Self-Deception

Eric Funkhouser

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351378635
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Self-deception poses longstanding and fascinating paradoxes. Philosophers have questioned whether, and how, self-deception is even possible; evolutionary theorists have debated whether it is adaptive. For Sigmund Freud self-deception was a fundamental key to understanding the unconscious, and from The Bible to The Great Gatsby literature abounds with characters renowned for their self-deception. But what exactly is self-deception? Why is it so puzzling? How is it performed? And is it harmful?

In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy and psychology of self-deception, Eric Funkhouser examines and assesses these questions and more:

• 
  
  

• Clarification of the conceptual background and "Basic problem" of self-deception, including Freud and Davidson and the important debate between intentionalists and motivationalists
• Deflationary accounts that appeal to cognitive and motivational biases, with emphasis on how motives and emotions drive self-deception
• Intentional self-deception and the "divided mind, " including the role of the unconscious in recent psychological research
• Challenges that self-deception poses for philosophy of mind and psychology, especially for our understanding of intention, belief, and deception
• Biology and moral psychology of self-deception: Is self-deception functional or beneficial? Are the self-deceived to be held accountable?

Combining philosophical analysis with the latest psychological research, and including features such as chapter summaries, annotated recommended reading and a glossary, Self-Deception is an excellent resource for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, moral psychology and ethics, as well as those in related fields such as psychology and cognitive science.

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1Self-deception: common, yet puzzling

1.2Psychological tendencies

1.3Why study self-deception?

Many of us tend to think that the work we do has special importance, if only because we want to believe this. So perhaps it is a bit of self-deceit on my part, but I believe that the topic of self-deception – roughly, failing to believe what the evidence indicates you should believe (and perhaps even believing contrary to it), because you are motivated or make an effort to do so – should have special importance within philosophy. As I understand the philosophical enterprise, at its core philosophy involves reflecting on our beliefs, wants, and values and then rationally scrutinizing and adjusting what we find. It is the love of wisdom. Self-deception is a real threat to the philosophical enterprise – and perhaps a real threat to leading a good human life, as well – because it is a failure of both reflection and rationality. The self-deceived are not appropriately examining their beliefs and making rational adjustments.

On the positive side, the phenomenon of self-deception introduces a host of philosophical and psychological problems for us to study toward the end of gaining a better understanding of the human mind, rationality, and our well-being. Philosophy benefits from having problems to solve and difficult questions to answer. How can a mind suppress the truth? How can wanting to believe something contribute to making it happen? What does all this say about the structure of the mind, the nature of belief, and the extent to which we are – and must be – rational? Are we best served by always pursuing the truth or loving wisdom, anyway?

Self-deception is not merely of theoretical interest; it is deeply important for practical life. If we have a predilection toward self-deception, then this tendency can be exploited by ill-intentioned advertisers, political propagandists, as well as friends and lovers. A beer company can indulge a man’s self-deceptive fantasy about his appeal to the opposite sex; a political website offers you “fake news” that confirms your own biases and prejudices; an alluring romantic prospect leads you to self-deceive regarding the kind of relationship and family life you would enjoy. Self-deception can certainly be dangerous in itself to the extent that it takes us away from the truth yet still guides our actions. It can also be dangerous by making us more vulnerable to manipulation by others.

This opening chapter provides an informal introduction to some of the problems of self-deception and the psychological tendencies that incline us to self-deceive. The chapter closes by explaining some of the theoretical and practical reasons why one might be interested in studying self-deception in the first place. Beginning in Chapter 2, we will treat these problems with greater technical rigor. Chapter 2 more rigorously charts the terrain of self-deception: its basic problems, its driving motives, and its purported end states. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present and evaluate the most prominent and promising positive accounts of self-deception that have been offered to address these problems and questions. These are accounts that appeal to motivational biases, divide the mind, or introduce nuanced purposes and states of mind. In Chapters 6 and 7, we will consider the person’s responsibility for their self-deception, as well as engage in a bit of cost-benefit reckoning to see how dangerous self-deception is or if it could even be advantageous.

Our focus throughout will be primarily on the philosophical problems of self-deception, using the various methods of philosophy. These include: investigating critical concepts such as belief, deception, and self; exploring the limits of rationality, especially as this relates to posessessing contradictory beliefs, engaging in projects aimed at misleading the self, and the influences of non-rational factors on belief; distinguishing different degrees of human agency, especially in our capacity as epistemic agents; breaking down the process of self-deception into its logical parts and charting (and assessing) the possibilities in psychological space. These are all familiar philosophical topics and tools. That being said, we will also turn to psychology and even biology as we search for answers to our questions about why and how self-deception occurs. The approach taken here aspires to have philosophical investigation work in concert with empirical investigation.

§1.1 Self-deception: common, yet puzzling

This book approaches the topic of self-deception from many angles: What is it? How is it possible? How do we execute it? What purposes does it serve? Is it beneficial or harmful? Is it laudable or condemnable?

