Military Agility

Ensuring Rapid and Effective Transition from Peace to War

Meir Finkel, Moshe Tlamim

• Publisher: The University Press of Kentucky
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780813179971
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The need to quickly enter into conflict and succeed in the initial engagements is an enduring demand on militaries around the world. Given today's dynamic geopolitical environment, the concept of successful, rapid transition or organizational and mental readiness is more relevant than ever.

Using the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study, Meir Finkel explores four important but generally neglected challenges of a swift transition from peace to wartime operations. He investigates the challenging mental transition from peace or routine security employment to a higher-intensity mode of action in combat. Then, Finkel explains that militaries must be capable of rapidly resolving debated prewar concepts and doctrine even as war breaks out. He also discusses how to integrate and employ new weapons systems delivered at the last minute or during a conflict. Lastly, he delves into methods for managing the tension between the need to win every tactical engagement in low-intensity conflict and the preparation of forces for a high-intensity conflict.

With clear applications for the IDF and US armed services, Finkel's study offers specific examples of hard-to-accomplish rapid transitions as well as broad suggestions for how to improve readiness. Military Agility will appeal to military personnel and leadership, strategists, historians with an interest in comparative analysis, and policymakers.

1

Hastening Force Buildup before and during War

Military force design—which includes the elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities—entails many levels of risk management. This chapter focuses on two major risks: miscalculating the outbreak date of the next war, and planning for a particular scenario when a different scenario might occur (based on a mistaken assumption).

Throughout Israel’s history, the likelihood of the eruption of a full-scale confrontation has arisen every few years, causing the Israel Defense Forces to hasten preparations for war; these preparations are termed “force buildup.” This chapter examines three events—the Sinai War, the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War—where the decision to augment the army’s readiness (professional competency, basic organizational suitability, weapons upgrade, and improved stockpile levels) was put to the test, followed by a discussion of what can and cannot be done when war appears on the horizon.

These three events were chosen because they can be analyzed within the limits of declassified information. They illustrate a range of time factors and types of action taken—for instance, the time interval between a decision to prepare for war (based on the perception that a fundamental change has occurred and war is imminent) and the actual outbreak of hostilities. Preparation for the Sinai War lasted a whole year—from the public announcement of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal in late September 1955 to the outbreak of war on October 29, 1956. Preparation time for the Six-Day War was shorter—roughly three weeks—from the alert on May 15, 1967, to the outbreak of war on June 5. Preparations for the Yom Kippur War continued for half a year—from the announcement of the “Blue-White” alert on April 16, 1973, to the Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6.¹ In addition, the chapter discusses the airlift that took place in the midst of the Yom Kippur War and the effort to assimilate new weapons in the course of fighting.

A determination that war is likely to erupt within a few months or a year enhances tensions in certain areas. (Note that this chapter deals with wartime scenarios, when the main force has to be deployed at the onset of hostilities, and not in a limited or pinpoint operation, where such tensions may be more circumscribed.) The main tension is between the heightened readiness for the approaching clash and the future relevancy of the weapons procured (as well as supplies and structural organization) if war does not occur at the expected time. Given that the army receives funding to improve its readiness in the face of impending war and that cutbacks routinely occur after hostilities abate, investment in the immediate time frame—that is, to procure weapons and supplies and undertake relevant training exercises for the expected confrontation—comes at the cost of developing military capabilities for a more distant clash whose nature cannot be known in advance.

In the case of weapons, the dilemma is whether to increase stocks of existing weapons or wait for newer and better ones to become available. For example, should an army upgrade its tank cannons and procure ammunition to improve its immediate military capability or take a risk and wait to acquire more advanced weapons that are better suited to oppose the new tanks the enemy will presumably receive after the war has ended. It should be remembered that every new weapons system requires a learning period. An additional element in risk management is the balance between the quantity of primary weapons (tanks and planes, for example) and the amount of ammunition and spare parts purchased for training and operational use.

