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Introduction
Objectives
How should we analyze and assess new terrorist behaviors? What are the particular risks and challenges from new terrorism? Should we negotiate with terrorists? How should we negotiate with terrorists procedurally? To what should we aim during these crises? How should we end such crises? When should we use force against terrorists?
These are some of the questions answered in this book, using a review of the specialist literature, an unprecedented analysis of the large-n data, qualitative exploration of key cases, interviews with experienced officials, and real-world simulations of new terrorist crises.
More than 20 years ago, a few scholars identified the rise of what they categorized as ânew terrorism,â characterized mainly by increased lethality and religious motivations. This book takes an evidence-based approach to define and describe this new terrorism. Moreover, we show the acute adaptiveness and progressive developments of new terrorists, so that now, more than 20 years since new terrorism was identified, we should be thinking of the ânewest terrorismâ that has emerged in the last years, its form today, and its trends into the future.
New terrorists are increasingly risky. Terrorist hostage-takings, kidnappings, and active violence are increasingly frequent and deadly. Increasingly, these activities are used by terrorists as means to other endsâincluding, unfortunately, to lengthen publicity before mass killings.
This book seeks to improve our knowledge of new terrorist behaviors, and our skills in responding to new terrorist behaviors. Along the way, this book challenges some frequent myths about terrorist behaviors, such as incorrect characterizations of recent terrorist hostage-taking as being effectively the same as old terrorist hostage-taking (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2011, pp. 269â273).
Our new theories and data suggest that new terrorists are dramatically more ideological, murderous, and suicidal; they are generally less reconcilable, less trusting of official negotiators, less likely to release detainees, and more likely to kill detainees; they are less likely to demand ransoms, yet more likely to release hostages in cases in which they do demand ransom; they are more informed about the official sideâs policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures; they make use of new information and communication technologies to communicate with suppliers, controllers, surveyors, the public, and officials; they are more capable fightersâthey kill more people even though they deploy fewer fighters per hostage; and they make use of freer societies to access easier targets, while holding more complex interpretations of legitimate targets and legitimate handling of hostages.
Given our new theories and data, we give more informed advice about how to navigate such crises, but we also challenge fashionable, wishful thinking that all terrorists are open to rational negotiation or de-radicalization, and the reductionist thinking that military responses always reflect badly on the official side (Cole, 2009, p. 238; Stern, 2010; Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2011, p. 272; Powell, 2014, 2015). In this book, our evidence proves a category of hostage-taking that we call irreconcilable hostage-taking, in which the hostage-takers are intent on killing all the hostages eventually, whatever alternative is offered to them.
Most books on hostage-takings include only negotiations as official responses, but we include assessments, negotiations, and assaults in the full spectrum of potential responses. The intent of this book is to help the official counterterrorist side to assess, negotiate, and (if necessary) assault terrorist hostage-takers, kidnappers, and active shooters. For instance, we identify ways to manipulate the religious obligations and other obligations on terrorists not to harm detainees.
Scope
The focus of this book is on terrorist hostage-takings, kidnappings, and active violence. The scope of this book extends to official responses with terrorists generally. For instance, our advice on negotiating with terrorist hostage-takers, kidnappers, and active shooters is applicable to negotiating with other terrorists for other purposes, such as to make peace, or to discover demands. The implications also extend to nonterrorist hostage-takings, kidnappings, and active shootings.
This book is both descriptive and prescriptive. We describe terrorist behaviors, using our own extension of the most useful large-n dataset (Global Terrorism Database), qualitative exploration of key cases, and an unprecedented review of the doctrine issued by new terrorists themselves.
We prescribe useful, practical, and effective responses to these terrorist behaviors by applying our new descriptive knowledge, review of official practices, interviews with experienced officials, and real-world simulations of new terrorist crises.
Justifications
This book is interesting for anyone studying terrorism, violent crime, or negotiations. It is important to the improvement of our preparedness to deal with the increased frequency and deadliness of new terrorism, which is differentiated by changes in behaviors, capabilities, and intents.
This book effectively fills a gap in our knowledge and skills. It fills a gap in our knowledge because it compares old and new terrorist hostage-taking for the first time through large-n analysis. The large-n dataset used here, and in most analyses of terrorism in recent years, has previously lacked any differentiation of new versus old terrorism, which this book provides for the first time.
This book fills a gap in our skills because it prescribes responses to new terrorism in particular. Little literature focuses on responding to new terrorists particularly, and most of the latter fails to separate new and old terrorism practically.
This book is focused on terrorist behaviors, yet the skills, lessons, advice, and data in this book are relevant to crisis negotiation in general, not just terrorist crises in particular. Indeed, the increasing frequency of self-barricades, suicidal confrontations with police, and hostage-takings, and the increasing likelihood of terrorism, suggest that the skills, lessons, advice, and data should be generalized to police everywhere. Currently, most police are not especially trained for such crises, not even in America or Britain, where the risks are unusually high. These issues are illustrated well by the recent experiences and reflections of a police constable in the Metropolitan Police of London:
