Poland's Transformation

A Work in Progress

Bjorn Kurten, Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, John Radzilowski, Dariusz Tolczyk

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351499323
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

Poland has carried out two peaceful revolutions in the span of one generation: first, the self-limiting movement of Solidarity, which undermined the legitimacy of Communism and then a negotiated transfer of power from Communism to free market democracy. Today, while Poland is seen as a success story and is joining political and economic associations in the democratic West, Poles themselves seem downcast. They ask: is social anomie a price worth paying for a successful transformation? In making moral compromises with an outgoing tyranny, can one avoid cynicism and disappointment with democracy?

Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University has calledPolish Transformation"a work that provides a comprehensive as well as incisive overview of the extraordinary difficult and historically unprecedented process of transforming an increasingly corrupt and decayed totalitarian system into a modern democracy."

John Lenczowski, director of the Institute of World Politics, adds that "this extremely useful volume explains the essential elements of the post-communist political transition in Poland. Its authors convey...the cultural and ideological underpinnings that can be captured only by authorities who have developed over a lifetime that special sixth sense for detecting the elusive and unquantifiable soul of a country."

Radek Sikorski, the executive director of the New Atlantic Initiative at the American Enterprise Institute, writes that "we should be grateful to the authors and editors of this thoughtful volume for asking questions which remain relevant for that uncomfortably large part of humanity that still lives under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes."

Introduction: The Polish Revolution in Hindsight

John Radziłowski

These indeed are golden times for historians. . . all revolutions arouse national consciousness. A revolution implies a re-evaluation of a nation’s history.

Jerzy Jedlicki, 1990¹

Sometimes l wonder why I feel discomfort when I wake up and remember that I live in a sovereign state.

Zbigniew Herbert, 1994²

It is hard to write history about events that have only recently occurred. It is difficult to attain perspective on issues whose full implications may not be clear for decades. Having lived through and witnessed recent events makes it harder to disentangle ourselves, our emotions, and our politics from what happened and to see the forest for the trees. Moreover, the landscape of the recent past is constantly shifting. History continues to be captive to and cause of epoch-making events that forever alter how we see the past. Many scholars, for example, have written about the Revolution in Russia and Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, some well, others poorly. But until the events of 1989-91 it was impossible to view this cataclysmic tragedy in quite the same way as we do now. Historians will continue to write well or poorly about the Revolution in Russia, but they cannot understand it in the same way after 1991 as they did before. To these problems of writing contemporary history, we may add the practical problems of as-yet unopened archives and memoirs of key actors that have not yet been written.

Yet, writing the history of recent events is not a futile gesture, as the authors of this volume show. Crucial events of our times call scholars to make sense of them and to record as closely as possible what happened and how these events shape the recent past and consider how they may affect the past that has not yet happened. The purpose is not merely to provide grist for mills of writers unborn, but to provide insight and speak truth to ourselves and our contemporaries, even as we understand that truth to be largely unrevealed and the insight as flawed as all things human are flawed. This requires no small measure of courage, for historians of contemporary and near-contemporary events set a standard that subsequent writers will aim to for or merely take aim at.

The Polish Revolution against Soviet communism, whose “Shot Heard ‘Round the World” occurred in October 1978 with the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Krakow as Pope John Paul II, and Poland’s transition away from single party rule and a command economy, are among the most important events of our time. Although others followed and only time will show which had a more successful transformation, the Poles went first. It is therefore entirely fitting to subject them to the scrutiny of contemporary history.

Poles, like most humans in most times, muddle through. At other times, they, like other peoples, can transcend the everyday and do something extraordinary. Such was the case in the Polish Revolution against communism and against Revolutions.³

It would be hard, therefore, for the Poles to top their achievement in that era, and it should not be a great surprise that a let down followed the days of revolutionary glory. Yet, Poland has performed better than expected economically. Since the fall of communism, GDP per capita has not quite doubled and even during the recent economic downturn, GDP has continued to grow, though not nearly at the rates it achieved in 1995-97.⁴ This economic growth is reflected in a steadily rising life expectancy. What is more, economic growth has been accompanied by a drop in pollution output and a general improvement in environmental quality.⁵ All these factors stand in sharp contrast to Poland’s larger eastern neighbors, Russia and Ukraine.

