The Best of Enemies

Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948

Uri Bar-Joseph

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135170172
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

An analysis of Israel's relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.

CHAPTER ONE

AGREEMENT AND DISCORD

November 1947 – May 1948

Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish defection?

—Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War

Now I am convinced that the British are leaving and we remain, we and you, face to face. Any clash between us

– will make it that much worse for us both.

—Abdullah, in a conversation with G. Meyerson and

representatives of the Yishuv, 17 November 1947

It is an accepted historical practice to view 29 November 1947 –the day the UN General Assembly passed the resolution to end the British Mandate over Palestine and to partition that country into a Jewish and an Arab state – as the Day on which the 1948 War commenced. Accordingly, the departure of the British High Commissioner from Palestine and declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel, on 14 May 1948, are viewed as the concluding events in the first stage of the 1948 War: the stage in which the Jewish Yishuv fought against the Palestinian Arabs.

This division corresponds closely, though not precisely, with the evolution of relations between the Yishuv and Transjordan under King Abdullah. Here, 17 November 1947 constitutes the opening of a new phase, as representatives of the Yishuv, led by Golda Meyerson, met with Abdullah. That phase was to end in a similar meeting on 11 May 1948 – a meeting which seemingly brought relations full circle.

(a) Naharayim: 17 November 1947

The Jewish Agency delegation to the meeting with King Abdullah, held on the eve of the UN partition decision, comprised three members: Golda Meyerson, Acting Head of the Jewish Agency Political Department in Jerusalem; Eliyahu Sasson, Chief of the Arab Section of the Political Department; and Ezra Danin, a member of the Arab section. The three were not unfamiliar with the views of the Transjordanian monarch. For years, meetings had been taking place between representatives of the Yishuv, and particularly members of the Agency’s Arab Section, and Arab representatives, and a special relationship had been formed between the Yishuv and the ruler of Transjordan. Both sides realized that these ties were based on mutual interest, and that, with mutual good will, they could reach fruition. Testimony as to the nature of contacts held whenever the Palestine question was about to take a new turn, can be found in the reports of Eliyahu Sasson. In August 1946, for example, when the Grady–Morrison Federation Plan was being discussed, Arab and Jewish representatives were invited to London for a conference on the subject. King Abdullah met with an Agency delegate and presented his views on the question in an effort to coordinate his position with that of the Yishuv.¹

In this sense, the Naharayim meeting of mid-November 1947 was not remarkable; it was, after all, but one in a long line of such encounters. However, in view of circumstances – and particularly the anticipation of a partition resolution – it did offer the first practical opportunity for the two sides to express their strategic intentions, with a view to possible collaboration. In this sense the participation of Golda Meyerson — replacing Moshe Shertok, who was in New York – was significant, not least because it reflected the importance attached to the meeting by the Yishuv leaders.

The conversation at Naharayim lasted 50 minutes. The Transjordanian monarch began by suggesting that the meeting take the form of an exchange of views and concerns. He particularly emphasized his staunch stand within the Arab League: ‘Everyone was against me, but I held on, and now it is clear that I am the strong one, and my army is an element of value.’² The king held that the Jews had become strong during the past 30 years, to the extent that they could not be ignored. Compromise was an obligation, because the conflict was not between Jews and Arabs, but rather between Jews and British, and Arabs and British. ‘Now I am convinced that the British are leaving and we remain, we and you, face to face. Any clash between us – will make it that much worse for us both.’

The king then returned to the Partition Plan once discussed between the two sides,⁴ this time emphasizing that it was imperative that partition not ‘embarrass me in front of the Arab world at a time that I appear to be defending it’.⁵ He also reiterated his idea for a federation, within which an independent Jewish republic would be established in part of Palestine, under the Transjordanian kingdom he headed. According to his plan, the economy, security affairs and legislature would be administered on a federative basis.

The king evidently accepted, at least for the time being, the negative reaction of the Agency delegates, who refused to exchange a British Mandate for a Jewish–Arab federation, though he would return to his proposal at a later stage of negotiations. For the time being he was interested in the possibilities of a de facto partition, and the Jewish reaction to any attempt on his part to capture the Arab areas of Palestine. The reaction of G. Meyerson and her colleagues to this inquiry was much more positive, ‘particularly if you do not hinder the establishment of our state and avoid a clash between us and your forces’.⁶

The Agency delegates evidently perceived that Abdullah’s plan might arouse UN opposition, and they therefore suggested –possibly in a friendly effort to camouflage the king’s true intentions – that in the course of his military moves he declare that they were directed toward restoring peace and order until such time as the UN succeeded in establishing a government in the territories under question. The king’s reply leaves room for speculation as to whether he grapsed this proposal as merely an excuse or as reflecting the Jews’ real intentions: he rejected the idea, stating that his goal was to attach the Arab territories to his state, and not to create ‘a new Arab state that would hinder my plans and allow the Arabs to “ride me ragged”. I want to be in the saddle, not underneath it’.⁷

The conversation moved to the question of carrying out partition. Both sides concurred that Britain was the principal force capable of executing partition, but in view of the possibility that suspicions would arise concerning British intentions, Abdullah accepted the Jewish preference for an international force. Having agreed on this point, Abdullah then noted that the international force should be concentrated along Palestine’s mandatory borders with Syria and Lebanon, and under no circumstances along the border between the Yishuv and the prospective Arab country. While he understood that the force might have to deploy along the Palestine–Transjordan border, he added that such a move was unnecessary, and for an obvious reason: his de facto understanding with the leaders of the Yishuv.

