Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Pavin Chachavalpongpun

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351364874
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic Conditions
• Index: Economics

The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand is a timely survey and assessment of the state of contemporary Thailand. While Thailand has changed much in the past decades, this handbook proposes that many of its problems have remained intact or even persistent, particularly problems related to domestic politics. It underlines emerging issues at this critical juncture in the kingdom and focuses on the history, politics, economy, society, culture, religion and international relations of the country.

A multidisciplinary approach, with chapters written by experts on Thailand, this handbook is divided into the following sections.

• 
  
  

• History

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• Political and economic landscape

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• Social development

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• International relations

Designed for academics, students, libraries, policymakers and general readers in the field of Asian studies, political science, economics and sociology, this invaluable reference work provides an up-to-date account of Thailand and initiates new discussion for future research activities.

Part I

The history

1

Introduction

A timeless Thailand

Pavin Chachavalpongpun

In 1967, Sir Anthony Rumbold, the British ambassador to Bangkok, was leaving his post and preparing to return home. He wrote a ten-page confidential document echoing his thoughts about the country in which he had served during the past two and a half years – Thailand. The document, which the ambassador hoped would be useful for his successor, explained in great detail how he perceived Thailand, particularly during the 1960s at the height of the Cold War. Rumbold talked about the domination of Bangkok, the rigid structure of Thai society and the rules which govern it, as well as the unwillingness of Thais to assume responsibility and the existence of endemic corruption. He went on to discuss Thailand’s political characteristics and the Thai attitude towards their king – in this specific context, King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1946–2016). He began this report by saying:

There is a theory that the Thais are rather easier for Europeans to understand than are other oriental people. I do not believe this theory. It seems to me that Sino/Indian/Malay/Thai ways of thought are so alien to ours that analogies between events in South-East Asia and events in Europe are nearly always misleading, that forecasts based on such analogies are bound to be wrong, that the motives of Asians are impossible for us to estimate with any exactness, and that Thailand and the Thais offer no exception to these precepts. The general level of intelligence of the Thais is rather low, a good deal lower than ours and much lower than that of the Chinese. But there are a few very intelligent and articulate ones and I have often tried to get some of these with whom I believe myself to be on close terms to come clean with me and to describe their national characteristics as they see them themselves and to explain why they behave in this way rather than in that way. The result has never been satisfactory.¹

Rumbold also wrote:

Thailand is governed by a benevolent dictatorship without a dictator. It is benevolent in the sense that it does its best according to its lights to promote the welfare of the people… . The dictatorship is embodied jointly in the two military leaders, Field Marshal Thanom Kittkachorn, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, and General Prapass Charusathiana, Minister of Interior and Commander-in-Chief of the Army… . But Field-Marshal Thanom has the backing of the King and enjoys a greater degree of general popularity and goodwill than does General Prapass.²

Rumbold’s description of Thai political characteristics still rings true today. Thailand in the 1960s is not much different, in many respects, than Thailand in the first two decades after the millennium. Something in the kingdom has remained intact and in some cases even moved backwards. Certainly, there have been some great developments in the past decades, particularly the economic growth and the opening up of society, the process in which one sees the traditions of Thailand being challenged by new ideas and the emergence of social media, which gives rise to the voice of the younger generation.

While admitting that Thailand has seen changes since the time of Rumbold, this chapter finds that much of what the British ambassador discussed in his report is worth revisiting. The document also brings up the pertinent question of how one defines “contemporary”. Where is the beginning of the contemporary period in Thailand? How far can one go back in time and yet define a given period as contemporary in order to explain the present? Since this handbook is about “contemporary Thailand”, it is imperative to make clear at this stage the starting point of Thailand in the contemporary period. There is a benefit in so doing. Contributors in this volume were requested to examine their chosen topic and its current situation. But they were also encouraged to go back into the past, particularly the past that has produced persistent implications in the present. In this process, such past can be considered as a part of being contemporary. This allows readers to understand better the topics based on their historical context. The developments or failures of Thailand, like any other country, owe much to its past. To look at contemporary Thailand, topics discussed in the volume cannot be totally divorced from the reality of yesteryear. Hence, “contemporary” in this volume carries a meaning of “continued impacts” on aspects of today’s Thai life.

The contemporary life of Thailand

Thailand’s contemporary politics might be defined as protracted, convoluted and even violent. For the longest time, many Thais have rested their trust in one key institution – not the democratic institution but rather the monarchy. It is true that the journey of the Thai monarchy on the political road has not always been agreeable. Following the revolution in 1932, which put an end to the centuries-old absolute monarchy, the royal institution has faced numerous challenges, most of which threatened its existence or questioned its anachronism. The first decade after the 1932 revolution witnessed some attempts on the part of the elites to promote democracy, then at its infant stage, while reaching for a compromise with the powerless monarchy. The abdication of King Prajadhipok in 1935 and the mysterious death of King Ananda Mahidol in 1946 further obscured the position of the monarchy in politics. The decline of the monarchy in this period, however, failed to strengthen democracy as a result of internal struggles among different factions within the realm of Thai politics. By the late 1950s, King Bhumibol, having already been on the throne for more than a decade, began a lifelong project of reviving the glorious days of the monarchy, with firm backing of the military represented by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Together, they crafted a version of neo-royalism whereby the monarchy would once again become central to Thai political life. In so doing, not only was the position of the monarchy elevated, but the military itself exploited the king in order to guarantee its interest in the political arena. Defending the monarchy was made equal to defending national security. Hence, the existence of the royal institution in many ways entrenched the prominent role of the military in politics – the role that has solidified over the years until now.