Another tension is the reliance on a foreign source for weapons, ammunition, and replacement parts versus reliance on domestic production. The dilemma revolves around the relatively high costs of developing, maintaining, and expanding independent production versus reliance on a foreign state in an emergency, with the inherent risks of embargo, delayed delivery, partial or gross incompatibility with the army’s needs, and so forth. This is one of the most complex tensions, and it involves an assessment of the political situation and long-term economic considerations. Although this aspect is irrelevant to the United States, it is a major consideration for America’s smaller allies, and US decision makers must understand this.

Training and exercises for assimilating new weapons are necessary steps whether those weapons are acquired from foreign sources or domestically. The dilemma is whether to gain proficiency in the use of a current weapon or wait for a more advanced weapon to become available, at the price of less time for assimilation and training. It must be remembered that the transition from a known weapons system that the forces are skilled in operating to a new weapons system often entails not only learning new procedures but also unlearning or overriding old habits.² Another issue is the diversity and scope of the retraining required. For example, training pilots to fly new aircraft demands many flight hours. In addition, ground-crew technicians need time to learn how to identify and fix problems in the new aircraft. There are other tensions related to the supply of ammunition and weapon operability (due to the numerous replacement parts and the time needed to repair breakdowns that occurred in the training period) and between the desire to train as much as possible and the need to maintain a sufficient degree of readiness in case of sudden war. Another source of tension is the ability to modify trainers (instruction teams), training areas, and training aids.

In the area of force organization, the dilemma is whether to restructure the forces based on the specific needs of the coming conflict (even though this lengthens the time needed to assimilate changes and bring them to fruition on the battlefield) or to act within known frameworks that may be less suited to the specific threat. (This refers to the establishment of new units, headquarters, and so forth—not to manning the combat forces.)

A final risk involves a low level of compatibility between the force elements: weapons replenishment (which includes several factors, such as the number and quality of weapons, the amount of ammunition, and the availability of replacement parts), the level of proficiency in their use (training and exercises), and the level of maintenance. When compatibility is low, the weak link in the chain dictates a unit’s operability. For example, there is no sense in maintaining a highly trained division equipped with the latest weapons if ammunition is in short supply.

I claim that once a decision has been made, readiness can be significantly improved within a matter of months. The main improvement results from the force’s increased competency and not from the assimilation of new weapons. This chapter analyzes the IDF’s accelerated force buildup after the decision had been made to prepare for war. Strong points and shortcomings are identified, and rules are presented for future scenarios. Although the focus is on the IDF’s experience, other events in other armies could have been used, for example, the Red Army’s preparation for war after the German invasion of Poland and France, the preparation of American armed forces for war between September 1939 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, or the Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942.

The Sinai War

The year before the Sinai War (which started in October 1956) was a special period for the IDF in terms of force design and buildup. Armor’s operational order of battle increased more than twofold, and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was in the midst of converting from piston-engine (propeller-driven) aircraft to jet planes. The accelerated force buildup taking place under the constant threat of war involved numerous risks and therefore serves as a model, allowing us to analyze risk management and learn the necessary lessons. All the while, the fledgling state of Israel was struggling to absorb massive waves of immigrants and recuperate economically from the lengthy War of Independence. Economic measures at the time included gasoline and food rationing.

During most of the first half of the 1950s, the IDF operated based on the assumption that war was unlikely in the near future (within two or three years); therefore, the 1953 three-year plan was built on this premise.³ A dramatic change in the regional balance of power occurred in September 1955 when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced a huge arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Prior to that deal, Egypt enhanced its armored force by acquiring British Centurions and upgraded cannons for its Sherman tanks. Israel estimated that Egyptian armor would increase from 130 tanks in late 1955 to between 310 and 430 tanks with the addition of Russian T-34s and Stalins to the British Centurions and French AMX-13s.⁴ Furthermore, the Egyptians were scheduled to receive a large number of modern Mig-15s and Mig-17s.⁵ The Syrian army, too, would be replenished with tanks and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). On October 18,

1955, Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett announced that “something has happened in the Middle East that portends the bleak prospect of our strongest enemy state gaining a decisive military advantage that will confront us with dangers unlike any we have known since the War of Independence.”⁶ At a government meeting in December 1955, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (who had returned to office after Sharett’s resignation) stated that the Egyptians would be ready for war in a few months and would attack Israel in the spring or summer of 1956. While Israel studied the possibility of an Israeli-initiated war before Egypt could assimilate its new weapons, it attempted to purchase offensive arms to counterbalance the Egyptian acquisition.

