1 Introduction
Questions and themes
Overview
While Singaporeās education system claims to implement meritocratic ideals, official statistics indicate that Malay students in Singapore have been underperforming when compared to other ethnic groups (MOE, 2012). This statistical representation raises the possibility of a politically induced, systemic inequality as a point of investigation. In order to interpret the contemporary state of inequality, there is a need to trace its historical and evolutionary development and construction (Garrity, 2010, p. 203). Towards this end, this research is both an investigation into how policy discourses manage the contradictions inherent in Singaporeās streaming1 system, and at the same time it is also, fundamentally, an investigation into the practice and advancement of critical discourse analysis (CDA)2 in examining inequality.
The focus of this research is primarily theoretical and methodological, articulated through a concern with the interface between theoretical concepts and methodological principles in interpreting empirical material. In doing so, it presents detailed methods for constructing a flexible philosophical-analytical model through which to apply the analytic principles of CDA for the interpretation of policy texts, thus developing CDA as a theory and method to enhance its capacity to tackle inequality. This philosophical-analytical framework developed through the analysis makes use of Foucaultās work on archaeology, genealogy, and ethics, and Nietzscheās work on valuation.
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the history of Singaporeās education system and the course of events that precipitated streaming in schools, how this policy has been supported by the media, and the outcomes and critiques of the streaming policy. The following sections will outline the research trajectory, briefly summarise the significance of the research and its contribution to the field, and, finally, provide an overview of the structure of the rest of the book that highlights the theoretical-methodological coordinates of this investigation.
Making sense of Singaporeās education policies
The Report on the Ministry of Education 1978 (MOE, 1979a) was the first to propose an explicit form of ability-based streaming which heralded the introduction of the āNew Education Systemā (NES) (Barr & SkrbiÅ”, 2008, p. 114; Soon, 1988, p. 1). This major policy initiative, which has since then profoundly altered the shape of Singaporeās education system, is underpinned by the āfundamental beliefā that ability grouping is responsive to learnersā diverse capacities and would ābetter fulfil his (a studentās) innate potentialā (Ng, 2008a, n.p.). Working on the fundamental principle of meritocracy, the system is designed to promote and explicitly claims to reward those who work hard (Wong, 2000, n.p.) through a āstreamingā mechanism in which different abilities and capacities can be identified, nurtured, and appropriately allocated for the benefit of a growing Singapore populace. Subsequent policies and policy adjustments in 1987, 1991, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012a, and 2019 have adapted and reinforced the 1979 policy based on meritocratic principles. Within this frame of meritocracy, streaming is represented as an increasingly necessary driver for securing Singaporeās economic strength.
While a āhorizontalā form of diversity (Archer, 2007, p. 639) featured prominently in the 1979 and 1991 MOE reports, which recommended a range of strategies designed to address the presumable absorption capacities of āslowā learners, subsequent policies published in 1987, 2002, 2006, and 2012a focus on a āverticalā form of diversity (Archer, 2007, p. 639). This form of diversity provides exclusive opportunities for greater diversification in the system to nurture and prepare talents for an era of what Gopinathan (2007, pp. 61ā62) refers to as āinnovation-driven growthā. Using carefully constructed arguments, the original and successive policy discourses draw upon and weave together different discursive formations that are brought forward under the rubric of meritocracy. While the discourse of meritocracy is a fundamental part of official rhetoric, the shifts in emphasis within these policies that aim to identity and groom talents contradict meritocratic principles. Indeed, it is the coexistence of these apparently contradictory strands that, in the view of this research, constitutes much of what is distinctive about current education policy and practice in Singapore. This study seeks to explore and account for this hybridity. It is particularly interested in what is seen as an attempt by policymakers to broaden opportunities for students who have ātalentā as defined by policy while at the same time claiming meritocratic ideals.
Based on a historical analysis of what might happen to Britain between 1870 and 2033, in āThe rise of meritocracyā (1958), Michael Young used the word āmeritocracyā in a pejorative sense and a term of disapprobation, arguing that the test-based system of advancement emerging in post-war Britain which appeared to provide opportunity for all was actually a coercive apparatus of the state through which a particular class maintains control and reproduces itself. Young himself was profoundly critical of the development he identified, and his futuristic satire was meant to be a warning of the folly of meritocratic life that polarises society and encourages the belief that oneās advancement is a result of oneās own merits (Sen, 2000, p. 7). Lacking access to schools with optimal resources, children from less privileged backgrounds consistently fared poorly in the 11-plus exam ā the test given to children after sixth grade that largely predetermined their professions. As a consequence, the disadvantaged remained at the bottom of the social ladder, their underperformance used to validate the status quo. With the insistence on meritocracy, the underprivileged class masses become increasingly disfranchised and deprived by educational selection; they no longer have their own people to act in their interests and bring about specific outcomes. Youngās apocalyptic vision, which ends in an imagined final revolt and countermovement against meritocracy in 2033, was credited with leading to the dissolution of the 11-plus in Britain (Fox, 2002, n.p.).