A separate discussion was devoted to the mutual enemy of both the Jews and Abdullah – the Mufti of the Palestinian Arabs. Abdullah counselled the Jews to reply ‘with sharp blows if the Mufti even dares attack us in an attempt to create faits accomplis. As a matter of fact that man must be removed from this world.’⁸ Possibly due to his suspicions that the Jews would not use the methods he preferred in dealing with Haj Amin al-Husseini, Abdullah proposed ‘that they transfer him to Transjordan, where he would take care of him’.⁹ The Jewish delegates quite naturally preferred not to react to his suggestion, which in any case was inoperative, as the Mufti was at this time in Egypt, after fleeing France. The Jews did, however, encourage the Trans-jordanian ruler to develop his ties with Palestine’s Arabs in anticipation of the execution of his plan, which called for their collaboration.

Towards the end of the conversation Abdullah admitted that the British attitude toward his plan remained a mystery to him, as they had not discussed it with him. When the Agency representatives concluded by asking whether he ‘would be prepared to sign a written agreement’,¹⁰ he replied in the affirmative, and suggested they prepare a draft.

Both sides appeared to have a clear grasp of the understanding they had achieved in their meeting. Abdullah may have been obliged to forgo his more ambitious plans (he was by now quite accustomed to making such concessions), but his minimum plan – to take control over extensive Arab territory in Palestine and prevent the establishment of an independent state under the rule of his arch-enemy – had received the blessing of the Yishuv representatives. As for Golda Meyerson and her associates, they appeared to have laid the foundation for an agreement which would, in the event of partition, permit them to carry out the decision without bloodshed or, alternatively, with the military support of Abdullah. Each side could clearly assess the gains and losses that would accrue; the real question concerned the feasibility of realizing the agreement, and here two key elements were involved. First, would each side be prepared to stand by the understanding, even at the price of certain concessions? And second, could each side – and the Bedouin ruler was clearly the more vulnerable – stand fast in the face of external pressure to alter its position? In any event, even though a written agreement was not signed – both parties realized that the hour was not yet ripe for such a signature – the Jews left the meeting with the impression that Abdullah felt strong enough to accept and even carry out the agreement.

The ensuing attempts on the part of both sides to stand by the understanding they had achieved, while pressured from various directions to violate it, constituted a central issue during the period that preceded the end of the British Mandate. The consequences of this process would ultimately come to bear on the next meeting between Abdullah and G. Meyerson six months later, in mid-May 1948.

(b) Transjordanian Strategy: November 1947–May 1948

It is difficult to assess to what extent Abdullah’s self-confident attitude at his meeting with Golda Meyerson indeed reflected a genuine belief on his part that, despite anticipated developments, he could achieve his principal objective of annexing the Arab areas of Palestine to his kingdom. But it was clear to the king that the realization of his goal would require the fulfilment of three preconditions: (i) coordination of policy with Britain – the central imperial power in the Middle East, and the protector of Transjordan; (ii) maintaining the understanding achieved with the Yishuv – Abdullah’s principal ally in the short run, and perhaps in the more distant future, too; and (iii) retaining a veil of secrecy over his intentions as far as the other Arab states — fellow members of the Arab League – were concerned, and, similarly, keeping his true goals in Palestine from the knowledge of those Arabs over which he was about to take control.

(i) Coordination with Britain

In the preliminary conversations between Abdullah and British Foreign Minister Bevin, held following the Labour Party’s rise to power in Britain, the Palestine question per se was not discussed. But even in November 1945 Bevin did mention, in a conversation with the Transjordanian ruler, the possibility that Britain would seek to abandon its Mandate in Palestine and deliver over the problem to the UN.¹¹ This idea was again discussed by the two in London in February 1946.¹² In the event, when Bevin did announce Britain’s intention of transferring the Palestine question to the UN, on 18 February 1947, Abdullah recognized the urgency of the situation and the need for intensive action on his part in order to realize his objectives in Palestine.

The UN Partition decision of November 1947, which specified that the British Mandate end the following May, caused Abdullah to despatch his representatives to Britain in a final attempt to attain a measure of operative collaboration. The Transjordanian delegation comprised Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Foreign Minister Fawzi al-Mulki, and Brigadier Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, who functioned as a military adviser and interpreter for the talks. The delegation appears to have arrived in London on 25 January 1948,¹³ and commenced negotations aimed at introducing alterations to the defence pact between Transjordan and Britain.¹⁴ But this was not the delegation’s only objective in coming.

With the conclusion of deliberations concerning the pact, Abu al-Huda requested a special interview with Bevin for the purpose of discussing the future of Palestine after the British withdrawal. The Transjordanian prime minister explained to the British foreign minister – with Glubb, he would later claim, serving as interpreter only – that in view of conditions in Palestine, where the Jews enjoyed a military advantage over the local Arabs, the latter had asked Abdullah to send his army to protect them upon termination of the Mandate. Bevin’s response was crystal clear: ‘It seems the obvious thing to do.’¹⁵

Here we already begin to encounter some of the difficulties that would affect the nature of the war in Palestine after the Arab Legion’s entry. Glubb at this point explained to Bevin that, due to the Legion’s limited strength, it could only occupy those parts of Palestine that bordered on Transjordan itself – wit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Glossary
• Introduction
• 1. Agreement and Discord: November 1947 – May 1948
• 2. The Strategy of Limited War: May-July 1948
• 3. Military and Political Options: July-December 1948
• 4. The Central Protagonists and their Aims
• 5. Negotiations – Secret but Official: January-February 1949
• 6. Rhodes and Shuneh: March-April 1949
• Summary
• Index