Poland’s economic success cannot be explained merely as a fluke or as a case of filling the hole left by the severe recession of the 1980s.⁶ For one thing, many ordinary Poles had far more entrepreneurial acumen than was generally supposed in the West at the time. Prior to the fall of communism, quite a few financed family vacations by small-scale trading, taking advantage of the bizarre discrepancies in the Comecon system to buy surplus goods in one area and trade or sell them in an area where they were scarce.⁷ Those Poles with the chance to travel to Germany or the United States often took the opportunity to work illegally, thus amassing capital which was used to start businesses or improve one’s standard of living.⁸ Although there is rightly much criticism of the system of spoils that allowed Communist Party opportunists to go into business after 1989 using formerly public assets, it should not be forgotten that many Poles had indeed been able to accumulate small amounts of capital, whether in dollars, gold, or entrepreneurial skill. Poland’s success was not based on these spoils alone.

After 1989, there was also an almost immediate and dramatic increase in the demand for education, including post-graduate education, especially in subjects like business. Student enrollment in business and management curricula increased over the last decade more than seven times while the overall number of students increased only 3.5 times. The most dynamic growth occurred among students in part-time and weekend executive business and management programs. This group increased more than 17.5 times during last decade.⁹ This rapid increase in education was driven by the desire of current and future managers to be able to succeed in a developing economy that requires modern skills that did not exist under communism. Poland did possess a well-educated workforce, but many Poles realized that the communist education system had not prepared them well for life in a free market democracy. Although assisted by Western aid programs, the impetus came from the Poles themselves. In a very short time, Poles re-oriented themselves and their economy to Western business and managerial practices. Demand for learning English was particularly notable. One outgrowth of this has been the opening of numerous private colleges.

If latent entrepreneurial skills and education were two of the underlying pillars of Poland’s economic advances in the 1990s, a third was the increase in small-and medium-sized firms, which have been the major engine of growth. Although former state enterprises that have been privatized are economically better off than those still owned by the state, by far the most efficient and dynamic firms are those started from scratch after 1989, most of them relatively small (though some can now be classified as medium sized or even larger thanks to their success).

Following the communist collapse and the birth of the Third Republic, Poland was able to create a functioning democracy with peaceful hand-offs of power. It established a functioning legal system (though one saddled with numerous problems and in need of on-going reform). There was suddenly rule of law, freedom of the press, and respect for human rights. Despite predictions in the Western media that Poles and other central and east Europeans would rise up and kill every foreigner and Jew in sight after the gentle hand of Soviet rule ceased to restrain their natural impulses, extremist parties fared poorly.¹⁰ Regardless of inherited problems, these were real achievements.

Poland’s external security is also greatly improved thanks to joining the NATO alliance as well as to a far-sighted policy of building stable and friendly relations with potentially difficult neighbors. This is most obvious in relations with Lithuania and Ukraine. In the case of the latter, Lithuanian nationalists under Vytautas Landsbergis, a hero of the independence movement and newly independent country’s first president, were particularly strident in their desire to repress the Polish minority and to extract an apology for the Polish seizure of Vilnius in 1920. The extremist Iron Wolf society even launched attacks on Poles in a few instances. The Polish minority, for its part, demanded autonomy and transferred its allegiance to Warsaw. The Polish government was forced to play a careful mediating role which frequently frustrated the Polish minority. Tensions between the two countries peaked in 1992 and early 1993. Yet, Lithuania’s need to rejoin the west and, ironically, the electoral success of the former communists, allowed the two countries to sign a mutual cooperation treaty on April 26, 1994. This helped to cool tempers within Lithuania and normalize relations.¹¹

Relations with newly independent Ukraine have been rather more complicated. Both sides harbored strong resentments against the other and minorities on the opposite side of the border who had long felt culturally oppressed.¹² Ukraine was also far more important to Polish security. Fortunately, although there were occasional problems, neither side had an interest in conflict given the not-so-secret Russian desire to regain its former “sphere of influence.”¹³ Poland and Polish institutions have shown a willingness to build ties to Ukraine by providing technical assistance in economics and education. Poland has also tacitly allowed a large number of Ukrainians to work illegally in Poland and permitted a relatively open border with its struggling neighbor.

For all the progress that has been made and all of the talk about Poland’s return to normalcy, however, the changes have only gone so far. The weakness of the party system, to cite just one example, is indicative of the inchoate nature of the Polish elite and its political immaturity. There were valid reasons for taking a very cautious approach to lustration after 1989, particularly given the potential for abuse and the above-mentioned political immaturity. Nevertheless, no serious effort to confront the past has been undertaken. Instead, social amnesia seems to have largely taken hold among many elites. A strange public discourse has emerged in which a kind of symbolic language of political abuse has taken the place of honest debate. For example, those who have reservations about EU membership are not merely mistaken in the eyes of their opponents, but are “fascists” and “anti-Semites.” The other side consists of “commies,” and “agents of foreign influence” or even “Jews.” This kind of surrealism helps to poison the well of politics and exemplifies the impact of nearly half a century of totalitarian rule.¹⁴ As Herbert put it, Poland’s elite must create “the language of truth” and this is one transition that has yet to occur.

