The Nazi Movement

Theodore Abel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138537019
• eBook ISBN: 9781351478830
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This book identifies the main factors by which the Nazi movement rose to power and measures their relative importance. It discusses Hitler's leadership, the strategy of party tacticians, and the favorable circumstances of popular economic and social discontent. Based on more than 600 autobiographies obtained from followers of Hitler, The Nazi Movement explains the social bases of Nazism and why it was so appealing.

Theodore Abel argues that no movement can succeed unless its adherents are motivated by deep, persistent, and widespread discontent with a societal status quo. A movement must also set forth an inspiring goal based upon deeply rooted popular sentiments. Finally, a successful movement must have a charismatic leader with organized, dedicated followers. Abel's analysis of the Depression, inflation, and right- and left-wing rioting and activities, gives theoretical depth to his earlier study of Nazi Party member's political biographies.

Originally published in 1938,The Nazi Movement remains at the heart of current debates on fascism and other nationalist/authoritarian movements. This book is a significant theoretical elaboration of Abel's earlier work, in which he interviewed ordinary Germans and discussed Nazism with them. Abel's work helps us understand why and how Hitler and his Nationalist Socialist party took root among ordinary middle and working class German people. In so doing, he takes us beyond those who focused on ideological dogmas that presented Nazism as a ruling class movement at one end and a vehicle for proletarian disaffection at the other.

PART ONE

Historical

Chapter II

The Background of the Hitler Movement

HITLER’S FIRST APPEARANCE before the German public as the prophet of a new order occurred on February 24, 1920. On this date, which marks the beginning of the movement, Hitler proclaimed the program of a new political organization, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party. In the speech which he delivered on this occasion he announced as the goal of this party a “fight to death” against the regime in Germany that had emerged from the aftermath of the World War. But in voicing this determination, Hitler was expressing a sentiment which had agitated thousands of his compatriots since the armistice. Hitler was not, therefore, building his movement upon a void. He was founding it upon a widely prevalent state of opposition and discontent in Germany, which many others before him had attempted to utilize for concerted action.

What was the source of the antagonistic attitude toward the new German government? In what way had it manifested itself before Hitler made his bid for leadership? The answer to these questions will reveal to us the background of the Hitler movement, which we need in order to understand its history. Taking our cue from the wealth of data marshalled in the autobiographies, we shall consider in this chapter the two major events and the reaction to them which, in my estimation, determined the nationwide sentiment that Hitler voiced in his opening address. These events were the revolution of 1918, and the signing of the Versailles treaty.

1. The “Revolution” of 1918

We realize today that the abdication of the Kaiser and the proclamation of the Republic on November 9, 1918, were precipitated by two main factors: first, there were the reversals at the front—the smashing of the main lines of defense of the Germans, together with the sudden surrender of Bulgaria and the crumbling resistance of the Austrian troops, which opened a fatal gap on the left flank of the Germans; second, there was the weakening of the home front, due to lack of food, supplies, and fuel, the general exhaustion and a growing sense of futility in regard to the war.

Conditions in Germany during the war are vividly described in these excerpts from the autobiographies:¹

[4.3.4.] I was, of course, tired of the war, and eager to be at home [writes a simple front-line fighter]. But even then I had no premonition of the imminent horror. As I came home that third Christmas, I saw hungry, dispirited faces, a people to whom nothing mattered any longer. The most anybody could wish for was a square meal and being left in peace.

This impression is further borne out by the reminiscences of children of the war now grown to manhood.

[2.3.2] Sometimes I had to scurry around eight to ten hours—occasionally at night—to procure a few potatoes or a bit of butter. Carrots and beets, previously considered fit only for cattle, came to be table luxuries.

[2.3.2] Hunger was upon us. Bread and potatoes were scarce, while meat and fats were almost non-existent. We were hungry all the time; we had forgotten how it felt to have our stomachs full.

All family life was at an end. None of us really knew what it meant—we were left to our own devices. For women had to take the place of their fighting men. They toiled in factories and in offices, as ostlers and as commercial travelers, in all fields of activity previously allotted to men—behind the plow as well as on the omnibus. Thus while we never saw our fathers, we had only occasional glimpses of our mothers in the evening. Even then they could not devote themselves to us because, tired as they were, they had to take care of their household, after their strenuous day at work. So we grew up, amid hunger and privation, with no semblance of decent family life.

Up to the end of July the majority of the German people were still hopeful of a victorious issue, or at least an honorable peace. The realization that the lines were crumbling was a profound shock, for which the nation was not prepared. The bad news led to a serious breakdown, of morale and a growing resentment against the government that had misled the people with false hopes. A vain attempt was made to stem the tide of demoralization by belated and hastily conceived reforms. The stringent war regulations which gave the military absolute control were lifted; the Prussian three-class election law was made more democratic; a new government, under the liberal Prince Max of Baden, superseded the government of Herting, which was in reality controlled by Ludendorff. Based as it was upon a coalition of the major Reichstag parties, the new Government was hailed as the “first real Government of the people, proclaiming to the world the birth of a new Germany, free from the fetters of a world policy misdirected for decades, and independent of reactionary potentates and militaristic second-Kaisers.”

