Sociology of Religion

An Historical Introduction

Roberto Cipriani

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351488884
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Sociologia

Sociology of Religion represents a documented introduction to the history of sociological thought as applied to religious phenomena. It examines both the substantive and functional definitions of religion that are more open, pluralistic, and not inscribed in a single explanatory horizon or within a single confessional perspective. The contributors' concerns are carefully written to show all sides of the argument. Roberto Cipriani argues for the simple definition that the sociology of religion is an application of sociological theories and methods to religious phenomena. Historically, close ties between sociology and the sociology of religion exist. The slow and uneven development of theory and methods affects the sociology of religion's development, but the latter has also benefited from increasing precision and scientific validity. Other sociological writers agree and disagree about different approaches. Some assume it is a militantly confessional or anti-confessional; others remain neutral within their work.

I
The Origins

1
The Historical-Philosophical Background

The Historical-Critical Method

The beginning of a scientific approach to the study of religious phenomena originated a long time ago and developed at a rather slow pace. It dates back to the seventh century and is linked to the new Galilean science, to Cartesian rationalism, and to Spinozism, that is, to the need to free religious studies from fideistic and ideological claims. In this regard Piergiorgio Grassi wrote, “Today we can see more clearly how Spinoza’s thought spread within late seventeenth century English culture by influencing the political and religious debate. . . . Spinoza wished to bring biblical hermeneutics back to the ratio” (1984:54–55).

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza lived in Holland from 1632 to 1677; his parents were of Spanish and Portuguese origin. Spinoza’s Jewish origins are a trait in common with other scholars who have been crucial for the development of the study of religion. Spinoza has been criticized in various ways (Grassi 1984), e.g., for being “Jewish” or for being “excluded from his own community.” “He died without the assistance of the clergy and without belief in a recognized God.” He was declared a “symbol of atheism,” a “godless philosopher, a threat to religion and society.” But he has been also seen as a “discreet and simple man,” a “virtuous atheist,” a “sober and frugal person, obedient to his country’s laws, indifferent to wealth, a man of faultless morality” (ibid.). Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus ([1670] 1991) did not find an easy road to success, because it was a text that is critical of the belief in prophecy, miracles, and theocracy.

Spinoza strenuously defended being a free thinker. For the sake of his autonomy, he went so far as to reject economic support from Louis XIV and an appointment offered to teach at the University of Heidelberg. Spinoza fought against prejudices that keep us from knowing the truth. Following Descartes, he adopted a deductive methodology. His motivation was mostly a moral one (which brings him close to Durkheim among others). He supported the superiority of the state over the church. His main objective was the possibility of expressing his thoughts in complete freedom. This freedom should be coupled together with a rationalistic attitude, the basis of scientific knowledge leading to laws that would be valid at any place and time. Truth could be achieved through the deductive method—that is, reality should be understood by first considering important and reliable ideas, which could be then applied to specific cases, going from the general to the particular.

Spinoza’s historical-critical method was directly linked to political questions designed to achieve a freer society, which would be open to new solutions, including a secular approach to religion.

Aside from the considerations described above, there are obviously other, more strictly philosophical implications in Spinoza’s thought. However, what is of interest here is Spinoza’s avant-garde position with respect to later social scientifically oriented developments.

Vico (1668–1744): Civil Theology in the Light of Providence

Notwithstanding an aversion, toward Cartesianism and toward the rationalistic and empirical presuppositions that are at the origin of sociology, Giambattista Vico contributed to a change in the study of religious phenomena. Through his historical approach to philosophical questions, he saw the origin of religion and the idea of God in the history of humanity. In fact, in the New Science he said: “The civil world for all peoples begins with religion” (1999:(8) 8), a statement he repeated later.

According to Vico, through history (the new science)—with its own laws and paths—it is possible to explain society, nature, and reality in general. From the age of the gods, or the age of “mere feeling,” there followed the age of the heroes, or the age of “imagination.” Finally there was the age of man, ruled by “reason.” Differently said: “People first feel things without noticing them, then notice them with inner distress and disturbance, and finally reflect on them with a clear mind” (ibid.:94).

Every society reflects the main traits of its particular age. So society will be in turn theocratic, aristocratic, and then democratic. But at the end of each cycle (of the three phases) there is a crisis and everything starts again, with cyclical returns, or ricorsi, to the age of the gods. Myth remains dominant until the advent of the third phase, that of human reason.

