Looking back to France in 1944, Gilles Deleuze recalled, âWe were still weirdly stuck in the history of philosophy. Quite simply, we got into Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger; we threw ourselves like puppies into a Scholasticism worse than the Middle Ages. Fortunately, there was Sartre. Sartre was our Outside, a fresh breeze from the back gardenâŠ. [Phenomenology and existentialism] were already history by the time we got to them: too much method, imitation, commentary and interpretation, except for the way Sartre did itâ (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 18â19; Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 12). How is that Sartre, who certainly belonged to what Paul Ricoeur called the generation of âthe three Hâsâ (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger) (Ricoeur 1970: 32) could be a way out of the new phenomenological scholasticism? If Sartreâs take on Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger was always slightly off kilter, this was in no small part because it was mediated by the work of philosophers writing in French: Emmanuel Levinas for Husserl; Jean Wahl for Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger; Henri Lefebvre for Hegel and Marx; and Alexandre KoyrĂ© for Hegel.
Leaving aside Husserl, I will focus here on how Sartre approached Hegel, Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Sartreâs Hegel interpretation is marked on the one hand by Lefebvreâs Marxism, with an emphasis on synthesis and totality, and on the other by Wahlâs Kierkegaardian reading of Hegel, with its emphasis on emotions and the individual, and KoyrĂ©âs conception of an open-ended dialectic that never reaches an âend of history.â A Marxist, Kierkegaardian Hegel, in short, one full of tensions and paradoxes that are never fully resolved in Sartreâs philosophy. It was also thanks to Wahl that Sartre read Heidegger through Kierkegaard and vice versa, something made abundantly clear in Sartreâs treatment of the theme of anxiety (angoisse) in Being and Nothingness. Sartre has often been reproached for not being sufficiently scholarly, but it is just this dilettantism and his reliance on French mediators of German thought that helped make Sartre a breath of fresh air.
Wahlâs existential Hegel and âthe unhappy consciousnessâ
Early in Being and Nothingness, Sartre makes this striking declaration: âConsciousness is by nature an unhappy consciousness, with no possible transcendence of its unhappy stateâ (Sartre 1976: 129; Sartre 1992: 140). He is in no way making the easily refutable claim that empirically speaking, people are always unhappy. He means âunhappy consciousnessâ in a very specific sense, taken from Hegelâs Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1977: Chapter IV. B.), and particularly Jean Wahlâs interpretation of Hegel in his 1929 book, The Unhappiness of Consciousness in Hegelâs Philosophy (Wahl 1929). The unhappiness of consciousness is a structural feature: consciousness is unable to coincide with itself, is internally divided or separated from itself, and so is unable to simply be what it is.
In Hegel, the unhappy consciousness is a âshapeâ or âfigureâ of Spirit that manifests itself historically in Judaism and Christianity, when consciousness experiences itself as a finite and transitory particular, a ânothingnessâ in relation to the full and solid being of the absolute Other that stands over against it: God. God is universal, infinite and eternal; consciousness is finite, particular and mortal. Yet this opposition between the being outside consciousness and the nothingness inside it is in fact a division within consciousness: the opposition between the sensory and the intelligible, instinct and reason, inclination and duty; in general, the opposition between the changing and the unchangeable, or between the particular and the universal aspects of consciousness. God, then, represents an alienation of consciousnessâs eternal and universal aspects into a being outside of itself. The goal of consciousness is to recover its alienated being, or to return to itself, by incorporating into itself those aspects of its own being that consciousness had projected outside itself.
Spiritâs return to itself from otherness is modeled, says Wahl, on human existence: âFor in what does life consist if not in separating itself from itself and transcending itself in order to return to itself? Separation resides in the notion of man himselfâ (Wahl 1929: 140). Every determination of Spirit reflects the suffering of a divided consciousness that longs to return to itself and heal itself (Wahl 1929: 10, 187f): human history is that of âthe unhappy consciousness of God,â âthe absolute unrest, the inequality of Absolute Spirit that creates othernessâ (Wahl 1929: 143).
In principle, says Wahl, Hegel holds that this process comes to an end when the philosophical concept (Begriff) brings together the duality of the sensible and the intelligible while preserving their differences and mutual determination: âthe unhappy consciousness, in perceiving this separation of united elements⊠will have the notion of their union and will be the happy consciousness⊠the concrete universalâ (Wahl 1929: 154). In fact, itâs not that simple. Each time consciousness tries to grasp itself as being, it is forced to do so with reference to non-being, so that it is âdriven from the one to the other of these categories by the negative force of reasonâ (Wahl 1926: 282â83). This creates a kind of ontological insecurity: each term by which consciousness seeks to grasp itself turns into its opposite and consciousness experiences itself as absolute negativity (Wahl 1927: 448â49; see Wahl 2017: 54â89). Yet consciousness cannot be this negativity or lack of itself (Wahl 1927: 448) as it is both being and nothingness (Wahl 1927: 451), both the reality of its negating transcendence and the nullity of what it negates. Consequently, consciousness is absolute unrest and doubleness or duplicity (Wahl 1927: 444): âit is too small for itself because it is greater than itselfâ (Wahl 1929: 155). âUntil the moment when consciousness achieves its unity, we are in the presence of a game of âloser wins,â where there is a continual reversal and an incessant irony, where consciousness ceaselessly ends up with the opposite of what it soughtâ (Wahl 1927: 467).
