Perspectives on the American Way of War

The U.S. Experience in Irregular Conflict

Thomas A. Marks, Kirklin J. Bateman, Thomas A. Marks, Kirklin J. Bateman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781032087795
• eBook ISBN: 9781000713046
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Perspectives on the American Way of War examines salient cases of American experience in irregular warfare, focusing upon the post-World War II era.

This book asks why recent misfires have emerged in irregular warfare from an institutional, professional, and academic context which regularly produces evidence that there is in fact no lack of understanding of both irregular challenges and correct responses. Expert contributors explore the reasoning behind the inability to achieve victory, however defined, and argue that what security professionals have failed to fully recognize, even today, is that what is at issue is not warfare suffused with politics but rather the very opposite, politics suffused with warfare.

Perspectives on the American Way of War will be of great interest to scholars of war and conflict studies, strategic and military studies, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and terrorism and counterterrorism. The book was originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.

1
The Mexican War

Frontier expansion and selective incursion

Craig A. Deare

ABSTRACT

Mexico’s defeat in the war that (in the U.S.) takes the country’s name resulted as much from the strategic context created by unrealized nation-building that followed independence as it did from American tactical supremacy. Three centuries of Spanish empire did not translate into national military excellence due to the decades of revolutionary upheaval that followed the sudden decapitation occasioned by Napoleon’s ouster of the monarchy in Madrid. That the occupation which followed major combat provided salutary lessons learned in dealing with guerrillas rather than a Vietnam-like litany of quagmire eventuated from the conscious designs of military leadership steeped in the same Napoleonic dynamic that had produced our opponent. The United States wisely chose to leave issues of state-building and governance to the Mexicans themselves, while annexing the sparsely populated northern remnant of Spanish empire.

The case of the still-expanding United States of America in mid-nineteenth century and its conflict with Mexico represents a compelling story of the ends justifying the means. At this juncture at the outset of the twenty-first century, there is precious little thought given – in the U.S. at any rate – regarding how acquiring vast swaths of territory ostensibly owned and/or controlled by external powers actually came about, particularly where armed conflict is involved. The interaction between British, French, and Spanish concerns in the late 1700s/early 1800s in what are now the 48 contiguous states of the union was a continuation of their colonial designs over yet unconsolidated terrain. Although this article focuses on how the U.S. pursued its perceived national interest in both geostrategic as well as blunt military terms, some space must be dedicated at the outset to setting the larger stage.

Setting the stage

The broader strategic context of the early nineteenth century and the evolving experiment of American governance was a dynamic environment. France, Britain, and Spain (among other European powers) competed for control over much of the New World. Indeed, success in the American Revolution against King George was part of that great game as France bet on the colonialists to advance her interests more than out of any solidarity with the American upstarts. Spain’s three century run at empire, beginning with the Habsburgs in the early 1500s, and continuing with the Bourbons from 1700 on, began to crumble in the early 1800s. Prior to the Spanish crown’s expansion into Central and South America, Hernan Cortés – following his victory over Cuauhtémoc and the Aztecs – began to consolidate and expand the Spanish empire in the space that now embodies significant parts of North and Central America. These new domains were known as New Spain. Spanish territorial control in North America at the turn of the nineteenth century thus included much of Florida, the Gulf Coast, and the expanse of land west of the Mississippi basin.

Spain’s territorial losses in what we now recognize as the continental U.S. over the course of several years resulted from both geopolitical struggles on the European mainland and internal, ongoing tensions throughout the Spanish empire in the Americas. The French Revolution of 1789 had little immediate impact, but Napoleon’s aggression against the Spanish monarchy in the 1809–1810 timeframe, coupled with independence movements in Mexico and beyond, combined to spell the beginning of the end of Spain’s control in the Americas. When King Carlos IV and King Ferdinand abdicated to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808, Napoleon gave the crown of Spain to his brother Joseph. Across the Atlantic in New Spain, Viceroy José de Iturrigaray formed a provisional government, but it was simply a matter of time before Spain would lose control completely. The internal power struggles in Mexico were too advanced to contain. This independence movement is a story unto itself, but suffice to say that Mexico was embarking on a transition to self-government that was quite unlike that of its northern neighbor. From 1810 to 1821, a series of internecine power struggles ensued, and eventually on 27 September 1821, General Agustín Cosme Damián de Iturbide, supported by the Army of the Three Guarantees, marched into Mexico City, and the independent Empire of Mexico was born.