The moral and philosophical leftovers of communism have caused the greatest concern, especially since the communist system deliberately sought to degenerate social and civic values. Although communism failed in this, its attempt had serious consequences. The need to rebuild a just society based on inalienable principles of human rights has been overshadowed by political compromise between the former communists and the liberal wing of the former opposition. During a visit to Silesia in 1995, Pope John Paul II spoke to this question with forceful eloquence:

Today our homeland is facing many difficult social, economic, and political problems. They must be solved with wisdom and perseverance. The most important of all, however, remains the problem of a just moral order. This order is the foundation of every individual’s life and of the life of every society. For this reason, today Poland urgently and primarily needs men and women of conscience! . . . Our twentieth century has been a period in which human consciences have been particularly violated. In the name of totalitarian ideologies, millions of people were forced to act against their deepest convictions. Central and Eastern Europe has had unusually painful experiences in this respect. We recall this period when consciences were suppressed, when human dignity was despised, when so many innocent people suffered for deciding to remain faithful to their convictions. ... In those years we often asked ourselves: Can history swim against the tide of conscience? At what price can it do so? I ask again: at what price? . . . This price is unfortunately the deep wounds in the nation’s moral fiber, open wounds which still need a long time to heal.

Those times, times of great trial for conscience must be remembered, since for us they are an ever timely warning and exhortation to vigilance: that Polish consciences may not yield to demoralization, that they may not surrender to the trends of moral permissiveness, that they may discover the liberating nature of the teaching of the Gospel and the commandments of God. . . . Despite appearances, the rights of conscience must be defended today as well. In the name of tolerance, a powerful intolerance, perhaps an ever more powerful intolerance, is actually spreading in public life and in the mass media. Believers are painfully aware of it. They notice the increasing tendency to marginalize them from the life of society: what is most sacred to them is sometimes mocked and ridiculed. These forms of recurring discrimination arouse great concern and should be a cause for much reflection.

Brothers and sisters! The time of trial for Polish consciences continues! You must be strong in faith!

Today, as you struggle for a new form of life in society and in the State, do not forget that this life depends first of all on how man will be. . . . In our Polish land the Cross has had its own history now for over 1,000 years. It is the history of salvation which has been written into the history of the great human community that is our nation. Down the centuries, in periods of very harsh trial, the nation has sought and found the strength to survive and to rise from its historical defeats precisely in the Cross of Christ! It has never been disappointed! The strength and wisdom of the Cross has been strong! Can that be forgotten?

At this point I recall what I said at the Krakow Meadowlands during my first pilgrimage to Poland in 1979. Sixteen years have passed since then and those words become ever more timely. I said at the time: “Can one reject Christ and all that he has brought to human history? Certainly one can. Man is free. Man can say ‘no’ to Christ. But the basic question remains: is it licit to do this? In whose name is this licit? By virtue of what rational argument, what value close to one’s will and heart would it be possible to stand before oneself, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow citizens, one’s country, in order to cast off, to say ‘no’ to all that we have seen for 1,000 years? To all that has created and always constituted the basis of our identity?”¹⁵

Today, as Poland lays the foundations for its free and sovereign existence, after experiencing so many years of totalitarianism, these words must be recalled. In their light, sixteen years later, a profound examination of conscience must be made: Where are we going? In what direction are consciences heading?¹⁶

The Pope’s concerns about the legacy of communism were shared by others. In a 1994 interview, Zbigniew Herbert told Tygodnik Solidarnosc’.

Many of us thought that after 1989 we would liberate ourselves from the lie, even if we were not instantly successful in building an ideal society. It did not work out because. . . [the] elite proved incapable of creating the language of truth. Yet telling the truth is the fundamental obligation of intellectuals, and the only possible justification for society’s largesse toward them. To think means to de...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication
• Preface
• 1 The Polish Revolution
• 2 Points of Departure
• 3 Consolidation and Legitimization
• 4 The Constitutionals Debate
• 5 Dead Ends and New Beginnings
• 6 Prospects for Constitutional Democracy
• 7 The Problem of Property Restitution
• 8 The New Geopolitical Situation
• 9 The Dead Hand of the Past
• 10 Poland’s Fragebogen
• 11 Polish Literature in Transition
• About The Authors