According to Vico, divine providence (a leitmotiv throughout the New Science) is at the origin of all these developments. History, in fact, is a sort of “civil theology reasoned in the light of providence.” To this logic should be attributed Vico’s idea of the “strength of religion”:

Divine providence initiated the process by which fierce and violent men were led from their lawless condition to enter civilization and create nations. Providence did this by awakening in them a confused idea of divinity, which in their ignorance they ascribed to objects incompatible with the divine. Still, in their fear of this imaginary divinity, they began to create some order in their lives.

(ibid.:87)

This principle of the New Science implies that religion carries out an educational activity even under difficult conditions. Even violent peoples accustomed to the use of weapons can become meek and promote social order. Vico discusses in advance this postulate in the seventh axiom (or metaphysical principle), which “proves that divine providence exists and that it acts as a divine legislative mind. For out of the passion of people intent on their personal advantage, which might cause them to live as wild and solitary beasts, it makes civil institutions which keep them within human society” (ibid.:78). It is clear from this last statement that there is a connection between religion and society, between religious beliefs and civil order.

Pasquale Soccio has observed in his introduction to Vico’s New Science that this is

a civil theology reasoned by providence—let us stress the adjective civil—that is, a divine providence that acts through natural means in the formation of simple human knowledge which chronologically precedes educated knowledge. The word reasoned here is used to demonstrate the natural and historical order of human things and facts. The work of providence is especially evident at the origin of humanity, when it acts through “merely natural routes” and reveals itself as acting from reason and good sense, thus guiding human occurrences toward justice, society and common well-being. Thus, those selfish individuals who think to act according to “different and opposite paths” are instead positively influenced by the work of providence toward man’s tendency for living in society.

(1983:214)

The conclusion of Vico’s work was in praise of religion:

Providence caused the world’s first governments to base themselves on religion, which alone made the state of families possible. Next, as they developed into heroic civil governments, or aristocracies, religion clearly provided the principal stable foundation. Then, as they advanced to popular governments, religion likewise served as the people’s means of attaining democracies. Finally, as they come to rest in monarchical governments, this same religion must be the shield of rulers. If peoples lose their religion, nothing remains to keep them living in society. They have no shield for their defense, no basis for their decisions, no foundation for their stability, and no form by which they exist in the world.

(1999:490)

The centrality of religion is constant. It is like an everlasting “shield” for civil life and thus a necessary ingredient in the social history of peoples.

In the end Vico openly shows his religious bias by stating:

Only religion can make people perform virtuous works by appealing to their senses, which effectively move people to action. . . . There is an essential difference between our true Christian religion and all the other religions, which are false. In Christianity, divine grace inspires virtuous works for the sake of an infinite and eternal good. And since this good lies beyond the senses, the mind must move the senses to virtuous actions.

(ibid.:490–91)

It necessarily follows that this “New Science is indissolubly linked to the study of piety; and unless one is pious, one cannot be truly wise” (ibid.:491).

Later analysis of religious fact omitted piety as a crucial ingredient for wisdom and scientific knowledge. Vico’s discussion of religion remains useful in particular for its diachronic analysis, which uncovers the close ties between religion and different societies.

Hume's Natural Religion (1711–1776)

The birth of a scientific subject like the sociology of religion is not a sudden event. Prior to the appearance of the sociology of religion as an independent field of study, there were highly contrasting attitudes toward religion. On the one hand, religion was heavily attacked, especially in its organized forms; on the other hand, individual confessional creeds were strenuously defended. More rarely, a neutral position emerged that aimed at a mere social analysis—not yet a sociological one—of religious phenomena.

The beginning of the sociology of religion can be traced back through various paths. However, the development of a philosophy of religion has contributed more than other disciplines to the social sciences’ initial interest in religious phenomena. In fact, the alliance between philosophy and sociology is an undeniable fact.

It should be stressed, however, that the scholars discussed in the following section of this book cannot be considered protosociologists of religion. In fact, the term sociology came into existence during their lifetime. However, the contributions by Hume, Feuerbach, Tocqueville, Marx, and Bergson are discussed in this volume because of their historical importance and theoretical weight, which was crucial for later scientific developments.

These authors’ observations on religion became both vantage points and dividing lines, since they followed different ideologies and philosophical orientations. The study of religion later became more objective, as it adapted the rules of experimental science to social phenomena. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the contribution of positivism became crucial. It is from this philosophical current that sociology emerged.

However, the path of the development of the sociology of religion is not clear-cut; in fact, it does not lead directly to Durkheim and Weber if one considers the work of the philosophers who were active in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The quest for his path should be undertaken with great care in order to detect speculative currents and cultural attitudes that underscore the role of religion within society.

