China’s Global Reach

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Volume II

Suisheng Zhao

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780367460983
• eBook ISBN: 9781000064261
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Commercial Policy
• Index: Business

China's Global Reach looks at China's emergence on the globe as a hegemonic power in the recent years.

Moving beyond Volume I, this new volume empirically examines the most recent development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the two most important initiatives launched by President Xi Jinping as China tries to emerge as a global power. The first part of the book presents an overview of geo-strategic development of the two initiatives. The second part examines domestic political dynamics, particularly Xinjiang as the core of BRI, in these two initiatives. The third part investigates the responses from the major foreign partners involved in the two initiatives, with a focus on the responses from India, African and Middle East countries.

The chapters in this book were originally published in various issues of the Journal of Contemporary China.

China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done

Suisheng Zhao

ABSTRACT

This article examines the design, objectives, and implementation of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) six years after its inception. It argues that although the BRI as a top-level design on which President Xi has staked his personal legacy is to serve China’s ambitious geostrategic and geo-economic interests, many developing countries have welcomed the BRI because of their desperate need in infrastructure construction. But the BRI’s popularity has exceeded the substance as China has yet to bridge many fault lines on the ground.

Arguably the largest and most ambitious project to enhance global connectivity, the BRI has been heavily controversial since its inception. On the one side, idealists present the BRI as a bold and visionary win-win cooperation between China and its partners. Establishing China as an engine of global development and providing China great access to natural resources and markets for sustained economic growth, the BRI is designed to win diplomatic allies and produce great prosperity across the developing world.¹ As one survey of six yearsprogress of the BRI projects argued, ‘the BRI has become the world most welcomed international public goods and international cooperation initiative.’² Shrugging at the BRI, the US is making a grave mistake because, creating transport infrastructure across the world, China ‘has revived the global dream of Abraham Lincoln’s allies when they planned and constructed the American transcontinental railway.’³

1 Wang Yiwei, ‘China’s one belt, one road initiative: a grand vision or a play for power’, Global Asia 12(2), (2017), pp. 56–59; Wang Wen, ‘Belt and Road Initiative: Creating a Smoother Path’, China Daily, May 21, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201805/21/WS5b02689da3103f6866ee9a4a.html; Tian Wenlin, ‘The belt and road initiative: a chinese concept for global development’, Contemporary International Relations 27(4), (2017), pp. 1–20; Wang Xiaolong, ‘The belt and road initiative: a new chapter for fruitful and Win-Win cooperation’, Foreign Affairs Journal 130, (2018), pp. 7–16; Weifeng Zhou and Mario Esteban, ‘Beyond balancing: China’s approach towards the belt and road initiative’, Journal of Contemporary China 27(112), (2018), pp. 487–501.

2 徐刚 (Xu Gang)，司文 (Si Wen)，陈璐 (Chen Lu)，”一带一路海外项目建设回顾与展望, [the retrospect and outlooks of the BRI overseas project construction], 国际研究参考 [International Studies References]，no. 5, 2019, p.27.

3 Parag Khanna, ‘Washington Is Dismissing China’s Belt and Road’, Washington Post, April 30, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/30/washington-is-dismissing-chinas-belt-and-road-thats-a-huge-strategic-mistake-226759; Matthew Ehret-Kump, ‘The American Spirit behind China’s New Silk Road’, Los Angles Review of Books, February 28, 2019, accessed June 22, 2019, https://chinachannel.org/2019/02/28/railway-links/.