Meritocracy is a key principle of educational governance in Singaporeās streaming system and is defined as āequal opportunities for each student to learn and to achieve his or her potentialā (Wong, 2000, n.p.). Through a detailed examination of recent educational policy discourses, this research seeks to explore how these enduring meritocratic principles and procedures are increasingly forced to coexist with broader notions of talent opportunities at the expense of ensuring equality of outcomes. The following section provides some historical context and a brief lead-up to the Goh report.
History of Singaporeās education system and the Goh report
Formerly a British colony, Singapore attained full internal self-government in 1959, and became part of Malaysia until 1965 (Betts, 1975, p. 149). Since gaining independence in 1965, it has been under the purview of the Peopleās Action Party (PAP) government. In the 1950s and 1960s, āthe Singapore educational sectors inherited from the British an ethno-linguistically divided, under-resourced system incapable of meeting the twin demands of unifying a pluralistic society (i.e. nation building) or match [sic] the evolving needs of a modern economyā (Gopinathan, 1995, 1997 as cited in Gopinathan, 2006, p. 296). Rather than abandoning colonial legal and legislative traditions, the government built upon these structures and constructed a centralised system of education to forge and articulate a Singaporean identity (Chia, 2011, p. 22) and promote social cohesion among the different ethnic communities. The system had a central focus on using both English and the Mother Tongue to produce a competent workforce through systematic skill formation strategies (Gopinathan, 2006, p. 296). More importantly, within a multi-ethnic society that could not afford ethnic discrimination, the government sought to enshrine meritocracy as a core value and promote advancement by merit (Rahim, 1998, p. 5).
After Singapore gained independence, the government started to study various aspects of education. Major weaknesses were identified in the late 1960s and 1970s (Ng, 2008b, p. 114). Of major concern were the āproblems of ineffective curriculum, low literacy levels and high resource wastage in the systemā (Ng, 2008b, p. 114). Recommendations of the review of the educational system resulted in the 1979 Goh report, from which various education policies emanate, including an early streaming system in schools and vocational education (Rahim, 1998, p. 121). It was not until the introduction of streaming as a policy and as an efficient allocating mechanism in 1979 that any form of explicit student division was widely practised in schools. The 1970s and 1980s saw the development of an efficiency-driven system based on the tracking and promotion of academic or cognitive achievement (Gopinathan, 2006, p. 299).
Dr Goh Keng Swee presented the āGoh Reportā in February 1979. It was an assessment of MOEās problems, and introduced the āNew Education Systemā (NES) (Barr & SkrbiÅ”, 2008, p. 114; Soon, 1988, p. 1), which used streaming to provide a curriculum that would respond to students of varied abilities and backgrounds so as to reduce āeducational wastage, low literacy and non-attainment of effective bilingualismā (MOE, 1979a, pp. 3-1, 3-4). The solution was to stream students to suit slow, average, above average and outstanding learners based on their school performance and intelligence tests (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 104).
Inconsistent with meritocratic claims of āequal opportunitiesā (Wong, 2000, n.p.), streaming was introduced to redress the imbalance of enrolment in academic and technical streams and to ensure that the country possessed a sufficient pool of technically skilled local workers to serve the broader goals of economic development and sustainable growth (Goh & Gopinathan, 2008, p. 27; Lee et al., 2008, pp. 3ā5; Rahim, 1998, p. 124). This gap was initially emphasised in a ministerial report in 1968 and radical changes were introduced in the field of technical education from 1969 to prepare the young to take up new economic activities that were being generated by an expanding manufacturing sector in the 1970s (Lee et al., 2008, p. 3). In conjunction with the Goh report, in 1979, the Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB) Act came into existence to meet the growing need for technical and skilled manpower. Through this, education becomes the social engineering process for national productivity within the context of educational meritocracy to meet industrial demands. Herein lies the contradiction between the discourses of meritocracy and streaming, and the efforts of the state to manage one in conjunction with the other. Established through the amalgamation of the Industrial Training Board (ITB) and Adult Education Board (AEB), the VITBās primary purpose was to provide an alternative for adults who did not continue their education up to the GCE āOā3 or āAā4 level (Ng, 2008c, p. 54). A review in the late 1980s led to the establishment of the Institute of Technical Education (ITE) to provide post-secondary training (Gopinathan, 1999, p. 298). As Lee Yock Suan, former Minister for Education, argued in June 1994:
Singapore will be poorer if everyone aspires to and gets only academic qualifications but nobody knows how to fix a TV set, a machine tool or a process plant. We need a world-class workforce with a wide variety of knowledge of skills to achieve a world-class standard of living.