The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–76) is the first author who should be considered for his essentially empirical approach to the analysis of religion. He spoke of a natural religion whose roots are found at the instinctual level, since human beings are instinctively motivated by three elements: happiness, poverty, and death. The desire for pleasure, together with the fear of poverty and death, have led people to seek satisfactory answers and explanations in religion through the creation and divination of anthropomorphic figures—a device to conquer all sorts of fears.

It is possible to infer from this the importance of Hume’s thought for the development of the empirical interpretation of religion. His thought also influenced the growth of a more modern theory of knowledge applied to religion. This theory relies on a concrete perception of reality and avoids theological hypotheses and assumptions that cannot be empirically demonstrated.

Among the leading members of the so-called Scottish moralists (as they are sometimes called) or the Scottish realistic school were Adam Ferguson ([1767] 1980) and John Millar ([1771] 1996). They dealt with inquiries concerning civil society (Montesquieu’s influence is clear) together with important conceptual hypotheses applied to sociologically relevant realities, such as groups, conflict, property, “association” (which is a form of cooperation aimed at the creation of associative institutions, such as religious ones), division of labor, anomie, power. However, most of these terms were not defined according to today’s sociological usage. David Hume—the philosopher, economist, and historian (1754–63) who also authored a history of England—worked in an environment that favored the empirical approach. However, if on the one hand he rejected the hypothesis of God because it is empirically unverifiable, on the other hand he attributed an important role to emotions in directing the individual’s life. Even though they lack an empirical basis, people’s beliefs appear to be consistent in their support of ethics, religion, and other social experiences that give sense to life.

Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) was published anonymously in two installments. The first volume, divided into two books, appeared in 1739 and the second volume was published in 1740 in three different books. The three books of the second volume deal with knowledge (book I), passions (book II), and ethics (book III). Religious questions are discussed in an unusual and daring way for the time. Religion is examined and subjected to experience. Hume’s better known observations on religion appeared partly in A Treatise. These notions are resumed in Four Dissertations: The Natural History of Religion, of the Passions, of Tragedy, of the Standard of Taste ([1757] 1996) and especially in Dialogues concerning Natural Religion ([1779] 1998).

For Hume, feeling is the foundation of religion, since experience bases itself on perceptions. However, from experience derive ideas to which emotions, memories, and anticipations are linked. The existence of God cannot be proven. For this reason both the person of faith and the nonbeliever share the same hopelessness when it comes to explaining the idea of God, which is a barely probable and unnecessary anthropomorphic character. This also explains a certain skepticism on the part of the believer. Since they cannot be rationally explained, miracles are seen through a skeptical lens (Hume 1748), also because scientific progress is more and more able to discover new horizons and to provide new explanations for various phenomena. Miracles as such then seem to be linked to a superstitious attitude and to the desire to see a supernatural event. In fact, there are usually very few witnesses to a miracle and their versions of what happened generally tend to conflict. According to Hume:

It is experience only which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but to subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder.

(Hume [1757] 1996:146)

From a more sociological perspective, Hume underlines the difference between monotheistic and polytheistic peoples. The first have a more rationalistic view of the world, whereas the second are tied to a less critical approach. However, polytheist peoples are more accepting of different views and are in general more socially open (Hume 1996:47). Moreover, polytheism is more familiar with the metaphysical dimension since the gods appear to be closer to human subjects.

Hume maintains that all knowledge falls under the control of experience. Hume’s method resembles that of Newton in physics. Hume sees social reality almost as pertaining to the field of physics. This analytical attitude holds true both for the Treatise (Hume [1739–40] 1986)—a juvenile work later rejected, written during his first stay in France (in La Flèche, where Descartes was educated)—and his later works (which were published under his name).

Briefly, one can say that Hume does not deny the possibility of religion. In fact, he would not be able to since experience shows the existence of a religious phenomenology. His skeptical attitude is then mainly with regard to the evidence of religious facts, which it is not possible to prove empirically and rationally. Religious beliefs turn out to be feelings and not knowledge. In fact, human beings are more mindful of feelings than of reason.

Notwithstanding his basic skepticism, Hume is mainly concerned with moral questions. The ties between ethics and religion are not fortuitous. In fact, he disagrees with certain ways of debating morals or with fanatical attitudes toward religion, but he does not completely deny them. On the contrary, through his moderate attitude he disdains religion’s miraculism on the one hand, and its rational and empirical claims on the other. Hume’s attitude toward morals seems to anticipate the same concerns of Durkheim a century later. It is not by chance that Hume, like Durkheim, was interested in the topic of suicide (Hume [1777] 1996). In 1757 Hume wrote an essay on ...