In contrast, the realists describe the BRI as a power grab by Beijing for global hegemony, fueled by its vast wealth that draws developing nations into Beijing’s grip.⁴ According to one observer, ‘Instead of gunboat diplomacy and coercive military power, the PRC intends to use BRI to access new markets, get a hold on to critical infrastructure assets, and influence regional countries’ strategic decisions.’⁵ Another observer warns that due to the long-term effects of the BRI, the RMB would replace the dollar, customers would use Alipay instead of VISA, authoritarian rule would be consolidated, families would watch Chinese TV programs and read the news provided by Xinhua, students, professionals, and political elites would be educated and trained in Chinese universities, internet censorship technology and applications from China’s great firewall would cover the region and filter public cyberspace, the spread of universal rights would yield to development rights, and Western influence, especially that of the United States, would be relegated to the margins.⁶

4 William A. Callahan, ‘China’s belt and road initiative and the new Eurasian order’, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Policy Brief 22, (2016), accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07951?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; Christopher K. Johnson, ‘President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative: A Practical Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Road Map for China’s Global Resurgence’, US-China Business Council, March 2016, accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/President; Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative.pdf; Ely Ratner, ‘Geostrategic and Military Drivers and Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative’, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 25, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_USCCTestimonyCORRECTED.pdf.

5 Nadège Rolland, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on: ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later’, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 25, 2018, accessed June 22, 2019, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=837.

6 Roy D. Kamphausen, ‘Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy amid China’s Belt and Road’, National Bureau of Asian Research, November 15, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=820.

Related to the realist view is the pessimist position that characterizes BRI as ‘One Belt and One Trap,’ a ‘bridge to nowhere,’ and ‘a grandiose and abstract wish list.’⁷ Such an ambitious, expensive, and risky initiative is doomed to collapse and ultimately exhaust China. The BRI is China’s way ‘to overplay its hand, encouraged by its sudden wealth.’⁸ The massive and costly projects of BRI could create ‘the risk of strategic overdraft’ (战略透支).⁹

7 Harry G. Broadman, ‘Will China’s “One Belt, One Road” Become a “Bridge to Nowhere”?’, Forbes, January 6, 2016, accessed June 22, 2019, http://onforb.es/1PL9o3J; Guy de Jonquiere, ‘Beijing’s Belt and Road summit invites caution in the West’, Nikkei Asian Review, April 27, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Guy-de-Jonquieres/Beijing-s-Belt-and-Road-summit-invites-caution-in-the-West; ‘The Challenges Facing China’s Belt And Road Initiative’, DIIS Policy Brief, February 2016, accessed June 22, 2019, http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/409521/PB_Belt_and_Road_WEB.pdf.

8 Philip Bowring, ‘China’s Silk Road Illusions’, New York Books, October 25, 2017, accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/10/25/chinas-silk-road-illusions/.

9 Shi Yinhong, ‘Amid Western uncertainties, China mustn’t spread too thin’, Global Times, October 26, 2016, accessed June 22, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1013884.shtml.

Advocates of the three views tend to present what they want to see. Examining BRI’s design, objectives, and implementation six years after its inception, this article argues that, focusing rightfully on infrastructure construction, BRI has provided opportunities not only for China but also for its partners to reach their respective goals. However, Beijing has yet to develop practical programs based on scrupulous economic planning and formidable diplomatic actions to realize these ambitious goals. While BRI has become an organizing concept of Chinese diplomacy, it faces challenges to be commercially sustainable, balance China’s interests with the interests of partners, and create shared values. Without overcoming colossal economic obstacles, navigating fragile political barriers, and placating apprehension surrounding its ambitions, BRI could become a huge white elephant, leaving an enormous amount of wasted resources strewn along its path.

A Top-Level Design

President Xi announced the Silk Road Economic Belt to connect China with Eurasia continent in his September 2013 visit to Kazakhstan and announced the Maritime Silk Road linking China with Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe the next month in his visit to Indonesia. Known later as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing extended it to the Arctic in January 2018, forming a Polar Silk Road. With Xinjiang as the core area of the Belt and Fujian as the core of the Road, BRI is to cover two-thirds of the world’s population by building six economic corridors: the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

The Third Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Congress in November 2013 endorsed BRI as a component of China’s long-term economic reform strategy. The Central Economic Work Confer...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• PART I The BRI/AIIB and China’s Global Reach
• PART II The BRI/AIIB and China’s Domestic Politics
• PART III International Responses to the BRI/AIIB
• Index