But the democratic cloak under which the monarchy tried to hide its despair soon became threadbare. The death knell of the regime was sounded when the government was forced on October 6 to sue for an unconditional armistice. The result was the complete breakdown of authority that goes with a sudden fall from prestige. Because the state was unprepared for the emergency, it soon became paralyzed. The police power of the state virtually vanished, as public officials, bewildered and crushed by the sudden turn of events, ceased to exercise their duties or were ignored when they did. Soldiers on furlough refused to go back to the front; there was a mutiny in the navy. Food riots and mob excesses became daily occurrences. There were mass demonstrations and political meetings of all sorts at which violence, revolution, and dictatorship were preached. But there was no person or group ready to take over the control of the government that had dropped from the helpless hands of the old regime. Its opponents, the Socialists and radicals, were equally, unprepared for the emergency. The Socialists had been waiting for the “natural course of evolution” to bring them into power; when this power was suddenly thrown into their laps, they did not know what to do with it. The more radical Socialists, under Lede-bour and Liebknecht, claimed that they had started preparations for the revolution as far back as 1916.² Indeed their agitation was responsible for the strike of the munitions workers; they also had a hand in the propaganda at the front that was designed to undermine the morale of the soldiers. But, like everybody else, they were unprepared to assume the reins of government when the old regime collapsed. In addition to this, they made the fatal mistake of confusing the German situation with that in Russia in 1917 and of trying to proceed along the route followed by the Russian Bolsheviks. But, as subsequent events clearly demonstrated, there was no true spirit of revolution, no mass support for radicalism in Germany, despite the uprising against the established government. In spite of the bloody street fights in Berlin and other cities, the efforts of the Communists to establish a soviet government in Germany collapsed for lack of support. The reason is obvious: what happened in 1918 was not the result of a general change of sentiment or allegiance to new ideas of law and order. The majority of the people were in a holy wrath against the regime for having brought about an intolerable situation. They favored banishing the regime as a punishment for its failure, and as an act of penance on their part for the mistaken sense of loyalty they had reposed in it. But they had no wish to change the structure of society. They longed to go back to work, to recapture the old state of stability and order. To change the rulers and leave practically everything else intact was the wish not only of the powerful middle class, which was the main source of resistance to a radical revolution, but also of the majority of the workers, who remained true to the doctrine of moderate state socialism under the aegis of a parliamentary government—that is, the program sponsored by the Social Democratic party.

The lack of revolutionary fervor was evident even at the time the revolution was supposed to be in full swing. The Frankfurter Zeitung wrote on December 11, 1918:

Never has there been a movement which originated from so many chance occurrences. Voltaire was able to predict the French Revolution. But nobody really wanted a revolution in Germany, and had anyone predicted it in 1914, he would have been considered ridiculous. The fact is that the German revolution, originating as a mutiny in the navy, later joined by soldiers and workers, is leader less. Does this revolt dispose of the old faith in authority? For four hundred years we have known nothing but obedience to bureaucracy. Frederick the Great declared he was tired of ruling over slaves; Bismarck complained about the submissiveness of German character. Snobbish superiority has always characterized the ruling classes. Has the idea of a free people now become a reality?

In the light of subsequent events the prediction of the “Sage of Heidelberg,” Max Weber, made at the height of revolutionary fervor, is an accurate answer to this question. “The prevaient liberal ideas are for most Germans only a drug to relieve the terrible tension created by the breakdown at the front,” he wrote.³ Liberal thought was doomed to vanish shortly, for, as Prince Max of Baden declared a short time previously (September 18,1918), “The lack of liberty in Germany is due not so much to the institutions of the Reich as to the general passiveness of the people in the face of authority, and their unwillingness to assume personal responsibility for the fate of the Fatherland.”

What were the outstanding features of the “Revolution of 1918”?

The ferment and disorganization imminent on the collapse of authority shortly after the opening of negotiations for an armistice first manifested themselves in a mutiny in the navy. The sailors refused to obey orders and to man their ships, suspecting that they would be sent out in a desperate effort to stave off the inevitable surrender by some “miracle of heroism.” They assumed command of seaports and established sailors’ councils.

As soon as news of the mutiny became known, soldiers on leave and workers in various cities got together and organized similar councils. These councils took over the local governments without resistance, and hoisted the red flag on public buildings. Mass demonstrations of workers and soldiers demanding the abdication of the Kaiser and the proclamation of the Republic were held in all cities. Events reached their climax in Bavaria on November 8, when a Republic was proclaimed and the Kaiser was forced to abdicate. The next day a general revolt of workers swept Berlin. The troops sent out against the rioters went over to them in a body. Around noon a bulletin announcing the abdication of the Kaiser was released by the Chancellor. Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats, proclaimed the Republic to the throngs assembled in front of the Reichstag, in the following words:

The monarchical system has collapsed. The greater part of the garrison has joined our ranks. The Hohenzollerns have abdicated. Long live the German Republic! Ebert is forming a new government in which all socialistic groups have joined hands. Let nothing disturb the triumph we have achieved. Maintain peace, order, and security.