It shared the continent, in particular, with the young representative democracy that was the United States. The fledgling constitutional republic in the 1840s was a fascinating place, an evolving socio-political and economic experiment. Of particular moment, the relationship between the commanders-in-chief and the senior ranking general officers was quite unlike what today passes as effective civil-military relationships. Individual personalities played an even stronger role in the policymaking process than they do today, especially since the nation and its institutions had only 60 years of development. Washington, Jefferson, and Adams in the beginning, and then Jackson in his own way, had a profound influence in how the armed forces of the nation would develop.

Of concern to us here, in the 1840s, a situation obtained where the Democratic Party and the Whig Party were vying for political control. In this antebellum period, the concept and, perhaps even more importantly, the manner of the growth of the national experiment remained a matter of contention. Among myriad other issues, the question of westward expansion was on the ballot, so to speak, and the Democrat and Whig camps offered different propositions. James K. Polk, an exemplary acolyte in the Andrew Jackson expansionist camp, emerged as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in 1844. No novice to the political scene, after several years in the Tennessee legislature, Polk had spent 14 years as a member of Congress, culminating as the Speaker of the House from 1835 to 1839. After a stint as the governor of Tennessee, he emerged as the consensus candidate for president on the ninth ballot, when no agreement could be reached among the early favorites. He was elected the eleventh president in 1845, simultaneously becoming the eleventh Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

Polk was elected in a setting where the Democratic Party was clamoring for westward expansion, specifically the ‘recuperation of Oregon’ and the ‘re-annexation of Texas.’ This is not the place for a full treatment of the history of the Republic of Texas, but the matter sparked a coming together of expanding U.S. territorial ambitions under the emerging doctrine of Manifest Destiny with continuing political instability and weakness in the newly independent Mexico.¹ The result was 15 years that saw the ‘transfer’ of more than half of Mexico’s territory to the United States. It is worth entertaining the question of whether the land of Tejas y Coahuila (as Texas was referred to in Mexico) was actually Mexico’s territory or only territory claimed but not effectively controlled by Mexico. Or even more pointedly, perhaps the territory in question was best characterized as land previously claimed by Spain – again, the majority of the land was not effectively occupied and controlled by Spaniards – and then became territory without a true legal owner after the collapse of the Spanish government to Napoleon, an argument that it was never really Mexican territory to begin with.

In any event, back in the States, we encounter the reality of the evolving civil-military dynamic of the post-War of 1812. Only months after the British burning of the White House, General Andrew Jackson defended New Orleans against a larger, veteran force. Jackson’s fame and representation was such that his subsequent presidential election was a mere formality. His populist personal style and political orientation resulted in the strengthening of the Democratic Party but also produced a strong opposition to those tactics, the evolving Whig party. Jackson’s legacy would endure, however, as one of the lieutenants in his army was James K. Polk. He defeated Martin Van Buren from the Whig party in part on the strength of his support for western expansion.

President Polk’s achievements as president are actually rather impressive. As historian Richard Bruce Winders argues:

President James K. Polk was one of the most successful commanders-in-chief of the United States has ever produced. He led the nation in its first major war where the opponents were not Europeans or Native Americans. He formulated the strategy that sent five armies onto foreign soil. He oversaw the greatest military expansion that Americans of his day ever witnessed. His troops won victory after victory, occupying large sections of the enemy’s territory…It is odd that, with all these accomplishments, Polk remains unknown to most Americans.²

The U.S. Army of 1845 was still in a process of becoming a stable institution. The enduring legacy of an all-powerful executive hung over the political psyche, and the notion of a standing army was anathema to the country’s leaders and citizens. It does not surprise, therefore, that only a few years after Jackson’s success in New Orleans, the Army was in lamentable shape. The U.S. Congress had authorized a strength of 8,615 officers and soldiers, though the true number was significantly less due to sickness and desertions, leaving the actual numbers closer to 5,000. Congressional guidance had established a force of 14 regiments and 10 staff departments, but the force was at less than 60 percent strength.

