theory and method. My aim is first to show that each method takes on a different meaning when analyzed in the interactionist framework—and hence can be shown to have different relevance for that theory—and second, by employing notions from the scientific method, I indicate how these methods can best be put to use to fit the demands of interaction theory. Third, and returning to the central thesis, I will suggest that methods are not atheoretical tools, but rather means of acting on the environment and making that environment meaningful. This point of view will, I hope, permit sociologists to overcome what I view as errors of the past, and reduce the gap that presently exists between theory and method. It should also lead sociologists to cease using methods in rote and ritualistic fashion, and enable us to move away from middle-range and small-scope theories to what I will term formal theory (see Simmel, 1950). Finally, I hope that this perspective will assist sociology toward the goal of a mature science of human interaction.

The Interactionist Perspective

The interactionist's conception of human behavior assumes that behavior is self-directed and observable at two distinct levels—the symbolic and the interactional (or behavioral). By "self-directed," I mean that humans can act toward themselves as they would toward any other object. As Blumer (1966) says, the human may "perceive himself, have conceptions of himself, communicate with himself, and act toward himself [p. 535]." This behavior, which Blumer calls "self-interaction," permits humans to plan and to align their actions with others. Integral to this position is the proposition that man's social world is not constituted of objects that have intrinsic meaning, but that the meaning of objects lies in man's plans of action. Human experience is such that the process of defining objects is ever changing, subject to redefinitions, relocations, and realignments, and for conduct toward any object to be meaningful, the definition of the object must be consensual. That is, if I cannot persuade another sociologist to accept my definition of what a particular research method means, I shall be incapable of discussing my actions with him.

The interactionist assumes that humans are able to act because they have agreed on the meanings they will attach to the relevant objects in their environment. But before such consensus can occur, common symbolic languages must be present, and in sociology it is mandatory that agreement over basic terms be established before serious activity can begin. (Consequently it will be necessary to give precise definitions to the terms theory, method, experiment, social survey, participant observation and validity. The interactionist additionally assumes that man learns his basic symbols, his conceptions of self, and the definitions he attaches to his social objects through interaction with others. Man simultaneously carries on conversations with himself and with his significant others.

Methodological Considerations from Interaction Theory

Given these basics of the interactionist perspective, I can now propose a series of principles that this perspective demands of its methodologies. If human behavior is observable at two levels—the symbolic and the behavioral—then central to understanding such behavior are the range and variety of symbols and symbolic meanings shared, communicated, and manipulated by interacting selves in social situations. Society contributes two essential elements that reflect directly on concrete interactions: the symbols, or various languages provided and communicated through the socialization process; and the concrete behavioral settings in which behavior occurs.

An interactionist assumes that a complete analysis of human conduct will capture the symbolic meanings that emerge over time in interaction. But the sociologist must also capture variations in ongoing patterns of behavior that reflect these symbols, images, and conceptions of self. These symbols are manifold and complex, verbal and nonverbal, intended and unintended. Verbal utterance, nonverbal gesture, mode and style of dress, and manner of speech all provide clues to the symbolic meanings that become translated into and emerge out of interaction.

The first methodological principle is that symbols and interaction must be brought together before an investigation is complete. To focus only on symbols, as an attitude questionnaire might, fails to record the emergent and novel relationships these symbols have with observable behavior. If I am studying the relationship between marijuana use and the strategies of concealing the drug in the presence of nonusers I will want to show that a marijuana user's attitude toward outsiders is reflected in his behavior in their presence. It would be insufficient to document only the fact that users do not like to get "high" when an outsider is present. Committed to the interactionst position, I must go further and demonstrate how this attitude is influenced by contact with nonusers.

Becker (1953, 1955, 1962) has provided such an analysis. In his interviews (1962, p. 597) it was discovered that among nonregular smokers fear of discovery took two forms: that nonusers would discover marijuana in one's possession; and that one would "be unable to hide the effects of the drug when he is 'high' with nonusers." This type of user adopts deliberate strategies to conceal the effects and presence of marijuana; he may even smoke infrequently because he cannot find a "safe" setting. Among regular users such fears are not present, although Becker indicated that as their interactional contacts change regular users may find it necessary to revert to only occasional use. One regular user who had married a nonuser eventually turned to irregular use. The following excerpt from Becker describes this pattern and demonstrates how the meanings attached to the social object (marijuana) actually emerged in patterns of interaction:

(This man had used marijuana quite intensively but his wife objected to it.) Of course, largely the reason I cut off was my wife. There were a few times when I'd feel like . . . didn't actually crave for it but would just like to have had some. (He was unable to continue using the drug except irregularly on those occasions when he was away from his wife's presence and control

[1962, p. 598].)

A second methodological principle suggests that because symbols, meanings, and definitions are forged into self-definitions and attitudes, the reflective nature of selfhood must be captured. That is, the investigator must indicate how shifting definitions of self are reflected in ongoing patterns of behavior. He must, therefore, view human conduct from the point of view of those he is studying—"take the role of the acting other in concrete situations"—and this may range from learning the other's language to capturing his salient views of self. Returning to the example of the marijuana user, it would be necessary to learn the language of marijuana subcultures, which, as Becker shows, includes special words for getting "high" and has various categorizations for "outsiders."

Taking the role of the acting other permits the sociologist to escape the fallacy of objectivism; that is, the substitution of his own perspective for that of those he is studying. Too often the sociologist enters the field with preconceptions that prevent him from allowing those studies to tell it "as they see it." A student of marijuana use, for example, may incorrectly generalize from his own experiences with it to the group of users he is studying. Often the investigator will find that the meanings he has learned to attach to an object have no relevance for the people he is observing. This error occurs frequently in areas of conduct undergoing rapid change; studies of racial interaction, political activity, fads and fashions, and even analyses of stratification hierarchies in bureaucracies may provide cases where the definitions of the sociologist bear only slight resemblances to the actual situation.

Everyday and Scientific Conceptions of Reality

I wish to maintain a distinction between the sociologist's conceptions of his subject's behavior and the motives and definitions that subjects ascribe to their own conduct. The way a subject explains his behavior is likely to differ from the way a sociologist would. Marijuana users, for example, do not employ such terms as "morality," "rationalization," "collusion," "social control," "subculture," "socialization," or "role behavior." Commenting on this fact Becker notes that the sociological view of the world is "abstract, relativistic and generalizing [1964, p. 273]." On the other hand, the everyday conception of reality that guides our su...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Dedication
• References
• Index