The proclamation of the Republic was followed for a time by a reign of chaos in Germany. The new government lacked power and authority to enforce order. Executive power was wielded arbitrarily and extravagantly by local soldiers’ and workmens’ councils, and by the provisional governments of Bavaria, Saxony, and other regions. The central government pursued a confused and vacillating policy. The empire was threatened with disintegration when powerful groups acted for the separation of provinces from the Reich. Strikes and riots occurred all over the country. The most critical situation was precipitated by the growing split within the ranks of the radical parties that supported the new regime. Factionalism finally ripened into open strife between the Social Democrats, who favored a moderate republic, and the Communists, or Spartakists, as they called themselves, under the leadership of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who, aided and abetted by Soviet Russia, demanded the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Civil war broke out. In a series of bloody battles in Berlin, Halle, and other cities, the Spartakists were defeated by regular troops and volunteers who rallied in support of the Republican government.

The defeat of the Spartakists decided the burning issue of the day: namely, whether or not executive power should be vested in the soldiers’ and workmen’s councils to retain the “achievements of the revolution.” Resolutions of civic organizations and front-line soldiers, demanding the convocation of a national assembly that would decide the future form of government, were pouring in. The Spartakists alone maintained that the revolution “stands or falls with the continuance of the councils,” and that, in the words of Karl Liebknecht, “the calling of a National Assembly signifies the defeat of the working class, and the suppression of the revolution.” The issue was finally decided by the councils themselves, at their Berlin congress, December 16-20, 1918. The delegates voted overwhelmingly in favor of the National Assembly after the resistance of the radicals had been broken by the suppression of their armed uprising.

The National Assembly, meeting at Weimar on January 19, 1919, adopted a new constitution and elected a president. The return to parliamentary government brought some order into the existing chaos. But the repercussions of the revolution continued to harass Germany well into 1924.

Throughout the months of ferment following the war there were two stabilizing factors. There was on the one hand the popular resistance to radicalism, the continued adherence to the old order of things, and the readiness of the people to content themselves with a superficial change in the form of government as long as they were allowed to resume the normal routine of life, with peace and bread. On the other hand there was the army, particularly the soldiers at the front. The most significant feature of the German “revolution” was the fact that the army at the front remained intact, maintained its discipline and order, and marched back in a fashion unparalleled in the history of defeated armies. There was no panic, no mutiny. A soldiers’ council was formed, but it functioned in close cooperation with General Headquarters.

From the first, the soldiers in the front lines opposed a radical revolution. They favored a moderate socialist government, and led with the demand for a national assembly. The general reaction of the army is succinctly stated by one of our informants:

[3.3.3.] Then came the thing we soldiers of the front could never have believed: the very men we had for years defended, for whose sake innumerable comrades had given their lives, while they led a life of ease and profits, betrayed us. My division, together with our commanding officers, who through the years had fought side by side with us, spurned the revolution and the soldiers’ councils. With a roll of drums we drew over the Rhine to Eilen-burg, where we were discharged in January 1919.

This attitude of the front-line soldiers precluded a repetition of the Russian Revolution, which was made possible to a large extent by the disorganization of the army. The returning soldiers were enthusiastically welcomed by the population. Their continued discipline gave the people new hope.

The returning troops, as a rule, dissolved the soldiers’ and workers’ councils, with the consent of the community. The following notice, in the Frankfurter Zeitung for November 27, 1918, is typical of many newspaper reports of this time:

Regiments of the Sixth Army, marching through Lennep, removed the soldiers’ and workmen’s council. The red flag on the municipal building was hauled down and burned amid the rejoicings of the population. In its place the Prussian war flag was hoisted. Sailors and workers of Remscheid, who came armed with machine guns, were taken prisoners.

Events like this, more than anything else, reveal the mental state of a great section of the German people. The bearing of the soldiers from the front and the reaction of the population to the soldiers’ rough treatment of the symbols of the revolution clearly demonstrate the weakness of the new revolutionary spirit.

2. Reaction to the Revolution

Since we are concerned here with the revolution only insofar as it concerns the Hitler movement, our main interest is in the negative, or unfavorable reactions to it, which were symptomatic of the general dissatisfaction it evoked. That there were positive or favorable reactions as well, particularly at the outset, goes without...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Preface
• I. Introduction
• Part One HISTORICAL
• Part Two ANALYTICAL
• Part Three SELECTED LIFE HISTORIES
• APPENDICES
• Index