Self-deception is normally viewed as a negative, something to be criticized and looked down on. It even seems a bit perverse that we deceive ourselves, nevertheless it is so common that there likely is some pleasure or benefit to it. But what is the thrill or the reason for which we trick ourselves? It is obvious how we humans, as well as other animals, could benefit from lying to or tricking others: We can exploit them. Lying is a malicious weapon belonging to the same general category as theft and assault, each of which can have positive strategic value if one can get away with it. Of course, these things are immoral; but Mother Nature does not care. It seems that lying to yourself, however, would be no more beneficial than stealing from or assaulting yourself. How foolish! (Or maybe not! In §5.2 and §7.3, we will evaluate the biological advantages and costs of self-deception when we turn to Robert Trivers’s famous theory that we self-deceive in order to better deceive others.)

Neither is it clear that it is even possible to execute. If we take the word at face value, it would seem that self-deception is the deception of the self by the self (for the self?). In some sense, it is lying to or tricking yourself about some truth. We know how easy it can be to deceive someone else: You come home late and lie to your mother, claiming that you were doing something other than going out drinking with your friends. The deception succeeds because your mother is not aware of the facts – the outrageous bar tab and the various concoctions imbibed. Neither is she aware of your intention to mislead. But how could you possibly succeed at lying to yourself about that? You know the truth and are well-acquainted with the evidence. Hiding the truth from yourself seems like a hopeless task, akin to tickling yourself. It cannot work because, unlike your mother, you know exactly what you are up to. But yet in self-deception, somehow the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing.

Suppose that, unlike your mother who is simply in the dark, your father is self-deceived about your behavior. He knows more than your mother does, yet he is unwilling to face the truth. Father blames your partying ways on your peer group – they are to blame for your self-destructive behavior. Yet if he were not your father he would see that, if anything, you are the bad influence in the group. His desire to think well of you clouds his judgment, motivating his self-deception and causing him to lose objectivity. If you were somebody else’s son, he would think quite differently. But, as it is, he focuses only on your friends’ flaws, blocking out (forgetting, avoiding, downplaying) what he knows to be your poor choices. He knows the truth in at least some sense – he is not completely detached from reality – yet in many regards it is as if he does not know. His mind avoids certain thoughts and facts, yet he knows exactly what to avoid. He says that he trusts you, yet he makes sure not to leave money lying around. Here we see telltale marks of self-deception: irrationality, division, and contradiction. Left hand, right hand.

As we will see beginning in Chapter 2, one of the central roblems of self-deception is demonstrating how all this is even possible. This is a peculiarly philosophical task: showing how something that we know to be actual is even possible!¹ Nevertheless, this kind of task arises in various domains and across philosophical history. Zeno of Elea famously gave us paradoxes – stories like the one about Achilles and the tortoise – which purport to show that motion is impossible. Zeno apparently thought that these stories actually demonstrated the impossibility of motion, but for most of us they issue a challenge to show how motion is possible while granting that, of course, it occurs. Many philosophers have also wondered how free will can possibly exist (in either a deterministic or indeterministic world) or how consciousness could arise from matter. Of course, some do deny that these things are truly possible, but for many others these questions challenge us to demonstrate how they could be possible even though we assume their actuality. Answering such paradoxes often sheds deep insight on the nature of the phenomenon – it corrects or expands our understanding.

Many, but by no means all, of the problems of self-deception are philosophical. Self-deception offends against two classical philosophical ideals in particular: the pursuit of truth and self-knowledge. First, the very word “philosophy” comes from the Greek word for “love of wisdom.” Philosophers are widely supposed to value the pursuit of knowledge and truth. Yet self-deceivers are driven in the opposite direction, wanting ignorance or falsehood instead. The self-deceived fail to confront reality. Second, philosophers tend to value reflection and self-knowledge in particular. Plato had Socrates speak favorably of the Oracle at Delphi’s injunction to “Know thyself!” This same oracle also famously proclaimed that no one is wiser than Socrates. Plato depicted Socrates as interpreting this claim, at his trial, in a way that fits nicely with valuing self-knowledge. Socrates’s great wisdom, in contrast with what he found when questioning the supposedly wise men of Athens, consisted in knowing the limitations of his own knowledge:

I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know. (Plato, 1997: Apology 21d)

Self-deceivers are not simply unaware that they have false beliefs; worse yet, they go out of their way to preserve this ignorance. (As we will discuss later, it seems impossible to be aware that you are self-deceived and maintain that state in full awareness.) Contrary to these philosophical ideals, the self-deceived seem to value or pursue falsehood and self-ignorance.