Armor Buildup

In September 1955 the IDF had 86 operational tanks (76 Shermans with M-3 cannons and 10 AMX-13 reconnaissance tanks); in addition, there were 131 nonfunctioning tanks without armament. The IDF planned to organize the Shermans in four tank battalions and to attach three of the battalions to armored brigades (the 7th, 27th, and 37th), with the fourth as a general support to the infantry units.⁷

In May 1955 the French government expressed a willingness to sell a large number of aircraft, tanks, and antitank missiles to Israel. The deal was stymied, however, due to opposition from the French Foreign Office and gaps in Israeli financing. In early November these obstacles were overcome (the reasons for the removal of French opposition have been studied in detail elsewhere) because of the shock of the Egyptian acquisition. The director of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, went on a procurement mission to Europe and succeeded in signing sales agreements for French Ouragan and Mystère aircraft, 60 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Super-Shermans, 175 75mm M-50 cannons for mounting on the Shermans, SS-10 missiles, and 500 73mm bazooka rockets.⁸ “Some of the items, such as the Super-Shermans and bazookas would be taken out of French army stores and units and quickly supplied, while the rest, the planes, light tanks and missiles, were still in production which meant that their delivery would take a few months.”⁹ The French put a freeze on the deal after signing it, but in April, after learning that Egypt was aiding the rebels in Algeria and determining that strengthening Israel would be in France’s interest, French and Israeli negotiators agreed on the sale of 72 Mystère-4s, 120 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Super-Shermans (with 76.2mm cannons), and 18 selfpropelled cannons. Delivery was scheduled for late July to late September 1956.

Within a year, the IDF’s number of operational tanks had more than doubled, from 86 in 1955 to approximately 181 tanks that took part in the Sinai War (120 Shermans of various models and 61 AMX-13s). The IDF’s total tank force rose that year to nearly 450, more than twice the number in September 1955. Between late July and the opening of hostilities in late October 1956, 233 tanks arrived: 120 AMX-13s, 40 Super-Shermans, 25 Sherman M-50s, and 48 Sherman M-1s.¹⁰ Israel’s beefed-up strength made a major impact on the order of battle (the establishment and dismantlement of units), crew training, and unit exercises with the new weapons. All this was carried out mainly between July and October while assimilating the weapons.

Tank Procurement and Upgrade

The case of the AMX-13 illustrates the problems inherent in the rapid procurement of an existing weapon with limited capabilities, when taking into account the enemy’s threat and serious technical serviceability weaknesses. Israel complied with French demands to purchase 180 light tanks, a larger number than its operational needs called for (112, according to the original plan) at a very high price (nearly $150,000 per tank), compared with a smaller number of Shermans at $25,000 per tank.¹¹ The relatively new AMX-13 tank (production began in France in 1951) had a three-man crew, weighed fourteen tons, offered a high speed and high muzzle velocity, and had the only shell that could penetrate the Egyptians’ Centurion armor. Nevertheless, the tanks’ protective armor was very thin (a 0.5-inch machine gun bullet could penetrate it), and it was unsuited for Israel’s combat conditions of heat and dust. Because of these limitations, the AMX-13 was originally defined as an antitank (or tank destroyer) weapon and not as a battle tank.¹² After testing and trials, the ordnance branch concluded that basic changes were needed to improve the tank’s durability in Israel’s soil and climate conditions: modifying the cooling system, switching the air filter...