Beyond those stark realities, in the years prior to the War between the U.S. and Mexico, another complicating factor was the nature of civil-military relations. The armed forces of today’s environment attempt to be as apolitical as possible; the model senior general and flag officers are not associated with any political party or explicit ideological bent. Their task is to translate strategic policy objectives into effectively organized, trained, and equipped operational combat units and supporting infrastructure. In 1845, the senior general officers of the day – major generals in that period – represented opportunities for the commander-in-chief to appoint, and for the Senate to confirm, important politico-military actors. Given the relatively reduced size of the force and number of commissioned officers, there were known personalities with political tendencies; choosing the men to lead this force represented an intensely personal decision for the country’s leaders.

At this point in time, the two key protagonists were Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, both senior general officers and profoundly different – in terms of personality, professional background, operational approach, and political orientation. In that each of these two key actors has books written about them, only a very superficial treatment will fit in these spaces.³ The larger point to keep in mind is that President Polk’s larger geostrategic objectives were shaped, in significant part, by the individual backgrounds of two of the senior Army officers of the day.

The senior officer, by date of rank, was Major General Scott, ‘Old Fuss and Feathers’ – earlier known as ‘Young Fuss and Feathers,’ nicknames that stemmed from his recognized penchant for the finer things in life, ranging from food to manners of dress, pomp and circumstance, and the like. Appointed general-in-chief of the Army in 1841, his meteoric rise was an affront to the more traditionally grown general officers. There were numerous open rifts between Scott and his contemporaries. Volunteering in the Army in 1808, shortly thereafter accepting a commission as a captain of light artillery he was a lieutenant colonel a brief four years later, at the age of 26, primarily due to intellect and hard work. Congress appointed him brigadier general on 9 March 1814, at the age of 29. A serious scholar of European doctrine and tactics, Scott earned a reputation as one of the most effective trainers and leaders in the Army. His brigade fought the British successfully at battles in New York during the War of 1812, and he was seriously wounded at Niagara. As a 30 year old brevet major general, he was number four in terms of seniority behind General Andrew Jackson and two others. From 1817 and over the course of the next 30 years, Scott’s military writings – influenced greatly by French and other European conventional tactics of the day – would have an important influence on the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine. As noted by Russell Weigley, ‘In strategy he was at his best in a war of limited objectives which could be pursued by maneuver and occupation of territory rather than by ruthless destruction.’⁴

Following an entirely different career path was Zachary Taylor, referred to by his devoted troops as ‘Old Rough and Ready.’ Taylor entered the Army in 1808, commissioned as a lieutenant of infantry. Quite distinct from Scott’s accelerated pace to general officer, Taylor rose gradually through the ranks, establishing himself an effective Indian fighter with a solid combat record, punctuated by an important victory on Christmas Day 1837 during the Seminole War. For that achievement, he was thereafter known as the Hero of Okeechobee. The commander of the U.S. 6th Infantry, he received a brevet promotion to brigadier general for his distinguished performance at Lake Okeechobee.

As President Polk envisioned his range of options against Mexico to achieve his strategic objectives, he initially placed Taylor in charge of the Army of Occupation. Polk distrusted Scott, a Whig whose undisguised presidential ambitions made him a serious threat to the Democratic Party. For this reason, the president removed him from any operational role in the impending war. Though also a Whig, Taylor was with solid justification viewed as a soldier’s soldier, eschewing the trappings of senior officers and preferring a more Spartan setting, and thus as a more appealing alternative for Polk’s purposes.

On the diplomatic front, Polk sent an envoy, John Slidell, to Mexico to negotiate a settlement on U.S. claims regarding Texas, as well to purc...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction – Perspectives on the American way of war: the U.S. experience in irregular conflict
• 1 The Mexican War: frontier expansion and selective incursion
• 2 Birth of the Cold War: irregular warfare first blood in Greece
• 3 Organizing for the ‘gray zone’ fight: early Cold War realities and the CIA’s Directorate of Operations
• 4 Counterinsurgency in Vietnam – schizophrenia until too late
• 5 Turning gangsters into allies: the American way of war in Northern Afghanistan
• 6 Iraq, 2003–2011: succeeding to fail
• 7 The American way of war in Africa: the case of Niger
• 8 Too little, too late: protecting American soft networks in COIN/CT
• 9 Systems failure: the US way of irregular warfare
• Index