As with many philosophical topics, it is good to stock the mind with several examples. Literature is a particularly good source of detailed case studies into the human condition, and self-deception is certainly a core and univeral feature of humanity. Self-deception is a common, yet typically complex, psychological phenomenon that often generates a state of conflict or tension in response to a less than ideal world. It is no surprise, then, that it features prominently in many great works of world literature. Sometimes the self-deception is described as a simple process that has immediate effect. In Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea, the protagonist Santiago aims to convince himself that, despite his advanced age and the long battle he has already waged against the great fish, he still has the strength to bring it into his boat:

I am not good for many more turns. Yes you are, he told himself. You’re good for ever. (Hemingway, 1952/2003: 92)

Santiago has a short-term goal – persevering at an arduous physical task – and he appears to accomplish it merely by reassuring himself, albeit with irrational optimism. Self-deception at the drop of a hat.

But self-deception often requires more work than that. In the 17th Century, Blaise Pascal considered someone who takes a mathematical approach to the question of whether to believe in God. Calculating the expected payoffs for belief and disbelief, this person should “wager” that it is safer to believe in God (with the chance of eternal reward and the risk of merely wasting one’s time) than it is to not believe (with the risk of eternal damnation and the scant gain of being able to sleep in on Sunday mornings). Yet she cannot succeed at believing this simply at will, as she can raise her arm at will. She needs to take an indirect route instead:

Follow the way by which they began, by behaving just as if they believed, taking holy water, having masses said, etc. That will make you believe quite naturally, and according to your animal reactions. (Pascal, 1995: 156)

In short, Pascal recommended “fake it until you make it” – belief will eventually follow practice. Self-deception often demands quite systematic lifestyle choices. Think of the great efforts that James Gatz had to go to in order to convince himself that he was something more than a Midwestern boy of modest means; he was the Great Gatsby.

Literature and the world of letters more generally show us that self-deception can have broad scope, both in terms of its psychological implementation and its agenda. I remember visiting the Clinton Presidential Library and being struck by one book in particular taken from the bookshelf of Bill Clinton’s youth: Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death. In that book, Becker argued that greatness requires living under a “vital lie,” denying our own mortality by throwing ourselves into projects that can outlive our meager biological lives:

The great boon of repression is that it makes it possible to live decisively in an overwhelmingly miraculous and incomprehensible world, a world so full of beauty, majesty, and terror that if animals perceived it all they would be paralyzed to act. (Becker, 1973/1997: 50)

Repression and lies at the heart of a meaningful life! It is not hard to imagine how this line of thought resonated with the ambitious mind of a future President. After his presidency, Clinton wrote:

According to Becker, as we grow up, at some point we become aware of death, then the fact that people we know and love die, then the fact that someday we, too, will die. Most of us do what we can to avoid it. Meanwhile, in ways we understand only dimly if at all, we embrace identities and the illusion of self-sufficiency. We pursue activities, both positive and negative, that we hope will lift us beyond the chains of ordinary existence and perhaps endure after we are gone. All this we do in a desperate push against the certainty that death is our ultimate destiny. Some of us seek power and wealth, others romantic love, sex, or some other indulgence. Some want to be great, others to do good and be good. Whether we succeed or fail, we are still going to die. The only solace, of course, is to believe that since we are created, there must be a Creator, one to whom we matter and will in some way return … I’ve spent a lifetime trying to do that. Becker’s book helped convince me it was an effort worth making. (Clinton, 2004: 235)

Clinton read the book on his honeymoon.

But do not think that self-deception is always driven by optimism or goodwill. In literature, as in life, the self-deceived are not always deceived in a favorable direction. Fyodor Dostoevsky was particularly adept at crafting characters who displayed psychological complexity with a negative orientation. For example, the narrator in Notes from the Underground rationalizes his inactivity and misery. He sees himself as superior to the “men of action,” but simultaneously he is filled with self-loathing. His methods are perverse:

I thought up adventures for myself, I concocted a life for myself so that at least I could live somehow. How many times did it happen that – well, for example, that I took offence just like that, for no reason, deliberately! and after all, I used to know very well that I’d taken offence for no reason at all, that I was making a show of myself; but you carry on to such an extent that by the end, it’s true, you really are offended. Somehow all my life I’ve been so attracted by this sort of game-playing that by the end I was no longer in control of myself. (Dostoevsky, 2008: 18–19)

We are likely to see the Underground Man’s strategy for the pathetic defense mechanism that it is. He is not alone. Who knows why Dr. Seuss’s the Grinch ended up as he did? The Wizard of Oz? Or Mr. Potter from It’s a Wonderful Life? How many real life failures similarly attempt to comfort themselves with self-deceptive withdrawal, negativity, and externalization of blame?

§1.2 Psychological tendencies

Self-deception is driven by psychological and biological facts about human nature that transcend cultural variation; they are universal. Experimental cognitive and social psychology has confirmed what writers and amateur psychologists have long suspected: people tend to think better of themselves, their family, their friends, and the other groups to which they belong than an objective assessment of the evidence would warrant. People tend to be biased in various ways that either count as self-deception in their own right or which provide motives for it. Most of these biases are self-serving in some regard, and they show people as favoring beliefs skewed away from the real and toward the ideal, self-serving, or simply convenient. Th...