(Quoted in Goh & Gopinathan, 2008, p. 27)
Streaming then becomes an instrument for determining oneās precise place in a school hierarchy, ostensibly in return for greater economic successes (Barr & SkrbiÅ”, 2008, p. 181). As Rahim (1998, p. 124) points out: streaming facilitates the āchannelling of students from the various educational streams eventually into the varying levels of the occupational hierarchyā. As such, in defending the cause for streaming as being in everyoneās best interests, the media published statements by a succession of Ministers for Education who cited strong outcomes by international standards even for āweakerā students and low levels of attrition up to post-secondary education (Ng, 2008a, n.p.; Shanmugaratnam, 2004, n.p.). However, the official justification for streaming in the state media continues to be grounded in customising pupilsā education according to their abilities (Shanmugaratnam, 2004, n.p.). In justifying pro-national and economic interests, the concept and practice of meritocracy is then unstable. The twin principles of meritocracy as equal opportunity and the pursuit of economic interest are potentially contradictory. At one level streaming is justified in terms of economic development. At another level it is justified in terms of equality of opportunity depending on abilities, which are conceived of as inherent, and not socially or culturally shaped. The central research inquiry revolves around the understanding of how meritocracy is negotiated amidst economic imperatives.
Parallel media and official discourse on the 1979 MOE report
Education policies are justified through both education policies and the media. Specifically, justifications for streaming in reducing educational wastage, catering to different abilities of students, and minimising failures and damage to self-esteem are three key elements of the 1979 MOE report that have been extended to and expressed in media discourse. In particular, how failures are constructed is discursively aligned with, and mirrors, the 1979 report. Given that official justifications in the media are drawn from the policy, this extension establishes the importance of examining how policy discourse legitimises streaming. Within a state-controlled media system, the media in Singapore can be taken to āreproduceā the state discourse, as the role of the press is to support rather than to challenge government policies (Holaday & Kuo, 1993 as cited in Hao, 1996, p. 112).
In reviewing the primary school streaming system, Members of Parliament called on then Education Minister Teo Chee Hean to rethink some of the policies. His response to their concerns was published in the Straits Times, in an article titled, āEducation System Caters to All Abilitiesā on 22 May 2002. Meritocracy and appropriate opportunities for all codifies the defence for streaming by Rear-Admiral Teo, who places the institutional practice at the centre of educational reform by arguing that catering to the ability of the child is imperative (Teo, 2002a, n.p.) He argues that a standard, albeit relatively āmore-demandingā, curriculum could potentially cause students who consistently fail to suffer from low self-esteem. Going by the philosophy that children learn differently, he maintains that streaming is āthe correct approachā, as it helps each child to meet his or her potential through customised programmes made to ensure their academic success and consequently, a high possibility of employment (Teo, 2002a, n.p., italics added).
In a subsequent article āMeeting Different Needsā published on 26 November 2002 in the Straits Times, Teo continues his defence of a more diversified education system, explaining the changes recommended by the review committee on upper secondary and junior college education. Teoās defence highlights two guiding principles: āmeritocracyā and āthe need for students who have benefited from the best the system had to offer to recognise their obligation to the countryā (Teo, 2002b, n.p.). These two key forms of rhetoric within the official discourse are used to bolt together conflicting and contrasting motivations and interests. This rhetoric had a self-contradictory proposition: while meritocracy dictates equality of access for everyone, it does in fact recognise that a particular section of the student population receives privileged access to specialised programmes (Teo, 2002b, n.p). This official prescription that subscribes to curriculum customisation is in fundamental conflict with the meritocratic dictum which purports āequal opportunitiesā. The rhetoric of meritocracy has a strong flavour of favouritism that privileges the stance of inegalitarianism.5
It could hence be argued that meritocracy, as that which constitutes āequal opportunitiesā does not entail equal outcomes. As Mr Heng Sweet Keat, then Minister for Education, points out, schools in Singapore are not meant to achieve āidentical outcomesā (Heng, 2014, n.p). In addition, he emphasises in an earlier speech:
We cannot guarantee equality of outcome, but we seek to provide equal opportunity for every student. We thus:
- Ensure that no child is deprived of educational opportunities because of their financial situation;
- Leverage on our school system to provide more support for families from poorer backgrounds;
- Invest in pre-school education targeted at children from families with poorer backgrounds; and
- Invest in levelling-up programs in primary schools that attempt to level up academically weaker students in both English and Mathematics, so as to improve their foundations for future learning.
(Heng, 2012, n.p.)
This claim seems to suggest that the aim of the education policies is not to elide the production of unequal outcomes, but rather, to rationalise them. Drawing on Lee Yock Suanās (quoted in Goh & Gopinathan, 2008, ...