This inability of consciousness to grasp itself fully and transparently, its inability to âbe what it isâ or attain sincerity because it is âtoo big for itselfââbecause it is always transcending and negating whatever determinate being it has attainedâplays an important role in Sartreâs account of âbad faithâ in Being and Nothingness, particularly the pages where he deals with the impossibility of sincerity (Sartre 1992: 99â112; Sartre 1976: 92â104). Sincerity would be possible only if I can coincide with myself and simply be what I am (Sartre 1992: 101, 105), but because I am constantly going beyond any fixed determinations of my present being toward my future possibilities, I am âa being which is what it is not and which is not what it isâ (Sartre 1992: 100, 107, 112, 116). I both am and am not my past; I both am and am not my being-for-others âin a perpetually disintegrating synthesis and a perpetual game of escape from the for-itself to the for-others and from the for-others to the for-itselfâ (Sartre 1992: 100). âOn all sides I escape being and yetâI amâ (Sartre 1992: 103).
The sincere person wants to be herself, to coincide with herself, says Sartre, in the way that a table is a table, but that is impossible: as soon as I conceive of âwho I really am,â by that very movement, I transcend the object I have made myself into and put it at a distance from me: I am already beyond it (Sartre 1992: 109, 120â26). On the other hand, I cannot coincide with my negative movement of self-transcendence either, since transcendence is anchored in a world (Sartre 1992: 111, 115â16). In fleeing our âinner disintegrationâ in sincerity, we run up against our self-transcendence; in trying to be the pure movement of transcendence, we run up against the self we transcend (Sartre 1992: 116). Because consciousness is simultaneously what it is not and is not what it is, we seem to be, in Wahlâs words, âin the presence of a game of âloser wins,â where there is a continual reversal and an incessant irony, where consciousness ceaselessly ends up with the opposite of what it soughtâ (Wahl 1927: 467).
Consciousness is structurally unhappy, then, because âit is a lack of a certain coincidence with itselfâ and âis haunted by⊠that with which it should coincide in order to be itselfâ (Sartre 1992: 153). Consciousness, being always consciousness of something, can only define itself through its objects, and each object reveals itself through a series of âprofilesâ (Abschattungen) that are the noematic correlative of the consciousnesses that âintendâ them (Sartre 1992: 5â6). Each particular appearance of the object is transcended toward the total series of appearances that would define the object, a closed and determinate totality. Inasmuch as an objectâs appearances are correlative to acts of consciousness, this totality is ânot the pure and simple contingentâ being-in-itself of the object, but the totality of consciousnessâs possibilities âcongealed in the in-itselfâ and made determinate (Sartre 1992: 139â40). Yet the totality of an objectâs appearances, its âessence,â poses a purely ideal limit to consciousnessâs possibilities (Sartre 1992: 250â54), reflecting the ideal of oneness (Sartre 1992: 121), just as sincerity, or âbeing who one is,â is merely an ideal of being that is never attained (Sartre 1992: 101). This ideal is in fact an impossible synthesis of open-ended transcendence and determinate being; consciousness âis perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it cannot attain the in-itself [closure, identity] without losing itself as [consciousness]â (Sartre 1992: 129; cf. Sartre 1992: 154). Consciousness thus experiences itself as the lack of the synthetic totality that would allow it to be what it is (Sartre 1992: 136â39, 147, 153) and suffers from that lack, driving it to seek an impossible wholeness, just as Wahl had argued (Wahl 1927: 443â44; 448).
We know that the resemblances between Sartreâs theory and Wahlâs are not coincidental. Sartre refers in Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1992: 529) to the concepts of âtrans-ascendenceâ and âtrans-descendenceâ (the upward movement of transcending from below to an Other and of transcending from above to an Other) which Wahl presented at a famous lecture in 1937 on âHuman existence and transcendenceâ (Wahl 1937; Wahl 1944); Wahl 2017: 152â215). In that same lecture, Wahl interprets Husserlâs âintentionalityâ as exstase, existing outside of oneself in order to be present to the phenomena that appear to consciousness (Wahl 1944: 13, 27, 29n), which requires that the self be separated from itself by its own future (Wahl 1944: 31â32): âThere is no consciousness save at a certain distance from itself⊠there are no consciousnesses but unhappy onesâ (Wahl 1944: 66â70). These ideas, which both Wahl and Sartre relate to Heideggerâs maxim that Dasein is âa being of distancesâ (Sartre 1992: 51, 52â53; Wahl 1944: 66; Heidegger 1929; Heidegger 1969),1 are not to be found in standard interpretations or commentary and are a sign of the distinctively French twist given to Hegel and Heidegger. Most importantly, Wahlâs influence was decisive for Sartre making Hegelâs unhappy consciousness t...