Bhumibol found an ally in the army, Sarit. The process of constructing the neo-royalist ideology commenced and was guided under the newfound alliance between the monarchy and the military. In this process, Bhumibol was reinvented into the utmost venerable king. Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul argues that the embodiment of neo-royalism rests on three important characteristics: “being sacred, popular and democratic”.³ Bhumibol was sacralised and transformed into Dhammaraja. He was down to earth and citizen-centric. But he was also protected by the draconian lèse-majesté law, which forbids anyone from insulting the king, the queen, the heir apparent and the regent.⁴ Accordingly, Sarit resurrected old rituals, such as prostration before the king, which was once declared “uncivilised” by King Chulalongkorn (1968–1910). The purpose of reviving old rituals was to elevate Bhumibol to the level of demigod, hence sacralising the royal institution that would command unconditional allegiance from the people. He boosted his popularity mainly through his royal developmental projects designed to supposedly improve the livelihood of those in marginalised regions. He embarked on endless trips throughout the country, meeting with his subjects, listening to hardship stories and handing out assistance, spiritual or material – introducing the concept of populism long before other politicians. The exhaustion from journeying thousands of miles was portrayed through an image of the hardworking king with “sweat on the tip of his nose”. As for his fondness of democracy, Bhumibol’s occasional interventions in politics, particularly during the tumultuous periods, earned him the status of a “stabilising force”. In intervening in politics bringing an end to political conflict, Bhumibol presented himself as a political alternative – one that was imbued in morality. Thai politics was gradually turned into a realm of ethics, with the monarchy standing on righteousness and politicians on immorality. As Rumbold referred to this, “The god-like position of the King is questioned by nobody”.⁵

In this process too, the military openly strolled into the political domain under the pretext of defending the country’s key institutions – the nation and the monarchy. The Cold War of ideological conflict provided the perfect arena for the military to deepen its roots in politics. The threat of communism was looming in Thailand’s neighbouring states. As Indochina became a stronghold of communists in the region, Thailand became the front-line state, directly encountering the menace to its security. Thai despots during the Cold War successfully made communism so extrinsic to Thai identity, so in the meanwhile, ironically, dictatorship became intrinsic to Thai nationhood. Had communism swept Thailand, then Thainess undoubtedly would have become communist. As the war against communism was brewing, the United States stepped in to play a significant role in the kingdom. The US government, in safeguarding its interests in the region, offered strong support for the monarchy and the military in combating the communist threat. Together, the monarchy, the military and the United States built closely knitted relations, lasting unto the present day. Painting the face of enemies was now a necessary mission as part of legitimising the despotic regime at home.⁶ While external enemies were assigned to Indochinese communists, internal enemies were members of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). When students at Thammasat University rose against Thai despots, they were accused of being communists and thus dealt with brutally.

The end of the 1970s, traumatised by the massacres of Thammasat students, served as a wake-up call for the monarchy and the military to reassess their position amid public fury with the state’s brutality. Neo-royalism was put in doubt, whether the royal institution should be taken as a political alternative. In 1979, Bhumibol initiated another self-reinvention project in order to distance himself from the dark days at Thammasat. He invited the BBC to interview him, a discussion which focused on the essence of neo-royalism. Called “Soul of a Nation”, it offered a narrative on the “normal” life of the royal family inside the walls of the palace. While one objective behind this interview was showcasing the royal family as the main pillar holding the Thai nation together against the threat of communism, the other goal was to portray the monarchy as a devoted institution. In this documentary, Bhumibol talked succinctly about his selfless care of his people and his kingdom. The documentary was elaborately staged; in some scenes Bhumibol was sitting on the floor with layers upon layers of blueprints flooding the entire room, signifying yet again a working monarch with a common touch. The emphasis on the people-centric royal institution was accompanied by the restructuring of the network monarchy. And the key figure behind the success of this network was General Prem Tinsulanonda.

The network for royal hegemony

Network monarchy, a term coined by Duncan McCargo, is a useful framework in analysing Thai politics.⁷ The best way to understand Thai politics is to look at it as a kind of network. The most powerful political network from the 1970s until at least the arrival of Thaksin Shinawatra as premier had been the network monarchy. It consists of powerful institutions outside the parliamentary structure, namely the military, judiciaries, senior bureaucrats, powerful businesses and royalists. Prem was handpicked by Bhumibol to serve as prime minister for two terms, from 1980 to 1988. At the beginning of the Prem regime, the communists continued to play a role as “the other”. But the American withdrawal from the region as a result of its loss in the Vietnam War compelled Thailand to readjust its position vis-à-vis the communist bloc. In search of a new security provider, Thailand established diplomatic relationship with China in 1975 during the Kukrit Pramoj government, four years before US President Jimmy Carter signed a joint communiqué normalising bilateral relations with his Chinese counterpart, Deng Xiaoping. It was another twist in the story of Thai nationhood. Just as Thailand depicted communists as number-one enemies throughout the Cold War, the reconciliation with China raised the question of what really constitutes “otherness” in the world of Thai nationhood. While defining communist Vietnam as a clear and present danger, Thailand defined communist China as a reliable friend. The notion of Thai nationhood was therefore malleable according to the power interests of the Thai political elites.

Domestically, Prem was credited for creating a template of an unelected but relatively effective prime minister during his eight-year tenure.⁸ A former army chief, he took advantage of his profound connection with the military in order to sustain political stability at the same time as King Bhumibol continued to firm up his moral and sacred persona. Prem was known as the key engine behind the network monarchy, particularly after he stepped down from the premiership. From 1988, Bhumibol appointed Prem as president of the Privy Council, an advisory body of the king. In the post-Prem government era, the network monarchy remained politically active, working intimately with powerful institutions in placing the monarchy at...